Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 372
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
II DIVISION
No. CV-26-107
JENNIFER NICOLE HUGHES AND Opinion Delivered: August 26, 2026
DAVID WAYNE HUGHES
APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
V. SMITH DISTRICT
[NO. 66FJV-25-308]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE SHANNON L. BLATT,
CHILDREN CIRCUIT JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge
Jennifer Nicole Hughes (“Jennifer”) and David Wayne Hughes (“David”) appeal the
order of the Sebastian County Circuit Court adjudicating their twin seven-year-old
daughters, MC1 and MC2, dependent-neglected. Both Jennifer and David argue that the
Arkansas Department of Human Services (“the Department”) failed to sufficiently prove that
the children were dependent-neglected. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On September 8, 2025, the Department placed a hold on MC1 and MC2 because of
suspected sexual abuse of MC1 after receiving a report from the Arkansas State Police. Upon
questioning Jennifer and David, the Department learned that although Jennifer and David
were married, they slept in different rooms; MC1 and MC2 had slept in David’s bed, and
he had changed MC1’s pull-up diaper during the night; Jennifer discovered MC1’s pull-up contained bloody urine the next morning; MC1 continued to have blood in her pull-up,
which led Jennifer and David to take her to Arkansas Children’s Hospital (“ACH”); MC1
required four sutures to repair a tear in her vaginal wall; and MC1 had been with her parents
and three siblings exclusively during the forty-eight hours leading up to their arrival at ACH.
On September 10, the Department filed a petition for dependency-neglect and emergency
custody. The court entered an order granting the request for emergency custody of the
children the following day.
On September 15, the court held a probable-cause hearing and found an emergency
existed warranting the Department’s continued custody of MC1 and MC2. The adjudication
hearing was then set.
The adjudication hearing took place on October 27 and November 3 and 4.1 At this
hearing, the Department first presented the testimony of Dr. Todd Maxson, the pediatric
surgeon who repaired MC1’s vaginal tear. Dr. Maxson stated that MC1 required anesthesia
for examination. He found that MC1 had suffered a one-and-a-half- to two-centimeter
internal mucosal tear of her vagina, and she had developed blood clots within her vagina,
indicating it had bled before she was taken into the operating room. He did not find any
external injury to her vagina. Dr. Maxson placed four sutures in the mucosa to stop the
bleeding. He testified as follows regarding MC1’s type of injury:
Q. . . . Is this type of injury consistent with penetration trauma?
1
After adjudicating the minor children dependent-neglected, the court held a hearing on the disposition. Appellees’ brief discussed the testimony and evidence presented during the disposition; however, we did not consider this portion of the hearing.
2
A. It is.
Q. And is it your experience that an accidental fall could cause a posterior vaginal
injury -- tear?
A. I don’t see that. What we -- what I typically see where there’s a fall or a straddle
injury, probably is the most common, is I see some injury externally on the
vagina. I typically see some injury at the introitus to the vagina. I don’t believe
I’ve ever seen an isolated internal vaginal injury without injury to the -- to those
other parts of the genitalia from a fall.
Q. Would you expect fresh bleeding shortly after a traumatic event?
A. I would.
Q. In pediatric medicine, is an internal vaginal tearing considered a red flag for
sexual trauma?
A. It is considered a red flag, yes.
Dr. Maxson further testified that MC1 had no prior medical condition that would
cause this type of tear. He opined that an injury significant enough to go to the operating
room for bleeding with no explanation of how it occurred would lead him to consult the
TCAR team2 and a social worker.
Dr. Maxson conceded on cross-examination by David’s counsel that he did not know
what caused MC1’s vaginal tear. He was not asked to perform a rape-test kit, and thus, one
was not done.
2
TCAR stands for ACH’s Team for Children at Risk for sexual abuse and neglect.
3
On cross-examination by Jennifer’s counsel, Dr. Maxson testified that MC1’s hymen
was still intact. On redirect examination, Dr. Maxson explained that MC1’s hymen could
remain intact after sexual penetration had occurred.
The next witness to testify was Dr. Sara Golden, who was designated as an expert
witness without objection. Dr. Golden is an ACH child-abuse pediatrician who reviewed
MC1’s medical records. Dr. Golden testified that vaginal bleeding in a seven-year-old is
abnormal and that MC1’s laceration indicated that trauma occurred. Dr. Golden was
questioned about the severity of MC1’s type of injury and what that meant:
Q. . . . The need for sutures, I’m sorry, does it indicate a more minor
or more severe type injury?
A. I would say that the need for sutures indicates that this is a
significant injury.
Q. In your opinion, is a posterior vaginal tear in a seven-year-old
warrant concern for sexual abuse and why?
