Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 57,067-CA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
O’NEAL CHIROPRACTIC Plaintiff-Appellee HEALTH CENTER, L.L.C.
versus
CHRISTINE D. KNADLER FOX Defendant-Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
Bossier City Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 105805
Honorable Santi A. Parks, Judge
*****
LAW OFFICE OF DICK “DAVE” Counsel for Appellant KNADLER, LLC
By: Dick “Dave” Knadler
JEFFREY LEE LITTLE Counsel for Appellee
*****
Before STONE, COX, and ROBINSON, JJ.
STONE, J.
This appeal arises from the Bossier City Court, the Honorable Santi A.
Parks presiding. The plaintiff-appellee, O’Neal Chiropractic Health Center,
L.L.C. (the “plaintiff” or “OCHC”),1 sued Ms. Christine Fox (“Ms. Fox” or
the “defendant”) on open account for chiropractic services rendered. Ms.
Fox, in February 2022, was treated for injuries after a car wreck and did not
pay the bill that she owed to OCHC. On December 20, 2024, the plaintiff
sent her a demand letter pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2781. On January 22, 2025,
OCHC filed the instant petition. The defendant filed an exception of
prescription, which the trial court denied. After a bench trial on March 2,
2026, the trial court awarded OCHC a $7,235 money judgment against Ms.
Fox (consisting of $1,075 in damages and $6,160 in attorney fees, plus
interest thereon). Ms. Fox appeals, arguing that the trial court: (1) erred in
denying her exception of prescription; (2) committed manifest error in
finding that the plaintiff proved its open account claim; and (3) erred in that
the amount sought is uncollectable because it is based on the unlicensed
practice of chiropractic, and therefore, an absolute nullity. The plaintiff has
answered the appeal, requesting additional attorney fees for defending the
trial court judgment against this appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm the trial court judgment and amend it to award additional attorney
fees.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Fox was in a car wreck that occurred on November 18, 2021. She
filed a lawsuit against the parties responsible, and the plaintiff claims
1
Dr. Edmund O’Neal (“Dr. O’Neal”), a licensed chiropractor, is the owner and operator of OCHC.
entitlement to be paid from the settlement funds from her personal injury
suit. Ms. Fox’s attorney representing her in this matter also represented her
in the personal injury case and has the disputed funds in his client trust
account.
Originally, Ms. Fox went to Dr. Brian Tassin (“Dr. Tassin”) for
chiropractic treatment after her vehicle accident. However, because he
would be unavailable for all of February of 2022, Dr. Tassin referred her to
Dr. O’Neal, owner of OCHC. Dr. O’Neal treated Ms. Fox four times that
month and billed her afterward, but she refused to pay, even after agreeing in
writing to do so.
At trial, OCHC submitted documentary evidence showing that Ms.
Fox agreed to pay OCHC for the services rendered to her. Ms. Fox denied
memory of all the signatures on all the paperwork and medical records
associated with her treatment at OCHC and further denied that they were
authentic based on her own analysis of the handwriting. Despite her alleged
inability to remember any of her signatures on any of the documents, Ms.
Fox claimed to remember in detail all her treatments and the dates thereof.
Her testimony on these points was self-serving. She claimed that (1) she
went to OCHC on February 25, 2022, but was not treated that day; (2) Dr.
O’Neal did not do a physical examination of her, or monitor or supervise his
employees as they administered ancillary treatment to her, namely: (i)
situating Ms. Fox on the traction table and turning it on, (ii) applying moist
heating packs to her affected areas, (iii) attaching the sticky pads for
electrostimulation therapy, and (iv) situating Ms. Fox in the spinal
decompression machine (which Ms. Fox described as the “stretchy neck
machine”). Dr. O’Neal testified that he trained, supervised, and monitored
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all such treatments administered by his employees, that he did perform a
physical examination on her, and that she did receive treatment as billed on
February 25, 2022.
Plaintiff’s counsel substantially impeached Ms. Fox’s testimony.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit G is a chain of email correspondence between OCHC and
Ms. Fox. On February 21, 2022, OCHC sent an email requesting that Ms.
