Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 57,029-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
BRANDON WAYNE LINDSEY Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 394,124
Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant By: Douglas Daniel Brown
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON
ERIC MATTHEW WHITEHEAD
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before STONE, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.
STONE, J.
This appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Chris Victory presiding. A jury found Brandon Lindsey (the “defendant”)
guilty of the second degree murder of Heaven Weed (“Heaven”) and he was
sentenced to imprisonment for life. The defendant appeals his conviction,
arguing that the trial court erred in allowing introduction of propensity
evidence, and that such was not a harmless error. For the reasons stated
herein, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.
Facts and procedural history
The defendant, Brandon Lindsey, lived with his girlfriend/murder
victim, Heaven. On the night of March 1, 2023, they went to the Sand Bar
in downtown Shreveport and had a conflict that “was becoming physical”
according to security staff who made them leave and further banned them
for 48 hours. The couple returned to Heaven’s house (the crime scene). By
the next day, Heaven’s mother, Chasity Weed (“Chasity”), became
concerned when Heaven did not answer her phone or return her calls within
usual timing. Chasity went to Heaven’s house to check on her. She testified
that when she arrived, the defendant told her, with a “carefree” demeanor,
that Heaven was “messed up.” The mother found her daughter in bed,
unconscious and wrapped in a blanket with her entire face swollen and blood
coming out of her mouth. Chasity took her daughter to the hospital where
she was put on life support. The defendant did not accompany them. Eight
days later, Heaven was pronounced braindead and taken off life support.
The coroner ruled Heaven’s death a homicide and found that the cause of
death was closed-head trauma resulting in a brain hemorrhage. Heaven also had two broken ribs and what appeared to have been an abrasion on her neck
from a garrote, in addition to bruises all over her body. She also had dirt and
leaves in her hair.
The crime scene investigation revealed an attempted cover-up. The
interior of the house had a strong odor of bleach. Blood spatters were found
in multiple places throughout the house. There were bloody clothes near the
washing machine and the in the trashcan. Heaven’s blood was found on the
defendant’s jeans, boxer briefs, and shirt. Inside the washing machine,
police found a pillow with Heaven’s blood on it, and a washcloth with her
blood on the floor of her bedroom. The clothes that the defendant wore on
March 1, 2023, at the Sand Bar were covered in Heaven’s blood. The
defendant’s DNA was found mixed with Heaven’s blood on defendant’s grey
shirt.
The defendant’s hands were swollen and bruised when they were
photographed on March 3, 2023. He blamed this on blocking a punch that
Heaven’s recent ex-boyfriend, Stephen Morgan, had thrown at his head four
days earlier.1 Per its internal GPS records, his work truck was parked at
Heaven’s house from 7:48 P.M. on March 1, 2023, to 11:07 A.M. on March
2, 2023. At that latter time, he drove to work but returned to Heaven’s
residence less than an hour later, having been excused from work after
claiming he was “sick.” He arrived back at Heaven’s house at 11:55 A.M.
and stayed until 8:00 P.M. (on March 2, 2023). His cellphone location
coincided with the truck’s location that entire time. He lied to the police,
first claiming that he had gone back to Heaven’s residence after being
1
Morgan was called as a witness by the prosecution.
2
ejected from the Sand Bar, then to work around 8:00 A.M. the next morning,
and did not return to her residence until that afternoon. However, when
confronted with his truck’s GPS information, the defendant claimed that he
dropped off the truck at Heaven’s house then went to his residence on his
motorcycle, then to work. His cellphone and truck location records
contradict this explanation.
Pursuant to La. C.E. art. 412.4, the prosecution introduced the
testimony of the defendant’s ex-girlfriend, Haley Hudson (“Ms. Hudson”),
whom he was with intermittently for seven years and shared a daughter. She
reported that initially, things were great between them, but later ― on
multiple occasions ― the defendant brutally battered her. She acutely
associated his consumption of drugs and alcohol with his violence.
Throughout the course of domestic beatings, Ms. Hudson’s injuries included
fractured facial bones, broken ribs, knocked-out teeth, a broken jaw, and
chronic seizures from head trauma. The defendant repeatedly gave Ms.