A. Yes, it does.
A. . . . The reason being is that seven-year-old children ideally would
not have any vaginal bleeding at all. In the event that they have
lacerations, like I mentioned previously, it’s the result of trauma.
When speaking to the child directly, she denied self-insertion of
any objects or falling onto objects, and so penetrating vaginal
trauma from sexual abuse is very high on the differential diagnosis.
Given that David and Jennifer noticed fresh blood in three pull-ups on the morning
of the surgery, Dr. Golden believed that MC1’s injury had occurred recently. When asked
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about the causes of MC1’s injury, Dr. Golden stated that this injury could not be caused
during the normal care of a seven-year-old. While she acknowledged that an injury like
MC1’s could be accidental, in MC1’s particular case, the family did not provide a history of
accidental trauma.
Dr. Golden testified that from a child-maltreatment medical perspective, MC1’s type
of injury justified continued protective custody by the Department until the safety of the
minor children could be ensured since there was a high concern for sexual abuse. Dr. Golden
acknowledged that MC1 denied being a victim of sexual abuse and that MC1 had
developmental delays; however, Dr. Golden stated that, in her experience, denial is common
in victims of sexual abuse and that children with developmental delays are at a higher risk
for sexual abuse.
When asked about the mechanism for the potential sexual abuse, Dr. Golden stated
that it was unknown but that it could have been caused by way of a penis, a finger, or an
object. She stated her belief that the caregivers should have had an explanation for MC1’s
injury given the fact that she was only seven years old at the time.
When asked whether MC1 could have caused this injury to herself by way of
masturbation, Dr. Golden explained that it is uncommon to see actual penetrative actions
with child masturbation; however, in the rare instance that it does occur, it is typically seen
in young adults. Further, she stated that she had never personally seen penetrative
stimulation in a child MC1’s age.
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Shelby Bouren (“Shelby”), the ACH clinical social worker, testified next. Shelby stated
that she was assigned to MC1’s case and that she interviewed the parents about MC1’s injury.
Shelby stated that they denied having any precise knowledge about the cause of MC1’s injury.
Shelby stated that she also interviewed MC1. MC1 denied any knowledge of how her
injury occurred, and she acted out how David assisted her with changing her pull-up through
the night. Shelby noted that when she asked MC1 about the cause of her injury, MC1
became tearful and began to cry. Shelby testified that when she attempted to provide support
to MC1 during this time, MC1 denied that she was crying.
The next witness to testify was the investigator assigned to the case, Bobby Woodrome
(“Bobby”), who was employed by the Sebastian County Sheriff’s Office. Bobby stated that he
had intended to do a rape test in the case; however, he stated that he was unable to do so
because ACH had failed to properly preserve the evidence. Bobby testified that he
interviewed David and Jennifer separately.
When Bobby asked Jennifer and David about what they thought had caused MC1’s
injury, they could not give Bobby a clear answer; instead, they offered the following as
possible causes: MC1’s medical issues, jumping on the trampoline, a kidney stone, or that
she could have started her period early. No criminal charges were filed against Jennifer or
David.
The next witness was an investigator with the Arkansas State Police Crimes Against
Children Division (“CACD”), Carley Zirbel (“Carley”). Carley asked Jennifer and David
what occurred the day before they took MC1 to ACH. Jennifer and David also gave Carley
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the same possible explanations for how MC1’s injury could have occurred. Jennifer and
David told Carley that only they and MC1’s siblings had access to MC1 in the preceding
forty-eight hours. Additionally, Carley stated that she expected the parents to provide her
with an accurate explanation of the injury, and because they could not, she was concerned
for both MC1’s and MC2’s safety.
Mary Duenas (“Mary”), a social service specialist with the Department, testified that
after MC1 and MC2 were removed, she spoke with Jennifer, who was unable to provide her
with an explanation for the injury. This concerned Mary because MC1 had a significant
injury without explanation that was caused by an unknown offender. She was also concerned
about the sleeping arrangements during the time frame of the injury.
Jennifer testified next. She stated that on the night of September 6, she and their
oldest daughter went to a banquet while David watched the other three children. When they
returned home, MC1 and MC2 were just getting out of the bathtub, and her son was asleep
in his room. She said that the girls put on their pull-ups, she told them goodnight, and then
they went into David’s room to watch TV. Jennifer said she did not know exactly when they
fell asleep in David’s bed. Jennifer stated that she slept in the office that night and likely
went to sleep around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. When she woke up the next morning, she saw that
the pull-up MC1 had worn the previous night appeared to contain light pink urine. After
MC1 had two more bloody pull-ups, she and David took her to the hospital around 12:00
p.m.
7
At the conclusion of Jennifer’s testimony, the attorneys made their closing arguments,
and the circuit court issued an oral ruling on the adjudication portion of the hearing.
