Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 373
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-25-138
TY FLOYD; KRISTY FLOYD; AND Opinion Delivered: August 26, 2026
COTTAGE CREATIONS, LLC
APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
APPELANTS
[NO. 17CV-23-378]
V. HONORABLE CANDICE A. SETTLE,
JUDGE
JOY BOWLIN-LEMON, KIM BOWLIN,
AND CORNELIA BOWLIN
AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN
APPELLEES PART
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in the Crawford County Circuit
Court in favor of appellees, Joy Bowlin-Lemon, Kim Bowlin, and Cornelia Bowlin
(collectively, “the Bowlins”). The circuit court found the Bowlins proved they established a
boundary by acquiescence and ordered the appellants, Ty Floyd; Kristy Floyd; and Cottage
Creations, LLC (collectively, “the Floyds”), to rebuild the fence on the eastern and southern
borderlines of the Bowlins’ property. Additionally, the Bowlins were awarded a judgment in
the amount of $12,000.
On appeal, the Floyds argue the circuit court clearly erred in (1) finding the value of
the trees removed by the Floyds was $4,000; (2) finding the Bowlins were entitled to treble
damages; (3) finding the Floyds should rebuild the fence on the eastern and southern borders of the Bowlins’ property; and (4) finding a boundary by acquiescence. Additionally, they
argue that even if the circuit court’s order is affirmed, the judgment should be amended to
include a specific legal description of the boundary at issue. We affirm the circuit court’s
order but remand for the limited purpose of amending the judgment to include a legal
description of the boundary at issue.
I. Background and Procedural History
This case concerns a dispute between adjoining landowners regarding the location of
the boundary line between their respective properties and the destruction of longstanding
fencing and timber near that boundary. On July 15, 2023, the Bowlins filed suit against the
Floyds alleging trespass and destruction of fencing and trees and seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.
On October 15, 2024, a bench trial was held. Joy Bowlin-Lemon testified her family
purchased the disputed property in 1967 when she was approximately ten years old.
According to Joy, the prior owner walked the property boundaries with her family at the
time of purchase and identified the existing fence lines as the property boundaries. Joy
testified the property had been used continuously by her family since that time, and the fence
lines had always marked the limits of the property until disputes arose with Ty Floyd. Joy
identified deeds establishing the Bowlins’ ownership of the property, which were admitted
into evidence as plaintiffs’ exhibits 1 and 2. She also identified an aerial photograph
depicting the property and marked the locations of the family homes and the disputed fence
lines. Joy testified the southern fence line extended approximately thirty to forty feet beyond
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the metes-and-bounds description reflected by the surveyed property line. She explained the
fence had existed in that location since at least 1967.
Joy further testified the fences were repaired in approximately 1973 and had
historically been used to contain livestock, including cattle and horses. She stated the Bowlin
family maintained the property up to the fence line by brush hogging and cutting hay and
that neighboring landowners had never disputed the location of the fence until the Floyds
purchased the adjoining tract. Joy testified the first dispute with the Floyds occurred in 2017
when the Floyds cut the southern fence line. According to Joy, the Floyds initially repaired
the fence twice before ultimately tearing it down completely around 2019. Joy also testified
regarding an incident in 2022 in which she and other family members attempted to repair
the fence and were confronted by Ty Floyd, Kristy Floyd, and another individual carrying
firearms.
Joy described the current condition of the fence as being in complete disrepair, with
sections bulldozed and removed entirely. She testified that ditches had been dug in the area
and that the fencing could no longer contain livestock. Joy further testified that trees had
been removed from the disputed area and that gravel had been dumped where bulldozing
occurred. She estimated that approximately fifty to one hundred trees, primarily oak trees,
had been removed. Joy also testified that “no trespassing” signs attached to the fence had
been rolled up and discarded during the destruction of the fencing. With respect to the
eastern boundary, Joy identified a survey provided by the Floyds during discovery, which was
admitted as plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4. Joy acknowledged the survey reflected the metes-and-bounds
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description of the eastern boundary and testified the Bowlins were willing to accept that
surveyed line as the eastern property boundary so long as the destroyed fence was rebuilt as
it previously existed. Joy testified the eastern fence had consisted of five-strand barbed wire
before it was destroyed by the Floyds. Numerous photographs depicting the fence lines,
cleared areas, and damage to the property were introduced. Joy testified the photographs
accurately depicted the condition of the property following the destruction of the fencing
and removal of trees.
