Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 57,019-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
SETH T. STRICKLAND Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2334035
Honorable Amy Burford McCartney, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS Counsel for Appellant AND WRIT SERVICE
By: Douglas Daniel Brown
CHARLES BLAYLOCK ADAMS Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
EDWIN L. BLEWER, III
ETHAN ARBUCKLE
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.
HUNTER, J.
The defendant, Seth T. Strickland, was charged with the seconddegree murder, La. R.S. 14:30.1, of his mother, Joyce Strickland. After a
hearing before a sanity commission, the defendant was found incompetent
and committed to Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System (“ELMHS”)
until he was deemed competent to stand trial. During trial, the defendant
entered a dual plea of “Not Guilty and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,”
was convicted, and sentenced to life without the benefit of probation, parole,
or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, alleging errors patent
on the face of the record. For the following reasons, we affirm
the defendant’s conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand the case for the
trial court to rule on the pending post-trial motions and comply with the
required sentencing delay before imposing the mandatory life sentence under
La. R.S. 14:30.1.
FACTS
On August 28, 2023, the defendant shot his mother inside their family
residence in DeSoto Parish. He then called 911 on himself, was found
outside the residence carrying a Bible begging God for mercy, and was
arrested without resistance. In the days following his arrest, the defendant
made statements to family members that the State put before the jury at trial.
He spoke of “stuff” he wished he had not “got into,” referred to “other
realities” and “powers or otherly world beings” with whom he
communicated. He further told family members that if he had not opened
those doors, “I would have had a normal life.” Additionally, the defendant
described his attorney as a “snake” and recounted dreams in which police
officers turned into snakes.
The defendant was arraigned on October 5, 2023, and entered a plea
of “NOT GUILTY,” while no plea of “not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity” was entered. On October 16, 2024, the district court signed an
order directing doctors to examine the defendant’s mental condition at the
time of the offense. On January 13, 2025, the court found the defendant
incapable of proceeding and committed him to the ELMHS where he spent
56 days under restoration treatment. On April 10, 2025, after a contradictory
hearing, the court adjudicated him competent.
The trial was set for October 27, 2025. In chambers, with all the
parties present, the court took up an unfiled motion to amend the plea that
prior defense counsel had drafted but never filed; counsel for both sides
indicated their belief that the dual pleas were already entered. With the
State’s express no-objection and at the joint request of the defense, the court
accepted the change, and the defendant entered a “Dual Plea of Not Guilty
and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity.” Three experts who examined the
defendant each opined that he was sane at the time of the offense. The
defense rested without calling a witness; and on October 29, 2025, the jury
unanimously found him guilty as charged.
On December 5, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for post-verdict
judgment of acquittal, pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, and a motion for
new trial, pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 851. At sentencing on December 11,
2025, defense counsel neither requested a hearing on those motions nor
objected to proceeding. The court reviewed the presentence investigation,
addressed the La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 factors, and imposed the only sentence
the law allows for second degree murder – life at hard labor without the
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of a sentence.
2
DISCUSSION
In the first assignment of error, the defendant alleges the trial court
erred in failing to relitigate his competency, which constitutes a due process
right violation under Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L.
Ed. 2d 822 (1966) and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L.
Ed. 2d 103 (1975) and cannot be waived by counsel’s failure to object. The
defendant further contends the procedural defects in the plea entry are
visible from the face of the record and reviewable under La. C. Cr. P. art.
920(2). Lastly, the defendant further claims the in-chambers transcript is
devoid of any colloquy by the defendant or good cause showing by the trial
court.1
Competency
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right not to be tried while
legally incompetent. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449, 112 S. Ct.
2579, 120 L.Ed.2d 353, 365–66 (1992), Drope v. Missouri, supra. A state
must observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be
tried while incompetent, and its failure to do so deprives the defendant of his
due process right to a fair trial. Id., (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 172, 95 S.
Ct. at 904, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 113); Pate v. Robinson, supra. The defendant’s
mental capacity to proceed may be raised at any time by the defense, the
district attorney, or the court. La. C. Cr. P art. 642; State v. Pugh, 02-171
(La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/02), 831 So. 2d 349; State v. Willie, 17-252 (La. App.
5 Cir. 12/20/17), 235 So. 3d 1345.
1
Notably, defense counsel filed his brief late, thereby waiving his right to argue, and appeared at oral argument only to casually acknowledge the waiver, demonstrating a complete disregard for the client’s rights and the Court’s time.
3
In Louisiana, a defendant is presumed sane and the state is not
required to prove sanity. La. R.S. 15:432; State v. Claibon, 395 So. 2d 772
(La. 1981); State v. Silman, 95-0154 (La. 11/27/95), 663 So. 2d 32. Mental
incapacity to proceed exists when, as a result of mental disease or defect, a
defendant presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against
him or to assist in his defense. La. C. Cr. P. art. 641; State v. Taylor, 49,467
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/15), 161 So. 3d 969. The defendant’s mental
incapacity to proceed may be raised at any time by the defense, the district
attorney, or the court. When the question of the defendant’s mental
incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall be no further steps in the criminal
prosecution, except the institution of prosecution, until the defendant is
found to have the mental capacity to proceed. La. C. Cr. P. art. 642.
