Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,982-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
Versus
DONALD DEWAYNE WHITE, II Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 399,673
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND Counsel for Appellant WRIT SERVICE
By: Remy V. Starns
Justin C. Harrell
DONALD DEWAYNE WHITE, II Pro Se
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
JASON WAYNE WALTMAN
CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN
MARY J. ABLE
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ.
STEPHENS, J.,
This criminal appeal arises out of the First Judicial District, the State
of Louisiana, the Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge, presiding. The
defendant, Donald Dewayne White, II, was convicted as charged of two
counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree
murder by a unanimous jury on September 10, 2025, and sentenced to two
consecutive life sentences for the second degree murders of Jasmine
Johnson, the mother of his three young children, and Jasmine’s mother, Joan
Johnson, and the maximum term of 50 years’ imprisonment for the
attempted second degree murder of Jasmine’s father, John Johnson. White
has appealed his convictions, urging that the trial court erred in allowing him
to represent himself and that his confrontation rights were violated by the
admission of other crimes and bad acts evidence in the form of hearsay
testimony. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm White’s convictions
and sentences.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Early in the morning of January 14, 2024, Shreveport Police
Department officers were sent to 2715 Willis Street following a report of
multiple people having been shot. Corporal Johnny Clinton, a patrol officer,
testified that he was assigned to the Cooper Road area and was the first
officer to respond. Upon his arrival, Cpl. Clinton observed a female,
subsequently identified as Jasmine Johnson, in distress, lying on her side,
facedown in a nearby ditch. Jasmine’s clothes were bloody, and she was
unresponsive. Cpl. Clinton rolled Jasmine onto her back and began
administering chest compressions.
Officer Dustin Kennemer testified that he arrived on scene shortly
thereafter. With the assistance of Officers Joshua Kennemer and Collin
York, Ofc. D. Kennemer breached the front entrance to clear the residence.
Just inside the door to the left, Ofc. D. Kennemer saw a small child on a
couch, whom he removed and took outside. Ofc. J. Kennemer1 picked up a
second child from a bassinet and took that child from the home.2
Ofc. York proceeded to the primary bedroom where a second victim,
subsequently identified as Joan Johnson, was found on the floor. Ofc. York
began chest compressions on her. A third victim, John Johnson, was
wounded but responsive and was taken to the hospital for emergency
services. No suspects were found inside the residence. Jasmine was
pronounced dead at the scene. Joan was taken to the hospital but died
shortly thereafter. John was able to tell emergency responders that Jasmine’s
boyfriend Dewayne (White) came into the residence and shot them all. In a
statement made later at the hospital, John confirmed that White was the
shooter.
Based upon the information related by John, Officers located then
took White to the police station for a statement. Detective Taywania
Thomas took White’s statement after first informing him of his Miranda
rights. White related that he and Jasmine were Facetiming earlier that day.
They were arguing. According to White, he and Jasmine argued “regularly.”
White drove over to Jasmine’s house in his mother’s vehicle, a black Toyota
1
Officers D. Kennemer and J. Kennemer are brothers.
2
There were three children under the age of five in the home, none of whom had been harmed. Their parents were Jasmine and White, who had been in a long-term relationship but had not been together since November 2023, according to the testimony of Jasmine’s first cousin Camron Johnson.
2
Camry, and forced his way inside the residence. White stated that he shot
Jasmine’s mother and father. Jasmine ran out of the house and jumped into
his mother’s car. White shot Jasmine, dragged her out of the car, then left.
White related to Det. Thomas that he couldn’t recall that anyone had
weapons except for him. He also told her that no one attempted to defend
themselves. White couldn’t recall whether his children were at the Johnson
home, what kind of gun he used, or what he did with the gun afterwards.
The black Camry was located at Angynettie Jefferson’s3 home on
Poinsettia Drive in Shreveport. Det. Thomas was able to see, even through
the windows, what appeared to be blood around the front passenger seat and
a bullet hole in the side of the center console. After warrants were secured,
White’s home and the vehicle were searched.4 There was blood on the
passenger seat and passenger door frame, and four bullet casings were found
on the passenger’s side of the vehicle. The defect in the center console
caused by a bullet was confirmed by Shreveport crime scene investigators.
A live round was found under the driver’s seat.5
Dr. James Traylor, a board-certified forensic pathologist and professor
of Clinical Pathology at Ochsner LSU, testified as an expert in forensic
pathology. According to Dr. Traylor, Jasmine’s cause of death was a
penetrating gunshot wound to the head which entered the right parietal skull
and caused “extensive damage to her brain.” Dr. Traylor stated that Jasmine
3
Ms. Jefferson is White’s mother.
4
Consent for the search was given by Ms. Jefferson, but the warrants were secured in accordance with police procedure.
5
Numerous shell casings were collected from the Johnson home, and 18 live rounds were found in a bedroom dresser drawer in White’s mother’s home which is where he resided.