Fox print and fill out the attached forms: vehicle accident information,
concurrence and acknowledgement, and payment policy. Apparently having
received no response, OCHC sent the request and the attachments again on
March 8, 2022. Ms. Fox responded, asking for the forms again on Thursday,
March 31, 2022. On Friday, April 1, 2022, Ms. Fox emailed OCHC that she
would complete the forms and deliver them on Monday, i.e., April 4, 2023.
The completed forms bearing Ms. Fox’s signatures were dated Sunday, April
3, 2022. Prior to being shown these emails, Ms. Fox scoffed at the idea that
her signatures on these documents were authentic and reasoned that she
obviously did not go to OCHC to fill out forms on a Sunday while they were
closed.2 Below are the relevant forms that Ms. Fox executed:
2
Plaintiff’s Exhibit F is a letter to Ms. Fox from her attorney, dated August 17, 2023, regarding the disbursements, claims on, and balance of her settlement proceeds. The letter reflects OCHC’s bill of $1,075 and states that upon conclusion of the contingency fee matter, counsel would provide Ms. Fox with a statement of monies collected and expenses paid “to include medical costs” as stated in the contingency fee agreement.
3
4
5
When asked why she did not want to pay OCHC, Ms. Fox originally
explained that it was because she had assumed her payment to Dr. Tassin
exhausted her medical liabilities.
During the trial, Ms. Fox apparently began sobbing when she
allegedly learned for the first time that the OCHC employees – who attached
sticky pads for electrostimulation therapy, gave her heat packs to apply, and
situated her in the spinal decompression machine and on the traction table –
were not licensed chiropractors. She indicated she would not have put
herself in such “jeopardy” had she known these employees were not licensed
chiropractors. The trial court would not have erred in regarding this as mere
performative histrionics, especially given that the trial took place more than
4 years after Ms. Fox’s last treatment at OCHC.
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of OCHC and issued written reasons for judgment.
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant. According to Ms. Fox, OCHC only treated her
through non-chiropractor employees. She also alleges she was only treated
three times, while the account statement asserts she was treated on four
separate days. The defendant denies (1) there was ever an agreement that
she would pay OCHC for the services he rendered to her; (2) that O’Neal
ever performed a physical examination on her (for which she was billed);
and (3) the authenticity of her signature on the above documents dated April
3, 2022. The defendant also expends a few sentences contending that the
plaintiff had no contract with her but, instead, was an apparent subcontractor
of Dr. Tassin.
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The defendant further contends that, because none of the plaintiff’s
employees were licensed chiropractors, she should not have to pay for the
services Dr. O’Neal provided through them as such vitiated her consent (i.e.,
fraud or error) and, further, violated La. R.S. 37:2805 (i.e., prohibition on
unlicensed practice of chiropractic medicine) and La. R.S. 37:1284
(prohibition on certain billing practices); she references the definition of
chiropractic services in La. R.S. 37:2805 as the proper metric.
She also argued that there was no meeting of the minds because she
was never given a price before accepting the services, citing La. C.C. art.
1927 and Bieber-Guillory v. Aswell, 723 So. 2d 1145, 1149 (La. App. 3 Cir.
12/30/98). On this basis, she asserts there never was an enforceable contract
or open account, and, therefore, a shorter prescriptive period is applicable
and expired before suit was filed, asserting applicability of La. R.S. 9:5701.
In the alternative, the defendant argues that even if she is liable for
part of the debt alleged, she cannot be liable for attorney fees because the
amount claimed was incorrect, citing Irwin Brown Co. v. Morton’s Auction
Exch., 446 So. 2d 403 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff-appellee. OCHC emphasizes that the standard of review is
manifest error, and that the trial court had a reasonable evidentiary basis for
crediting his version of the facts over that of the defendant. The court found
that the billing was accurate based on the billing records themselves and
corroboration thereof via correspondence with defendant’s personal injury
attorney (with respect to plaintiff’s claim against the settlement funds).
