Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,992-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
DERRICK DEONE MORRIS Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 405,929
Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND Counsel for Appellant WRIT SERVICE
By: Remy V. Starns
Michael A. Mitchell
Douglas D. Brown
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
MARGARET E. RICHIE GASKINS
COURTNEY RAY
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.
THOMPSON, J.
“… [H]e ain’t gonna come in there and smother me with a pillow,”
was the reason given by a hospitalized shooting victim for why he provided
false information about who shot him – to buy safety and time to heal. His
fear remained palpable when he was released from the hospital days later
and, rather than returning home, hid away in a hotel room. Shortly
thereafter, the victim acknowledged to law enforcement he had always
known the identity of the shooter and identified the defendant, Derrick
Morris, someone he had known for many years. Morris was subsequently
charged with attempted second degree murder, and following a jury trial,
was convicted by a unanimous jury of the responsive verdict of attempted
manslaughter. After being adjudicated a second felony habitual offender,
Morris was sentenced to the maximum sentence of 40 years at hard labor,
without benefit or probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Morris now
appeals his conviction and sentence. For reasons fully detailed below, we
affirm the conviction and amend the sentence to delete the portion restricting
the benefit of parole, and in all other respects affirm the sentence as
amended.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 19, 2024, the Shreveport Police Department responded to
multiple calls reporting a shooting on the 100 block of Ute Trail in
Shreveport. Officer Ashley Heflin, a patrol officer with SPD, testified at
trial that she responded to the scene at the Northwood II Apartment
Complex, but that there were no eyewitnesses to the shooting. While on
scene she observed a black male covered in blood lying on the ground by a
dumpster. Officer Heflin testified that the victim, who was later identified as Willis, was not breathing, had no pulse, and was unconscious. Officer
Helfin testified that while she was rendering aid to Willis, she observed two
gunshot wounds, one in each of Willis’ thighs. Officer Heflin and a first
responder from Shreveport Fire Department who had arrived on scene
applied tourniquets to Willis’ legs, which allowed him to regain
consciousness. Officer Heflin explained that Willis was agitated when he
regained consciousness, and his mental state was altered; he was unable to
provide a statement to the first responders at the scene. Willis was
transferred to Ochsner LSU Hospital where he received life-saving
emergency surgery. Officer Heflin’s body camera footage captured the
response to the scene and was introduced into evidence and played for the
jury at trial.
Approximately one week after the shooting, and after intentionally
naming other innocent or random parties while hospitalized, Willis finally
did identify the defendant, Derrick Deone Morris, as his shooter to the
police. SPD issued an arrest warrant for Morris, who was ultimately
arrested in December 2024. On February 26, 2025, Morris was charged with
one count of attempted second degree murder. A jury trial was held on
September 22-23, 2025. The following facts were established at trial:
Sergeant Donald Belanger, Jr., a detective with the robbery/homicide
unit of SPD, investigated the scene of the shooting. Sgt. Belanger testified
that Willis had already been transported to the hospital by the time he
arrived on the scene. Sgt. Belanger observed a blood trail from a white
Chevrolet Impala that belonged to Willis, then 10-15 feet away in a grassy
area, and then back to the vehicle, leading him to believe Willis stumbled a
few feet away from the vehicle and then came back and collapsed. No shell
2
casings were recovered at the crime scene, indicating the shooting was either
committed with a revolver or the shooter picked up the shell casings.
Sgt. Belanger testified that three days after the shooting, he went to
the hospital to attempt to interview Willis, but that Willis was still too
sedated to speak or remember clearly. As part of his investigation, Sgt.
Belanger testified that he also spoke with two potential witnesses from the
apartment complex. Both individuals stated they were inside their
apartments when they heard gunshots but did not see the shooting take place.
Sgt. Belanger testified that Willis was the only source of eyewitness
evidence he was able to obtain from his investigation regarding the shooter’s
identity.
Tauris Willis, the victim of the shooting, testified that around 7:00
p.m. on the day of the shooting, after leaving work, he had just arrived back
at the apartment complex and was still seated in the driver’s seat of his
vehicle with the door open. He testified he had consumed one alcoholic
beverage between leaving work and arriving home. Willis saw defendant,
Derrick Deone Morris, running around the side of his vehicle. Morris
tapped the side of Willis’ car with his handgun. Morris then pulled down a
rag that was covering his face, looked Willis directly in the eyes, and said, “I
told you I was going to get you.” Willis testified he recognized Morris’
face, voice, and stature because the men had known each other since they
were ten years old. Willis also used to work with Morris at Lincoln
Memorial Cemetery; Morris had stopped working there one year prior.
