UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARSEILLES JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24 - 1692 (SLS)
v.
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marseilles Jefferson was a lead cybersecurity systems administrator for the Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for roughly twenty months before his termination.
SAIC contracts with the United States Air Force (Air Force) to provide support and services at a
training and simulation center in Germany. In March 2022, Mr. Jefferson raised concerns that the
cybersecurity head at that training center was trying to circumvent certain cybersecurity
protections and best practices to the detriment of the federal government. Soon after, SAIC
stripped Mr. Jefferson of his telework privileges, imposed written reprimands, placed him on
leave, and ultimately terminated him. Mr. Jefferson brought this lawsuit to challenge these actions
under various statutes, including the False Claims Act and the Defense Contractor Whistleblower
Protection Act. SAIC now seeks summary judgment on both claims, and Mr. Jefferson seeks
summary judgment on certain portions of his claim under the Defense Contractor Whistleblower
Protection Act. For the reasons below, the Court grants SAIC’s motion for summary judgment on
the False Claims Act claim. But the Court denies summary judgment to both Parties on the Defense
Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act claim, which will proceed to trial.
BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
“Generally, federal whistleblower protection statutes aim to uncover serious fraud against
the government or critical health and safety violations by encouraging those with firsthand
knowledge to come forward.” Kappouta v. Valiant Integrated Servs., LLC, No. 20-cv-1501, 2021
WL 4806437, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021), aff’d, 60 F.4th 1213 (9th Cir. 2023). Indeed, the
term whistleblower “is derived from the act of an English bobby blowing his whistle upon
becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert other law enforcement officers and the
public within the zone of danger.” Winters v. Houston Chron. Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727
(Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J. concurring). Whistleblower protections have a long pedigree in American
law. The Second Continental Congress passed the first American whistleblower protection statute
in 1777 to protect revolutionary soldiers who reported their commanders “for treating[] prisoners
in the most inhumane and barbarous manner.” Elizabeth A. Williams, Note, Blowing the Whistle
While Gasping for Air, 18 Loy. Mar. L.J. 219, 222 (2019) (cleaned up). That Act provided “[t]hat
it is the duty of all persons in the service of the United States . . . to give the earliest information
to Congress or any other proper authority of any misconduct, frauds or misdemeanors committed
by any officers or persons in the service of these states[.]” Id. at 222–23 (cleaned up). This case
concerns two whistleblower protections statutes that carry forward this longstanding tradition: the
False Claims Act and the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act.
“The False Claims Act was adopted in 1863 and signed into law by President Abraham
Lincoln in order to combat rampant fraud in Civil War defense contracts.” Kellogg Brown & Root
Servs., Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Carter, 575 U.S. 650, 652–53 (2015) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99–345, at 8
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273). The Act was a response to a “series of
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sensational congressional investigations” into “large contractors during the Civil War” that
“painted a sordid picture of how the United States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless
goods, charged exorbitant prices for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the
necessities of war.” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 176, 181–82 (2016)
(cleaned up). “Since then, Congress has repeatedly amended the Act[.]” Id. at 182. It now serves
as “the government’s primary litigative tool for the recovery of losses sustained as the result of
fraud against the government.” Avco Corp. v. DOJ, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing
S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266). And the statute’s purpose
is to “incentivize whistleblowers to come forward when they become aware of fraud against the
government, and to protect them from retaliation when they do.” United States ex rel. Sheldon v.
Allergan Sales, LLC, 170 F.4th 227, 232 (4th Cir. 2026) (cleaned up).
Congress enacted the False Claims Act’s retaliation provision in 1986 “in response to
concern that employees who exposed false claims were being punished by their companies[.]”
United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, this provision “was
expanded to cover acts done by . . . contractors, agents, and associated others” as well. Cestra v.
Mylan, Inc., No. 14-cv-825, 2015 WL 2455420, at *10 n.5 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2015). The
retaliation provision broadly prohibits discharge, demotion, threat, harassment, or discrimination
“in the terms and conditions of employment” of such individuals for engaging in activity protected
by the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). The provision also seeks to “assure those who
may be considering exposing fraud that they are legally protected from retaliatory acts.” Yesudian,
153 F.3d at 736 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99–345, at 34 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5299).
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Meanwhile, the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act “expand[s]
whistleblower protection traditionally reserved for government employees to [Department of
Defense] and [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] contractor’s employees by
prohibiting retaliation against those who report certain types protected information.” Kappouta,
2021 WL 4806437, at *3. The Act was originally enacted in congressional defense appropriations
in 1986 and has been reauthorized in various forms in federal appropriations bills since then. See
Pub. L. No. 99–591, § 2409, 100 Stat. 3341–83, 3341–162 (Oct. 30, 1986); Alden v. AECOM Tech.
