Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 57,007-CA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
BRIGETTE SNOWDEN Plaintiff-Appellant SWAYZER
versus
INTERSTATE HYUNDAI Defendant-Appellee
*****
Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. C-20233487
Honorable Frederick D. Jones, Judge
*****
BRIGETTE SNOWDEN SWAYZER In Proper Person,
Plaintiff-Appellant
H. CAMERON MURRAY & ASSOCIATES Counsel for DefendantBy: H. Cameron Murray Appellee
*****
Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.
PITMAN, C. J.
Plaintiff-Appellant Brigette Snowden Swayzer appeals the district
court’s determination that she is judicially estopped from pursuing her claim
and its granting of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee
Interstate Hyundai, Inc. (“Hyundai”).1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 20, 2023, Swayzer filed a petition against Hyundai (the
“Claim”). She stated that on April 24, 2023, her 2014 Hyundai Sonata (the
“Sonata”) was towed to Hyundai for an engine replacement. She alleged
that Hyundai still had the Sonata and had not repaired it. She stated that she
no longer wanted the Sonata returned but requested damages, including
$7,500 for the value of the Sonata and $60 for each day Hyundai had the
Sonata.
On October 11, 2023, Hyundai filed an answer and exceptions.
On April 4, 2025, Hyundai filed a motion for summary judgment. It
stated that in June 2023, Swayzer filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which
required her to declare all assets she owned and all claims she had against
others. It alleged that she failed to declare the Sonata and the Claim. It
requested that the district court declare Swayzer judicially estopped from
seeking the replacement value of the Sonata, as permitting her to proceed
with this Claim would allow her to profit at the expense of her creditors.
On June 6, 2025, Swayzer filed an opposition. She stated that she did
not intentionally fail to disclose the Sonata as an asset. She explained that
the omission was due to confusion regarding the Sonata’s status and her
1
In her original petition, Swayzer named “Interstate Hyundai” as the defendant. In an amended petition, she changed the defendant to “Interstate Hyundai, Inc.” understanding of her obligations during the bankruptcy process. She alleged
that Hyundai dismantled the Sonata, so it had no value in that state.
A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on
December 11, 2025. Swayzer’s counsel stated that she amended her
bankruptcy case to add the Sonata as an asset. Hyundai’s counsel responded
that this information was not included as evidence in the pleadings. The
court stated that although there are questions as to whether Swayzer believed
the Sonata’s dismantled state made it an asset or debt, she should have
amended the bankruptcy to include the Sonata and the Claim. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of Hyundai.
On January 16, 2025, the district court signed a judgment granting
summary judgment, estopping Swayzer from pursuing the Claim and
dismissing the matter with prejudice.
Swayzer appeals.
DISCUSSION
Swayzer argues that the district court erred in applying the doctrine of
judicial estoppel and granting summary judgment. She contends that a
genuine issue of material fact remains regarding the condition and the value
of the Sonata. She contends that judicial estoppel does not apply because
she proved to the bankruptcy trustee that she inadvertently omitted the
Sonata and that the trustee added it to her bankruptcy plan in July 2025.
Hyundai argues that judicial estoppel must be applied in this case and
that the district court properly granted summary judgment. It contends that
as Swayzer failed to disclose the Sonata and the Claim as assets to the
bankruptcy court, she is estopped from stating that she owns the Sonata and
from asserting the Claim. It argues that Swayzer did not act inadvertently in
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omitting the Sonata as an asset because she placed a $7,500 value on it in
her petition. It notes that Swayzer did not provide any document evidencing
an amendment to the bankruptcy. It argues that allowing Swayzer to
proceed with this Claim would allow her to profit from her dishonesty,
which undermines the integrity of the judicial system.
Judicial estoppel is a common law doctrine by which a party who has
assumed one position in his pleadings may be estopped from assuming an
inconsistent position. Thomas v. Econ. Premier Assur. Co., 50,638 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 196 So. 3d 7, writs denied, 16-1169, 16-1177 (La.