3
Johnson was shot five times, and the fatal wound entered her thigh,
lacerating the femoral artery and femoral vein, which caused her to bleed
out. Dr. Traylor opined that Jasmine could have survived “a few minutes”
before losing consciousness.
Phillip Stout, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public
Safety, testified that he examined the casings and projectile evidence
submitted in this case. Stout’s analysis showed that there were two distinct
types of casings. Four shell casings recovered from outside the Johnson
home were brass 9mm cartridge cases “commonly associated with some
models of Glock pistols.” On the other hand, the casings recovered from
inside Mr. and Mrs. Johnson’s bedroom and from White’s vehicle were steel.
Stout stated that rifling from the steel casings was consistent with having
been fired from the same firearm, although there was insufficient evidence
from which to make a definitive conclusion. Stout did testify that the
projectile recovered from Joan’s body was “consistent with a 9-mm bullet
which had been fired from the barrel of a weapon rifled with a right twist”
and not the polygonal rifling associated with a Glock pistol. This finding is
in keeping with the prosecution’s theory that the brass casings from the front
yard were unrelated to the crime, likely fired from a Glock on New Year’s
Day, which was two weeks prior to the shooting, and that the steel casings
found inside the Johnson home and in White’s car had been fired by the
murder weapon (which was never recovered).
Jasmine’s father, John Johnson, was the only surviving shooting
victim. Johnson testified that he was 77 years old at the time of trial. On the
night of the incident, Johnson, his wife Joan, Jasmine, and the three
grandchildren were living at their home on Willis Street in Shreveport.
4
Johnson stated that Jasmine and White had a relationship, and White was the
father of Johnson’s three grandchildren. That night, Johnson had gone to
bed but was awakened by a noise. All of a sudden, he looked up to see his
wife “laying there by the bathroom door … bloody.” Johnson explained that
the bathroom door was at the foot of the bed, and his wife Joan was lying to
one side of the door. Johnson attempted to rise and get out of bed when he
saw White. “[H]e had a gun like this here. Pow. He shot me.” Johnson
testified that White was about four feet away from him when the shot was
fired. Johnson eventually managed to get to the living room, then made it
outside the house. He walked over to his neighbor Mary’s house where he
was able to call for help. Johnson testified that he was interviewed by police
while recovering at the hospital, and he pointed out White sitting in the
courtroom and identified him as the person who shot him.
White testified in his own defense. He stated that on the night of the
shooting, he went to the Willis Street address to “purchase firearms.”
According to White, he brought with him some ammunition wrapped in a
towel so he could test-fire the weapon before he bought it. White stated that
when he arrived, he entered the home with Jasmine’s consent and knowledge
and described a lighthearted scene—he was doing the “Pink Panther” theme
and making the Johnson family laugh because he likes playing a lot. When
he left the house to smoke a cigarette and relieve himself in a nearby field,
he heard gunshots. At first White believed the shots were “test rounds”
coming from a trench behind the property.
White stated that he grew concerned when he returned to the Johnson
residence and saw perforating gunshots on both sides of the trailer. He saw
two unknown men exit the home, one of whom he identified as “Donnie G.”
5
According to White, a wounded Jasmine ran out of the house screaming. He
tried to help her get into his car, but he was confronted by one of the
attackers. He then panicked and drove away, leaving Jasmine behind.
White stated that he went to his mother’s house on Poinsettia Street in the
Southern Hills neighborhood of Shreveport where he later called 9-1-1.
On cross-examination, White admitted to giving a recorded police
interview, which was played for the jury, in which he confessed to shooting
Jasmine, Joan, and John Johnson. White maintained at trial that the video
was “very edited” and that he was “overdosed on medication … scared …
and trying to tell them the truth.” He further told the jury that “I’m in a
matrix. I’m seeing things. I’m hearing things that’s not really there, and I’m
trying to tell [Det. Thomas] exactly what happened.”
Also introduced into evidence by the State was a recording of a
telephone call made by White to his mother from jail on the evening of
January 14, 2024, in which his mother stated, “I don’t understand what
happened. I guess I never will. It’s between you, her, and God. I know you
will never talk about it. Something triggered you to do that. We don’t know
what triggered it. Something triggered you to do that.” The prosecutor
pointed out that the recording reflected that White was silent in response to
his mother’s statements.
On April 24, 2024, White was charged by the Caddo Parish grand jury
with two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted second
degree murder. On July 3, 2024, defense counsel made a motion for the
appointment of a sanity commission. The court-appointed evaluators
diagnosed White with schizoaffective disorder but found him competent and
able to assist in his own defense.
