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Luv N' Care, Ltd., by and through Abraham Jack Hakim, Eddie Jack Hakim, And David Jack Hakim And Abraham Jack Hakim, Eddie Jack Hakim, and David Jack Hakim, Individually v. Nouri Ed Hakim, Joseph H. Hakim, Abraham Nouri Hakim, Leah Raquel Hakim Goldenberg, Jack Allen Hakim, Joseph Daniel Hakim, Abraham Joseph Hakim, Louise Hakim Moore, Kay Hakim Lahasky, and Hannah Hakim Jones; and Other Related Parties And Companies to Luv N' Care, Ltd., Nominal

2026-08-26

Summary

Holding. The court reversed in part and affirmed in part. The trial court correctly sustained the exception of no right of action only as to the plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claims against fellow shareholders, but erred in sustaining the exception as to all other claims, including those based on fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, detrimental reliance, breach of contract, and unfair trade practices. The amended judgment was revised to dismiss only the fiduciary duty claims with prejudice and allow the remaining claims to proceed.

Three shareholders of Luv N' Care, Ltd. sued fellow shareholders and company officers, claiming a scheme to transfer valuable intellectual property (the Nuby and Dr. Talbot's brands) out of the corporation to entities owned solely by the defendant shareholders, thereby depriving the plaintiffs of their share of income from these brands. The plaintiffs asserted both direct claims (for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and other torts) and derivative claims on behalf of the corporation. The trial court granted the shareholder defendants' exception of no right of action, dismissing all claims.

On appeal, the court addressed two main issues: whether the trial court properly amended the original judgment to add decretal language, and whether the trial court correctly sustained the exception of no right of action against all of the plaintiffs' claims. The appellate court found that while shareholders generally do not owe each other fiduciary duties under Louisiana law, the plaintiffs stated valid direct claims based on non-fiduciary theories such as fraud, conversion, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, as well as derivative claims on behalf of the corporation.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether shareholders owe fiduciary duties to one another
  • Whether an amended judgment may substantively change an original judgment lacking decretal language
  • Whether plaintiffs have standing to bring direct claims based on non-fiduciary theories against fellow shareholders
  • Whether plaintiffs may pursue derivative claims on behalf of the corporation for alleged breaches by shareholder defendants

Procedural posture

The plaintiffs appealed from an amended judgment entered by the trial court on January 21, 2026, which sustained an exception of no right of action filed by shareholder defendants and dismissed all claims against them.

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.

Application for rehearing may be filed

within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,

La. C.C.P.

No. 57,046-CA

COURT OF APPEAL

SECOND CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

LUV N’ CARE, LTD., BY AND Plaintiffs-Appellants THROUGH ABRAHAM JACK

HAKIM, EDDIE JACK HAKIM,

AND DAVID JACK HAKIM

AND ABRAHAM JACK HAKIM,

EDDIE JACK HAKIM, AND

DAVID JACK HAKIM,

INDIVIDUALLY

versus

NOURI ED HAKIM, JOSEPH H. Defendants-Appellees HAKIM, ABRAHAM NOURI

HAKIM, LEAH RAQUEL HAKIM

GOLDENBERG, JACK ALLEN

HAKIM, JOSEPH DANIEL

HAKIM, ABRAHAM JOSEPH

HAKIM, LOUISE HAKIM

MOORE, KAY HAKIM

LAHASKY, AND HANNAH

HAKIM JONES; AND OTHER

RELATED PARTIES AND

COMPANIES TO LUV N’ CARE,

LTD., NOMINAL DEFENDANT

*****

Appealed from the

Fourth Judicial District Court for the

Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana

Trial Court No. 2021-0470

Honorable Jefferson B. Joyce, Judge

*****

BREAZEALE, SACHSE & WILSON, LLP Counsel for Appellants

By: Claude Favrot Reynaud, Jr.

Carroll Devillier, Jr.