10/28/16), 208 So. 3d 377, 378. The purpose of the doctrine is to protect the
integrity of the judicial process by preventing parties from playing fast and
loose with the courts to suit the exigencies of self-interest. Id. The doctrine
is generally applied where intentional self-contradiction is being used as a
means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking
justice. Id.
When judicial estoppel is raised in the context of a bankruptcy case,
federal law applies. Tates v. Integrated Prod. Servs., Inc., 51,574 (La. App.
2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 716, writ denied, 17-1825 (La. 12/15/17),
231 So. 3d 644. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized
three requirements for applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel in
bankruptcy cases: (1) the party’s position must be clearly inconsistent with
the previous one; (2) the court must have accepted the previous position; and
(3) the nondisclosure of an asset must not have been inadvertent. Id., citing
Allen v. C & H Distributors, L.L.C., 813 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2015).
The inconsistent position requirement is generally met when a debtor
does not disclose an asset to the bankruptcy court but then pursues a claim in
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a separate tribunal based on the undisclosed asset. Tates v. Integrated Prod.
Servs., Inc., supra. Chapter 13 debtors have a continuing duty to disclose
post-petition causes of action to the bankruptcy court. Id. The judicial
acceptance element ensures that judicial estoppel is only applied in
situations where the integrity of the judiciary is in jeopardy. Thomas v.
Econ. Premier Assur. Co., supra. Absent judicial acceptance of the
inconsistent position, application of the rule is unwarranted because no risk
of inconsistent results exists. Id. The debtor’s nondisclosure of an asset is
only inadvertent when he either lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claim or
has no motive to conceal it. Id. A motivation to conceal may be shown by
evidence of a potential financial benefit that could result from concealment.
Id.
Federal courts review judicial estoppel determinations for abuse of
discretion even when the district court granted summary judgment on that
basis. Thomas v. Econ. Premier Assur. Co., supra. Because judicial
estoppel is an equitable doctrine, courts may apply it flexibly to achieve
substantial justice. Id.
In this case, the three requirements for applying the doctrine of
judicial estoppel are met. Swayzer’s position in her Claim is clearly
inconsistent with her bankruptcy case. Swayzer is pursuing this Claim for
the value of the Sonata while failing to disclose these assets to the
bankruptcy court. Hyundai attached to its motion for summary judgment a
copy of Swayzer’s Form 106A/B on which she was to list her assets for the
bankruptcy court. The only vehicle she listed was a Chevrolet Malibu, and
she stated that she did not have any claims against third parties, “whether or
not [she had] filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment.” Although
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Swayzer alleged at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and on
appeal that she amended this form to add the Sonata and the Claim, evidence
of this amendment is not in the record. Swayzer filed a motion to
supplement the appellate record with her bankruptcy documents, and this
court denied the motion as the documents were never introduced into
evidence at the district court.
As Swayzer’s alleged amended Form 106A/B is not in the record, this
court finds that the bankruptcy court accepted her original Form 106A/B in
which she declared under penalty of perjury that she provided a true and
correct list of her assets and did not include the Sonata or the Claim.
Swayzer’s nondisclosure of the Sonata and the Claim were not
inadvertent. She had a duty to list the Sonata and the Claim as assets when
she filed her Form 106A/B with the bankruptcy court but intentionally failed
to do so. She had a financial motive to conceal these assets from the
bankruptcy court because of the possibility that she could keep any awarded
damages rather than the damages being distributed to creditors.
As the record shows that Swayzer pursued her Claim in district court
while omitting the Sonata and the Claim as assets in her bankruptcy
disclosures, summary judgment is appropriate in this case under the
principle of judicial estoppel. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel, granting Hyundai’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Swayzer’s petition with prejudice.
Accordingly, these assignments of error lack merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s application of
the doctrine of judicial estoppel and its granting of summary judgment in
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favor of Defendant-Appellee Interstate Hyundai, Inc. Costs of this appeal
are assessed to Plaintiff-Appellant Brigette Snowden Swayzer.
AFFIRMED.
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