6
On August 28, 2025, the State filed a motion to admit the prior
statements by Jasmine under La. C.E. arts. 412.4 and 804(7)(A) and (B),
which allow such statements where the victim is absent or unavailable due to
the accused’s wrongdoing (forfeiture by wrongdoing). A hearing on the
motion was held on September 5, 2025. Prior to argument on the motion,
White waived his right to counsel and declared his intention to represent
himself. After a brief colloquy (including the trial judge asking the
defendant whether he was aware of the saying that a lawyer who chooses to
represent himself has a fool for a client), White was allowed to represent
himself and standby counsel was appointed. When asked to object to the
motion at issue, White attempted to argue the admissibility of his own
statement to police. The State’s motion was granted, and trial commenced
several days later on September 9, 2025.
White represented himself through jury selection and the State’s first
five witnesses. On the second day of trial, White’s court-appointed attorney,
who had been acting as standby counsel, resumed representation of the
defendant. As noted above, White took the stand and testified on his own
behalf. A unanimous jury found White guilty as charged on all three counts.
Post-verdict judgments for acquittal and new trial filed by White were
denied by the trial court on September 18, 2025. White was sentenced to
two consecutive life sentences on the second degree murder convictions and
the maximum term of 50 years on the attempted second degree murder
conviction on September 19, 2025. White has appealed his convictions,
urging two assignments of error.
7
DISCUSSION
(1) Whether the trial court erred in allowing the defendant, who
has a history of mental illness and was not being administered
his prescribed medications, to represent himself at trial.
The Defendant’s Argument
According to White, the trial court erred in allowing him to represent
himself at trial. White notified the trial court of his intent to waive counsel
and represent himself during the September 5, 2025, pre-trial hearing, only
four days before jury selection was to begin in this double homicide case.
The trial court questioned White as to his education and experience; White
replied that he had a high school diploma and worked occasionally as a
laborer. He also informed the trial court that he had been diagnosed with an
“outside condition” for which he had been prescribed several anti-psychotic
medications that he was not receiving during pre-trial custody due to the
Caddo Correctional Center’s internal policies.6
According to appellate counsel, the prescription and sudden
withdrawal of some of these medications calls into question White’s
competency to represent himself or his ability to knowingly and voluntarily
waive his right to counsel. The prescriptions White should have been taking
include treatment for significant anxiety, mood instability, depression, and
attention deficit disorder. Discontinuation of the medication (especially the
benzodiazepines) can cause withdrawal manifested by “severe anxiety,
impaired concentration, agitation, sleep disruption, and even a risk of
seizures and marked cognitive disorganization.” Counsel asserts that
White’s ability to think clearly, regulate impulses, as well as appreciate the
6
The medications counsel alleges that White was supposed to be taking were Adderall, alprazolam, Celexa, Ativan, and Depakote.
8
consequences of self-representation were “materially compromised,” which
calls into question whether the waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.
Counsel cites several examples of White’s erratic behavior from the
first day of testimony, irrational objections, an emotional breakdown, and an
incriminating cross-examination of the surviving victim, to illustrate that
White’s mental illness and medication withdrawal precluded his ability to
exercise his right to self-representation. The trial court should have been
warned when, during the colloquy, White told the judge that he was not
receiving his medications, he had an “outside condition,” and needed his
doctor and counselor present in the courtroom during trial. According to
counsel, the Faretta standard cannot be satisfied when a defendant, while
answering “yes” to questions during the colloquy, nonetheless discloses an
untreated psychiatric condition. The record shows that White’s waiver was
neither knowing nor intelligent, and for this reason, White’s conviction
cannot stand.
The State’s Argument
At a pre-trial hearing the week before trial, White advised the trial
court that he was choosing to exercise his right to waive counsel and
represent himself at trial. The trial court ascertained White’s age and
education and made sure he understood the charges against him and the
possible penalties. The trial court also inquired into White’s mental health
history, including whether he was taking any medications.7 The trial court
7
The State correctly points out that the only medications White had discontinued that the trial court was made aware of at the time he waived counsel were his ADHD and general anxiety medications.
9
further told the defendant of the pitfalls of self-representation and appointed
his public defender as standby counsel. The State contends that the record
contains nothing to show that White was incapable of making this choice
knowingly and voluntarily at the time he decided to exercise his right of selfrepresentation.
The State emphasizes that White’s difficulty in handling the trial, in
particular, his cross-examination of the victim John Johnson, and his
realization that self-representation was not helping his case, is not
determinative of his pre-trial competence to waive counsel. In other words,
White’s incompetence at self-representation in a second degree/attempted
second degree murder trial does not equal incompetence to waive his right to
counsel.
The State also urges that, notwithstanding White’s statement that his
ADHD and anxiety medications had been discontinued while he was in
CCC, during the Faretta colloquy, he exhibited a “calm and steady”
behavior and showed mental clarity regarding his understanding of the
circumstances, the charges he faced, the jury trial before him, and his desire
for self-representation. The State suggests that there was no overt indication
to the trial court at that time that any potential mental health issue was
affecting White’s competence to waive his right to counsel. “[A]t the point
in the trial where White’s mental/emotional state began impairing his selfrepresentation and White became aware that his self-representation was not
effective, he requested that standby counsel resume his role as defense
counsel for the remainder of the trial.”