Morris was aware that employees at the cemetery were paid on Fridays (the
day of the shooting was a Friday). When approached by Morris, Willis
removed his wallet from his pocket and threw it out of the vehicle, because
3
he believed Morris only wanted money from him. After throwing his wallet,
Willis tried to exit the vehicle to run away. Willis testified he remembers
nothing else from the time he threw his wallet on the ground until he woke
up in the hospital.
Willis testified that about a week before the shooting, Morris came to
his apartment and asked for money. Willis did not want to give Morris
money and was angry about the request, because he had helped Morris get
the job at the cemetery that Morris ultimately quit. Willis asked Morris to
leave, and Morris responded, “I’m going to get you.” There had also been a
prior disagreement regarding a woman both men had been seeing at the
same time. Willis testified he was no longer concerned about that woman or
any prior disagreement.
Willis testified that he remembered Sgt. Belanger speaking to him in
the hospital, and stated that despite his misdirection to others, he always
knew the identity of the person who shot him, but he did not want to reveal
the shooter’s identity while he was still hospitalized. Willis testified, “I
didn’t want Morris to be alerted that I knew that he shot me … I didn’t tell
[the detective] that Derrick shot me, because I knew I was in the hospital,
and I couldn’t walk. I wasn’t fixing to let him know that I knew who got me
until I could get myself stable where I could at least try to defend myself.”
Willis testified that he sustained one gunshot wound to each thigh, as well as
a graze wound to his head.
Willis acknowledged that while hospitalized he had intentionally told
Nathan Johnson, a friend who came to visit him, the names of two other
individuals that he believed shot him to cause a diversion. Willis testified he
did not want Morris to be aware that he knew the truth about the shooting.
4
Willis believed Morris intended to kill him, because he revealed his face to
him before shooting him, and shot at his head. Willis believed Morris would
come to the hospital and finish the job, stating, “I had IV’s and stuff hooked
up to me, he ain’t gonna come in there and smother me with a pillow.”
Willis advised that when he was released, he went to a hotel room instead of
his apartment because he was afraid of Morris. From the hotel, once he was
able to walk again, Willis told Sgt. Belanger that he had in fact been shot by
a friend, Derrick Morris. Sgt. Belanger presented Willis with a single photo
of Morris, rather than a six-photo line-up since the shooter was known to the
victim, and Willis identified him as the shooter.
The friend who visited Willis in the hospital, Nathan Johnson, was
called to testify at trial for the defense. Johnson testified that he has known
both Willis and Morris for approximately 30 years. He testified that he
heard from a neighbor that Willis had been shot, and he also saw the
shooting on the news. Johnson went alone to visit Willis in the hospital the
next day. He testified that Willis seemed to understand him, recognized
him, and spoke to him during his visit. Johnson testified that he asked Willis
who shot him, and that Willis responded: “He said Baby D and Dayro shot
him.” Johnson testified he was certain those were the names Willis told him
during his visit to the hospital. Johnson testified that he was not aware that
Morris was a suspect in the shooting at the time of his hospital visit.
Johnson testified that he did not know Dayro or Baby D, because he moved
away from the Cherokee Park neighborhood in 2003 and never returned.
Exercising his constitutional right, Morris elected not to testify at his trial.
On September 23, 2025, at the conclusion of the two-day jury trial, a
unanimous jury found Morris guilty of the responsive verdict of attempted
5
manslaughter.1 On October 20, 2025, the State filed a second felony
habitual offender bill of information based on Morris’ prior conviction for
possession of Schedule II CDS from September 2023. After a hearing on
November 12, 2025, Morris was adjudicated a second felony habitual
offender and was sentenced to the maximum sentence of 40 years2 at hard
labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. A
motion to reconsider sentence was denied. Morris now appeals his
conviction and sentence, asserting three assignments of error.
