UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KAMALUDDIN NABIZADA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 23-02906 (AHA)
MARCO RUBIO, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the United States Department of
State, et al., 1
Defendants.
Memorandum Opinion
Kamaluddin Nabizada sues the Secretary of State and other federal officials and agencies,
asserting they violated the Administrative Procedure Act by adding him to the Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, which froze his U.S. assets, and by denying his
petition to be removed from the list. The parties each move for summary judgment. The court
grants the government’s motion and denies Nabizada’s motion.
I. Background
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) authorizes the President
to take certain actions upon declaring a national emergency, including imposing economic
sanctions “to address significant foreign threats . . . to American national security, foreign policy,
or the economy.” Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229, 237 (2026); see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701,
1702(a)(1)(B). In 2001, relying on IEEPA and other authorities, President Bush issued an
executive order declaring a national emergency to respond to the threat of terrorist attacks and
1
Secretary of State Marco Rubio is “automatically substituted” as the defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
authorizing economic sanctions against people or groups identified in the order or who were in the
future determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General, to support terrorism as defined in the order. Blocking Property and
Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism,
Exec. Order No. 13224, § 1(a)–(b) & app., 66 Fed. Reg. 49079, 49079, 49082 (Sep. 23, 2001). In
2019, President Trump amended the executive order to authorize the imposition of economic
sanctions against people determined “to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of ” people or entities
that are already subject to sanctions under the order. Modernizing Sanctions To Combat Terrorism,
Exec. Order No. 13886, § 1, 84 Fed. Reg. 48041, 48042 (Sep. 9, 2019).
The Treasury Secretary has delegated the authority to determine who should be subject to
sanctions under this and similar executive orders to the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (“OFAC”). 31 C.F.R. § 594.802. And OFAC has issued regulations to implement the
sanctions regime authorized by the order. See Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 68 Fed.
Reg. 34196, 34196–205 (June 6, 2003) (promulgating 50 federal regulations “to carry out the
purposes of ” President Bush’s executive order). Among other things, these regulations provide
that, when OFAC determines a person qualifies for sanctions under the executive order, it
designates them as a “specially designated global terrorist.” 31 C.F.R. § 594.310; see also id.
§ 594.201(a). OFAC maintains a list of such people called the “Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List (‘SDN List’).” Id. ch. V, app. A; see also id. § 501.807.
In May 2022, acting under these regulations, OFAC designated Nabizada for economic
sanctions for materially supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (“IRGCQF”), an organization already designated for sanctions for providing support to multiple terrorist
2
groups. ECF No. 40-1 at 3–4, 8–9; see Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions, 87 Fed. Reg. 33305,
33308 (June 1, 2022). OFAC therefore added Nabizada to the SDN List and blocked his property
interests in the United States. See ECF No. 40-1 at 7; Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 110 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (explaining that someone added to the SDN List has “all their assets in the United States
or under the control of any person who is in the United States . . . blocked, or effectively frozen”
(cleaned up)). In an evidentiary memorandum accompanying its decision, OFAC stated Nabizada
“has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.” See ECF 40-1 at 8–9. That memorandum
contains classified materials and some unclassified information about Nabizada based on public
reporting. See id. at 8–17. The Treasury Department also issued a press release announcing that it
had designated Nabizada and others. Id. at 3–4. In addition to providing details about Nabizada
based on the public reporting referenced in the evidentiary memorandum, the press release stated
Nabizada assisted an IRGC-QF associate in arranging “the sale and transport of tens of thousands
of tons of oil on behalf of senior IRGC-QF officials.” Id. at 4.
In October 2022, Nabizada petitioned OFAC to reconsider its decision to designate him
and remove him from the SDN List. ECF No. 40-1 at 53–54; see 31 C.F.R. § 501.807 (allowing a
designated person to “submit arguments or evidence that the person believes establishes that
insufficient basis exists for the sanction or that the circumstances resulting in the sanction no longer
apply” and “propose remedial steps . . . which the person believes would negate the basis for the
sanction”). Without access to the classified information OFAC relied on to designate him,
Nabizada’s petition challenged statements in the public press release and argued there was no basis
for his designation. See ECF No. 40-2 at 14–28. And while that reconsideration petition was
pending, Nabizada filed this suit. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 12.
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In March 2024, OFAC denied Nabizada’s petition. See ECF No. 16 ¶ 66; ECF No. 17 ¶ 77.