10
Analysis
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
§ 13 of the Louisiana Constitution give a defendant the right to counsel as
well as the right to defend himself. A defendant may represent himself only
if he makes an unequivocal request to represent himself and knowingly and
intelligently waives his right to counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); State v. Bell, 09-0199 (La.
11/30/10), 53 So. 3d 437, cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1025, 131 S. Ct. 3035, 180
L. Ed. 2d 856 (2011); State v. Edwards, 54,055 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21),
327 So. 3d 1079.
The trial court should inform the defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that “he
knows what he is doing, and his choice is made with his eyes wide open.”
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541, citing Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 242, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942);
State v. Edwards, supra. Once the defendant has made an unequivocal
request to represent himself, the trial court must determine whether he did so
knowingly and intelligently with full understanding of the risks and possible
consequences. State v. Bell, supra; State v. Edwards, supra.
The decision to waive counsel does not require a higher level of
mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2686, 125 L. Ed. 2d
321 (1993). The competence that is required of a defendant seeking to
waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the
competence to represent himself. Id.; State v. Edwards, supra.
11
Furthermore, a criminal defendant’s ability to represent himself has no
bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation. Godinez, 509
U.S. at 400, 113 S. Ct. at 2687.
Hybrid representation involves the appointment of standby counsel
and it allows a defendant the right to defend himself as co-counsel while
standby counsel is available to explain and enforce the basic courtroom rules
or to take over the defense of the accused, should the defendant decide to reexercise his right to counsel at some point in the proceedings. State v.
Brown, 03-0897 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 1, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1022,
126 S. Ct. 1569, 164 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2006). A trial court has the discretion to
appoint a standby counsel to aid the accused if and when the accused
requests help, and to be available to represent him should termination of the
defendant’s self-representation be necessary. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, n. 46,
95 S. Ct. at 2541; State v. Mathieu, 10-2421, p. 6 (La. 7/1/11), 68 So. 3d
1015, 101; State v. Bell, supra; State v. Cornelison, 55,957, pp. 12-13 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 11/20/24), 401 So. 3d 918, 926-27. The appointment of cocounsel for an accused who opts to represent himself is not mandatory but is
within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Bell, supra.
A defendant who chooses to represent himself may not complain on
appeal that his self-representation was inadequate. Faretta, supra; State v.
Bell, supra. The propriety of allowing a defendant to elect selfrepresentation shall not be judged by what happens in the subsequent course
of that representation. Instead, it is the record made in recognizing the
waiver that controls. State v. Strain, 585 So. 2d 540, 542 (La. 1991); State v.
Moore, 40,311 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/06), 920 So. 2d 334, writ denied, 06-2267 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So. 2d 167.
12
Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally
asserted the right to self-representation must be determined on a case-bycase basis, considering the facts and circumstances of each case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. State v. Strain,
supra.; State v. Leger, 05-0011 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So. 2d 108, cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1221, 127 S. Ct. 1279, 167 L. Ed. 2d 100 (2007); State v.
Cornelison, supra; State v. Edwards, supra. There must be a showing of a
clear abuse of discretion for a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s right to
counsel to be upset, as the trial court has the opportunity to observe the
defendant in court appearances and become familiar with him. State v.
Cornelison, 55,957 at 16, 401 So. 3d at 930, citing State v. Holley, 53,405, p.
12 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/22/20), 297 So. 3d 180, 188, writ denied, 20-00923
(La. 11/10/20), 303 So. 3d 1036.
Although there is no particular formula which must be followed by
the trial court to determine whether a defendant has validly waived his right
to counsel, State v. Carpenter, 390 So. 2d 1296 (La. 1980), a trial judge, in
accepting a waiver of counsel at trial, should advise the accused of the
nature of the charges and the penalty range, inquire into the accused’s age,
education, and mental condition, and determine according to the totality of
the circumstances whether the accused understands the significance of the
waiver. State v. Strain, supra; State v. Edwards, supra. “The Constitution
does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. What is required is that the
accused knows what he is doing and that his choice was made with eyes
open.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.
Ed. 1461 (1938).
13
At the pre-trial hearing held on September 4, 2025, the week before
trial, White informed the trial judge that he wanted to waive his right to
counsel and represent himself. The same trial judge considered and ruled
upon White’s motion for appointment of a sanity commission at a hearing,
which was held on September 30, 2024. Both mental health experts
appointed by the trial court to examine the defendant specifically opined that
he was capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings and able to
assist in his defense. Dr. Jennifer Russell noted that White, who was
incarcerated at the time of both evaluations, was not taking his prescribed
ADHD medication and that “any attentional problems were not of sufficient
severity as to interfere with his competency-related abilities during this
evaluation.”