Corp., No. 18-cv-03258, 2021 WL 1405284, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2021) (explaining
development of statute over time). The current version of the statute was largely enacted in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 1863, 134 Stat.
4278 (Jan. 1, 2021) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 4701). The Act provides that employees of defense
contractors cannot be “discharged, demoted, or otherwise discriminated against as a reprisal for
disclosing . . . [g]ross mismanagement of a Department of Defense contract or grant, a gross waste
of Department funds, an abuse of authority relating to a Department contract or grant, or a violation
of law, rule, or regulation related to a Department contract (including the competition for or
negotiation of a contract) or grant.” 10 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(1)(A).
B. Factual Background
The Court draws the facts from the Statements of Material Facts submitted by the Parties
as well as the underlying materials referenced in those statements. See Joint Statement of Facts
(JSF), ECF No. 49;1 Joint Agreed Upon Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 50.
1
The Joint Statement of Facts contains two separately numbered lists of asserted undisputed facts from each Party. For clarity, this Memorandum Opinion will cite the Defendant’s facts as DJSF, and the Plaintiff’s as PJSF.
4
The “United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa Warfare Center” (War
Center), located in Kaiserslautern, Germany, “is a training and simulation center” used “to train
[Air Force] servicemembers and [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] partners . . . in air
operations” and “provide opportunities to practice skills outside of an actual combat or warfare
event.” DJSF ¶¶ 3–5. The War Center runs complicated virtual simulations where participants
select targets, weapons to attack those targets, and aircraft to carry the weapons, and determine
what support is needed. JSUF ¶ 6. “The exercises involve what is essentially a ‘video game’
environment through which personnel can practice skills and strategy in a virtual and simulated
environment on closed computer networks specifically owned by the United States Air Force,
involving various aircraft and air personnel.” DJSF ¶ 7.
The Defense Information Systems Agency is tasked with performing security vulnerability
scans for the Department of Defense (DoD) as a type of security control, and sets certain Security
Technical Implementation Guidelines that govern the scans. JSUF ¶¶ 15, 39. These guidelines are
“configurations for computers and servers, primarily orientated around what operating system they
are running.” Id. Assured Compliance Assessment Solution (ACAS) is a monitoring security
program used to scan DoD networks and connected IT systems that satisfies the Security Technical
Implementation Guidelines. Id. ACAS scans are uploaded into a system known as EMASS, which
is also used for accreditation. JSUF ¶ 43.
SAIC is an independent contractor that provides support and services for the Air Force’s
models and simulation program at the War Center. JSUF ¶ 3. On December 5, 2020, around the
time that SAIC won the Air Force contract, Mr. Jefferson began his employment with SAIC as a
Cybersecurity Systems Administrator at the War Center. JSUF ¶¶ 1–2. Mr. Jefferson teleworked
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to give him the flexibility to attend his wife’s medical appointments—as she had suffered a minor
stroke—and to care for his young child. JSUF ¶¶ 82, 84, 88.
In approximately November 2021, Mr. Jefferson sent multiple emails to SAIC
management detailing purported critical ACAS issues and vulnerabilities in the War Center’s IT
system. JSUF ¶ 48. In December 2021, Mr. Jefferson reported that he was implementing numerous
fixes “to combat purported vulnerability issues with ACAS.” JSUF ¶ 49. Shortly after, on February
4, 2022, SAIC gave Mr. Jefferson a lead supervisory role on the team and approved an increase in
compensation because of that role. JSUF ¶ 50. As part of his duties, Mr. Jefferson was to assess
vulnerabilities, run scans on War Center networks, and give recommendations. JSF ¶ 18.
In March 2022, Reuben Gjellstad, a civil Air Force employee, became the Information
System Security Manager (ISSM) leading cybersecurity at the War Center. JSUF ¶¶ 30–31, 53.
ISSM Gjellstad reported to Jonathan Powell, the Air Force Commander and Information Systems
Owner (ISO) at the War Center. JSUF ¶ 32. Commander Powell had the authority to waive certain
policies to complete the War Center’s mission. JSUF ¶ 18. Matthew Jamison was the Site
Lead/Project Manager who managed War Center operations on site. JSUF ¶ 24. Allen Johnson, an
IT Manager, was Mr. Jefferson’s immediate supervisor. JSUF ¶ 27.