Danielle L. Borel

Kelsey Clark Luckett

Jordan S. Varnado

JACQUES M. ROY, APLC

By: Jacques M. Roy

RICHARD A. ROZANSKI, APLC

By: Richard A. Rozanski

DAVENPORT, FILES, & KELLY, LLP Counsel for Appellees,

By: W. David Hammett Abraham Nouri Hakim,

Grant M. Tolbird Leah Raquel Hakim

Goldenberg, Jack Allen

Hakim, Abraham Joseph

Hakim, Louise Hakim

Moore, Kay Hakim

Lahasky, Hannah Hakim

Jones, and Talbot’s

Pharmaceuticals

Family Products, LLC

WATSON, McMILLIN, & STREET, LLP Counsel for Appellees,

By: David Canton McMillin Joseph Herman Hakim,

Jeff Lahasky, Tyler

Goldenberg, Control

Services, Inc., and L

Care Mexicana S De R.I.

LISKOW & LEWIS Counsel for Appellees,

By: Shannon Skelton Holtzman Luv N’ Care, Ltd.; Luv

Leon Hirsch Rittenberg, III N’ Care Holdings, LLC;

Melanie N. Derefinko Luv N’ Care, LLC; Luv

Alec N. Andrade ‘N Care International,

Carol Welborn Reisman Inc.; Nuby UK LLP;

Carey L. Menasco HHHII, LLC; HHHII

Robert Martin Chiaviello, Jr. Russia; Misty Bayou,

LLC; Jud Realty, Inc.;

Penny Realty, Inc.; I-20

Corridor Properties,

LLC; DeSiard

Investment Properties,

LLC; Fairytail, LLC;

French Acadian Homes,

LLC; Garrett

Manufacturing, LLC;

Gain Plus Limited, LLC;

Elite Limousine Service

of Monroe, LLC; PEJJ,

LLC; Rapid Transit,

LLC; Rayville

Manufacturing, LLC;

Sherrouse Plantation,

LLC; Stonebridge

Estates, LLC; The

Brandy House, LLC; TriH Partners, LLC; and

Zodiac Stone, LLC

MURPHY BALL STRATTON, LLP Counsel for Appellees,

By: Michelle S. Stratton Nouri Edward Hakim,

Shaun G. Clarke Admar International,

Inc., and Monroe

Manufacturing, Inc.

BREITHAUPT, DUBOS, & Counsel for Appellees,

WOLLESON, LLC North American Land

By: Michael Lee Dubos Development Corp.

Adam Roger Karamanis and Nuby Asia Pacific

Benjamin Dubos Limited

*****

Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.,

This appeal arises out of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ouachita

Parish, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Jefferson B. Joyce, Judge,

presiding. The plaintiffs in this case are three shareholders in a closely held

family corporation, Luv N’ Care, Ltd. (“LNC”), who, individually and on

behalf of the corporate entity, filed a petition alleging direct and derivative

claims against current or former executive officers of LNC, including their

uncles, their fellow shareholders (the plaintiffs’ cousins), and other related

parties and companies to LNC.

The plaintiffs have appealed from an amended judgment rendered by

the trial court which was made to correct the lack of decretal language in a

previous judgment that sustained an exception of no right of action filed by

the shareholder defendants (seven of the individual shareholders sued by the

plaintiffs). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part, amend in part,

and as amended, affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

LNC was incorporated in 1990 by three brothers: Nouri Ed Hakim

(“Ed”), Joseph H. Hakim (“Joseph”), and Jack R. Hakim (“Jack”). Since

that time, the three brothers have transferred a good portion of their

ownership to their children—LNC shares are now held by 12 shareholders,

all of whom are children of the original three incorporators, and each of

whom are equal shareholders of LNC per the “root percentage ownership” of

their respective father.

LNC is a parent company to numerous companies and the owner of

several brands which include Nuby and Dr. Talbot’s, both of which

manufacture very popular baby products such as pacifiers and bottles. The shareholder plaintiffs in this suit believe that the Nuby and Dr. Talbot’s

brands were, until very recently, the intellectual property of LNC, with each

of the 12 shareholders being entitled to income derived from the sale of

products sold under those brand names.