The trial judge had this information regarding White’s mental health,
as well as what he gleaned during the colloquy with White at the motions
hearing. The trial court first determined the defendant’s age and education
level before then inquiring about his mental health history. The defendant
acknowledged that he had been diagnosed with mental health issues and he
reminded the judge about the earlier determination by the sanity commission
that he was competent enough for trial. The judge asked White whether he
was supposed to be taking medication, and he related that the ones he was
supposed to be taking were Adderall, an extended release alprazolam
(Xanax), and another alprazolam-type medication. However, White told the
trial court that he was not taking the prescribed medications in jail because
Caddo Corrections said it was too addictive.
The trial court then explained to White that self-representation was
unwise and could be dangerous, especially since the defendant would be
14
required to follow Louisiana’s Evidence Code and Code of Criminal
Procedure. The judge further explained to White that, as his own attorney,
regardless of the outcome, he could not claim ineffective assistance of
counsel. The defendant indicated his understanding that he would not be
given any special treatment as a non-lawyer. White also acknowledged that
he understood the charges against him (the current ones as well as the
pending domestic ones) as well as the possible penalties. Although White
told the trial judge that he didn’t want to allow his current counsel to
continue to represent him on a temporary basis, the court granted the State’s
motion that White’s attorney be appointed as standby counsel. The judge
explained to White that this was necessary “to relieve the trial court of the
necessity of constantly explaining and enforcing the basic rules of courtroom
procedure and to assist you in overcoming routine obstacles during the
preparation and trial.”
There is no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in this case. As noted
above, White’s ultimate handling of his defense at trial and difficulties with
evidentiary and trial procedures as proof of his mental capacity or lack
thereof do not factor in this Court’s after-the-fact determination of whether
White was competent to waive his right to counsel and elect selfrepresentation before trial. The record shows that White’s trial proceeded in
an orderly fashion notwithstanding his emotional breakdown while he was
cross-examining John Johnson. In fact, White had the mental acuity at that
time to realize the ineffectiveness of self-representation and wisely chose to
have standby counsel resume his role as trial counsel. In a case involving a
defendant with a prior medical health history such that appointment of a
sanity commission for evaluation of the accused’s mental state to proceed to
15
trial and assist in his defense is warranted, standby counsel is beneficial to
ensure that a defendant’s Constitutional right to counsel is protected while
balancing his right to self-representation. See, State v. Cornelison, supra.
This assignment of error is without merit.
(2) Whether the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause were violated by the presentation of testimonial
hearsay statements of other crimes and “bad acts” by a
deceased witness per the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
The Defendant’s Argument
Defense counsel asserts that White’s confrontation rights under the
U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions were flagrantly violated by the admission
of testimonial hearsay statements regarding alleged other crime evidence
admitted through an unusual source—the videotaped statements of the
deceased victim Jasmine Johnson. On or about August 26, 2023, Jasmine
reported a domestic violence incident wherein White allegedly drove her
vehicle off the roadway and struck her repeatedly after she got out of the car
and ran into a nearby field. Jasmine reported the incident to law
enforcement, and SPD Sgt. Jennie Brooks took Jasmine’s videotaped
statement. Two years later, on September 4, 2025, on the same day of (but
prior to) White’s waiver of counsel, the State moved to admit this taped
statement into evidence, relying upon the forfeiture by wrongdoing
provision of La. C.E. art. 804.
The link between the defendant’s actions and the victim’s
unavailability may be established when “a defendant puts forward to a
witness the idea to avoid testifying, either by threats, coercion, persuasion,
or pressure.” State v. Aguilar, 15-1230, p. 2 (La. 9/18/15), 181 So. 3d 649,
650. See also, Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 171 L. Ed.
16
2d 488 (2008), in which the Supreme Court held that this exception applies
only if the defendant has in mind the particular purpose of making the
witness unavailable. Counsel argues that Giles is right on point—evidence
of a prior altercation, even when coupled with a later homicide—does not
establish forfeiture absent proof that the charged conduct was undertaken for
the purpose of silencing the victim as a witness.
In the instant case, the State offered no evidence linking the homicide
to any effort by White to prevent Jasmine from testifying about the earlier
incident, argues counsel. Therefore, Giles precludes application of the
forfeiture doctrine and the trial court erred in allowing this hearsay
testimony into evidence against an unrepresented “likely mentally infirm”
defendant, contends appellate counsel. The State only mentioned the articles
supporting its motion but no facts, and the trial court made no further
inquiry.
Counsel claims that admission of Jasmine’s videotaped statements
was “constitutional error of the first magnitude” given that the State’s entire
argument for forfeiture rested on the bare fact that Jasmine was dead, and
White was charged with killing her. There is no evidence to support the trial
court’s finding, which was made without an independent analysis in support
thereof. Jasmine’s statement was testimonial—it was a formal recorded
account given to officers to document White’s criminal conduct, and its
admission with no opportunity for cross-examination violated the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of his accuser.