Hudson black eyes while she was pregnant. She reported that, to conceal
what the defendant was doing to her, she lied to her boss about why she was
frequently going to work with black eyes and other facial bruises. Ms.
Hudson’s boss, however, was not deceived and eventually terminated her
employment once the defendant started showing up at the workplace.
On one occasion, the defendant dragged Ms. Hudson around the house
by the hair while their child was watching and crying. This left her with a
permanent bald spot where the defendant ripped out her hair. She sought
refuge in her parents’ house in flight from this particular beating. Once
inside her parents’ home, with her face covered in bruises and blood and
blood on her clothing, she locked the door, warned them “he’s outside,” as
3
she asked them to call 9-1-1. The defendant followed her there and went
inside their house unwelcome. She had her first seizure in the hospital later
that day.
The defendant went to jail multiple times for these crimes, and Ms.
Hudson reported that the only time she got a reprieve from the defendant
beating her was while the defendant was in jail. She also reported that the
defendant gaslighted her into thinking she was the problem, told people that
she was crazy (as a way of discrediting her), and that he got angry when
denied “control.” Ms. Hudson cried throughout most of her testimony. This
seven-year period began in 2010. It ended when defendant got a 4-year
sentence for the abovementioned unauthorized entry.
Pursuant to the La. C.E. art. 403 balance test, the defense
unsuccessfully objected at the Prieur hearing, arguing that the unfair
prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative
value. However, trial counsel neither asked for cautionary instructions when
this evidence was introduced at trial, nor in the jury charge at the end of the
trial. Likewise, the defendant’s trial counsel did not cross-examine Ms.
Hudson.
In the closing argument, the prosecution argued that what the
defendant did to Ms. Hudson, he did to Heaven in killing her. The defense
made no contemporaneous objection, despite its contention on appeal that
this use of the La. C.E. art. 412.4 evidence (particularly Ms. Hudson’s
testimony) varied from the use for which the trial court allowed it to be
admitted.
4
Assignment of error
The defense asserts that (1) the trial court erred in admitting the La.
C.E. art. 412.4 evidence; and (2) that such was not a harmless error,
especially given the lack of cautionary instructions, prosecution’s use of the
evidence in closing argument, and the time gap between the offenses against
Ms. Hudson and the present offense.
Arguments
Defense. The defense argues, without citing any jurisprudential
authority, that the La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1)(a) prohibition on propensity
evidence remains operative even when the evidence would meet the
elements of La. C.E. art. 412.4. From that premise, the defense argues that
whatever permissible use of the evidence that may remain after applying art.
404(B)(1)(a) is nonetheless excluded pursuant to La. C.E. art. 403.
The defense also makes a few subsidiary arguments, namely that (1)
because this supposed error has constitutional ramifications, it is subject to
de novo review, not abuse of discretion review, citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 20, 87 S. Ct. 824, 826 (1967),2 and, regardless, this
was an abuse of discretion; and (2) the right to raise on appeal the issues of
lack of cautionary instructions and allegedly improper closing argument is
preserved notwithstanding trial counsel’s failure to contemporaneously
request cautionary instructions or object, citing State v. Prieur, and the error
patent rule.
2
This case does not support the defendant’s appeal. It holds that a violation of the defendant’s federal constitutional rights in a criminal case must be proved “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” for a conviction to avoid reversal on that ground.
5
Prosecution. The state argues that La. C.E. art. 412.4 is an exception
to La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1)(a) exclusion of propensity evidence, and that the
defendant’s domestic violence history is of “stratospheric” probative value
as propensity evidence, and that the legislation would be internally
contradictory if La. C.E. art. 412.4 evidence were per se unfairly prejudicial.
Law
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v.
Bradley, 53,550 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So. 3d 369.
“Second degree murder is the killing of a human being…[w]hen the
offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La.
R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). “Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which
exists when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. Intent
may be inferred from the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal
conclusion to be resolved by the finder of fact.” State v. Govan, 593 So. 2d
833, 835 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 654 (La. 1992).