Louisiana’s statutory scheme for determining whether a defendant is
mentally competent to stand trial jealously guards the defendant’s right to a
fair trial. State v. Nomey, 613 So. 2d 161 (La. 1993).
Where a bona fide question is raised regarding a defendant’s capacity,
the failure to observe procedures to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried
or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process
right to a fair trial. State ex rel. Seals v. State, 00-2738 (La. 10/25/02), 831
So. 2d 833; State v. Jones, 19-0440 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/5/20), 305 So. 3d
925, writ denied, 20-01045 (La. 11/24/20), 305 So. 3d 100. Accordingly, the
defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his
incapacity to stand trial. State v. Anderson, 06-2987 (La. 9/9/08), 996 So. 2d
992, citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 134 L. Ed.
2d 498 (1996). The determination of sanity is a factual matter reserved to the
jury or other fact finder. State v. Claibon, supra at 772.
4
La. C. Cr. P. art. 653 states: “Upon the trial of the defense of insanity
at the time of the offense, the members of the sanity commission may be
called as witnesses by the court, the defense, or the district attorney.” A
reviewing court owes the trial court’s determinations as to the defendant’s
competency great weight, and the trial court’s ruling thereon will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Bridgewater,
00-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So. 2d 888; State v. Martin, 00-0489 (La.
9/22/00), 769 So. 2d 1169.
Upon review, we find that the trial court adequately protected the
defendant’s constitutional right to a competency determination. At the
defense’s request, the court considered the defendant’s sanity at the time of
the offense and his present capacity to proceed. The court appointed a sanity
commission, including Dr. Jennifer Russell and Dr. Marc Colon, which
found the defendant incompetent after examination. The defendant was then
committed for eight weeks of restoration treatment. During this period, Dr.
Russell reported the defendant could “discuss his legal situation as well as
his relationship with counsel and available evidence, without evidence of
mental disease or defect.” In contrast, Dr. Colon observed the defendant was
unable to “maintain a consistent defense,” and “cannot listen to testimony of
witnesses and inform his lawyer of any distortions or misstatements made by
the witnesses.” Additionally, Dr. John Roberts, consulting psychiatrist, and
Dr. Shannon Sanders, evaluating psychologist at ELMHS, noted: “the
defendant has no memory defects or mental illness that would preclude him
from being able to help his attorney” and “the defendant can testify
relevantly and be cross-examined if it is necessary in his own defense.”
5
The record establishes that the defendant was deemed competent on
April 10, 2025, and understood the charges against him. Notably, six months
elapsed before trial; neither party challenged the defendant’s competency,
the defendant offered no evidence to renew the issue, and the record
reflected no communication problems with counsel.
Dual Plea & Good Cause
When a defendant is tried on a plea of “not guilty,” evidence of
insanity or mental defect at the time of the offense shall not be
admissible. La. C. Cr. P. art. 651. However, the defendant has the burden of
establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a
preponderance of the evidence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 652. Evidence pertaining to
the defense of insanity at the time of the offense may be introduced at the
trial by both the defense and by the district attorney. La. C. Cr. P. art. 653.
The defendant in a felony case shall plead in person. The plea shall be made
in open court and shall be immediately entered in the minutes of the court. A
failure to enter a plea in the minutes shall not affect the validity of any
proceeding in the case. La. C. Cr. P. art. 553.
A defendant may withdraw a plea of “not guilty” and enter a plea of
“not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,” within ten days after
arraignment. La. C. Cr. P. art. 561. When the change of plea is sought after
the ten-day period, the defendant must show that good cause exists to justify
the change in plea and that the motion is not a dilatory tactic to achieve a
strategic advantage. State v. Mercer, 564 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990);
State v. Mickelson, 50,940 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/16), 210 So. 3d 898, writ
denied, 17-0538 (La. 12/5/17), 231 So. 3d 626. In summary, “good cause” of
Article 561 is shown when the defendant produces an indicium of insanity
6
and shows the plea is not changed as a dilatory tactic to achieve a strategic
advantage. State v. Miller, 05-1826 (La. 6/29/07), 964 So. 2d 911.
Upon the trial of the defense of insanity at the time of the offense, the
members of the sanity commission may be called as witnesses by the court,
the defense, or the district attorney. Regardless of who calls them witnesses,
the members of the commission are subject to cross-examination by the
defense, by the district attorney, and by the court. La. C. Cr. P. art. 653. A
judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any
error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights
of the accused. La. C. Cr. P. art. 921.
While the dual plea was entered after the commencement of trial, both
the transcript and the minute entry show that the defendant was present with
counsel and that the plea was discussed in his presence. The text of La. C.