The denial letter said that after “reviewing and carefully considering the evidence and other
information available to OFAC, as well as the information and arguments provided by [Nabizada],
OFAC has determined that [he] continues to meet the criteria for designation” and that Nabizada
“has not provided credible arguments or evidence establishing that an insufficient basis exists for
his designation or that the circumstances resulting in his designation no longer apply.” ECF No.
40-1 at 49. The letter further said OFAC “determined that [Nabizada] helped raise funds for the
IRGC-QF through the sale and transport of tens of thousands of tons of oil on behalf of senior
IRGC-QF officials” and “has been involved in price negotiation, contract execution, and the
subsequent sale and shipment of Iranian oil, as well as the repatriation of millions of dollars to the
IRGC.” Id. OFAC also provided a partially redacted, unclassified evidentiary memorandum
addressing and rejecting Nabizada’s arguments, concluding he “still meets the original criteria for
designation” because the information available to OFAC showed he had materially assisted,
sponsored, or supported the IRGC-QF through oil-related business dealings with IRGC-QF
associates, and thus recommending denying Nabizada’s petition. Id. at 60; see id. at 51–62; ECF
No. 40-2 at 1–4.
After OFAC denied his reconsideration petition, Nabizada filed an amended complaint,
challenging both his initial designation and the denial of his reconsideration petition under the
Administrative Procedure Act. ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 1, 20. Nabizada asks the court to set aside these
actions, order the government to remove his name from the SDN List, and award him costs and
fees. Id. at 22. The government now moves for summary judgment on all of Nabizada’s claims.
See ECF No. 30. Nabizada cross-moves, arguing he is entitled to summary judgment that the
government acted arbitrarily and capriciously in designating him and denying his reconsideration
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petition and violated his due process rights when it designated him without providing Nabizada
with the classified information underlying that decision. See ECF No. 32; ECF No. 32-1 at 1–2.
II. Discussion
In Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) cases, summary judgment generally “serves as
the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the
administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Zevallos v.
Obama, 10 F. Supp. 3d 111, 117 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9
(D.D.C. 2012)), aff’d, 793 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The court asks whether “the evidence in the
administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Olenga v. Gacki, 507 F.
Supp. 3d 260, 272 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. v. FDA, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18
(D.D.C. 2008)).
Nabizada’s first count asserts OFAC unlawfully delayed in ruling on his reconsideration
petition. ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 69–78. But, as Nabizada seems to acknowledge, this claim became moot
when the government denied his petition. See, e.g., Zevallos, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 123 (concluding an
APA unreasonable delay claim “is moot because OFAC has issued its decision regarding
[plaintiff’s] designation”); Karadzic v. Gacki, No. 23-cv-1226, 2024 WL 4253132, at *4 (D.D.C.
Sep. 20, 2024) (concluding the plaintiff’s “claims are moot” because “OFAC has adjudicated her
request for removal from the SDN list”); see also ECF No. 32-1 at 2 n.3 (Nabizada declining to
oppose the government’s argument that the unreasonable delay claim is moot). Because it lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate a moot claim, the court must dismiss count one without prejudice. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring dismissal if “the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction”); see also Zevallos, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 123.
Nabizada’s remaining claims assert that OFAC’s initial designation and denial of
reconsideration were arbitrary and capricious. See ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 79–87 (count two challenging
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OFAC’s “use of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence”); id. ¶¶ 88–91 (count three
challenging the initial designation); id. ¶¶ 92–97 (count four challenging the reconsideration
denial). The court disagrees and instead concludes the government is entitled to summary
judgment.
The APA requires courts to hold unlawful and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
An action is “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Put simply, courts
are tasked with verifying that the agency undertook “reasoned decisionmaking.” Id. at 52. This is
a limited review; the court cannot “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Id. at 43. Instead,
the court “presumes the validity of agency action,” evaluates “whether the agency has considered
the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made,” and vacates the action “only if the agency’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence, or the agency has made a clear error in judgment.” AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692,
698 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up) (quoting AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir.
2000)); see Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating
that, “if OFAC’s actions were not arbitrary and capricious and were based on substantial evidence,
we must affirm the district court’s decision” granting summary judgment to the government). The
D.C. Circuit has recognized the delicate approach courts should take when reviewing agency
decisions in cases like this one, “at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and
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administrative law.” Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 734. Even still, however, judicial
review serves as a meaningful check against an agency giving “an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence” or that “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise.” State Farm, 643 U.S. at 43.