Specific intent to kill is unnecessary for second degree murder. It is
sufficient for second degree murder that the defendant has the specific intent
to cause great bodily harm. The courts of this state have repeatedly found
that unarmed beatings are sufficient evidence of intent to cause great bodily
harm. State v. Daigle, 440 So. 2d 230, 232 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1983), writ
denied, 444 So. 2d 123 (La. 1984); State v. Terrick, 03-515 (La. App. 5 Cir.
9/30/03), 857 So. 2d 1153, 1156, writ denied, 03-3272 (La. 3/26/04), 871 So.
2d 346; State v. Buchanon, 95-0625 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96), 673 So. 2d
663, 666, writ denied, 96-1411 (La. 12/6/96), 684 So. 2d 923; State v.
Govan, supra.
6
‘“Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” La. C.E. art. 401. (Emphasis added.) “All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, the Constitution of Louisiana, this Code of Evidence, or other
legislation. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” La. C.E. art.
402.
La. C.E. art. 403 establishes a balancing test by which relevant
evidence may be excluded:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of
time. (Emphasis added.)
“The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the
capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into
declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S. Ct. 644,
650, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1997). The Louisiana Supreme Court quoted this
language with approval in State v. Rose, 06-0402 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So. 2d
1236, 1243. Thus, propensity evidence, by definition, is unfairly prejudicial
because it is not “proof specific to the offense charged.”
In accordance with that recognition, La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1)(a) states:
“evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
7
mistake or accident.” (Emphasis added.) “Even when the other crimes
evidence is offered for a purpose allowed under art. 404(B)(1), the evidence
is not admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue or to rebut a
defendant’s defense.” State v. Rose, supra.
However, this rule of La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1)(a) categorically
excluding propensity evidence has been made subject to exceptions “as
otherwise provided by law.” Id. Enacted in 2016, La. C.E. art. 412.4(A)
does just that. In relevant part, it states:
When an accused is charged with a crime involving
abusive behavior against a…household member, or dating
partner…evidence of the accused’s commission of another
crime, wrong, or act involving assaultive behavior against
a…household member, or dating partner…may be
admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant, subject to the balancing test
provided in Article 403. (Emphasis added.)
The appellate courts of this state have recognized that La. C.E. art. 412.4
comes within the exceptions to the general prohibition of La. C.E. art.
404(B):
La. C.E. art. 412.4 is intended to be an exception to La.
C.E. art. 404(B)(1)…La. C.E. art. 412.4 permits the
admission of other incidents of domestic abuse for any
relevant purpose including the defendant’s character and
his acts in conformity therewith, subject only to the
balancing test established by La. C.E. art. 403. Simmons,
332 So.3d at 162; Jones, 346 So.3d at 345; Porter, 279
So.3d at 1021. (Emphasis in original.)
State v. Breaux, 22-581 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/10/23), 366 So. 3d 727, 736. The
permissive language of La. C.E. art. 412.4(A) (i.e., “may be admissible”) has
two important effects: (1) removes the prophylaxis of La. C.E. art.
404(B)(1)(a); and (2) allows La. C.E. art. 403 to retain its full force. It does
not create a presumption of admissibility.
