FILED
Aug 26 2026, 10:00 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Andrew Rashawn Crossley,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
August 26, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-644
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court
The Honorable Christopher C. Fronk, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D01-2508-F3-28
Opinion by Judge Weissmann
Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 1 of 13
Weissmann, Judge.
[1] A jury found Andrew Crossley guilty of two counts of rape and one count of
child exploitation after he sexually assaulted and photographed a 16-year-old
girl in a dressing room at a South Bend community center. The trial court
entered judgment on one rape count and the child exploitation count and
sentenced Crossley to maximum, consecutive sentences totaling 22 years
imprisonment.
[2] Crossley contends the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offenses and his character due to his mental illness, traumatic childhood,
homelessness, and history of employment. But Crossley’s offenses were serious
and had a particularly devastating impact on the child victim. His character,
marked by prior sexual offenses, also reflects poorly on him. As his claim of an
inappropriate sentence is unpersuasive, we affirm.
Facts
[3] In February 2025, 16-year-old G.M. and her friend went to the Kroc Center in
South Bend to swim. Crossley, then 29, was not a member there nor did he
have a pass to enter. He gained entry by telling the Kroc Center front desk he
needed to use a restroom. He then lingered inside the center for the next two
hours. Eventually, Crossley approached G.M. and her friend, gave them a false
name, and offered them $1,000 and a Mercedes to go to the mall and engage in
sexual acts. The girls declined, after which G.M. headed to a dressing room to
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 2 of 13
change into her swimsuit. Crossley followed and repeatedly knocked on the
dressing room door, but G.M. ignored him.
[4] When the girls headed to the pool, Crossley followed and offered them
thousands of dollars from his bank account if they accompanied him to the
mall. G.M.’s friend called her mother for permission to go to the mall. The
friend’s mother said no.
[5] G.M. eventually reentered the dressing room to change out of her swimsuit.
Crossley then knocked on the door until G.M. opened it, telling her that he
wanted to discuss the trip to the mall. When she opened the door, Crossley
forced his way into the dressing room and pushed her against the wall. He
kissed and touched G.M. despite her objection. G.M. believed Crossley had a
gun because he repeatedly moved his hand in and out of his pocket. She also
feared what he would do if she refused him.
[6] Crossley exposed himself, masturbated, pulled down G.M.’s swimsuit top, and
photographed her exposed breasts. He also offered her “ice,” which police
identified as a slang term for methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. I, p. 55. Crossley then
turned G.M. toward the wall, covered her mouth, and penetrated her either
vaginally or anally as she told him to stop. G.M. testified that she had not had
intercourse before and described experiencing “the worst pain imaginable.” Id.
at 58.
[7] Crossley stopped the assault only after G.M.’s friend knocked on the door. He
hid in the shower and told G.M. to be quiet, claiming that her friend already
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 3 of 13
knew what he had done. Too embarrassed to immediately report the sexual
attack, G.M. accompanied her friend back to the pool but eventually pulled her
aside in a private bathroom and revealed part of what happened. G.M. also
gave a partial report of Crossley’s actions to a Kroc Center employee. Crossley
was escorted out of the building by a staff member, to whom he provided a false
name.
[8] The mother of G.M.’s friend picked the girls up early because she was
concerned about the mall offer. G.M. told her friend’s mother that Crossley
kissed her, photographed her “private parts,” and “touched her private parts.”
Id. at 84. The friend’s mother relayed this information to the Kroc Center and
to G.M.’s mother.
[9] Five days later, G.M. revealed to her mother that she had been raped but that
she had concealed that information out of fear of getting in trouble. G.M.’s
mother immediately took G.M. to the hospital. Due to the lapse of time since
the attack, the hospital’s examination of G.M. yielded no identifiable male
DNA.
[10] A forensic examination of Crossley’s phone revealed about 2,400 pornographic
files, including a photograph of a naked G.M. that investigators found in the
trash folder. The State charged Crossley with two counts of Level 3 felony rape
and one count of Level 5 felony child exploitation. At his jury trial, the
prosecutor observed Crossley laughing and making faces as G.M. testified.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 4 of 13 [11] G.M.’s mother testified that her daughter’s schoolwork and demeanor declined
sharply after the offense. G.M. attempted suicide at least three times, requiring
hospitalization each time. She had no history of suicidal ideation before the
assault. The jury found Crossley guilty as charged, but due to double jeopardy
concerns, the trial court only entered judgment of conviction on the child
exploitation count and one of the two rape counts.