On March 23, 2022, Mr. Jefferson provided Air Force and SAIC management with his
regular, weekly “Vulnerability Summary” of the War Center network. JSUF ¶ 55. ISSM Gjellstad
responded by requesting that Mr. Jefferson create an account for him on each of their ACAS
servers and set up a time to meet, noting that he wanted to determine “what we need[ed] to
internally track” under relevant Air Force guidelines. JSUF ¶ 56. Mr. Jefferson asked for more
specificity about the request. JSUF ¶ 57. ISSM Gjellstad responded that the Air Force
only requires the [Security Technical Implementation Guidelines] and ACAS scans
for persistently connected systems to be uploaded into eMASS. Systems that are
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temporary (e.g. exercise workstations, event-based M&S builds, etc) or are not
realistically/effectively scannable (e.g. VoIPs) should be excluded. Not sure if our
ACAS asset groups are already built this way, if not, we can discuss the best way
to get there.
Id. Mr. Jefferson replied that he could not find guidance in the Defense Information Systems
Agency’s Best Practices Guide “about not scanning temporary workstations.” JSUF ¶ 58. And
ISSM Gjellstad responded that there were different requirements “tailored specifically for unique
training enclaves like [the War Center],” and that he would prepare the relevant forms and trainings
for those requirements. JSUF ¶ 59. He requested that, in the meantime, Mr. Jefferson “create
ACAS accounts for him on multiple servers.” Id. Mr. Jefferson responded, copying
Commander Powell and his SAIC management, stating that he felt uncomfortable deviating from
the Defense Information Systems Agency’s policies and requesting written confirmation from
Commander Powell before moving forward with ISSM Gjellstad’s request. JSUF ¶ 60.
Commander Powell never responded to Mr. Jefferson. JSUF ¶ 61.
On March 28, 2022, ISSM Gjellstad met with Mr. Jefferson regarding their email
exchange. PJSF ¶ 29. In that meeting, ISSM Gjellstad and Mr. Jefferson aired disagreements, and
Mr. Jefferson suggested that ISSM Gjellstad had a conflict of interest because he had previously
worked for SAIC. PJSF ¶ 30. At the same meeting, ISSM Gjellstad informed Mr. Jefferson that he
intended to end telework at the War Center. PJSF ¶ 31.
On or around April 7, 2022, Mr. Jefferson participated in a meeting with
Commander Powell, Mr. Jamison, and SAIC management. PJSF ¶ 32. The Parties dispute what
was said at that meeting. Id. But the next day, Mr. Jefferson sent a follow-up email to
ISSM Gjellstad, Commander Powell, Mr. Jamison, and SAIC management raising concerns about
equipment and other issues, and making clear that it was his job to accurately report “fraud, waste,
and/or abuse.” PJSF ¶ 34; Pl. Ex. V, ECF No. 20. In response, ISSM Gjellstad told Mr. Jefferson
7
that many of the things that he said were not wrong, and that he had made notes of Mr. Jefferson’s
suggestions for improvement. PJSF ¶ 35.
Mr. Jamison forwarded the email to Bryan Newman, an Employee Relations Analyst at
SAIC, with the following note:
[R]egretfully I’m seeking your guidance regarding an employee’s action last week.
[Another employee] attended a meeting with the customer and Marselles Jefferson
regarding performance and tasking, that Marselles had objections with. . . . [A]t the
conclusion of the meeting their [sic] appeared to be a gentlemen’s agreement on a
path forward. However it appears that Marselles, was not satisfied of the outcome
of this meeting and decided to draft and send the below email thread, to his
government counterpart the Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM), and
the Director of the WPC.
I am seeking your assistance, to determine the appropriate disciplinary actions for
these actions. Please review the below threads and advise me of policy and or
procedures that may have been violated, as I intend to provide a written reprimand
for these actions.
Pl.’s Ex. V (emphasis added); see also JSUF ¶ 139. Mr. Newman responded:
It’s not unheard of for some employees to not be satisfied with something being
done and then going up to the CEO or EVP of HR to make their voice heard. It’s
not the right way to do it but we see it often. We haven’t disciplined those
employees but worked with the managers to address the issue with the employee
separately.
Pl.’s Ex. V. Mr. Newman suggested:
[I]t would be best to pull Marselles to the side, indicate that you received word that
he escalated the matter to the government, and that it was not necessary to do that
and that if he has any concerns, he needs to work with his management team and
not go through unauthorized channels. It can be treated as a verbal counseling.
Id. But Mr. Johnson replied by stressing that they were in the “middle” of negotiations for a new
contract with Commander Powell; that he thought a “gentlemen[’s] agreement” had been reached
in the meeting with Mr. Jefferson; and that it was Mr. Jefferson’s “lack of willingness to resolve
the matters that concerned him.” Id.