Applying these standards to the record, the court concludes OFAC’s initial-designation and
reconsideration-denial decisions were supported by reasoned decisionmaking. As the initial
evidentiary memorandum says, OFAC designated Nabizada based on a determination that he “has
materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or
goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.” ECF 40-1 at 8–9. It is undisputed the IRGCQF is an entity that had already been designated for economic sanctions under the executive order,
added to the SDN List, and had its assets blocked by the government. See id. The letter denying
Nabizada’s reconsideration decision reiterates that OFAC’s decision “was based upon evidence
that he materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force
(IRGC-QF).” Id. at 49. It explains that, after “reviewing and carefully considering the evidence
and other information available to OFAC,” the government determined Nabizada had “not
provided credible arguments or evidence establishing that an insufficient basis exists for his
designation” and “continues to meet the criteria for designation.” Id. The letter also says OFAC
determined that Nabizada “helped raise funds for the IRGC-QF through the sale and transport of
tens of thousands of tons of oil on behalf of senior IRGC-QF officials” and “has been involved in
price negotiation, contract execution, and the subsequent sale and shipment of Iranian oil, as well
as the repatriation of millions of dollars to the IRGC.” Id. Finally, the evidentiary memorandum
accompanying the denial letter explained that these “oil-smuggling operations” were the reason
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for its decision and that the other facts mentioned in the public press release about Nabizada’s
designation—namely, the activities of a company Nabizada formerly managed and any connection
between Nabizada and the Kabul Bank—“did not provide the basis for” the designation. ECF No.
40-1 at 60–61; ECF No. 40-2 at 2 (explaining Nabizada’s “claim to have no relationship with or
involvement in Kabul Bank or any schemes to defraud it is irrelevant to his basis for designation”).
The government has also lodged the full classified agency record for ex parte and in camera review,
and that record confirms the court’s conclusion that OFAC’s decisions pass muster under the APA.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (explicitly providing for such review of classified information underlying
decisions made pursuant to the powers granted by IEEPA). On this record, the court cannot say
that OFAC’s decisions fall short of what is required by the APA. 2
Nabizada makes two arguments to the contrary, both of which are unpersuasive. He first
argues that the government relied on false premises, disputing various factual statements in the
public press release that accompanied the government’s initial designation. For example, the press
release mentions Nabizada’s former management of a company tied to the IRGC-QF, but he says
he relinquished control before the company began supporting the IRGC-QF. See ECF No. 40-1 at
3 (press release); ECF No. 32-1 at 15. Similarly, Nabizada disputes the press release’s statements
that he was the Afghan “chargé d’affaires in Moscow” and that he was involved in a corruption
scheme involving Kabul Bank. ECF No. 32-1 at 15–16; see ECF No. 40-1 at 3–4. But the
reconsideration evidentiary memorandum explains that none of those facts in the press release
provided the basis for OFAC’s designation or reconsideration decisions. See ECF No. 40-1 at 60–
2
The APA counts in Nabizada’s complaint also assert that OFAC’s decisions were an abuse of discretion and/or contrary to law in violation of the APA, but he offers no argument on how those theories allow his APA claims to survive summary judgment. The court thus understands them to be redundant of Nabizada’s arbitrary-and-capricious claims and concludes the government is entitled to summary judgment for the same reasons.