[12] At Crossley’s sentencing, the evidence showed he had a prior felony conviction
for both sexual battery and sexual misconduct with a minor in 2020. He also
had been convicted twice in 2025 for failing to register as a sex or violent
offender. His Static-99R score placed him in the “Well Above Average Risk”
category for committing another sexual offense, and the Indiana Risk
Assessment System rated his overall risk to reoffend as “HIGH.” App. Vol. II,
pp. 59-60.
[13] The court imposed the maximum sentences for rape and child exploitation and
then ordered the two sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in an
aggregate sentence of 22 years imprisonment. Crossley appeals, claiming his
sentence is inappropriate.
Discussion and Decision
[14] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits this Court to revise a sentence authorized
by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,” we find it
“inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 5 of 13
offender.” The nature of the offense and the character of the offender are
“separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence
is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor
v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Because Rule 7(B) review
requires a holistic approach, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates
against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify
relief.” Id. at 127.
[15] When conducting sentencing review, we do not substitute our judgment for the
trial court’s; the role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers,” not to
achieve a perceived correct result. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.
2008). We focus on the aggregate sentence in light of the defendant’s
culpability, the severity of the offense, and the harm caused. Id. Crossley bears
the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate.1 Wright v. State,
108 N.E.3d 307, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
I. Nature of the Offenses
[16] In assessing the appropriateness of a sentence in light of the nature of the
offense, we first look to the statutory sentencing range established for that class
1
Crossley’s brief often veers into discussion of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. That is a claim of
sentencing error reviewed for abuse of discretion, and it is separate from the appropriateness question before
us. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. A trial court’s
stated reasons for a sentence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion; the “relative weight or value assignable
to” those reasons “is not subject to review for abuse”; and the merits of the sentence are reviewed only under
Rule 7(B). Id. Crossley develops no independent argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
identifying reasons for his 22-year sentence, so we need not address that issue. Id. at 491.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 6 of 13
of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g,
875 N.E.2d 218. The legislature set the penalty for rape as a Level 3 felony,
punishable by a term of 3 to 16 years imprisonment, with an advisory sentence
of 9 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). Child exploitation is a Level 5 felony
punishable by a term of 1 to 6 years, with an advisory sentence of 3 years. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Crossley received the maximum on each count.
[17] Crossley concedes that his crimes were “grave.” Appellant’s Br., p. 9. He argues
that his mental illness left him “impulsive and abnormal.” Id. at 12. But the
record shows that Crossley’s offenses were not impulsive and were consistent
with the poor character he had previously revealed.
[18] Crossley talked his way into the community center under false pretenses, waited
two hours before singling out two teenaged girls, and offered them money and a
car in an attempt to draw them aside. When both girls refused the proposition,
he did not relent. He waited until the girls separated to make his move. He
followed G.M. to a locked dressing room and gained entry by persistently
knocking and lying about his motivation for entering. He also engaged in
repetitive actions that left her reasonably believing he was armed. The tactics
used in these offenses were similar to those used in his previous sex crimes,
which involved a 15-year-old girl.
[19] Crossley committed two separate acts against G.M.: photographing the child’s
exposed body and then raping her while covering her mouth to silence her.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 7 of 13
When it was over, and G.M. had partially reported Crossley to community
center staff, Crossley gave the employee a false name and deleted the
photograph from his phone. Planning, tactical choice of a vulnerable victim,
persistence in the face of refusal, isolation of the victim, and concealment are
the marks of calculated conduct, not the spontaneous loss of control that
Crossley suggests.
[20] Moreover, the offenses caused profound and lasting harm. As a result of the
assault, G.M. was hospitalized for suicidal ideation and attempted to take her
own life at least three times. Because the evidence of the nature of the offenses
weighs against relief, his showing on the character prong must be
correspondingly stronger. Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127.
II. Character of the Offender
[21] Crossley argues that mental illness, a traumatic childhood, homelessness, and a
history of employment establish a character that does not warrant the
maximum sentence. First, we note that the only evidence of Crossley’s mental
illness and traumatic childhood is his own account to the probation officer
preparing the presentence investigation report. That statement conflicted with
Crossley’s statements in an earlier presentence investigation report in which he
revealed good mental health and denied childhood mistreatment or abuse. The
trial court considered all the proffered mitigating circumstances but did not
explicitly find Crossley’s alleged mental illness, employment, or homelessness
to be mitigating. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 69-71; App. Vol. II, p. 73. As to Crossley’s
suggestion of a troubled childhood, the court gave it little weight as a mitigator.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 8 of 13 [22] The court found Crossley’s character to be that of a “predator” based on the
underlying facts in this prosecution which closely resembled those in his prior
sex crimes. Tr. Vol. II, p. 70. A defendant’s criminal history is a central
measure of character, and its significance turns on “‘the gravity, nature, and
number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.’” Boling v. State, 982
N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d
867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on
a defendant’s character. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[23] Crossley’s criminal history is neither minor nor unrelated. He was convicted in
2020 of sexual battery and sexual misconduct with a 15-year-old girl, and in
2025 he was twice convicted of failing to register as a sex or violent
offender. The record’s risk assessments confirm the concern that he will
reoffend, placing him in the “Well Above Average Risk” category to commit
another sexual offense and rating his overall risk to reoffend as “HIGH.” App.
