Jessika Aarius Terrell v. State of Indiana

2026-08-26

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in considering evidence of the defendant's post-sentencing misconduct when resentencing her following a direct-appeal reversal. The judgment is affirmed.

Jessika Aarius Terrell was convicted of kidnapping and interference with custody. On her first appeal, the court reversed the interference-with-custody convictions due to double jeopardy concerns and remanded for resentencing on the kidnapping counts alone. At the resentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence and cited Terrell's institutional misconduct since her initial sentencing—specifically, ten disciplinary write-ups received in 2025—as an aggravating factor.

On her second appeal, Terrell argued that a trial court conducting resentencing after a direct-appeal reversal must be limited to facts existing at the time of the original sentencing and cannot consider post-sentencing behavior. The court rejected this argument, holding that judges resentencing defendants following a successful direct appeal or post-conviction challenge may properly consider evidence of the defendant's conduct occurring after the original sentencing. Terrell also contended that the write-ups alone did not prove actual misconduct because their adjudication status and procedural history were unclear. The court found this argument waived because Terrell's counsel acknowledged at the resentencing hearing that her institutional performance had not been perfect, without disputing the factual basis of the violations.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a trial court resentencing after direct-appeal reversal may consider post-sentencing behavior
Whether DOC disciplinary write-ups constitute sufficient evidence of misconduct for sentencing purposes
Whether a defendant waives challenges to factual basis of misconduct by failing to dispute at resentencing hearing

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed the trial court's resentencing decision following reversal and remand by the same court on direct appeal for double jeopardy violations.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

FILED

Jessika Aarius Terrell, Aug 26 2026, 10:22 am

Appellant-Defendant CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 26, 2026

Court of Appeals Case No.

26A-CR-861

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Marchal, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D31-2407-F6-19232

Opinion by Judge Vaidik

Judges Altice and Foley concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-861 August 26, 2026 Page 1 of 4

Vaidik, Judge.

[1] Jessika Aarius Terrell was convicted of three counts of Level 5 felony

kidnapping and three counts of Level 6 felony interference with custody. The

trial court imposed a ten-year sentence, with four years to be served in the

Department of Correction (DOC) and six years suspended to probation. Terrell

appealed, and we held that the convictions for both kidnapping and interference

with custody constituted double jeopardy. Therefore, we reversed the

interference-with-custody convictions and remanded for resentencing on the

kidnapping convictions. Terrell v. State, No. 24A-CR-3137, 2025 WL 3281215

(Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2025) (mem.).

[2] On remand, the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence, with four years to be

served in the DOC and five years suspended to probation. In doing so, the court

found as an aggravating factor Terrell’s “poor institutional conduct since being

committed to the Department of Correction.” Tr. p. 8. The court relied on a

DOC progress report indicating that Terrell “had ten different write ups” in

2025. Id.

[3] Terrell appeals again, arguing that a trial court resentencing a defendant after a

reversal on direct appeal is limited to the record as it existed at the time of the

original sentencing and cannot consider any misconduct occurring after that

time. She is incorrect. We have held that a trial court “revising a sentence

following a successful direct appeal or post-conviction challenge” may consider

evidence of a defendant’s post-sentencing behavior, good or bad. Ousley v. State,

Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-861 August 26, 2026 Page 2 of 4

807 N.E.2d 758, 760-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see also Porter v. State, No. 25ACR-1708, 2026 WL 820651, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2026) (mem.). The

resentencing in Ousley followed a post-conviction-relief proceeding, not a direct

appeal as in this case, but the opinion treats such proceedings the same. 1

[4] Terrell also argues that the fact she had “write ups” in the DOC isn’t conclusive

proof that she actually engaged in any misconduct. She asserts:

The court does not know if the DOC conduct violations listed in

the report have been adjudicated, whether they are on appeal,

whether Terrell was already sanctioned, whether they come with

any penalty at all, whether Terrell was afforded her rights during

the disciplinary process, or what the specifics of the conduct

were. Based on the bare allegations in Terrell’s DOC report, the

trial court had no way of knowing what the procedural posture of

those allegations was.

Appellant’s Br. p. 16. But when the DOC report was discussed at the

resentencing hearing, Terrell didn’t deny engaging in misconduct or claim that

she was challenging the allegations. Tr. pp. 6-8. To the contrary, her attorney

acknowledged that her “performance has not been perfect at the Department of

Correction.” Id. at 6.

As Terrell notes, a panel of this Court held in Ingle v. State that a trial court conducting resentencing after a

reversal on direct appeal could not consider evidence of the defendant’s good behavior after the original

sentencing. 766 N.E.2d 392, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. But the panel relied on Edwards v. State,

which involved a resentencing after a successful motion to correct erroneous sentence under Indiana Code

section 35-38-1-15. 518 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied. Such a proceeding is much

more limited than a resentencing after a successful direct appeal or PCR petition. See Ousley, 807 N.E.2d at

760-61. Therefore, we believe Ingle was wrongly decided.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-861 August 26, 2026 Page 3 of 4 [5] Terrell has not shown that the trial court erred or abused its discretion by

considering evidence of her conduct after the original sentencing.

[6] Affirmed.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy Morgan

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General

Brandyn L. Arnold

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-861 August 26, 2026 Page 4 of 4