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On April 14, 2024, Mr. Johnson delivered a written warning letter to Mr. Jefferson citing
standards of conduct, workplace behavior, communication, and conflict resolution as areas of
improvement. PJSF ¶ 36. Around that time, Mr. Johnson also advised Mr. Jefferson that he needed
to provide additional doctors’ notes to verify that he was caring for a disabled spouse and small
child to justify his telework in light of Air Force policy. JSUF ¶ 85. Mr. Jefferson promptly
provided a previous doctor’s note and promised to provide an updated note after his wife’s next
doctor’s appointment. JSUF ¶ 86.
On April 27, 2022, Mr. Jamison and Mr. Johnson met with Mr. Jefferson and expressed
that the government was no longer confident in Mr. Jefferson’s work. Id. They pointed to his April
8, 2022, email as evidence that he had become disgruntled. Id. Mr. Johnson suggested paid leave
as an opportunity for Mr. Jefferson to get away from work and try to set a new course when he
returned. JSUF ¶ 87. Mr. Jamison and Mr. Johnson also told Mr. Jefferson that he could not
continue in his supervisory role and relieved him of his ACAS duties. PJSF ¶ 40.
On April 28, 2022, Mr. Jefferson began six weeks of Family Medical Leave. PJSF ¶ 41.
On May 17, 2022, Mr. Jefferson sent an email to Mr. Jamison and Mr. Johnson recapping their inperson April 27, 2022, meeting and stating an intention to start afresh on his return. PJSF ¶ 42;
JSUF ¶ 93. Mr. Jefferson returned from leave on June 13, 2022. JSUF ¶ 95.
On June 15, 2022, Mr. Jefferson sent an email to Mr. Johnson and SAIC management with
the subject line “Retaliation for Whistleblowing,” where Mr. Jefferson outlined alleged retaliatory
actions by ISSM Gjellstad and Commander Powell, including (1) informing SAIC that he could
not telework, (2) removing his ACAS access, (3) refusing to give written as opposed to verbal
confirmations to ensure accountability, (4) lying about his PTO requests, (5) lying about
deliverables, (6) requesting medical documentation only to deny telework, (7) telling his employer
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that they were not confident in his work after he complained about fraud, waste, and abuses, and
(8) requesting that he take a leave of absence. Pl. Ex. EE, ECF No. 27-24. Mr. Jefferson expressed
his view that they were attempting to setup a “structure” “so that they could get around DoD
policy.” Id. He further stated that there was a “conflict of interest.” Id. Mr. Jefferson noted that he
would seek advice and consider filing a complaint with the Office of the Inspector General. Id.
In response, SAIC drafted a series of reprimand letters for work performance that it
ultimately did not send to Mr. Jefferson. Instead, SAIC asked if he would be willing to transfer to
another facility. JSUF ¶¶ 100–08. Mr. Jefferson refused. Id. Mr. Jamison forwarded
Mr. Jefferson’s email to Employee Relations with the message below:
Mr. Marseilles Jefferson is making some serious allegations against both SAIC and
the government. We have given him a warning letter, compelled him to take time
off to “reset,” and offered to move him to a position which would allow telework.
. . . I believe we are now at an impasse with regard to whether Mr. Jefferson can
function on this program. I don’t believe additional written warnings will resolve
the situation.
Pl. Ex. EE.
Shortly after, Mr. Jamison responded to Mr. Jefferson’s June 15, 2022, email noting that
he had “outlined serious allegations” but stating:
Your position is a full time salaried position. Mr. Powell has mandated no telework.
I expect you to be at work even if you think it can be done from home. You recently
utilized family medical leave, are you pursuing additional reduced work programs
associated with this?
Pl. Ex. FF, ECF No. 29-10. Mr. Jefferson responded:
I’ll be here daily . . . except for when any medical need arises, PTO, etc. Since my
wife’s appointments have been disrupted, the schedule has changed. I’ll make up
the hours and take PTO as needed. Am I no longer allowed to make up hours either?
Like I told you before I left, I’m here to do my job (full-time) and to the best of my
ability without causing any problems.
Id.
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On June 21, 2022, a little over a week after Mr. Jefferson returned from six weeks of family
leave, Air Force officials requested a “Problem Notification Report” on whether Mr. Jefferson had
missed deliverables. JSUF ¶ 109. Mr. Jamison coordinated with SAIC management and
ISSM Gjellstad to prepare this report. JSUF ¶ 119. Mr. Jefferson complained to SAIC
management that the report was harassment in response to his allegation of retaliation, describing
the process as “bothering” him. JSUF ¶¶ 123, 125.
