Edward Joseph Unger v. Jennifer Rose Unger

2026-08-26

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that while a disqualified judge cannot make substantive changes to oral rulings in writing, the proper remedy is not to void the entire contempt order but rather to remand for the judge to enter an amended order deleting the findings that were not orally announced during the hearing.

Edward Unger appealed from three orders entered by two judges in a family law case involving time-sharing violations. The central issue was whether a contempt order written by a judge after his disqualification could be vacated entirely because it contained findings that were not announced orally during the hearing. The appellate court agreed that the judge's written order improperly included new findings not articulated from the bench, particularly regarding a prior 2021 contempt proceeding and the former wife's move to Miami. However, the court rejected Unger's argument that the entire order should be voided.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Authority of a disqualified judge to enter written orders reflecting oral pronouncements
Distinction between ministerial acts and substantive changes in post-disqualification orders
Proper remedy when a judge adds unannounced findings to a written contempt order
Contempt findings regarding time-sharing violations and relocation of children

Procedural posture

The former husband appealed from a circuit court contempt order and two related orders, one entered after the trial judge was disqualified.

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

EDWARD JOSEPH UNGER,

Appellant,

JENNIFER ROSE UNGER,

Appellee.

No. 4D2025-2209

[August 26, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Jessica Marra and Elaine Alexandra Carbuccia, Judges; L.T. Case No. 062012DR011780AXXXCE.

Edward Joseph Unger, Boca Raton, pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

CONNER, J.

The pro se former husband appeals from three orders by two different judges handling the case: (1) the initial judge’s granting the former wife’s contempt motion alleging the former husband willfully violated timesharing orders regarding their children; (2) the initial judge’s denying the former husband’s motion to vacate the order granting former’s wife’s contempt motion; and (3) after the initial judge who conducted the contempt hearing was disqualified, the successor judge’s denying reconsideration of the initial judge’s orders. The former husband argues the initial judge’s written contempt order, entered after disqualification, contained findings that the initial judge had not orally announced during the contempt hearing, and thus the entire written contempt order should be vacated.

We agree with the former husband that the initial judge’s written contempt order, entered after disqualification, contained findings that the initial judge had not orally announced during the contempt hearing. However, the proper remedy is not to vacate the entire written contempt order. Rather, the proper remedy is for the initial judge to enter an amended written contempt order which deletes the unannounced findings. Thus, we affirm in part, and reverse in part.

We agree with the former husband’s beginning premise that “[g]enerally, a disqualified judge is barred from further participation in the case.” Ross v. Ross, 77 So. 3d 238, 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citations omitted). The former husband correctly acknowledges that “[w]hen a judge has heard the testimony and arguments and rendered an oral ruling in a proceeding, the judge retains the authority to perform the ministerial act of reducing that ruling to writing.” Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 243 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Godin v. Owens, 275 So. 3d 700, 701 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (a disqualified judge “maintains the authority to perform the ministerial duty of preparing a written order to reflect oral pronouncements made before the motion to disqualify”) (citations omitted). The former husband also correctly points out that the ministerial act exception does not apply where the trial judge substantively changes oral determinations by providing “details not articulated in the trial court’s prior oral pronouncement.” Godin, 275 So. 3d at 701 (citing Parnell v. Parnell, 113 So. 3d 989, 990-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). “In that instance, substantive changes in the trial court’s [oral] ruling are not ministerial and are considered void.” Id. (citing Parnell, 113 So. 3d at 990-91).

Based on the foregoing authorities, the former husband specifically attacks the written contempt order, because the order contains findings regarding the former wife’s prior move to Miami, and a ruling on the former husband’s 2021 motion for contempt against former wife, that were not made at the 2025 contempt hearing.

Regarding the former husband’s contempt motion attacking the former wife’s move to Miami in 2021, the 2025 written contempt order found “[t]he record reflects that said [prior] order found [the former wife] in contempt as it relates to the school boundary issue ‘only’ and ordered the children to attend school in Boca as the school boundary could not be changed.” Additionally, the 2025 written contempt order states that “[the former wife]’s move in 2021 was not found to be contemptuous.” The 2025 written contempt order concluded that the 2021 contempt order was of no consequence, because the issue of the former wife’s move to Miami had been resolved years ago, and the former wife had returned to Boca Raton.

We agree with the former husband that the 2025 contempt transcript shows that the initial judge made no oral findings as to the factual determinations from the 2021 contempt proceeding. More problematic is a misstatement in the 2025 written contempt order that the former wife was not found in contempt in 2021, when in fact the 2021 contempt order stated “[the former wife] is in contempt for failing to comply with the terms

of the 2013 agreement by relocating to Miami-Dade County.”

The former husband argues that those two findings regarding the 2021 contempt proceeding in the 2025 written contempt order—neither of which were orally announced during the 2025 contempt hearing—render the entire 2025 written contempt order void. The former husband further argues that he is entitled to a new hearing on the former wife’s contempt motion before a different judge.

We disagree with the former husband’s proposed remedy. Although the caselaw holds that “substantive changes in the trial court’s [oral] ruling are not ministerial and are considered void” when a disqualified judge issues an order after disqualification, Godin, 275 So. 3d at 701, we disagree that the entire 2025 written contempt order is void. Because we have the transcript from the 2025 contempt hearing, we can determine what oral determinations were made before the initial judge’s disqualification. Thus, we hold that the proper remedy in this case is to reverse the written contempt order and remand for the initial judge to (1) vacate the 2025 written contempt order, and (2) enter an amended written contempt order which removes the two findings discussed above that the initial judge did not orally announce during the 2025 contempt hearing.

Except as discussed above, we reject the former husband’s other arguments raised on appeal. As we warned in our order striking the former husband’s initial brief with leave to amend, we again caution the former husband about the use of artificial intelligence in preparation of documents filed with the court.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

CIKLIN, J., and BURTON, CHARLES E., Associate Judge, concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.