“[B]ecause the jury heard Jasmine’s own voice describing White as
dangerous and violent, this Court cannot find the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
17
White asks this Court to reverse his convictions “on all counts” and
remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial.
The State’s Argument
According to the State, the record supports a finding of forfeiture by
wrongdoing warranting the admission of Jasmine’s prior statement to
officers in the domestic violence incident that preceded the instant
homicides and attempted homicide. The statement, which was videotaped,
was made by Jasmine to the SPD detective assigned to investigate a
domestic abuse incident that occurred on August 26, 2023, approximately
three months prior to Jasmine’s murder.
In the instant case, at the September 4, 2025, pre-trial hearing, White,
representing himself, objected to the admission of Jasmine’s prior statement
on the grounds that he had filed a “404 motion.” However, the clerk of court
could not locate any such motion filed by either White or his attorney, and
the trial court granted the State’s motion, finding Jasmine’s recorded
statement to be admissible.
The circumstances leading to the prior statement of Jasmine were
introduced at trial through the testimony of Sgt. Brooks, who told the jury
that a domestic abuse situation had been reported to an Officer Williams
with the SPD on August 26, 2023, by Jasmine Johnson. According to
Jasmine, White, her ex-boyfriend, had struck her vehicle with his, causing
her to run off the road into a field. White then dragged Jasmine from her car
and slammed her into the ground before striking her in the head with a pistol
and threatening to kill her. Sgt. Brooks stated that she had interviewed
Jasmine at the hospital and that this interview was recorded. A portion of
18
Jasmine’s interview was played for the jury over a contemporaneous
objection made by White.
White’s appellate attorney asserts that his confrontation rights were
violated and that admission of the statement was erroneous because the State
failed to show that any wrongdoing by White was intended to prevent
Jasmine from testifying.
The State relies on State v. Aguilar, supra, in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the applicable code articles do not require that the
defendant engage in violence or employ threats of physical violence to cause
fear in the victim in order to procure the witness’s unavailability. Id.
Instead, the link between the defendant’s actions and the victim’s
unavailability can be established when a defendant “puts forward” to a
witness the idea to avoid testifying, either by threats, coercion, persuasion,
or pressure. Id. According to the State, in State v. Aguilar, supra, the
Louisiana Supreme Court found that the defendant’s violation of a protective
order and repeated suggestions and encouragement of the victims to recant
their statements was sufficient “persistent contact” to warrant application of
the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. “Because the witnesses’
unavailability is a logical outgrowth of the defendant’s actions in this
domestic violence case, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is properly
applied.” Id.
The State argues that there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion
in its admission of Jasmine’s recorded statement as the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine was properly applied. However, if the trial court erred
in allowing the statement into evidence, this error was harmless. See,
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967);
19
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182
(1993); and, State v. Johnson, 94-1379 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So. 2d 94.
According to the State, White’s guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered even without admission of Jasmine’s prior statement, since,
notwithstanding Jasmine’s statement (and Det. Brooks’ testimony explaining
it to the jury), the record contains “overwhelming and straightforward
evidence” that White committed the second degree murders of both Joan and
Jasmine Johnson as well as the attempted second degree murder of Jasmine’s
father, John Johnson. See, Chapman, supra; Sullivan, supra. The only
contrary evidence is the “outrageous” story told to the jury by White during
his testimony, urges the State.
Analysis
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an
accused in a criminal prosecution the right to confront the witnesses against
him. The Confrontation Clause of the Louisiana Constitution specifically
and expressly guarantees the accused the right “to confront and crossexamine the witnesses against him.” La. Const. Art. I, § 16; State v.
Robinson, 01-273, p. 5 (La. 5/17/02), 817 So. 2d 1131, 1135. Confrontation
not only means the ability to confront the witnesses physically but also to
secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination, which is its
main and essential purpose. Id.
Cross-examination is the principal way to test the believability and
truthfulness of the testimony, and it has traditionally been used to impeach or
discredit the witness. Id. at p. 6, 817 So. 2d at 1135; State v. Anderson,
55,168 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 372 So. 3d 413, writs denied, 23-01427,
23-01446 (La. 4/9/24), 382 So. 3d 842, 844, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145
20
S. Ct. 296, 220 L. Ed. 2d 96 (2024); State v. Williams, 04-608 (La. App. 5
Cir. 11/30/04), 889 So. 2d 1093, 1100, writ denied, 05-0081 (La. 4/22/05),
899 So. 2d 559. The confrontation clause prohibits the admission of an outof-court “testimonial” statement against a defendant unless the declarant is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273, 165 L. Ed.
2d 224 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
1374, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).
In Crawford, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the
admissibility of testimonial statements as evidence at a criminal trial in
situations where a declarant is unavailable to testify and required that the
defendant have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id.; State
v. Griffin, 14-251, pp. 26-27 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/15), 169 So. 3d 473, 490.