The instant suit was filed in February 2021 by David Jack Hakim,

Abraham Jack Hakim, and Eddie Jack Hakim, individually and on behalf of

LNC, alleging that Ed, Joseph, and the other named shareholder defendants1

created and executed a scheme to divest LNC of its value and “starve out”

the shareholder plaintiffs from the income previously received from the

Nuby and Dr. Talbot’s brands by approving Ed’s motion to transfer the Nuby

brand to Admar (a company owned solely by Ed and managed by Joseph)

and transfer the Dr. Talbot’s brand from Talbot’s Pharmaceuticals, LLC

(“Talbot’s I”-an LNC company) to Talbot’s Pharmaceutical Family Products,

LLC (“Talbot’s II”-a company separate from LNC and owned by the eight

individual shareholder defendants) at a shareholder meeting which was

arranged and conducted intentionally without including the shareholder

plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs further alleged that Admar licensed the Nuby brand to

Talbot’s II. Thus, Talbot’s II has been operating and selling Dr. Talbot’s

products, with distributions being made only to Ed, Joseph, and their

children rather than all 12 of LNC’s shareholders. The plaintiffs further

alleged that Admar licensed the Nuby brand to Talbot’s II, which allowed the

1

The other shareholder defendants are the children of Eddie and Joseph and include Jack Allen Hakim, Abraham Nouri Hakim, Abraham Joseph Hakim, Hannah Hakim Jones, Leah Raquel Hakim Goldenberg, Kay Hakim Lahasky, and Louise Hakim Moore. The eighth individual shareholder is Joseph Daniel Hakim. Because he was never served, he is not a party to this action or appeal at this point.

2

eight shareholders in Talbot’s II to benefit financially from that intellectual

property which had formerly been under the LNC umbrella.

In their petition, the shareholder plaintiffs asserted that they had the

right to sue the shareholder defendants individually because the loss

sustained by the plaintiffs as minority shareholders was not a loss sustained

by all shareholders—the lucrative brands in question had been transferred

out of the LNC family of companies and either owned by or licensed to

companies owned solely by the eight shareholder defendants. The

shareholder plaintiffs also alleged a derivative claim on behalf of LNC,

asserting that the entity was harmed by the loss of the lucrative intellectual

property; without the Nuby and Dr. Talbot’s brands, LNC no longer owned

anything of value.

On February 14, 2022, the shareholder defendants filed an exception

of no right of action and/or motion for summary judgment seeking to have

the shareholder plaintiffs’ direct claims against the shareholder defendants in

their individual capacities dismissed. According to the shareholder

defendants, the claims made by the shareholder plaintiffs against them as

individuals were dismissed previously in a records suit by the trial court; the

shareholder plaintiffs cannot show that they sustained any personal or direct

losses; they have no right of action against the shareholder defendants

because shareholders do not owe one another any fiduciary duty; and, absent

a showing of fraud, the shareholder defendants cannot be held liable for any

debts of LNC. The shareholder defendants also pointed out that the

plaintiffs neither claimed nor showed fraud. Furthermore, claim the

defendants, their exercise of voting rights as shareholders in opposition to

the wishes of the plaintiffs did not constitute fraud.

3

The plaintiffs opposed the exception and motion for summary

judgment, the defendant shareholders filed a reply, and a hearing on the

exception was held on October 23, 2023, following which the trial court

took the matter under advisement. On November 3, 2023, the trial court

issued a judgment granting the exception of no right of action which did not

include an opportunity for the shareholder plaintiffs to amend their petition

as required by La. C.C.P. art. 934. The trial court noted that its ruling on the

right of action pretermitted its need to rule on the motion for summary

judgment.2

The shareholder plaintiffs filed a writ application with this Court

which was denied on the showing made on March 12, 2024. An application

for rehearing was likewise denied on April 22, 2024. On August 27, 2025,

the shareholder defendants filed a motion to amend judgment in which it

asked the trial court to amend its November 3, 2023, judgment to include

decretal language dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims against the shareholder

defendants. The plaintiffs opposed this motion.

A hearing on the motion to amend was held on December 8, 2025,

after which the motion was taken under advisement. The trial court granted

the motion and issued an amended judgment on January 21, 2026, which

ordered that the shareholder defendants “are dismissed with prejudice at

plaintiffs’ costs.” By this judgment, it appears that the trial court has

2

The trial court issued Written Reasons for Judgment in which it opined that the only remedy available to the shareholder plaintiffs was a derivative suit on behalf of LNC because the shareholder plaintiffs did not allege a loss as shareholders of LNC that was not sustained by all LNC shareholders. Even if the shareholders did allege a loss that was not felt by all shareholders, the trial court did not believe that the shareholder plaintiffs could prove that loss. Furthermore, according to the trial court, even if the shareholder plaintiffs could prove a disparate loss not felt by the shareholder defendants, there was no duty on the part of an individual shareholder to another shareholder, only a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation by its officers and directors.