Answer to appeal. The plaintiff requests that the judgment amount be
increased to include additional attorney fees incurred in opposing this
appeal.
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
General precepts
La. C.C. art. 1831 generally allocates the burden of proof regarding
conventional obligations in litigation as follows:
A party who demands performance of an obligation must
prove the existence of the obligation.
A party who asserts that an obligation is null, or that it has
been modified or extinguished, must prove the facts or
acts giving rise to the nullity, modification, or extinction.
Guide Co., LLC v. Madison Par. Hosp. Serv. Dist., 56,469 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11/26/25), 425 So. 3d 426, 444, writ granted, 25-01630 (La. 5/12/26), 432
So. 3d 745.
Most of the defendant’s assignments of error attack the trial court’s
rejection of her testimony as incredible and crediting of the plaintiff’s
evidence. These are findings of fact subject to manifest error review. The
Louisiana Supreme Court “has stated a two-part test for the reversal of a
factfinder’s determinations: 1) the appellate court must find from the record
that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court,
and 2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes
that the finding is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.” Read v.
Willwoods Cmty., 14-1475 (La. 3/17/15), 165 So. 3d 883, 888. Manifest
error review requires great deference to the factfinder’s decisions regarding
witness credibility. However, if documents or objective evidence so
contradict the witness’s story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent
or implausible on its face, that a reasonable factfinder would not credit the
witness’s story, the court of appeal may find manifest error regarding a
finding purportedly based on a credibility determination. Lam ex rel. Lam v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 05-1139 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So. 2d 133; New
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South Communications v. Wright, 35,442 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/28/01), 803 So.
2d 1103.
Questions of law are reviewed de novo, i.e., without deference to the
trial court. Ballard’s Inc. v. N. Am. Land Dev. Corp., 28,437 (La. App. 2 Cir.
6/26/96), 677 So. 2d 648.
Exception of prescription
Open account claims are subject to 3-year liberative prescription. La.
C.C. art. 3494(4). The last amendment to this provision predates the instant
matter by several years. The defendant asserts that the applicable
prescriptive period is one year. This is incorrect. The applicable period is
three years. La. C.C. art. 3494(4). OCHC filed suit on filed January 22,
2025, which is less than three years since the earliest time that Dr. O’Neal
treated the defendant. This assignment is without merit and is denied.
Licensing requirements
Subject to exclusions not relevant here, La. R.S. 37:2801(3)(a) defines
the “Practice of chiropractic” as:
[H]olding one’s self out to the public as a chiropractor and
as being engaged in the business of, or the actual
engagement in, the diagnosing of conditions associated
with the functional integrity of the spine and treating by
adjustment, manipulation, and the use of the physical and
other properties of heat, light, water, electricity, sound,
massage, therapeutic exercise, mobilization, mechanical
devices such as mechanical traction and mechanical
massage, and other physical rehabilitation measures for
the purpose of correcting interference with normal nerve
transmission and expression. A chiropractor may also
make recommendations relative to personal hygiene and
proper nutritional practices for the rehabilitation of the
patient. A chiropractor may also order such diagnostic tests
as are necessary for determining conditions associated
with the functional integrity of the spine.
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La. R.S. 37:2805(A)(1) prohibits the practice of chiropractic by anyone
without a license.3
The defendant had the burden of proving the facts on which her claim
of nullity is based, i.e., that unlicensed employees performed “chiropractic
services” on her which did require a personal license even though Dr.
O’Neal, a licensed chiropractor, supervised and monitored these employees
in the provision of these services. Resolution of this issue also involves a
question of law – do the relevant facts, as supported by the evidence,
demonstrate unlicensed practice of chiropractic?