Kim Bowlin, Joy’s brother, also testified on behalf of the plaintiffs. Kim corroborated
Joy’s testimony regarding the longstanding existence of the fence lines and the Bowlins’ use
of the property up to those boundaries for decades. Kim testified the family had continuously
treated the fence as the boundary line and that neighboring landowners had never disputed
the boundary before the Floyds acquired the adjoining property. Kim further testified
regarding the condition of the property after the Floyds removed fencing and trees and
identified additional photographs admitted into evidence depicting the damage. Kim
testified he estimated Ty Floyd removed between twenty-five and fifty trees valued at around
$250 a tree.
Ty Floyd testified for the plaintiffs and later during the defense’s case-in-chief. Ty
admitted he removed portions of the fence and trees from the disputed areas. He testified
that, in his opinion, portions of the disputed property belonged to him based on his
understanding of the property boundaries and a survey he claimed to have relied on.
However, Ty acknowledged he did not introduce into evidence any survey establishing the
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southern boundary. Ty further admitted he had placed stakes along the southern portion of
the property to mark where he believed the property line should be located. During his
testimony, Ty also stated he was willing to rebuild the fence “boundary wise on the property
lines.”
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Bowlins moved to amend their pleadings to
conform to the proof and requested injunctive relief requiring the Floyds to rebuild the
damaged fencing. Counsel for the Floyds did not object and expressly stated there was no
objection to ultimately erecting the fence. Following the bench trial, the circuit court found
in favor of the Bowlins, concluding that a boundary by acquiescence existed along the
southern fence line, awarding damages for the destruction of trees and fencing, awarding
treble damages pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-60-102 (Repl. 2015), and
ordering the Floyds to rebuild the fencing along the eastern and southern boundaries.
II. Discussion
A. Trees Valued at $4,000
For their first point on appeal, the Floyds argue the circuit court clearly erred in
finding the trees Ty Floyd removed were worth $4,000. Specifically, they contend that no
credible evidence was presented regarding the value of the trees and that any valuation was
based solely on speculation.
In bench trials, the circuit court sits as the finder of fact and is charged with
determining the credibility of witnesses and, in doing so, may accept or reject any part of a
witness’s testimony. See Holmes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 384, 586 S.W.3d 183. The appellate
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court gives due deference to those credibility determinations because the circuit court is in a
superior position to observe the witnesses and evaluate their testimony firsthand. See Pop-ADuck, Inc. v. Gardner, 2022 Ark. App. 88, 642 S.W.3d 220. The question on appeal is not
whether there was conflicting evidence but whether the circuit court’s finding was clearly
erroneous.
Arkansas law does not require expert testimony to establish the value of trees or
damage to real property in every instance. Property owners are generally permitted to testify
regarding the value of their property and the damages sustained. See City of Lowell v. M&N
Mobile Home Park, Inc., 323 Ark. 332, 916 S.W.2d 95 (1996) (owner of property, based on
his relationship as owner, is competent to give opinion testimony on value of his property
regardless of knowledge of property values and it is not necessary to show that owner is expert
or is acquainted with market value of local real estate and such testimony should be struck
only if it has no reasonable basis); see Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Duff, 246 Ark. 922, 440
S.W.2d 563 (1969) (opinion testimony of owner is competent and admissible on question
of value, regardless of his knowledge of property values, if he has intimate acquaintance with
property). Here, the circuit court heard testimony regarding the number of trees removed,
the nature of the property, the estimated value of the trees ($250 a tree), and the extent of
the clearing performed by the Floyds. The circuit court also had the benefit of photographs
and testimony describing the condition of the land before and after the removal of the trees
and fencing. In light of this evidence, the circuit court determined the value of the trees
removed was $4,000.