8
State v. Rose, supra, was decided before La. C.E. 412.4 was enacted;
La. C.E. arts. 404(B) and 403 were the governing rules. The trial court
admitted prior crimes evidence as modus operandi tending to prove the
defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. The Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that, in the prosecution for the second degree murder of
the defendant’s second wife (committed November 2003), the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant’s (1) prior
conviction of manslaughter in the homicide of his first wife (committed
November 1991); (2) his earlier conviction of aggravated assault with a
firearm against his first wife (convicted 1990) wherein he claimed she
brandished a gun first, whereupon he opened fire on her; and (3) his prior
arrest for domestic battery of his second wife (August 2003), wherein he
struck her and left bruises on her face. The court held that the strong
similarity between the offenses tended to prove via modus operandi the
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, i.e., his pattern of murdering his
partially estranged wives amid conflict and anger. He killed his first wife by
stabbing her (and claimed self-defense), while the second wife was
strangled. Both homicides occurred inside the defendant’s home and were
presaged by earlier criminally violent episodes and argument with the victim
the day of the homicide. After both homicides and the domestic battery, the
defendant fled authorities, but then reversed course and surrendered to the
police. This case is noteworthy because it considered this modus
operandi/identity purpose for the evidence as, somehow, distinct from a
propensity purpose, and because it was decided before La. C.E. art. 412.4
was enacted. While State v. Rose, supra, may arguably have
mischaracterized propensity evidence (inadmissible at that time) as evidence
9
of modus operandi (potentially admissible then), it does teach a clear point
of wisdom: a finding of unfair prejudice substantially outweighing probative
value may be difficult indeed where the alleged prior conduct is
substantiated by a conviction. Such satisfactorily mutes the risk that
unreliable, unproven, unadjudicated, or theretofore unreported prior acts will
lure the jury into a guilty verdict.
Analysis
The defense’s legal argument that the general prohibition of La. C.E.
art. 404(B)(1)(a) is applicable to La. C.E. art. 412.4 evidence, if accepted,
would nullify the deference clause in the former and the entirety of the latter.
State v. Breaux, supra, is persuasive indeed. We reject this legal argument
by the defense.
We turn now to the La. C.E. art. 403 balancing test. The defendant’s
repeated prior acts of beating Ms. Hudson, his former live-in girlfriend (and
his four related convictions) show a pattern of ― and a propensity to ―
savage but unarmed violence against women, namely, his dating partners. It
takes a special kind of “man” to perpetrate such a robust pattern of evil, and
the prior girlfriend-beating evidence shows that the defendant is ― or at
least was ― that kind of special. None of the other evidence proves that
particular point.
Nonetheless, Ms. Hudson’s testimony, if sought to be introduced alone
into an evidentiary vacuum to prove that the defendant is the murderer,
would indeed be inadmissible. However, such is counterfactual here. The
probative value of La. C.E. art. 412.4 evidence must be evaluated in light of
all the other evidence. Even without the La. C.E. art. 412.4 evidence, there
is amply sufficient evidence in this case to, in the mind of a reasonable juror,
10
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the murderer. Without
the La. C.E. art. 412.4 evidence, it is nonetheless clear that (1) someone beat
Heaven to death; (2) someone tried to destroy evidence at the crime scene;
(3) the defendant’s truck and cellphone were at the crime scene for the entire
time frame in which the murder occurred, except for part of the 11 o’clock
hour of that morning; (4) the defendant lied to the police regarding his
whereabouts during the time frame in which the murder occurred; (5) the
defendant’s DNA was found mixed with Heaven’s blood at the crime scene
and his clothing had the victim’s blood on it; (6) the defendant’s hands were
bruised and swollen the day after the murder; (7) the defendant was
captured on security video fighting with Heaven at the Sand Bar intensely
enough to get them both ejected from the bar and banned for 48 hours ―
and this was only hours to minutes before she received her fatal beating; (8)
the defendant was the only person present when Chasity arrived at Heaven’s
house and discovered she had been brutalized, and he knew Heaven had
been brutalized as he told Chasity that Heaven was “messed up”; (9) the
defendant declined to bring or accompany his girlfriend to the emergency
room or call an ambulance for her; (10) Stephen Morgan’s DNA was not
found at the crime scene, nor was there any evidence that he had been at the
crime scene during the relevant time frame. Given all of the other evidence,
Ms. Hudson’s testimony has extremely high probative value in identifying
the defendant as the murderer, as it shows that the murder of Heaven fit
exactly into his longstanding pattern of extreme domestic violence. It turns
a body of circumstantial evidence into a compelling and intuitive narrative
story.
11
Thus, the question becomes whether that probative value is
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Propensity
evidence is, by definition, unfairly prejudicial because it invites the jury to
conclude “guilt on grounds other than proof specific to the offense charged.”