4

dismissed all claims against the shareholder defendants—direct and

derivative—regardless of whether those claims were reliant upon the

existence of a fiduciary duty owed.

It is from this judgment that the plaintiffs have appealed.

DISCUSSION

Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion to amend the

judgment filed by the shareholder defendants.

The Plaintiffs’ Argument

Regardless of whether this Court agrees that the exception should

have been denied, according to the plaintiffs, the law is clear that the

shareholder defendants’ motion to amend judgment should have been

denied. The November 3, 2023, judgment granting the exception lacked

decretal language and did not dismiss any claims against any parties. The

shareholder defendants remained parties to the suit and were named in the

plaintiffs’ amending petition filed on August 19, 2024.

The plaintiffs argue that what the defendants proposed as amending

language in their August 27, 2025, motion to amend was not an innocuous,

clerical modification, but instead was a substantive change to the original

judgment, which is not procedurally allowed. In fact, point out the

plaintiffs, the trial court acknowledged the substantive nature of this

amendment during the hearing on the motion to amend. While the trial court

did not adopt the proposed language exactly, the amended judgment has the

same intended effect—the shareholder defendants were dismissed with

prejudice.

The plaintiffs next assert that Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure

does not allow for the modification requested by the shareholder defendants

5

and granted by the trial court in the amended judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 1951

provides that a final judgment can only be amended to alter the phraseology

of the judgment, to correct deficiencies in the decretal language, or to correct

errors of calculation. A judgment may be amended where the amendment

takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment. Bourgeois v.

Kost, 02-2785 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So. 2d 692. While the November 3, 2023,

judgment did not contain decretal language, by granting the defendants’

motion to amend, the trial court awarded them relief to which they were not

only not entitled, but for which they had not addressed in their exception—

dismissal with prejudice.

Next, according to the plaintiffs, even if the trial court could modify

the judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1951, the shareholder defendants’ motion

to do so was untimely. The original judgment was issued on November 3,

2023. The deadlines for the filing of a motion for new trial and appeal had

clearly run. A judgment cannot be changed substantively through a motion

to amend under La. C.C.P. art. 1951. Because the deadlines had run, the

shareholder defendants had no right to make any changes to the November

3, 2023, judgment.

Finally, almost a year after the judgment on the exception was

rendered, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition naming the shareholder

defendants, who filed no responsive pleadings thereto. The plaintiffs point

out that the exception pertained only to the original petition. However, the

trial court dismissed all claims by the plaintiffs against the shareholder

defendants in both the original and amended petitions, notwithstanding the

fact that the shareholder defendants filed no exceptions in response to the

amended petition. In doing so, the trial court basically raised the exception

6

of no right of action for the shareholder defendants and dismissed claims

against them which they had never answered or excepted to, which was

improper.

The Shareholder Defendants’ Argument

According to the shareholder defendants, their motion to amend did

not ask for a substantive change, nor was it untimely. The plaintiffs

erroneously argue that the amended judgment changes the substance of the

prior judgment because, by dismissing the shareholder defendants, “it

granted relief which was not addressed in the Exception, and which the court

did not award in its Written Reasons or the November 3, 2023, Judgment.”

The shareholder defendants argue that their exception plainly sought the

dismissal of any and all claims against them with prejudice at the plaintiffs’

cost.

The plaintiffs’ insistence that the judgment did not dismiss the

shareholder defendants is contrary to their previous representations to this

Court, urge the defendants, who suggest that the plaintiffs’ own assertions

confirm that the judgment “effectively dismissed” the shareholder

defendants from the suit. The shareholder defendants argue that the

plaintiffs are the ones seeking to change the substance of the original

judgment by claiming that it should now be interpreted to exclude some of

their claims. All the amended judgment did, according to the shareholder

defendants, was correct the absence of decretal language in the original

judgment, which was “entirely proper” under La. C.C.P. art. 1951.