On July 5, 2022, Mr. Jefferson inquired with human resources about the process to file a
formal complaint with SAIC. JSUF ¶ 130. Less than a week later, on July 11, 2022, SAIC placed
Mr. Jefferson on leave-without-pay status for four weeks, claiming that it needed time to
investigate an ethical allegation by the Air Force about his timekeeping. JSUF ¶¶ 131, 134. But
Commander Powell only filed a formal ethics complaint about Mr. Jefferson’s timecard usage and
performance on July 14, 2022, days after SAIC placed him on leave without pay for alleged
timekeeping issues. JSUF ¶ 137. On July 19, 2022, Mr. Jefferson filed a retaliation complaint
against Mr. Jamison and Mr. Johnson. JSUF ¶ 138. And on August 5, 2022, Mr. Jefferson emailed
SAIC executives, human resources, and management, alleging that they were committing fraud
against and lying to the U.S. Government by making false claims, submitting improper security
controls, and providing false information that created risks to national security. JSUF ¶ 136.
On August 5, 2022, SAIC notified Mr. Jefferson that his leave without pay was being
extended, pending SAIC’s resolution of internal matters through its legal department. JSUF ¶ 145.
A few weeks later, on August 29, 2022, SAIC terminated Mr. Jefferson for insubordination,
violation of the SAIC Code of Conduct, refusal to comply with company investigations, and other
reasons. JSUF ¶ 146. According to SAIC management, around the same time, Air Force officials
told them that Mr. Jefferson was no longer permitted on War Center property. JSUF ¶ 127.
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Sometime after Mr. Jefferson’s termination, a security clearance investigator contacted
Mr. Jamison about Mr. Jefferson. JSUF ¶ 149. When asked if Mr. Jamison had faith that
Mr. Jefferson could operate U.S. classified and unclassified systems, Mr. Jamison answered no.
Id.
C. Procedural Background
Mr. Jefferson filed this whistleblower action against SAIC and SAIC managers in June
2024, alleging that their conduct violated whistleblower protections in the Defense Contractor
Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 4701;2 the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); and
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. Compl., ECF No. 1. The Defendants moved to
partially dismiss those claims and the Court granted that motion in part by dismissing
Mr. Jefferson’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act claim. Jefferson v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp.,
No. 24-cv-1692, 2025 WL 1305245, at *3 (D.D.C. May 6, 2025). This ruling had the effect of
dismissing all claims against the individual defendants, leaving SAIC as the only Defendant.
Following discovery, SAIC now moves for summary judgment, Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF
No. 25, and Mr. Jefferson moves for partial summary judgment, Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 27.
These motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. See Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF
No. 36; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (Pl.’s Resp.), ECF No. 40; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 41;
Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 42.
LEGAL STANDARD
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
2
At times, the Parties refer to 10 U.S.C. § 4701 as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). That statute is the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act, which was amended by the NDAA. For clarity, the Court will refer to 10 U.S.C. § 4701 as the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act.
12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden is on the movant to make the initial showing of the absence of
any genuine issues of material fact.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D.D.C.
2006) (citations omitted). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Est. of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). When “both
parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, each must carry its own burden under the
applicable legal standard.” Ehrman, 429 F. Supp. 2d. at 67 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
SAIC seeks summary judgment on Mr. Jefferson’s remaining claims under the False
Claims Act and the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act. And Mr. Jefferson seeks
partial summary judgment on four elements of his Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection
Act claim. The Court grants in part and denies in part SAIC’s motion. A reasonable jury could find
for Mr. Jefferson on his Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act claim but not his False
Claims Act claim. And the Court denies Mr. Jefferson’s partial motion. The issues on which he
seeks summary judgment are factual ones that a reasonable jury could dispute and thus
inappropriate for resolution at this stage.
A. False Claims Act
Starting with Mr. Jefferson’s whistleblower retaliation claim under the False Claims Act,
to establish such a claim, “an employee must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in protected activity,
that is, acts done . . . in furtherance of an action under this section; and (2) he was discriminated
against because of that activity.” Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 736 (cleaned up). On the first element, “the
[False Claims Act] covers two forms of protected activity.” United States ex rel. Kini v. Tata
Consultancy Servs., 146 F.4th 1184, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2025). The first is “steps taken antecedent to
a False Claims Act proceeding,” i.e., an “investigation” concerning “false or fraudulent statements
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or records concealing, avoiding, or decreasing an obligation to pay the government.” Id. (cleaned
up). The second is “lawful acts done in furtherance of other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of”
the False Claims Act. Id. (cleaned up). The latter is only protected if the plaintiff can show “an
objectively reasonable belief that the employer is violating, or will violate,” the Act. Id. (cleaned
up).
Here, Mr. Jefferson argues that he engaged in both categories of protected activity because
he was investigating and “actively trying to stop” violations of the False Claims Act’s conversion
provision, which prohibits one who “has possession, custody, or control of property or money
used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less
than all of that money or property.” Pl.’s Opp’n. 3; 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(D).3 But to succeed on
such a claim, a plaintiff must “identify” some money or “specific excess or recoverable item or
other property that [the defendant] possessed but failed to deliver to the government.” United
States ex rel. Foreman v. AECOM, 19 F.4th 85, 122 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States ex rel.