Cr. P. art. 561 leaves the “good cause shown” finding to the trial court;
although the trial court did not use “good cause” on the record, we find the
showing was established by the fact that all counsel had assumed the dual
plea was in place. Had the trial court refused to treat the jointly requested
plea as effective, the defendant would have been tried upon the plea of “not
guilty” alone, barring any insanity defense.
The defendant further cites State v. Lecompte, 371 So. 2d 239 (La.
1978), alleging the testimony of the three sanity commission experts violated
La. C. Cr. P. arts. 650, 651, and 653. However, the defense moved for the
commission to request examinations of the experts to determine the
defendant’s competency and sanity. The State had the right to call any
experts of the sanity commission to testify, and its failure to call Dr. Colon
does not render inadmissible the testimony of the other three experts who
7
were qualified without any objection by the defense and were crossexamined. The defense could have called Dr. Colon to testify; however, it
inexplicably failed to do so.
Lastly, the trial court observed the defendant throughout the
proceedings and noted no signs of incompetency. We find there was no
violation of Pate, Drope, or Articles 553, 561, 650, 651, and 653. Therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant competent
and allowing the defense to enter a dual plea of “not guilty and not guilty by
reason of insanity.”
Sentencing Delays
In the second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial
court committed procedural errors under La. C. Cr. P. arts. 821, 853, 873,
and 874. We note the defendant has raised this issue as an assignment of
error, reviewable under La. C. Cr. P. art. 920(2). Specifically, the defendant
alleges the trial court erred by sentencing him without first ruling on his
pending post-trial motions. The defendant further contends the sentence
must be vacated and the case remanded because the trial court failed to rule
on the motions and did not observe or obtain an express waiver of the
required 24-hour sentencing delay under Article 873.
A post-verdict judgment of acquittal shall be granted only if the court
finds that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, does
not reasonably permit a finding of guilty. La. C. Cr. P. art. 821. A motion for
new trial raises, among other things, the claim that the court ruling on an
objection showed prejudicial error, or that the ends of justice would be
served by granting a new trial. La. C. Cr. P. art. 851. The trial court is
required to rule on a defendant’s motion for new trial prior to sentencing.
8
La. C. Cr. P. art. 853. Both La. C. Cr. P. arts. 821 and 853 require the
trial court to rule on motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of
acquittal prior to imposing a sentence. State v. McKnight, 56,309 (La. App. 2
Cir. 7/16/25), 416 So. 3d 899, writ denied, 25-01042 (La. 2/10/26), 425 So.
3d 1205. Failure to do so requires the sentence to be vacated and the matter
remanded for further proceedings. State v. Randolph, 409 So. 2d 554 (La.
1981); El-Mumit v. Twenty-First Judicial District Court, 500 So. 2d 414
(La. 1987); State v. Thomas, 50,085 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/1/15), 166 So. 3d
379.
In State v. Jackson, 614 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1993), the
defendant was convicted under La. R.S. 40:967 and sentenced to 15 years of
hard labor. The defendant appealed, alleging numerous assignments of error,
specifically, the lower court’s failure to rule on motions for a new trial and
post-verdict judgment of acquittal in advance of sentencing pursuant to La.
C.C. arts. 821 and 853. The defendant filed motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal on December 12, 1991, and was convicted on
April 13, 1992. This record established neither the minutes nor transcripts of
the proceedings; the trial judge ruled on the motions.
If a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days shall elapse
between conviction and sentence. If a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of
judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least 24 hours after
the motion is overruled. If the defendant expressly waives a delay provided
for in this article or pleads guilty, sentence may be imposed immediately.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 873. Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable
delay. If a defendant claims that the sentence has been unreasonably
9
delayed, he may invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the appellate court.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 874.
In this case, the defendant filed motions for a post-verdict judgment of
acquittal and for a new trial on December 5, 2025, six days before
sentencing. However, a review of the record shows no ruling on the motions
appears before, during, or after sentencing, and neither the sentencing
transcript nor the minute entry reflects that the trial judge addressed any of
the motions. Accordingly, the requirements of La. C. Cr. P. arts. 821 and
853 were not met as the trial court did not dispose of the pending motions
before sentencing the defendant. We must vacate the defendant’s sentence
and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to rule on the
motions and resentence the defendant
Moreover, the court found no reason to revisit the defendant’s
competency on the December 11, 2025, sentencing hearing because no bona
fide doubt existed as to sanity. After the defendant was found competent on
April 10, 2025, the defense raised no further competency concerns, and the
record provided no reasonable basis to question the defendant’s mental
capacity to proceed. Thus, we find the defendant’s argument regarding the
trial court’s failure to reassess his competency prior to sentencing lacks
merit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the defendant’s
conviction is AFFIRMED, and this sentence is hereby VACATED.
10
We further remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings
to rule on the motions and observe the required delay before resentencing
the defendant to the mandatory life sentence pursuant to La. R.S. 14.30.1.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED;
REMANDED.
11