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Additionally, the amount awarded was not excessive or facially unreasonable given
the testimony concerning the destruction that occurred. The Floyds essentially ask this court
to reweigh the evidence and second-guess the circuit court’s credibility determinations,
which we will not do. See Cloird v. Young, 2021 Ark. App. 271, 625 S.W.3d 739. Therefore,
because the circuit court’s valuation finding was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
B. Award of Treble Damages
Next, the Floyds argue the circuit court clearly erred in awarding the Bowlins treble
damages under Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-60-102. Specifically, they contend there
was insufficient evidence that Ty Floyd intentionally cut trees or removed fencing belonging
to the Bowlins because he allegedly believed the property was his on the basis of a survey he
obtained.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-60-102(a)(1) provides that a person who cuts
down, destroys, or carries away trees, timber, rails, or wood growing on the land of another
shall pay treble damages to the injured party. Although the statute requires intentional
wrongdoing, the requisite intent may be inferred from the carelessness, recklessness, or
negligence of the offending party. Hackleton v. Larkan, 326 Ark. 649, 933 S.W.2d 380 (1996).
The circuit court’s finding of intentional conduct was supported by substantial
evidence. Testimony established that “no trespassing” signs had been placed on the existing
fence line and that Ty tore down the fence despite those postings. There was also testimony
that Ty placed stakes along the southern edge of the Bowlins’ property to mark where he
personally wanted the property line to be. Although Ty claimed he had obtained a survey
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demonstrating the disputed property belonged to him, he failed to introduce into evidence
any such survey establishing the southern boundary.
Further, Ty admitted that he removed the trees and fencing at issue. The circuit court
was entitled to consider not only his admissions but also his conduct in proceeding to remove
trees and fencing despite the longstanding existence of the fence line and posted warnings.
From this evidence, the circuit court could reasonably infer intentional wrongdoing or, at
minimum, the degree of recklessness or negligence sufficient to support treble damages
under section 18-60-102. The circuit court’s finding was supported by the evidence presented
at trial and was not clearly erroneous; therefore, we affirm the award of treble damages.
C. Injunctive Relief – Rebuilding the Fence
Next, the Floyds argue the circuit court clearly erred in ordering them to rebuild the
fence located on the eastern and southern boundaries of the property. However, the record
demonstrates the Floyds waived any challenge to this relief. During trial, Ty expressly testified
he would be willing to rebuild the fence. The circuit court later clarified this testimony,
asking, “You said that you’re willing to rebuild the fence on the east side of the property?”
Ty responded that he was willing to put up a fence “boundary wise on the property lines[.]”At
the close of the evidence, the Bowlins moved to amend their pleadings to conform to the
proof and requested injunctive relief requiring the Floyds to repair and rebuild the fence.
The Floyds did not object to the amendment. To the contrary, counsel for the Floyds
affirmatively stated there was no objection to ultimately erecting the fence.
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It is well settled that a party may not complain on appeal of an action that he induced,
consented to, or acquiesced in below. Gray v. Moreland, 2010 Ark. App. 207, 374 S.W.3d
178. Because the Floyds expressly agreed to rebuild the fence and failed to object to the
requested injunctive relief, they cannot now challenge that ruling on appeal. Accordingly,
this argument is not preserved for appellate review, and we affirm.
D. Boundary by Acquiescence
Next, the Floyds argue the circuit court clearly erred in finding a boundary by
acquiescence existed between the Bowlin and Floyd properties. Specifically, they contend
there was no evidence that either the parties or their predecessors expressly or impliedly
agreed the fence constituted the boundary line.
Boundary-line cases are reviewed de novo, but this court will not reverse findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Smith v. Bowser, 2020 Ark. App. 425, at 5–6. Because
the location of a boundary is a question of fact, the circuit court’s finding will be affirmed
unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.