Foreman v. AECOM, 454 F. Supp. 3d 254, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), and citing United States ex rel.
Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP v. BASF Corporation, 929 F.3d 721, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
Mr. Jefferson has not done so.
3
Although Mr. Jefferson notes that his “reports did not solely raise concerns about SAIC’s possible reverse false claims liability,” his brief focuses only on the conversion provision and fails to make any argument about reverse false claims liability. Pl.’s Opp’n. 2–3. Thus, he has forfeited reliance on a reverse false claims theory of liability. “Mentioning an argument ‘in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones’ is tantamount to failing to raise it.” Am. First Legal Found. v. GAO, 819 F. Supp. 3d 20, 29 (D.D.C. 2026) (quoting Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
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1. Equipment
Mr. Jefferson complained about certain equipment at the war center. This aspect of
Mr. Jefferson’s claim centers on the following complaint to ISSM Gjellstad and other Air Force
officials:
Th[ere] is millions of dollars of equipment that has been sitting on the floor and/or
racks collecting dust for the last several years. Did anybody even conduct a
feasibility study or considered the operational costs of purchasing specialized
equipment no one knows who [sic] to use? There are tens of thousands of dollars
in additional equipment we can’t even use on our closed network.
Def. Ex. 12, ECF No. 25-114. This complaint alone falls well short of what is needed to survive
summary judgment. Mr. Jefferson does not dispute that the equipment that he complained of was
not “purchased by or owned by SAIC,” DJSF ¶ 119, and he concedes that he has no “idea where
that equipment came from, and who owns it,” DJSF ¶¶ 120. He says only that the record evidence
is “vague and speculative concerning whether SAIC had any obligations to ensure” that the
equipment “was secured, evaluated, maintained, and preserved pending the government’s decision
about it.” DJSF ¶ 122. But the undisputed record is not vague. It reveals that the equipment
predates SAIC’s contract with the War Center. DJSF ¶¶ 120–21. And SAIC contends that it does
not purchase or otherwise provide equipment to the War Center, citing plenty of record evidence
to support that assertion. DJSF ¶¶ 119, 21; Def. Ex. 3 at 81:3–8, ECF no. 25-5 (“We do not provide
equipment to the customers on the AFMS3 contract.”). Mr. Jefferson does not bother to contest
SAIC’s contention, “properly address” this record evidence, or point to contrary evidence.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Court thus considers these facts “undisputed for purposes of [SAIC’s]
motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
This record, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Jefferson, does not support a False
Claims Act claim. No reasonable jury could conclude that SAIC failed to “deliver, or cause to be
delivered” any specific money or property to the federal government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(D).
15
It may well be that the equipment in question was being neglected at the War Center. But even
“widespread negligence and mismanagement” concerning government property is not enough to
make out a claim absent indicia that the defendant “deliver[ed]” or “failed to deliver” property “to
the government.” Foreman, 19 F.4th at 122. So Mr. Jefferson cannot meet his burden to “identify”
a violation of the Act that he was investigating or preventing. Id.
Ultimately, as he himself tells it, Mr. Jefferson’s claims arise from “concerns regarding
compliance with cybersecurity requirements,” not any fear that SAIC was not delivering certain
equipment. Jefferson Decl. ¶ 24, ECF No. 37-2. And the False Claims Act “is not ‘a vehicle for
punishing” mere “regulatory violations.” Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, 929 F.3d at 727 (quoting
Universal Health Servs., 579 U.S. at 194) (recognizing that courts do “not interpret the term
‘property’ in a way that fundamentally changes the relationship between the [False Claims Act]
and garden-variety regulatory violations” (cleaned up)).
2. Scans
Next, Mr. Jefferson claims that he engaged in False Claims Act protected activity by
complaining of “the scope of [SAIC’s] ACAS scans and accuracy of its corresponding reporting.”
Pl.’s Opp’n 4. This time, Mr. Jefferson does not even bother to identify a provision of the False
Claims Act that SAIC was allegedly violating or that he was investigating. See id.at 4–5. He makes
no attempt to explain how the relevant scans or reporting have any connection to any money or
property that SAIC “has possession, custody, or control of” and that would be delivered to the
federal government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(D). Nor does he suggest that these scans or reporting
were related to any “obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.” Hoyte
v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 518 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up) (discussing the reverse false
claims act standard). On this record, no reasonable jury could find for Mr. Jefferson.
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***
For these reasons, the Court grants summary judgment to SAIC on Mr. Jefferson’s False
Claims Act retaliation claim.
B. Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act
The Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act borrows its “legal burdens of proof”
from the Whistleblowers Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), which protects federal government
employees. 10 U.S.C. § 4701(c)(7); see United States ex rel. Cody v. ManTech Int’l, Corp., 746
F. App’x 166, 178 (4th Cir. 2018). Thus, to make out a retaliation claim under the statute, a plaintiff
must show that “(1) he engaged in protected activity . . ., (2) the [relevant] decision maker knew
he engaged in protected activity, and (3) his protected activity was a contributing factor in the
adverse employment action taken against him, unless (4) [the defendant] shows by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the employment action despite [the plaintiff’s]
protected activity.” Miller v. Inst. for Def. Analyses, 795 F. App’x 590, 597 (10th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted); see also Marcato v. USAID, 11 F.4th 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (discussing
standard under § 1221(e)); Oliva v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 176 F.4th 650, 656 (Fed. Cir. 2026)
(same). The Court addresses each prong in turn, ultimately finding that each raises factual
questions incapable of resolution at this stage.
1. Protected Activity
Starting with protected activity, “[a]n employee makes a protected disclosure ‘if a
disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by
the employee [could] reasonably conclude that the actions [at issue] evidence gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a violation of any law, rule, or
regulation.’” Busselman v. Batelle Mem’l Inst., No. 18-cv-5109, 2019 WL 7763845 at *5 (E.D.
17
Wash. Nov. 15, 2019) (quoting Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 890 (9th
Cir. 2004)). A plaintiff “‘need not prove that the condition disclosed actually established one or
more of the listed categories of wrongdoing,’ but instead ‘must show that the matter disclosed was
one which a reasonable person in h[is] position would believe evidence one of the situations
specified.’” Id. at *5 (quoting Drake v. Agency for Int’l Dec., 543 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2008)) (emphasis omitted).
On this record, a jury could find that Mr. Jefferson made protected disclosures. He
repeatedly warned that the failure to follow the Defense Information Systems Agency’s best
practices would result in “fraud, waste, and abuse.” Pl. Ex. V. And he made various complaints
that ISSM Gjellstad, Commander Powell, and SAIC management were engaged in retaliation and
efforts to circumvent DoD policy. Pl. Ex. EE. Indeed, SAIC itself seemed to presume that some
sort of “gentlemen’s agreement” was reached during a meeting with Mr. Jefferson to resolve his
concerns and complaints. Pl. Ex. V. And an “abuse of authority” under the Act is “[a]n arbitrary
and capricious exercise of authority that is inconsistent with the mission of the Department of
Defense or the successful performance of a Department contract or grant.” 10 USC § 4701(g)(6).
This is enough for a jury to find that Mr. Jefferson reasonably believed that there was a covered
wrongdoing at SAIC.
SAIC argues the contrary, contending that Mr. Jefferson “did not have an objectively
reasonable belief that there was a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement,
or that he was engaging in any other protected activity.” Def.’s Mot. Mem. 21, ECF No. 25-1. But
a plaintiff “need not prove that the condition disclosed actually established one or more of the
listed categories of wrongdoing.” Busselman, 2019 WL 7763845 at *5 (cleaned up). And in any
event, in seeking summary judgment, SAIC relies on the expert testimony of a cybersecurity
18
professional that Mr. Jefferson’s concerns were unreasonable. Def.’s Reply 1–10. But
Mr. Jefferson, who has an extensive background in cybersecurity himself, attests otherwise in a
declaration. And because the testimony of SAIC’s expert and Mr. Jefferson “both . . . may be
deemed admissible” to show whether Mr. Jefferson acted as a reasonable person under the relevant
guidance, it is “for a jury to assess which is more credible on the ultimate issue.” Grotheer & Co.
v. Safe Haven Enters., No. 10-cv-2058, 2014 WL 12662646, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2014)
(denying summary judgment based on expert testimony alone). “Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 255. Ultimately, both Parties fail to recognize that “it usually is for the jury to decide whether
the conduct in question meets the reasonable man standard.” Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282,
1296 (D.D.C. 1976) (quoting 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2730,
at 572–73 (1973)). The Court sees no reason to depart from that well established principle here. It
thus denies summary judgment to both Parties on this question.
2. Knowing State of Mind
Next, a plaintiff must establish that the relevant decision maker knew that he engaged in
protected activity. The Court may not grant summary judgment on this question either.
Mr. Jefferson asks this Court to find that “SAIC decisionmakers had knowledge of [his] protected
disclosures before taking adverse action.” Pl.’s Mot. Mem. 17, ECF No. 27-1. But given that the
Court leaves it to the jury to decide whether there are protected disclosures in the first place, it
cannot rule on whether SAIC knew or did not know about any protected disclosures. Regardless,
“a determination of someone’s state of mind usually entails the drawing of factual inferences as to
which reasonable men might differ—a function traditionally left to the jury—summary judgment
19
often will be an inappropriate means of resolving an issue of this character.” Shifrin, 412 F. Supp.
at 1295 (quoting 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2730, at 583–84).