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61; ECF No. 40-2 at 2. Instead, the memorandum explains the decisions were based on Nabizada’s
“involvement in arranging the sale of Iranian oil for the IRGC-QF and helping to arrange the
repatriation of proceeds.” ECF No. 40-1 at 60. That is consistent with the public press release,
which stated that Nabizada assisted an IRGC-QF associate to arrange “the sale and transport of
tens of thousands of tons of oil on behalf of senior IRGC-QF officials.” ECF No. 40-2 at 6. And
the classified administrative record contains substantial evidence to support that determination,
independent of the information Nabizada contests. See Zevallos, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 123 n.9
(upholding an OFAC decision even when “a fraction of the newspaper articles” relied on may have
been “biased” because “they were not the only evidence relied upon by OFAC” and “the evidence
OFAC relied upon as a whole ‘adequately supports its ultimate decision’” (quoting Fla. Gas
Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010))); Kadi, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 16–17
(observing OFAC did “not appear to rely significantly on” an article the plaintiff disputed the
accuracy of and emphasizing that the plaintiff “provided OFAC with his version of the claims
made in the” article, so “OFAC therefore had the benefit of [the plaintiff’s] account which it then
reasonably discredited based on the evidence in the record as a whole”); see also Dickson v. Sec’y
of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that an agency’s decision need not “be a
model of analytic precision to survive a challenge” and that reviewing courts will “uphold a
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned” (quoting
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Motor Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974))). Finally, to the
extent Nabizada challenges OFAC’s stated basis for its decision—the “oil-smuggling
operations”—as opposed to the additional facts mentioned in the press release, the denial letter
and accompanying evidentiary memorandum rejected Nabizada’s conflicting arguments and
evidence as not credible—a decision that this court, again, cannot say flunks APA review. ECF
9
No. 40-1 at 49, 60–61; ECF No. 40-2 at 3; see Zevallos, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 123 n.9 (observing the
plaintiff raised the same evidentiary arguments before OFAC, which OFAC rejected, and stating
that it “is not the province of this Court to reweigh the evidence and reconsider [plaintiff’s]
arguments”).
Nabizada, second, argues he has been denied due process because OFAC designated him
using classified information that has not been made available to him or his attorneys. See ECF No.
32-1 at 12, 19–23. That argument does not provide a basis for granting Nabizada summary
judgment for several reasons. As a threshold matter, Nabizada’s complaint does not assert a Fifth
Amendment due process claim, and he “is not permitted to raise new claims at the summary
judgment stage.” See Taylor v. Mills, 892 F. Supp. 2d 124, 137–38 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting
cases). And, further, even assuming Nabizada had asserted a due process claim and is entitled to
Fifth Amendment protections, the court concludes the process the government provided was not
constitutionally deficient. See Olenga, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 272–73 (collecting cases in which courts
have “often declined to decide whether foreign plaintiffs can assert rights under the due process
clause where, even assuming they could, the agency had provided the requisite process”). 3
The “fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.” Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d
192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (cleaned up) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
3
On the same day Nabizada filed his amended complaint, he filed a motion to compel disclosure of redacted parts of the administrative record through unclassified summaries or an opportunity for counsel with the required clearance to review redacted information on his behalf, arguing that the failure to provide such information violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. See ECF No. 18-1 at 6–7. He also argued that ex parte, in camera review of the classified information by the court would be insufficient in this case. Id. at 14. The court denied Nabizada’s motion to compel, explaining that Nabizada had not shown he was entitled to further unclassified summaries and that “summary judgment is the proper time to address the kind of due process questions Nabizada raises,” as the court now does. ECF No. 26 at 2–4.
10
That guarantee “requires only that process which is due under the circumstances of the case.”
People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “To
determine whether OFAC’s designation of a plaintiff provides constitutionally adequate notice—
enabling him meaningfully to avail himself of his opportunity to be heard—courts weigh three
factors under the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test: (1) ‘the private interest that will be
affected by the official action’; (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards’; (3) and ‘the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’”
Fares v. Smith, 901 F.3d 315, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S at 335).
The D.C. Circuit has recognized, under the first factor, that “the effect of an OFAC
designation on the designee’s private interests is ‘dire’” and, under the second factor, that “[w]hen
the government freezes assets based on redacted evidence—thereby limiting the designee’s
opportunity to probe or cross-examine on that evidence—the risk of erroneous deprivation is
especially high.” Id. at 323–24 (quoting Nat’l Council of Resistance, 251 F.3d at 196). But the
circuit has also rejected the argument that “due process prevents” designating a plaintiff “based
upon classified information to which [they have] not had access.” Holy Land Found. for Relief &
Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 163–64 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In other words, an OFAC designation
decision does not violate due process “simply because the agency relies upon classified
information that the government refused to disclose.” Fares, 901 F.3d at 324 (cleaned up) (quoting
People’s Mojahedin Org., 327 F.3d at 1241–42). Rather, because the government’s interest is
strong (the third factor) and “[f]orcing the executive branch to disclose information that it has
validly classified would ‘compel a breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect,’”
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due process requires “the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”
Id. (quoting Nat’l Council of Resistance, 251 F.3d 208–09; People’s Mojahedin Org., 327 F.3d at
1242); see id. (emphasizing the need “to ensure a designee’s notice and process via alternative
means, while respecting compelling national security interests”).