The shareholder defendants ask this Court to affirm the amended

judgment in its entirety.

7

Analysis

La. C.C.P. art. 1951 provides in part that a final judgment may be

amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment or to correct

deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation, and that a final

judgment may not be amended under this Article to change its substance. As

stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court, “a judgment may be amended by the

court only when the amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the

original judgment.” Tunstall v. Stierwald, 01-1765, p. 4 (La. 2/26/02), 809

So. 2d 916, 920 (citations omitted). However, once the trial court is divested

of jurisdiction and that of the appellate court attaches, the appellate court is

empowered to correct both clerical and substantive errors in judgments

under the authority provided by La. C.C.P. art. 2164. See La. C.C.P. art.

1951, Official Revision Comments, Comment (d).3

This appeal is from an amended judgment signed by the trial court on

January 21, 2026. This amended judgment was rendered after the

shareholder defendants filed a motion for amendment due to the fact that the

November 3, 2023, judgment on the shareholder defendants’ exception was

not a final judgment as it contained no decretal language.4

3

Amendment at this level is necessary for several reasons. First, this Court’s jurisdiction is only proper because the amended judgment is in fact a final judgment. Second, the amendment was required because the initial judgment itself was interlocutory, not just because there was no decretal language. This is because the trial court did not certify that judgment as immediately appealable as authorized under La. C.C.P. art. 1915 prior to its amendment in 2025.

4

La. C.C.P. art. 1918(A) provides:

A final judgment in accordance with Article 1841 shall be identified as such by

appropriate language; shall be signed and dated; and shall, in its decree, identify

the name of the party in whose favor the relief is awarded, the name of the party

against whom the relief is awarded, and the relief that is awarded. If appealed, a

final judgment that does not contain the appropriate decretal language shall be

remanded to the trial court, which shall amend the judgement in accordance with

Article 1951 within the time set by the appellate court.

8

In their motion to amend the judgment on their exception, the

shareholder defendants requested that the trial court amend the previous

judgment to “add the appropriate decretal language showing the legal effect

of granting of the shareholder defendants’ Exception of No Right of

Action[.] …” The trial court granted the motion to amend, then added the

following language:

As such, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that

the individual Shareholder defendants: Abraham Nouri Hakim,

Leah Raquel Hakim Goldenberg, Jack Allen Hakim, Abraham

Joseph Hakim, Louisa Hakim Moore, Kay Hakim Lahasky, and

Hannah Hakim Jones, are DISMISSED with prejudice at

Plaintiffs’ costs.

It is no wonder that the plaintiffs are aggrieved by this language. The

decretal language for a judgment sustaining an exception of no right of

action does not typically effect a dismissal of the party defendants—instead

it has everything to do with the dismissal, in whole or in part, of the right or

rights of the party or parties (in most cases, this will be the plaintiff or

plaintiffs) against whom the exception of no right of action has been

sustained. We will amend the amended judgment to include the appropriate

decretal language after we address the question of whether the trial court

erred in granting the shareholder defendants’ exception of no right of action

as to all of the plaintiffs’ claims against the shareholder defendants.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the exception of no right of

action filed by the shareholder defendants.

The Plaintiffs’ Argument

According to the plaintiffs, because they filed their derivative action

against the shareholder defendants derivatively on behalf of LNC per La.

R.S. 12:1-742.1, the plaintiffs are within the class of persons to whom the

law grants standing to sue derivatively. Additionally, because the breach of

9

fiduciary duty caused a direct loss to the plaintiffs, which is distinct from

that incurred by all LNC shareholders, the plaintiffs also have the right to

pursue their individual claims in a direct action to recover their personal

losses. See, Palowsky v. Premier Bancorp, Inc., 597 So. 2d 543, 545 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 1992).