DISCUSSION
Assignment of Error No. 1: Defendant-Appellant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because trial counsel (a) failed to investigate substantial third-party-perpetrator evidence identifying two other named individuals as the shooters,
despite counsel’s pretrial knowledge of that evidence, and (b) failed to move to suppress the unduly suggestive single-photo identification procedure conducted six days after the shooting by a victim who at the time of the identification was full of morphine.
Morris argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
trial counsel failed to properly investigate two other named individuals who
were identified as possible shooters and failed to move to suppress the
identification of Morris with a single photo. Morris argues that his
conviction rests entirely on the identification of a morphine-medicated
1
La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:31.
2
The sentence for manslaughter, provided in La. R.S. 14:31(B), is imprisonment at hard labor for not more than 40 years. The statute that defines attempt, La. R.S. 14:27, provides that a defendant’s imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted. As such, the maximum sentence for attempted manslaughter is imprisonment for 20 years.
The habitual offender statute provides that second felony offenders face a sentence of at least one-third of the longest possible sentence for the primary offense, up to twice the longest possible sentence. Therefore, Morris’ enhanced sentencing range for his conviction of attempted manslaughter as a second felony offender is 6.5-40 years.
6
victim who had already identified two different men as his shooters. Morris
also asserts there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime.
Morris argues that trial counsel did not conduct an investigation into
the two men previously named as what was later described as a diversion
tactic before naming him as the shooter to the police. Morris also argues
that trial counsel failed to challenge the suggestive single-photo
identification procedure the police used to identify him. Morris contends
counsel’s failure to move to suppress a single-photo identification, a
procedure the Sgt. Belanger acknowledged departs from the 6-person lineup
standard, was objectively unreasonable. Morris argues he was prejudiced
and there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had the single
photo been challenged. Morris’ arguments on this theory are confounded by
the victim identifying him at trial.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more properly raised in
an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court because this
provides the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing under La. C. Cr. P.
art. 930. State v. McGee, 18-1052 (La. 2/25/19), 264 So. 3d 445; State v.
Ward, 53,969, (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 324 So. 3d 231. When the record
is sufficient, allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may be
resolved on direct appeal in the interest of judicial economy. Id.; State v.
Galloway, 54,704 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/1/23), 354 So. 3d 919, 924, writ denied,
23-00366 (La. 5/31/23), 361 So. 3d 467.
Under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984), adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Washington, 491
So. 2d 1337 (La. 1986), a reviewing court must reverse a conviction if the
7
defendant establishes that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and
counsel’s inadequate performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent that
the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. State v. Ball, 19-01674
(La. 11/24/20), 305 So. 3d 90; State v. McGee, supra.
In a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
show that counsel’s performance was deficient, committing errors so serious
that he or she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the
occurrence. Strickland v. Washington, supra; State v. Paben, 43,415 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 990 So. 2d 123.
The jury clearly found Willis’ testimony regarding his identification
of Morris as the shooter credible. Although Willis named two other people
to a hospital visitor, his testimony was that he did so as a diversion. The
record shows that trial counsel cross-examined Willis at length about
identifying two different individuals to Johnson, his hospital visitor, as the
perpetrators. However, Willis only ever told police one version of events –
that Morris, his childhood friend, was the shooter, and testified accordingly
at trial, identifying Morris before the jury.
Regarding the single-photo identification method, the record shows
that Willis was out of the hospital, in a hotel room, and was no longer
heavily sedated when he identified Morris as his shooter. Sgt. Belanger
testified that Willis only identified Morris as his shooter during his
investigation and did not name any other individuals. The SPD case report
states that Willis was shown a photograph of Morris at the hotel, after he
identified Morris to police as his shooter. This was not a situation where
8
police were attempting to identify an unnamed suspect. Rather, Willis had
already named Morris as the shooter. The suggestive nature of a single
photo lineup does not automatically preclude admissibility unless the
process is found to be untrustworthy under the totality of the circumstances.
See State v. Daniels, 56,701 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/17/25), 425 So. 3d 1276.
We find these claims to be without merit on the limited record before us.
We recognize that Morris’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could
be more appropriately raised in an application for postconviction relief in the
trial court, where a full evidentiary hearing can be conducted, if necessary,
and Morris can present any desired evidence to support his allegations. This
assignment of error is without merit.