Here, the government disclosed to Nabizada the unclassified portions of the administrative
record. The unclassified information included the reason for designating him—that he provided
support to the IRGC-QF, an organization that was already designated. See ECF No. 40-1 at 2, 8–
9. And when Nabizada filed a petition for reconsideration, the record suggests OFAC gave his
petition and accompanying evidence due consideration (including by sending Nabizada a
questionnaire to get additional information) and specifically rejected his arguments and evidence
based on the totality of the evidence before it. See ECF No. 40-1 at 49–62; ECF No. 40-2 at 1–4.
The government’s denial letter explained that Nabizada “continues to meet the criteria for
designation” because he “helped raise funds for the IRGC-QF through the sale and transport of
tens of thousands of tons of oil on behalf of senior IRGC-QF officials” and “has been involved in
price negotiation, contract execution, and the subsequent sale and shipment of Iranian oil, as well
as the repatriation of millions of dollars to the IRGC.” ECF No. 40-1 at 49. And the reconsideration
evidentiary memorandum provided further unclassified information about the basis for Nabizada’s
designation as well as responses to Nabizada’s arguments. See id. at 60–62; ECF No. 40-2 at 1–4.
The court concludes the unredacted information the government disclosed to Nabizada was
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process and that the remaining redactions fall “within
the privilege and the prerogative of the executive.” Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 164; see
People’s Mojahedin Org., 327 F.3d at 1242 (rejecting the argument that the use of classified
information disclosed only to the court ex parte and in camera violates due process).
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Nabizada acknowledges he is not entitled to the classified record and that IEEPA authorizes
lodging it with the court for ex parte and in camera review. See ECF No. 32-1 at 1 n.2, 23 n.7
(citing 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c)). But he argues an “ex parte, in camera judicial review of the classified
information would be insufficient . . . in this case based on the government’s track record.” Id. at
20. Specifically, Nabizada argues the factual errors he alleges the government made in the public
press release requires it to provide further “unclassified summaries or complete disclosure to
properly cleared defense counsel subject to an appropriate order” to satisfy due process. Id. To be
sure, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that “in certain limited circumstances, in lieu of classified
evidence the government may provide designees with sufficiently specific ‘unclassified summaries
ensuring that neither the government’s sources nor national security were compromised, that
provide plaintiffs with the “who,” “what,” “when” and “where” of the allegations.’” Fares, 901
F.3d at 324 (alterations omitted) (quoting Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir.
2001)). But the court is not persuaded the government was required to provide more than it did
here. To start, the reconsideration evidentiary memorandum does provide additional, unclassified
information about OFAC’s decisionmaking. See ECF No. 40-1 at 60–62; ECF No. 40-2 at 1–4.
And, as explained above, the facts Nabizada continues to point to from the press release did not
form the basis for OFAC’s decisions to initially designate Nabizada and to deny his
reconsideration petition. See ECF No. 40-1 at 60; ECF No. 40-2 at 2; see also ECF No. 21 at 12
n.3. In light of the official decision letters and evidentiary memoranda in the record, the court
declines to draw a broader inference about the government’s “track record” based on the public
press release. See ECF No. 21 at 12 n.3 (explaining “[t]he press release addressed the designation
of an oil-smuggling network involving at least ten individuals and nine entities”). The government
has also represented that it cannot provide any more information “without causing exceptionally
13
grave or serious damage to national security,” and the court’s review of the classified record
supports that representation. ECF No. 21 at 14 (quotation marks omitted).
In sum, the government gave Nabizada sufficient notice of OFAC’s reasons for designating
him—through its initial decision, the process that followed, and its reconsideration denial—and
lodged the full classified record with the court for ex parte and in camera review as contemplated
by statute. The court therefore concludes the government has complied with the requirements of
due process under the relevant precedents and that Nabizada’s contrary arguments do not provide
a basis for granting him summary judgment. See Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 164; Olenga, 507
F. Supp. 3d. at 276 (“The public record materials provided [plaintiff] with sufficient notice of
OFAC’s reasons for re-designating him to allow for a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Under
Holy Land, that is all—and, indeed, more than—IEEPA and the Constitution require.”).
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, count one is dismissed without prejudice, the government’s motion for
summary judgment is otherwise granted, and Nabizada’s cross motion for summary judgment is
denied. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
AMIR H. ALI
United States District Judge
Date: August 26, 2026
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