The plaintiffs assert that there is a distinction between the derivative

and direct claims set forth in their petition, both of which are properly

alleged in this action. According to the plaintiffs’ petition, the shareholder

defendants breached their duties to LNC and other shareholders, including

the individual plaintiffs, by, inter alia, failing to be informed of critical

decisions before them as shareholders, to avoid self-dealing without proper

disclosure and approval, and to avoid disloyalty to LNC by allowing

outrageous compensation and grant of powers to Ed. There were further

allegations that the shareholder defendants’ self-dealing led to the intentional

harming of LNC, leading to liability to LNC derivatively. Additionally, the

plaintiffs alleged that the shareholder defendants, in violation of fiduciary

responsibilities to LNC, have allowed: Ed to cause Talbot’s II to usurp

Talbot’s I and convert the plaintiffs’ rights and value; each of the related

entities to use the Nuby brand to build and market themselves; the Nuby

brand, as well as all LNC marks and brands owned as LNC’s to be converted

by Ed without Board approval, which resulted in the theft of intellectual

property; Ed to enjoy “purely personal” self-dealing and distributions; Ed

and Joseph to falsely and without right breach their duties of loyalty to

declare that Ed (as the only shareholder) “owns” and Joseph manages,

through Admar, all intellectual property.

10

The plaintiffs reiterate that the acts of mismanagement and fraud

harmed LNC and were brought on behalf of LNC by them. All of the

defendants’ actions as alleged in the petition were done “in concert” between

Ed, Joseph, and the shareholder defendants, urge the plaintiffs. “The

shareholder defendants were knowing and willing participants in causing the

harm… as they voted in a concerted block making them controlling and

majority shareholders. [They] also collectively own 100% of Talbot’s II.

Thus, they are the direct beneficiaries of the schemes detailed in the Petition

and Amended Petition.”

Based on the above, the plaintiffs urge that they have established that

they have a right of action in their derivative claim on behalf of LNC.

Likewise, they have a direct right of action against the shareholder

defendants. Because the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty also caused a

direct loss to the plaintiffs, a loss not incurred by all other shareholders, the

shareholder plaintiffs have the right to pursue an individual claim in a direct

action to recover their losses.

According to the plaintiffs, the shareholder defendants in concert with

all defendants have used Talbot’s II to specifically harm the plaintiffs and

protect the shareholder defendants. Talbot’s I was owned by the 12

shareholders who own LNC—now Talbot’s II is owned by only the

shareholder defendants despite having been built 100% by LNC and Talbot’s

I. The plaintiffs contend that the shareholder defendants are operating

Talbot’s II as a direct competitor to LNC by allowing Talbot’s II to utilize

LNC’s intellectual property, including the Nuby and Dr. Talbot’s brands and

trademarks. “[W]hile the shareholder defendants are protected from harm

and participating in the profits generated by Talbot’s II, the plaintiffs are not

11

and are suffering a harm unique to them.” The plaintiffs also claim that,

because their plaintiffs’ interests were diluted to further the IP theft by

“starving them out” to enforce compliance when the defendants purposefully

ended all dividends and sharing in approved rental payments, arbitrarily and

without proper notice and approval, they have the right to sue individually.

The plaintiffs also urge that they have rights of action to assert claims

of conversion, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, detrimental reliance,

fraud and misrepresentation, and unfair and deceptive trade practices against

the shareholder defendants who conspired with the other defendants to

commit tortious and quasi-tortious acts.

The Shareholder Defendants’ Argument

The plaintiffs’ first contention is that the trial court erred in finding

that they had no right to pursue their derivative claims because, contrary to

the trial court’s ruling, “shareholders have fiduciary duties to the corporation

and must act in good faith, with the best interest of the corporation and its

fellow shareholders in mind.”

In Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642, 646 (La. 1937),

which was cited by the trial court in its written reasons, the court stated:

There is no such fiduciary relation on the part of a stockholder

of a corporation to the corporation, or to all other stockholders

of the corporation, as there is on the part of a director or other

officer to the corporation, or between a director or other officer

and the stockholders generally.

The plaintiffs, ignoring Williams, urge this Court to reverse the trial court’s

ruling based on out-of-state caselaw and two Louisiana appellate decisions,

neither of which held that a shareholder had a fiduciary duty to other

shareholders.

12

In Hirsch v. Cahn Electric Co., Inc., 29,327 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/9/97),

694 So. 2d 636, 637, writ denied, 97-1561 (La. 10/3/97), 701 So. 2d 200, the

plaintiffs’ derivative action was filed against the corporation and its officerdirectors. In Moulton v. Stewart Enterprises, Inc., 20-0090 (La. App. 4 Cir.