Old Chief, supra; State v. Rose, supra. In other words, it invites the jury to
infer that “the defendant is the kind of person who would do something like
this; therefore, he must have done it in this case.” Ordinarily such evidence
is per se inadmissible under La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1)(a). However, when
legislatively authorized, propensity evidence cannot be treated as
categorically manifesting unfair prejudice that requires exclusion. For better
or worse, our legislature has chosen to make exceptions for certain
categories of particularly reprehensible conduct, such as the defendant’s
beatings of Ms. Hudson.
Crucially, at trial, the defendant did not contest the truthfulness of any
of the propensity evidence. This is not a case where the propensity evidence
is testimony alleging conduct that was never reported to police, or that was
never prosecuted; on the contrary, the defendant pled guilty to three crimes
against Haley Hudson: (1) on March 30, 2011, simple battery, sentenced to
60 days’ incarceration, suspended; (2) on July 20, 2011, domestic abuse
battery,3 sentenced to 8 months’ incarceration, suspended; (3) on August 29,
2012, second degree battery,4 sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration. She
also alluded to his conviction (for attempted unauthorized entry into an
inhabited dwelling) for which he received a 4-year sentence; this conviction
3
The original charge was domestic abuse battery.
4
The original charge was aggravated second degree battery with a dangerous weapon, an iron, by which he inflicted serious bodily harm.
12
was predicated on him following Ms. Hudson into her parents’ house when
she fled from him after the episode wherein he dragged her by her hair.5 The
documentation of these convictions was provided to the court in hearing the
defense objection (outside the presence of the jury) but was not introduced
into evidence. The trial court’s decision to admit Ms. Hudson’s testimony is
substantially supported by this corroboration of her testimony. Combined
with the defendant’s failure to controvert Ms. Hudson’s testimony, such
official corroboration ― in the form of defendant’s guilty pleas ― of her
testimony powerfully mitigates the risk of false, unsubstantiated, and/or
previously unreported allegations unfairly prejudicing the jury.
Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that a lack of reliability is not the
only unfair prejudice can result from propensity evidence. It can also come
from other factors, including the relative age and emotional impact of the
evidence, the propensity inference itself, a lack of similarity between the
charged offense and the prior acts, and whether the evidence of the prior act
is direct or weak and circumstantial. In this case, the most relevant of those
factors is the emotional impact. Although Ms. Hudson’s testimony was
entirely credible, the facts described in her testimony are extremely
inflammatory. They quite naturally evoke a strong emotional reaction, not
only against the defendant, but, also, against the criminal justice system for
5
Ms. Hudson stated only that the defendant went to jail for four years as a result of the episode. In the Prieur hearing and in appellate brief, the defense argues that this evidence does not fit the elements of La. C.E. art. 412.4 because attempted unauthorized entry into an inhabited dwelling does not have an element of “abusive behavior.” However, that qualification applies to the instant offense, not the prior act evidence. The qualification for the prior “crimes, wrongs, or acts” is that they must “involve assaultive behavior.” Clearly, the defendant’s attempted or actual entry into Ms. Hudson’s parents’ home when he pursued her as she fled from him and sought refuge there is part of the assaultive episode wherein he beat her and dragged her by her hair. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ms. Hudson’s testimony indicating that the defendant went to jail for four years as a result of this criminal episode.
13
letting him go free so quickly after those atrocities. Nonetheless, the
defendant himself brazenly created the very facts making that influence
manifest, and, although perhaps not rising to the level of distinctiveness
required for modus operandi, the prior acts are similar enough to each other
and the charged offense to mitigate unfair prejudice. Moreover, Ms.
Hudson’s testimony was keenly direct proof of the defendant’s prior acts and
was based on personal experience rather than mere observation. There is,
emphatically, no inferential leap needed to conclude the defendant
committed the prior acts from her testimony.
The heightened reliability of Ms. Hudson’s testimony, combined with
the similarities between the crimes, requires us to hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in holding the unfair prejudice does not substantially
outweigh the probative value of Ms. Hudson’s testimony.
CONCLUSION
The defendant’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
14