The only instance wherein a chiropractic employee is required under
the Chiropractic Act (La. R.S. 37:2801 et seq.) to have a certification is in
administering X-rays.4 La. R.S. 37:2828 and 2830. Nothing in the
Chiropractic Act prohibits a licensed chiropractor from performing certain
ancillary treatments through employees under his supervision. The tasks
done by O’Neal employees were: situating the patient on the traction table
and turning it on, applying moist heating packs, attaching the sticky pads for
electrostimulation, and situating the patient in the spinal decompression
machine. Dr. O’Neal testified that he trained, supervised, and monitored all
such treatments administered by his employees. Had the legislature intended
to prohibit uncertified or unlicensed chiropractic employees from
performing these tasks even with such training, supervision, and monitoring,
it would have been clear about it, as with X-rays. Furthermore, Dr. Tassin
3
La. R.S. 37:2828 requires certification of chiropractic assistants before they may legally perform X-rays on patients. La. R.S. 37:2830 exempts or “grandfathers in” assistants who were already performing X-rays before the passage of La. R.S. 37:2828.
4
The trial court correctly rejected the defendant’s testimony regarding the details of her treatment at O’Neal Chiropractic (which she claimed to recall clearly while denying recollection of signing any documents at all).
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and Dr. O’Neal testified that such is ordinary in the practice of chiropractic.
Their testimonies reflect not only the correct interpretation of the
Chiropractic Act, but also, the sound policy of allowing licensed
professionals to responsibly delegate certain tasks to employees under the
professional’s supervision. This assignment of error is without merit and is
rejected.
Open account
In relevant part, La. R.S. 9:2781, the open account statute, provides:
A. When any person fails to pay an open account within thirty days
after the claimant sends written demand therefor correctly setting
forth the amount owed, that person shall be liable to the claimant
for reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution and collection of
such claim when judgment on the claim is rendered in favor of the
claimant. Citation and service of a petition shall be deemed written
demand for the purpose of this Section. If the claimant and his
attorney have expressly agreed that the debtor shall be liable for the
claimant’s attorney fees in a fixed or determinable amount, the
claimant is entitled to that amount when judgment on the claim is
rendered in favor of the claimant. Receipt of written demand by the
person is not required.
B. If the demand is forwarded to the person by first class
mail to his last known address, a copy of the demand shall
be introduced as evidence of written demand on the
debtor.
C. If the demand is made by citation and service of a
petition, the person shall be entitled to pay the account
without attorney fees by delivering payment to the
claimant or the claimant’s attorney within ten days after
service of the petition in city courts and fifteen days after
service of the petition in all other courts.
D. For the purposes of this Section and Code of Civil
Procedure Articles 1702 and 4916, “open account”
includes any account for which a part or all of the balance
is past due, whether or not the account reflects one or
more transactions and whether or not at the time of
contracting the parties expected future transactions. “Open
account” shall include debts incurred for professional
services, including but not limited to legal and medical
services. For the purposes of this Section only, attorney
fees shall be paid on open accounts owed to the state.
(Emphasis added.)
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To make a prima facie case under La. R.S. 9:2781, the plaintiff must
introduce a statement of the account and an affidavit or testimony attesting
to the correctness thereof. Sessions & Fishman v. Liquid Air Corp., 616 So.
2d 1254, 1258 (La. 1993). A creditor whose judgment is affirmed on appeal
is entitled to additional attorney fees for defending against the debtor’s
appeal. Ballard’s Inc. v. N. Am. Land Dev. Corp, supra.
The trial court did not commit manifest error in finding the existence
of an open account. The plaintiff introduced prima facie evidence of an
open account, especially considering the language emphasized above in La.
R.S. 9:2781. Ms. Fox’s testimony was particularly incredible, as outlined
earlier in this opinion. There are no grounds for disturbing the trial court’s
credibility determinations or other factual findings.
Additional attorney fees
La. R.S. 9:2781(A) states that the trial court “shall” award reasonable
attorney fees to a successful claimant “for the prosecution and collection of
such claim when judgment on the claim is rendered in favor of the
claimant.” This includes attorney fees for defending a favorable judgment
on appeal. The plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees for this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED and AMENDED
strictly to increase the attorney fee award from $6,160 to $8,560. All costs
of this appeal are taxed to the appellant.
AFFIRMED AND AMENDED.
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