A boundary by acquiescence arises when adjoining landowners tacitly accept a fence
line or other monument as the visible evidence of their dividing line and apparently consent
to that line over many years. Myers v. Yingling, 372 Ark. 523, 279 S.W.3d 83 (2008). Such a
boundary may exist even when it differs from the true surveyed boundary. Charles R. Griffith
Farms, Inc. v. Grauman, 2009 Ark. App. 515, 333 S.W.3d 430. A boundary by acquiescence
may also exist without any prior dispute regarding the property line. Mullins v. Helgren, 2022
Ark. App. 3, 638 S.W.3d 864. To establish a boundary by acquiescence, the evidence must
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demonstrate (1) a tacit agreement between the parties; (2) recognition of the boundary for a
long period of time; and (3) a fixed, definite, and certain line. Id.
Here, substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s finding. Joy Bowlin-Lemon
testified that when her parents purchased the property in 1967, the previous owner walked
the property with them and identified the boundary up to the existing fence line. She further
testified that, shortly after purchasing the property, the Bowlin family spent time and money
repairing the fence without objection from neighboring landowners. The testimony also
established the fence served as the practical boundary line for decades. The Bowlins kept
cattle and other farm animals confined within the fenced property and maintained the land
adjacent to the southern boundary by brush hogging and cutting hay. No neighboring
landowner disputed the location of the fence or objected to the Bowlins’ use of the property
until the Floyds purchased the adjoining tract.
Contrary to the Floyds’ argument, an express agreement is not required to establish
a boundary by acquiescence. Tacit acceptance alone is sufficient. See Whitecotton v. Owen,
2016 Ark. App. 120, at 6, 487 S.W.3d 380, 384. Silent acquiescence may be inferred from
the conduct of the parties over many years, and mutual recognition of the boundary need
not be expressly stated. Id. The longstanding existence of the fence, the Bowlins’ decadeslong maintenance and use of the property up to the fence line, and the complete absence of
any dispute regarding the boundary until the Floyds acquired the neighboring property
constitute substantial evidence supporting the circuit court’s finding. Moreover, it is the
parties’ acquiescence to the line—not the mere existence of the fence itself—that controls.
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Camp v. Liberatore, 1 Ark. App. 300, 615 S.W.2d 401 (1981). Neither a prior dispute nor
adverse possession is required. Strother v. Mitchell, 2011 Ark. App. 224, 382 S.W.3d 741.
Giving due deference to the circuit court’s superior position to assess witness
credibility, the finding of a boundary by acquiescence was not clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in quieting title in
accordance with the established fence line. We affirm.
E. Remand of Judgment
Finally, the Floyds argue that even if the judgment is otherwise affirmed, it should be
remanded for the limited purpose of amending the decree to include a specific legal
description of the boundary at issue. The Bowlins agree, as does this court.
Arkansas law requires that a decree establishing a boundary line describe that
boundary with sufficient specificity that it can be identified solely by reference to the decree
itself. Whitecotton, 2016 Ark. App. 120, 487 S.W.3d 380; Dohle v. Duffield, 2011 Ark. App.
135. Even when a decree references surveys or exhibits containing legal descriptions, remand
is appropriate if the decree itself does not adequately describe the boundary. See id.
Here, while the circuit court referenced the disputed boundary and the evidence
supporting its ruling, the decree does not contain a metes-and-bounds description sufficient
to independently identify the boundary. Accordingly, consistent with Arkansas precedent,
we remand for the limited purpose of amending the judgment to include a specific legal
description of the boundary line established by the circuit court.
Affirmed in part; remanded in part.
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GLADWIN and TUCKER, JJ., agree.
The Applegate Firm, PLLC, by: Ryan J. Applegate, for appellants.
Taylor & Taylor Law Firm, P.A., by: Tory H. Lewis, Andrew M. Taylor, and Tasha C.
Taylor, for appellees.
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