On November 20, the court found that Jennifer’s testimony was not convincing and
entered an adjudication order that MC1 and MC2 were dependent-neglected due to sexual
abuse with severe trauma by unknown offender and parental unfitness. The court found the
allegations in the petition were true, and the vaginal injury to MC1 was consistent with
penetration and bleeding. The court further found oversight was necessary to protect the
children from the risk of sexual abuse, and without a known offender, there was no viable
safety plan.
After receiving an Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification, Jennifer and
David appealed.
II. Legal Framework
The purpose of an adjudication hearing is to determine whether the allegations in
the petition are substantiated by the proof. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-316(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2025);
see Araujo v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 181, at 4, 574 S.W.3d 683, 685. The
burden of proof at an adjudication hearing is a preponderance of the evidence. Id., 574
S.W.3d at 685.
On appeal, appellate courts use de novo review, will defer to the circuit court’s
credibility determinations, and will not reverse the circuit court’s order unless its findings
were clearly erroneous. Id; see also Samuels v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 2, 479
S.W.3d 596. “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it,
8
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Id. at 6–7, 479 S.W.3d at 600.
Only one ground is necessary to support a dependency-neglect finding. Franklin v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 390, 654 S.W.3d 76. The Juvenile Code defines a
dependent-neglected juvenile to include any juvenile who is at substantial risk of serious
harm as a result of, among other things, sexual abuse. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(17)(a)(iii)
(Supp. 2025). The definition of sexual abuse includes deviant sexual activity, by a caretaker,
to a person younger than eighteen years of age. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(54)(D). Deviant
sexual activity is defined as any act of sexual gratification involving penetration, however
slight, of the labia majora or anus by a body member or foreign instrument. Ark. Code Ann.§
9-35-102(20)(B).
III. Jennifer’s Appeal
Jennifer argues on appeal that the circuit court clearly erred in finding there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding of dependency-neglect. Because only one ground is
necessary to support a dependency-neglect finding, we focus on whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the circuit court’s finding of sexual abuse and need not determine
whether the evidence independently established other grounds for a finding of dependencyneglect. Franklin, supra.
Jennifer argues that “there is almost always a disclosure by the child or direct witness
evidence for this court to affirm a finding of sexual abuse.” She contends that because MC1
did not testify or tell any of the providers how the injury occurred, nor did any witness
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disclose how MC1 was injured, the Department did not meet its burden of proof. There is
no requirement that a disclosure be made by a witness to sustain a finding of sexual abuse.
Jennifer cites no authority for this claim, and we do not consider arguments without
convincing argument or citation to authority. Ward v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark.
App. 491. On the contrary, Dr. Golden testified that denial is common in victims of sexual
abuse. The court also heard from the clinical social worker, Shelby, who testified that when
she asked MC1 about the cause of her injury, MC1 became tearful and began to cry.
Jennifer’s argument is not well taken.
Jennifer fails to acknowledge the numerous witnesses who testified on behalf of the
Department. The court weighed the evidence and testimony and found the Department met
its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence—it was more likely than not that the
children were dependent-neglected. See Turner v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 682, 537 S.W.3d 299.
Jennifer argues there is no indication that the injury to MC1 was for the purpose of
sexual gratification as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-102(20)(B). This
argument is without merit.
We have held it is not necessary for the state to provide direct proof
that an act is done for sexual gratification if it can be assumed that the desire
for sexual gratification is a plausible reason for the act. McGalliard v. State, 306
Ark. 181, 813 S.W.2d 768 (1991). We have previously stated that “when
persons, other than physicians or other persons for legitimate medical reasons,
insert something in another person’s vagina or anus, it is not necessary that
the state provide direct proof that the act was done for sexual gratification.”
Id. [at 183, 813 S.W.2d at 769].
10
Warren v. State, 314 Ark. 192, 196–97, 862 S.W.2d 222, 225 (1993). The testimony of the
witnesses supported the determination that MC1 suffered a penetrating injury to her vagina
without further damage to the external tissues. Clearly, something had been inserted into
her vagina. Dr. Golden testified that without a legitimate medical basis or accidental injury,
some type of sexual trauma—whether from a penis, a finger, or an object—caused MC1’s
injury. In light of Warren, the court could infer the act was done for sexual gratification. The
court did not clearly err in finding there was sufficient evidence to meet the element of sexual
gratification given the location of MC1’s injury and that there was no legitimate medical
reason or accidental basis for the injury.
Jennifer’s argument that the expert witness testimony did not chin the necessary bar
of substantial evidence of sexual abuse falls short. Dr. Golden testified that “[w]hen speaking
to the child directly, she denied self-insertion of any objects or falling onto objects, and so
penetrating vaginal trauma from sexual abuse is very high on the differential diagnosis.”