Assignment of Error No. 2: The sentence is illegal because the trial court, per court minutes, imposed a forty-year sentence “without benefit or probation, parole, or suspension of sentence,” The restriction on parole eligibility is not authorized by La. R.S. 14:27, La. R.S. 14:31, or La. R.S. 14:529.1(G) for the offense of attempted manslaughter.
Morris asserts that the trial court imposed his sentence “without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence,” but neither the
attempted manslaughter statutes, nor the habitual offender enhancement
statute, authorizes the restriction on parole. This assignment of error has
merit. The State concedes this error and confirms Morris should be allowed
parole eligibility.
The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender
sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 are those called for in the reference
statute. State v. Young, 56,958 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/15/26), --- So. 3d ---; State
v. Gaines, 52,536 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 948, writ denied, 19-00773 (La. 9/17/19), 279 So. 3d 379. The underlying statutes in the present
case do not restrict parole. See R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:31. Therefore,
9
the trial court should not have imposed Morris’ enhanced sentence with a
parole restriction.
When a sentencing error involves the imposition of restrictions
beyond what the legislature has authorized in the sentencing statute, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled that the appellate courts should not rely
on La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) to correct the error as a matter of law but should
correct the sentence on its own authority under La. C. Cr. P. art. 882 to
correct an illegal sentence at any time. State v. Young, supra. We
accordingly amend Morris’ enhanced sentence to delete the restriction on
parole. We also order the First Judicial District Court Clerk of Court to
transmit notice of the amended sentence to the appropriate authorities in
accordance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 892(B)(2) and to the Department of
Corrections’ legal department.
Assignment of Error No. 3: The trial court imposed a constitutionally excessive sentence under Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana
Constitution by imposing the absolute statutory maximum under the
habitual-offender enhancement on a compromise responsive verdict, by relying on arrests that did not result in convictions, and by failing to adequately consider mitigating circumstances.
Morris argues that the trial court erred by imposing an
unconstitutionally harsh and excessive sentence of 40 years without benefit
probation or suspension of sentence. Morris also argues the trial court failed
to address the compromise nature of the jury verdict as a mitigating factor.
Morris argues that the jury’s verdict undermines the trial court’s
determination that Morris committed the worst offense of attempted
homicide, because it rejected attempted second degree murder and returned a
responsive verdict of attempted manslaughter.
10
An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence
for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court complied
with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The
trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance
outlined in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, but the record must reflect that he
adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the
defendant. Id. The important elements the trial court should consider are
the defendant’s personal history, prior criminal record, the seriousness of the
offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049
(La. 1981). There is no requirement that specific matters be given any
particular weight at sentencing. State v. DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.
Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is
grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more
than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.
Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1, citing State v. Bonanno, 384 So.
2d 355 (La. 1980). This analysis extends to sentences imposed pursuant to
the habitual offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d
1276 (La. 1993).
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). On review, an appellate court
does not determine whether another sentence may have been more
11
appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7.
We find the trial court properly considered the factors set forth in La.
C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 when sentencing Morris for his conviction of attempted
manslaughter. The trial court specifically noted Morris’ conduct manifested
deliberate cruelty to the victim, actual violence was used in the commission
of the offense, and the offense resulted in significant injuries to the victim
and economic hardship to his family. Also, a dangerous weapon – a firearm
– was used in the commission of the offense. Morris shot an unarmed victim
three times, once in the head, and left him for dead. The trial court noted that
it found no mitigating factors applied to Morris.
Further, Morris’ sentence of 40 years is within the sentencing range of
6.5-40 years provided by the habitual offender statute. Morris’ maximum
sentence is supported by the record, which shows he had an extensive
criminal history, including four prior felony convictions and a ten-year
period of incarceration. The trial court stated that Morris’ criminal history
indicated “that he has not understood the seriousness of his crimes and has
no reason to believe he will in the future.” Morris’ repeated criminal
behavior indicates the need for a more prolonged period of incarceration.
Morris’ behavior during the commission of the offense justifies his
maximum sentence, which is reserved for the most egregious and
blameworthy offenders. The State correctly notes that Willis’ survival of the
shooting was not due to any mercy or mistake by Morris, but due to the
speed and skill of local first responders and medical professionals who
treated him. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion
12
when it imposed the 40-year sentence under these specific facts and
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we amend Derrick Deone Morris’
enhanced sentence to delete the restriction on parole, and in all other regards
affirm his conviction and sentence as amended.
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
13