The Crawford court, while not defining “testimonial,” observed that “an
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officials bears
testimony in a sense that a person making a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S. Ct. at 1354
(internal citations omitted); State v. Warner, 12-0085, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir.
5/1/13), 116 So. 3d 811, 819.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford recognized that there are
exceptions to a defendant’s right of confrontation, including the doctrine of
“forfeiture by wrongdoing,” which is premised on the principle that a
defendant should not be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoing. State
v. Griffin, 14-251 at p. 27, 169 So. 3d at 490; State v. Warner, 12-85 at p. 17,
116 So. 3d at 820.
21
La. C.E. art. 804(B)(7), which is modeled after F.R.E. Rule 804(b)(6),
sets forth exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay for certain types of
evidence when the declarant is unavailable as a witness, provides:
(a) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement offered against a
party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant
as a witness.
(b) A party seeking to introduce statements under the forfeiture
by wrongdoing hearsay exception shall establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the party against whom the
statement is offered, engaged or acquiesced in the wrongdoing.
As required by Giles, supra, and La. C.E. art. 804(B)(7), in order to
introduce an unavailable victim’s out-of-court statement, the State must
show that a defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the of the declarant as a
witness. Id.; State v. Aguilar, supra. There is no requirement in La. C.E. art.
804(B)(7) that the defendant must engage in violence or employ threats of
physical violence to cause fear in the victim in order to procure the witness’s
unavailability. State v. Aguilar, supra. Instead, the link between the
defendant’s actions and the victim’s unavailability may be established when
a defendant “puts forward to a witness the idea to avoid testifying, either by
threats, coercion, persuasion, or pressure….” Id., 15-1230, p. 2, 181 So. 3d
at 650.
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Taylor, 16-1124, p. 18 (La.
12/1/16), 217 So. 3d 283, 296; State v. Glover, 56,285 (La. App. 2 Cir.
7/16/25), 416 So. 3d 34, writ denied, 25-01055 (1/28/26), 425 So. 3d 108.
A pre-trial hearing was held on September 4, 2025. The State’s
attorney informed the trial court that, inter alia, a notice to introduce other
22
crimes evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.4 had been filed regarding its intent
to present evidence of an incident of prior domestic violence perpetrated by
White upon Jasmine on August 26, 2023. The prosecutor also indicated the
State’s intent to play for the jury a recorded statement made by Jasmine to
Det. Jennie Brooks regarding the August 26, 2023, incident, and noted that a
motion to allow this interview pursuant to La. C.E. art. 804(B)(7) had been
filed.
As the State’s attorney attempted to argue the merits of the notice and
motion, White informed the trial court of his intent to exercise his right of
self-representation, and the hearing veered off in that direction. The State’s
motion and notice had attached thereto the initial and supplemental police
reports documenting the August 26, 2023, incident, Jasmine’s injuries and
interview with Det. Brooks, and White’s arrest for the instant offenses on
January 14, 2024. Together with the evidence presented at trial, the record is
clear that there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in allowing the
State to play a portion of Jasmine’s recorded statement for the jury in this
case.
Det. Brooks testified that on August 26, 2023, she was contacted by
Officer W.J. Williams who related that he was at the Willis Knighton South
location at 2510 Bert Kouns in Shreveport to work a domestic violence
incident. The victim, Jasmine Johnson, told Ofc. Williams that her exboyfriend struck her car with his vehicle which caused her car to run off the
road into a field. Jasmine’s ex-boyfriend grabbed her from her vehicle,
slammed her to the ground, then struck her in the head with a pistol before
threatening to kill her. Det. Brooks stated that she went to the hospital to
speak to Jasmine and record an interview with her. Before doing so, Det.
23
Brooks met with the Ofc. Williams to get the suspect’s information. The
suspect had been identified as the defendant White.
Det. Brooks testified that she found Jasmine in the emergency room at
Willis Knighton South.8 The detective identified and authenticated the DVD
that contained her interview with Jasmine, and a portion of the recorded
interview was then played for the jury.
On the day of the incident, August 26, 2023, Jasmine went to a
Walmart Marketplace store where White worked to retrieve a gun that
belonged to her. Jasmine got the gun from White’s unlocked car, then went
into the store to tell him she had done so. White got mad and told her to
leave. Jasmine left; two children, toddlers aged one and two years old, were
riding with their mother in her car. White called Jasmine as she was driving
and told her to return the gun. Jasmine then noticed a car coming upon her
fast from behind. White was the driver of the approaching car. He struck
Jasmine’s car, forcing her off the road into a field. White rammed her
vehicle a second time, then pulled Jasmine from her car by her shirt and
threw her to the ground several times. He then got the gun from Jasmine’s
car, struck her in the head with it, and told her he would kill her. Jasmine
got back in her car and drove herself to a hospital.9
8
Jasmine executed a HIPAA release and the medical information from her visit to Willis Knighton South on August 26, 2023, was included among the police reports submitted to the trial judge in support of the State’s evidentiary motions. In relating the incident to ER staff, Jasmine reported that she sustained a loss of consciousness as well as head and abdominal injuries. Jasmine also stated that she was 23 weeks pregnant at the time. ER staff noted swelling and edema in Jasmine’s scalp, and based on a fetal ultrasound, personnel in the Labor and Delivery department estimated Jasmine’s delivery date to be December 16, 2023 (which is less than 30 days prior to the date of the shootings).