Similarly, Dr. Maxson ruled out a fall or straddle injury because there was no external vaginal
trauma and only internal trauma. Dr. Maxson stated that in pediatric medicine, vaginal
tearing is “considered a red flag” that warrants bringing in the TCAR team for evaluation.
Both Dr. Maxson and Dr. Golden testified that an injury to a child’s genitals—especially one
significant enough to require surgical repair to stop the bleeding and having no known
explanation—presents an ongoing medical risk to the child.
To the extent Jennifer argues that a particular cause must be identified, we find
Franklin, supra, persuasive. In Franklin, the parents of a seven-week-old denied knowing how
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the child obtained multiple skeletal fractures; instead, they speculated that the injuries were
caused by the older sister jumping and falling on the child. Id. at 1–2, 654 S.W.3d at 77–78.
The court heard testimony from three physicians as to the nature and extent of the child’s
injuries and how they could have occurred. The court found the child dependent-neglected
on the grounds of abuse. The father appealed, arguing that there was no identified act or
omission or evidence the injuries were not accidental. Id. at 2–4, 654 S.W.3d at 77–79. We
affirmed the finding of dependency-neglect in the absence of any potential medical cause or
plausible accidental injury. Though there was conflicting testimony about the potential
causes of the injury, the court was free to believe the testimony that supported the finding
of abuse. Id.
Over the course of three days, the court heard witness testimony that MC1 suffered
an acute injury that had occurred within forty-eight hours of arriving at the hospital, and
only the people in the home had access to her. The testimony of the expert and treating
physician detailed how this seven-year-old child suffered a penetrating mucosal tear to her
vagina that was significant enough to warrant four sutures to stop the bleeding. This is
abnormal by all accounts. The court weighed the testimony and considered the possible
explanations offered by Jennifer and David—her underlying medical condition,3 starting her
menstruation cycle, accidental fall, or kidney stone—and instead chose to believe that MC1
suffered a penetrating injury without further external trauma, which could be caused by a
3
The only testimony presented was that MC1 was developmentally delayed, and she has polymastia. Neither of these would explain an internal posterior vaginal tear.
12
penis, a finger, or an object, as testified to by the medical experts. The court found Jennifer’s
testimony unconvincing and instead found the testimony of the expert, treating physician,
social worker, and CACD investigator more persuasive. The circuit court was in the best
position to evaluate the testimony of the witnesses and determine the weight to be given to
their testimony. See Araujo, supra. “[T]his court will not substitute its own judgment or
second-guess the credibility determinations of the trial court.” Hambrick v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 458, at 12, 503 S.W.3d 134, 140.
Jennifer argues that because the investigator with the sheriff’s office, Bobby, “said it
could not be and was not Jennifer,” the adjudication order as to her should be reversed. She
argues that Bobby’s testimony supports her argument that she did not cause MC1’s injury.
The court did not have to give weight to Bobby’s testimony. Regardless of what weight the
court gave Bobby’s testimony, an adjudication of dependency-neglect occurs without
reference to which parent committed the acts or omissions leading to the adjudication; the
juvenile is simply dependent-neglected. Eason v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012 Ark. App.
507, 423 S.W.3d 138. Because of this, “[t]he focus of an adjudication hearing is on the child;
not the parent[.]” Young v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 270, at 6, 549 S.W.3d
383, 386–87. The child must be protected regardless of precisely who or what placed him or
her at substantial risk of serious harm. Franklin, supra.
We cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the children were
dependent-neglected based on sexual abuse and affirm.
IV. David’s Appeal
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David argues on appeal that the evidence does not support the circuit court’s finding
that the children were dependent-neglected due to sexual abuse and parental unfitness. Only
one ground is necessary to support a dependency-neglect finding; therefore, we do not
address David’s argument regarding parental fitness. Franklin, supra. David makes many of
the same arguments as Jennifer’s—no disclosures, unknown offender, and Bobby’s testimony
do not support a finding of dependency-neglect.
To the extent David argues that the Department failed to prove he was the perpetrator
of any alleged sexual abuse, we have frequently held that a parent cannot avoid the legal
consequence of a dependency-neglect finding at the adjudication stage just because the
alleged sexual abuse might have been caused by someone else. Eason, supra. “It is not
uncommon for trial courts at the adjudication stage to find abuse or neglect but also find that
the offender is unknown.” Parnell v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 108, at 23, 538
S.W.3d 264, 278.
For the reasons discussed in our consideration of Jennifer’s appeal, we also reject
David’s arguments and hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding the children
dependent-neglected.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant David
Wayne Hughes.
Dusti Standridge and Tara Crippen, for separate appellant Jennifer Hughes.
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Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children.
15