3. Causation
Turning next to causation, the standard under the Defense Contractor Whistleblower
Protection Act bears some familiarity to the McDonnell-Douglas framework used in Title VII
cases. But the Act establishes its own burden shifting framework drawn from federal employee
whistleblower protection law. See Miller, 795 F. App’x at 597. Under the statute, a plaintiff has a
“prima facie burden . . . to show that his or her whistle-blowing was a contributing factor in the
retaliatory actions taken against him or her.” Rouse v. Farmers State Bank of Jewell, 866 F. Supp.
1191, 1207 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)). This test “is broad and forgiving,”
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor, 717 F.3d 1121, 1136 (10th Cir. 2013), and is
“specifically intended to overrule existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove that
his protected conduct was a ‘significant’, ‘motivating’, ‘substantial’, or ‘predominant’ factor in a
personnel action in order to overturn that action,” Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “A contributing factor is any factor, which alone or in
combination with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.” Miller,
795 F. App’x at 597 (quoting Feldman v. Law Enf’t Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir.
2014)). “If the [plaintiff] meets this burden, then the employer must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such
disclosure.” Rouse, 866 F. Supp. at 1207 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2)).
SAIC argues that Mr. Jefferson cannot meet the contributing factor causation standard, and
that even if he could, SAIC has demonstrated that it would have fired him regardless. Def.’s Mot.
Mem. 27–28. To put it mildly, SAIC’s argument is a stretch. There is substantial record evidence
20
from which a jury could determine that Mr. Jefferson’s claimed protected activity was a
contributing factor or even a but-for cause for his termination and the other acts that preceded it.
For instance, there is substantial “temporal proximity between [Mr. Jefferson’s claimed] protected
activity and the adverse employment actions” that he complains of. Miller, 795 F. App’x at 597.
Mr. Jefferson began receiving warning letters and purported threats to end telework within weeks
of his March 23, 2022, email raising concerns that SAIC was not following the Defense
Information Systems Agency’s best practices or policies. PJSF ¶¶ 29–33 JSUF¶¶ 51–59. And his
compelled leave, revocation of telework, and termination followed other emails raising concerns
about retaliation. See supra Factual Background. This temporal proximity is particularly indicative
of causation because SAIC promoted Mr. Jefferson shortly before his claimed protected activity.
JSUF ¶ 50. Such a change in temperament after a plaintiff engages in protected activity can be
strong evidence of causation. See Harris v. CNN Am., Inc. / Warner Media Inc., No. 23-cv-3526,
2026 WL 491447, at *11 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2026); Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 999 F.3d
333, 352 (6th Cir. 2021).
Furthermore, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Johnson was “lying about the
underlying facts of [his] decision” to deny telework based on his earlier internal communications
suggesting that he thought that Mr. Jefferson should be reprimanded for his email disclosures.
Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up); Exs. V, EE. And the “changes
and inconsistencies” in the reasons for Mr. Jefferson’s termination—shifting between performance
and ethical timesheet concerns—may also serve as evidence of causation for retaliation purposes.
Id. But any “[c]redibility determinations, . . . weighing of the evidence, and . . . drawing of
legitimate inferences from the[se] facts are jury functions, not those of a judge at summary
judgment.” Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Pardo21
Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, the Court may not
decide the question of causation on this record.
Finally, Mr. Jefferson contends that SAIC took several adverse actions in response to his
claimed protected activity, including prohibiting telework and revoking his telework privileges,
demoting him, issuing two written warnings, placing him on leave without pay, terminating him,
and making negative statements regarding his credibility to a security clearance investigator. Pl.’s
Mot. Mem. 19–22. And he asks this Court to rule at summary judgment that the revocation of his
telework, demotion, and termination were adverse actions under the statute. Id. The Court notes
that the Parties dispute whether Mr. Jefferson voluntarily chose to telework and whether he was
demoted. PJSF ¶¶ 37, 40. So those are issues for a jury to decide. Undoubtedly though,
Mr. Jefferson’s termination would be an adverse action if he shows causation. See Cejka v. Vectrus
Sys. Corp., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1193 (D. Colo. 2018). Accordingly, he is not entitled to summary
judgment in this case, but the Court notes its agreement with Mr. Jefferson on that legal question.
***
Because there are factual issues to be resolved at each step, the Court denies summary
judgment to both Parties on the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act claim.
22
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 25, and denies the Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 27.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: August 26, 2026
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