5/5/21), 321 So. 3d 1038, 1043, the plaintiff shareholders sought damages

from the company and members of the board.

In this case, however, the shareholder defendants are just that—they

are not officers or directors of LNC, and the plaintiffs have not alleged them

to be. Under Louisiana law, the shareholder defendants do not have

fiduciary responsibilities to LNC or to the shareholder plaintiffs. The trial

court correctly ruled that the plaintiffs could not pursue claims against the

shareholder defendants for breach of fiduciary duties.

The plaintiffs also contend that, separate from their derivative claims,

they have a direct right of action against the shareholder defendants

“because the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty also caused a direct loss to

the plaintiffs.” However, note the shareholder defendants, the cases upon

which the plaintiffs rely to support their claims involve alleged fiduciary

breaches by officers and directors, not shareholders. The trial court’s finding

that individual shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties to fellow

shareholders prohibits both the plaintiffs’ derivative and direct claims

against the shareholder defendants.

The defendants also contend that the plaintiffs’ direct action claims

that do not rely on the shareholder defendants’ alleged breach of fiduciary

duties were included and addressed in the defendants’ exception of no right

of action and the judgment granting said exception. The shareholder

defendants assert that they did not file a partial exception and did not limit

13

their requested relief—dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit against them—in any

way. The trial court considered all of the claims against the shareholder

defendants and found that none had merit based upon its conclusion that

shareholders have no fiduciary duty to one another. The shareholder

defendants urge this Court to affirm the trial court’s ruling.5

Analysis

Only a person having a real and actual interest to assert may bring an

action. La. C.C.P. art. 681; SRP Environmental, LLC v. Burychka

Enterprises, LLC, 56,354 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/16/25), 418 So. 3d 471. A

peremptory exception of no right of action is used to show that a plaintiff

has no legal right or interest in enforcing the matter asserted, based upon the

facts and evidence submitted. La. C.C.P. arts. 681, 927; Campbell v. Nexion

Health at Claiborne, Inc., 49,150 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So. 3d 436.

A peremptory exception of no right of action determines whether the

plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of

action asserted in the suit. Durel v. Acadian Ear, Nose, Throat & Facial

Plastic Surgery, APMC, 23-0024 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So. 3d 1010; Miller v.

Thibeaux, 14-1107 (La. 1/28/15), 159 So. 3d 426; City of Shreveport v. CDM

Smith Inc., 56,567 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/25), 426 So. 3d 186, writ denied,

25-01608 (La. 3/28/26), 427 So. 3d 1247; Campbell, supra. An objection of

no right of action tests whether these particular plaintiffs, as a matter of law,

have an interest in the claim or claims sued on. Id. The exception does not

5

Without filing their own appeal or answering the plaintiffs’ appeal, the shareholder defendants argued in their brief that the trial court’s judgment can, in the alternative, be affirmed based on the shareholder defendants’ motion for summary judgment. However, this issue will not be considered or addressed by this Court due to the aforementioned procedural reasons and because the record shows that the trial court did not rule on the motion for summary judgment but pretermitted doing so based upon its disposition of the no right of action issue.

14

raise the question of the plaintiffs’ ability to prevail on the merits or the

question of whether the defendants may have a valid defense. City of

Shreveport, supra; Garrison v. James Construction Group, LLC, 14-0761

(La. App. 1 Cir. 5/6/15), 174 So. 3d 15, writ denied, 15-1112 (La. 9/18/15),

178 So. 3d 146.

The exception of no right of action presents a question of law, and an

appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling granting such an exception de

novo. Badeaux v. Sw. Computer Bureau Inc., 05-0612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.

2d 1211; Succession of Mabray, 56,102 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 408 So. 3d

1071.

A shareholder of a corporation does not generally have a right to sue

personally for alleged losses sustained by the corporation due to

mismanagement and/or a breach of fiduciary duties. Palowsky, supra.

Rather, a shareholder may only sue to recover losses to a corporation

resulting from mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duties secondarily

through a shareholder’s derivative suit. Id; Cook v. Hibernia National Bank,

03-0330 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/18/04), 869 So. 2d 176.