9
At the time, White also had pending charges in Bossier Parish for a previous incident involving Jasmine.
24
Two days later, on August 28, 2023, Sgt. Brooks scheduled an
interview with White for August 30, 2023. Later that day, White called Sgt.
Brooks to inquire whether Jasmine had contacted her. When he learned that
Jasmine had not contacted Sgt. Brooks, White said, “okay,” and hung up.
On August 29, 2023, Jasmine called Sgt. Brooks and related that she wanted
to dismiss the charge. Sgt. Brooks informed Jasmine that she could not
dismiss the charge because it was a felony, and the investigation would
proceed. Two minutes later, White called Sgt. Brooks, whose report
contains the following entry:
At 0953, this investigator received a phone call from White
stating, Ms. Johnson just told him she was informed she
couldn’t dismiss charges. Upon informing Mr. White that is
correct, he advised he didn’t understand how she couldn’t if she
said he didn’t do anything to her. Mr. White was informed Ms.
Johnson didn’t say he didn’t do anything to her, she said she
wanted to dismiss charges. He was further informed if she did
state he didn’t do anything to her, this investigator wouldn’t
believe her because victims of Domestic Violence tend to recant
their statement.
Less than ten minutes later, Jasmine called Sgt. Brooks back to tell her
that “when she hit her brakes, Mr. White struck the back of her vehicle and
then she hit her head on the steering wheel.” Four minutes after that, White
called Sgt. Brooks to verify that Jasmine had called her and asked again
whether he needed to attend the interview scheduled for the next day. Sgt.
Brooks told White that he did need to attend and explained that because of
Jasmine’s physical injuries, the investigation was proceeding. White did not
show up at the interview. An arrest warrant for White was issued on August
30, 2023. However, White killed Jasmine before the arrest warrant could be
executed.
25
Both White and the State have cited Giles, supra. The following
language from the majority’s opinion in Giles we find to be especially
compelling. Recognizing the difficulty of prosecuting defendants accused of
domestic violence whose victims have been silenced by further incidents of
domestic abuse or intimidation, the Louisiana Supreme Court found:
The domestic violence context is, however, relevant for a
separate reason. Acts of domestic violence often are intended to
dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, and include
conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or
cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive
relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support a
finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim
and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or
cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior
statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier
abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from
resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this
inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at
which the victim would have been expected to testify.
Id., 554 U.S. at 377, 128 S. Ct. 15 2693.
The domestic violence incident in which White ran Jasmine off the
road, pistol-whipped her, then threatened to kill her, occurred only five
months prior to her murder by White. During Sgt. Brooks’ investigation into
the domestic violence incident, White made numerous attempts to get
Jasmine to drop the charges. Upon learning that even a forced recantation
by Jasmine would not suffice to have the investigation halted and charges
dropped, White failed to show up for his interview with police and then
killed Jasmine before the arrest warrant on the domestic abuse charges could
be served.
In State v. Aguilar, supra, the defendant repeatedly violated a
protective order prohibiting him from contacting witnesses against him in an
upcoming criminal prosecution, and both witnesses (his girlfriend and their
26
daughter) recanted their testimony, ultimately becoming uncooperative with
prosecution of the case against the defendant. In this case, White not only
threatened physical violence against Jasmine, but he carried it out by
shooting her four times and killing her, which, while maybe not the intended
purpose at that time, prohibited her from testifying against him in the
pending domestic violence case. Jasmine’s unavailability “is a logical
outgrowth of the defendant’s actions in this domestic violence case…” Id.,
15-1230 at p. 2, 181 So. 3d at 650. As the Louisiana Supreme Court found
in State v. Aguilar, we find that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is
applicable under the facts and circumstances of this case.
The defendant himself killed the witness he now complains he cannot
confront. White’s actions in having Jasmine call the investigating officer
several times in an attempt to get the domestic violence charges against him
dropped, and then when that didn’t work, his ultimate silencing of her by
killing her after shooting her mother and father, shows that White engaged in
a pattern of behavior intended to ensure that Jasmine could never testify
against him. See, Giles, supra. “[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the
judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims,
the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce. While defendants
have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have the duty
to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial
system.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. at 833, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. This
assignment of error is without merit.
Errors Patent
The record was reviewed for errors patent, and there were none.
27
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the convictions and sentences
imposed in this case against the defendant, Donald Dewayne White, II, are
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
28