Vol. II, pp. 59-60. This is the character of an offender for whom a maximum
sentence is not inappropriate.
III. Maximum Sentences
[24] Finally, Crossley contends that maximum sentences are reserved for the “worst
of the worst,” and that a single mitigating circumstance is enough to spare him
one. Appellant’s Br., p. 11 (“[E]ven very bad crimes and criminals are not the
worst of the worst if some mitigating factors can be found.”). In coming to this
conclusion, he relies on a string of old Indiana cases from the 1990s and early
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 9 of 13
2000s that applied sentencing law that no longer exists. Buchanan v. State, 767
N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002); Bacher v. State, 686 N.E.2d 791, 802 (Ind. 1997);
Spears v. State, 811 N.E.2d 485, 491-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Brown v. State, 760
N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
[25] These cases were decided under a regime long since dismantled. At the time
they were handed down, Indiana used a presumptive-sentencing scheme. A trial
court could deviate from the fixed presumptive term only by identifying the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and articulating its evaluation and
balancing of them. See, e.g., Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 636 (Ind. 2005).
Appellate courts reviewed the result for whether the sentence was “manifestly
unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender” under former Indiana Appellate Rule 17(B). See, e.g., Bacher, 686
N.E.2d at 801. The conclusion that a maximum sentence must rest on a proper
balancing of aggravators against mitigators is a product of that old framework.
[26] Effective January 1, 2003, Appellate Rule 7(B) replaced the “manifestly
unreasonable” analysis with the present “inappropriate” standard. Neale, 826
N.E.2d at 636. Then in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-05 (2004), the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences based on
facts other than those decided by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
[27] Soon thereafter, in Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ind. 2005), our
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Indiana’s fixed term sentencing
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 10 of 13
framework because it was the functional equivalent of the sentencing scheme
set aside in Blakely. As the Smylie Court explained:
Both [schemes] establish[ed] a mandatory starting point for
sentencing criminals based on the elements of proof necessary to
prove a particular offense and the sentencing class into which the
offense falls. The trial court judge then [had to] engage in judicial
fact-finding during sentencing if a sentence greater than the
presumptive fixed term [was] to be imposed. It is this type of
judicial fact-finding that concerned the Court in Blakely.
Id. Ultimately, the Smylie Court concluded that the sentencing scheme thenapplicable in Indiana violated the Sixth Amendment because it “mandate[d]
both a fixed term and permit[ted] judicial discretion in finding aggravating or
mitigating circumstances to deviate from the fixed term.” Id. at 685 (emphasis
in original).
[28] Within weeks of Smylie, the Indiana General Assembly replaced the
presumptive scheme with the current advisory system. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at
487-88. It did so by amending Indiana’s sentencing statutes to eliminate fixed
presumptive terms in favor of “advisory sentences” that are between the
minimum and maximum terms left intact by the legislature. Id.; see Ind. Code §§
35-50-2-3 to -7 (2005). “In addition, the Legislature eliminated the requirement
that trial courts must consider certain mandatory circumstances when
determining the exact sentence to be imposed.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 488.
“Rather, the amended statute now includes a non-exhaustive list of aggravating
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 11 of 13
and mitigating circumstances trial courts ‘may consider.’” Id. (quoting Ind.
Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)-(b) (2005)). This sentencing scheme remains in similar
form today.
[29] Under our present system, a trial court may impose any sentence within the
statutory range, and “[t]he relative weight or value assignable to” the reasons
for a sentence “is not subject to review for abuse.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at
491. Crossley is inviting us to return to the old sentencing scheme by asking us
to weigh the mitigating circumstances and lower his sentence because he is not
the worst offender and his crimes are not the worst offenses. We reject that
invitation.
Conclusion
[30] Crossley has not demonstrated that his maximum 22-year sentence for rape and
child exploitation is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses or his
character. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 12 of 13 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
A. Robert Masters
St. Joseph County Deputy Public Defender
Nemeth, Feeney, Masters & Campiti, P.C.
South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Caroline G. Templeton
Assistant Section Chief
Alfredo Navarro
Certified Legal Intern
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-644 August 26, 2026 Page 13 of 13