In Palowsky, supra, the First Circuit held that if a shareholder suffers

only an indirect loss in the form of a decline in the value of his stock

resulting from a loss sustained by the corporation due to mismanagement

and/or breaches of fiduciary duty, that shareholder may only bring a

derivative action on behalf of the corporation. Id. However, if the breach of

fiduciary duty causes a direct loss to the shareholder, but not to the

corporation, that shareholder may have a right to sue individually. Id.

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It is not just corporate officers and directors who owe fiduciary duties

to a corporation. In Hirsch, supra, this Court adopted the holding of Pepper

v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07, 60 S. Ct. 238, 245, 84 L. Ed. 281 (1939):

A dominant or controlling stockholder’s power is a power in

trust. His dealing with the corporation are subjected to rigorous

scrutiny and where any of his engagements with the corporation

is challenged, the burden is on the director or stockholder not

only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show

it’s inherent affirmance from the viewpoint of the corporation

and those interested therein. His fair dealing is increased to the

precise decree that his representative character has given him

power and control derived from the confidence reposed in him

by the stockholders who appointed him their agent. If he

should be the sole director, or one of a smaller number vested

with certain powers, this obligation would be still stronger and

his acts subject to more severe scrutiny and their validity

determined by more rigid principles of morality, and freedom

from motives of selfishness.

Hirsch, 29,327, p. 11, 694 So. 2d at 642.

In their “Exception of No Right of Action/MSJ Re Individual

Shareholders,” the shareholder defendants asserted only that the plaintiffs

“have no standing or right of action to sue their fellow shareholders for

damages.” The exception itself did not include the plaintiffs’ derivative

claims on behalf of LNC, but these claims, as well as the plaintiffs’

additional claims, were addressed in the shareholder defendants’ memo in

support of the exception/MSJ did.

We find that the trial court erred in sustaining the shareholder

defendants’ exception of no right of action without considering the plaintiffs’

claims against the shareholder defendants on a more specific basis (the

claims, not the defendants). The plaintiffs have asserted direct claims and

derivative claims on behalf of LNC. The direct claims do not all arise out

of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Louisiana law is clear that

shareholders do not owe each other a fiduciary duty, on this we agree with

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the shareholder defendants. See, Williams, supra. However, there is nothing

precluding a right of action on the part of the plaintiffs as to their other

claims, i.e., breach of contract, unjust enrichment, detrimental reliance, fraud

and misrepresentation, and unfair and deceptive trade practices against the

shareholder defendants whom the plaintiffs have alleged entered into a

conspiracy with the other defendants to commit tortious and quasi-tortious

acts. The exception of no right of action should not have been sustained as

to these claims, none of which contain as an element the existence of a

fiduciary duty, or the plaintiffs’ derivative claims on behalf of LNC.

We therefore find that the trial court did not err in sustaining the

shareholder defendants’ exception of no right of action as to the plaintiffs’

claim against their fellow shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.

However, the trial court did err in granting the shareholder defendants’

exception of no right of action as to all other claims asserted by the

plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, that part of the trial court’s ruling

sustaining the exception of no right of action as to all of the plaintiffs’ claims

except their claim against the shareholder defendants for breach of fiduciary

duty is reversed; the trial court’s ruling granting the no right of action

exception is affirmed as to the plaintiffs’ claim against the shareholder

defendants for breach of fiduciary duty. We amend the “Amended

Judgment” of January 21, 2026, as follows:

We hereby DELETE Paragraph Five which provides:

As such, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED

that the individual Shareholder Defendants: Abraham Nouri

Hakim, Leah Raquel Hakim Goldenberg, Jack Allen Hakim,

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Abraham Joeseph (sic) Hakim, Louise Hakim Moore, Kay

Hakin Lahasky, and Hannah Hakim Jones, are DISMISSED

with prejudice at Plaintiffs’ cost.

And REPLACE Paragraph Five with:

As such, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED

that the peremptory exception of no right of action filed by the

shareholder defendants is granted only as to the plaintiffs’ claim

for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the shareholders.

The exception is denied as to all other claims asserted by the

plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ claim against the shareholder

defendants for breach of fiduciary duty is hereby dismissed

with prejudice.

Costs are assessed to the parties equally.

REVERSED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART, AND, AS AMENDED,

AFFIRMED.

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