Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed August 26, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Nos. 3D24-1690 & 3D24-1934
Lower Tribunal Nos. F85-27788,
F88-18402 & 04-21999-CA-01
Aaron Shaw,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida,
Respondent/Appellee.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for MiamiDade County, Laura Shearon Cruz and Lourdes Simon, Judges.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Shearon Cruz and Lourdes Simon, Judges.
Aaron Shaw, in proper person.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg and David Llanes, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent/appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Aaron Shaw challenges, both via appeal (case number 3D24-1934)
and certiorari (case number 3D24-1690), an October 17, 2024 trial court
order that found Shaw had failed to establish probable cause that Shaw's
condition had changed such that it would be safe to discharge Shaw from his
civil commitment under Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act (the "Act").1 Without further
elaboration, we dismiss Shaw's certiorari petition for lack of jurisdiction.2
Further, because Shaw was afforded due process and because the
trial court's order is supported by competent, substantial evidence, we affirm
the appealed order.
1
Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act, also known as Florida's "Sexually Violent Predator Act" provides, among other things, that certain convicted sexual predators remain civilly committed until rehabilitation is proven. Chapter 394, Part V affords a detainee with a limited hearing to establish whether there is probable cause that a change in condition renders him safe to be released. § 394.918(3), Fla. Stat. (2024).
2
We lack certiorari jurisdiction to review a challenged order when the alleged harm caused by the order can be remedied on plenary appeal. Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998); DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass'n, 313 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (dismissing a petition for writ of certiorari and finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant certiorari relief, as the petitioners did not suffer a harm that could not be remedied on appeal). Orders, such as the instant one finding no probable cause under section 394.918(3), are reviewable by appeal and not by certiorari. See Gelish v. State, 394 So. 3d 114, 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).
2
I. Relevant Background
From the limited record, it appears that Shaw was originally charged
with sexual battery, coerced by threat, in October 1985. Although it is not
clear, it appears Shaw was sentenced to two and a half years in prison. After
he was released, he re-offended in June 1988, when he was charged with
and convicted of sexual assault with a weapon and kidnapping. Thereafter,
while incarcerated, Shaw was charged with battery on a law enforcement
officer in September 1988. The victim was a corrections officer whom Shaw
grabbed and attempted to fondle.
The record is replete with instances of violence by Shaw during his
incarceration. In 1992, he again assaulted a corrections officer, this time with
a mop wringer. The record shows that Shaw was charged multiple times
throughout his incarceration in connection with separate incidents of: biting
a staff member, kicking a staff member, and placing his hands around a staff
member’s neck. The record also shows that, at some point, Shaw was found
with an eighteen-inch, homemade knife. This list is not exclusive.
On Shaw’s release from prison, the State filed an involuntary civil
commitment petition pursuant to the Act. The civil commitment proceedings
were then set for trial. The court determined that Shaw was a sexually violent
predator pursuant to section 394.917 of the Act, and Shaw was civilly
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committed to the Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”) on May 5, 2008.
He has remained committed since that time, although his commitment has
been interrupted several times for re-incarceration for new criminal
convictions. Shaw was re-admitted to FCCC in 2020. Pursuant to section
394.918(1) of the Act, Shaw's status is reviewed annually. Shaw may petition
the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing limited to determining
whether Shaw has established probable cause that his condition has so
changed he is safe to be discharged.3
For this purpose, Dr. Melanie Mercado conducted an evaluation on
April 30, 2024, examining Shaw’s long record and history. Shaw declined to
be present and/or be interviewed for purposes of the evaluation. Mercado’s
report covered the period spanning April 1, 2022, to May 4, 2023, and relied
on two previous Sexually Violent Predator evaluation reports (both from
2004) from two previous doctors, Department of Children and Families’
records, and FCCC Clinical and Administrative Records. The report outlined
Shaw’s pattern of poor attendance and refusal to participate in treatment
programs. Of note, Dr. Mercado stated, along with a detailed list:
3
“If the court finds probable cause on the safety and re-offending issues [following the hearing], the court conducts a bench trial to determine the individual's entitlement to release.” Abaunza v. State, 278 So. 3d 207, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); see § 394.918(3), Fla. Stat. (2024).
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During this review period, Mr. Shaw continued to struggle with
resistance to rules and supervision. This was evidenced by
incurring multiple Behavioral Management Reports (BMRs) and
noncompliance with recommendations included in his Integrated
Care Plan (ICP). . . . Mr. Shaw incurred a total of 20 [BMRs]
during the review period. All of the 20 BMRs received were
substantiated.
Ultimately, Dr. Mercado concluded that Shaw needs further treatment to
avoid reoffending if released.
Shaw was notified of his right to petition for release on April 30, 2024,
along with notice of the probable cause hearing and Shaw’s right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing. In preparation for the probable cause
hearing, another medical professional, Dr. Amy Swan, was appointed by the
trial court to examine Shaw. This time, Shaw cooperated and participated.
Dr. Swan’s report contains a detailed and comprehensive timeline of Shaw’s
convictions, actions, and dangerous behavior. Relying on Shaw’s history, the
twenty BMRs, and Dr. Swan’s interview with Shaw, Dr. Swan concluded that
Shaw remains an “extremely dangerous sexual predator” who, “without a
doubt, continues to meet criteria” and “[i]f he is released into the community,
his propensity to commit acts of violence is of such a degree as to pose a
menace to the health and safety of others.” She described Shaw as having
an “extremely psychopathic” indifference while still denying his actions in the
5
face of abundant and substantiated evidence. In her view, his conduct is
consistent and unlikely to change, resulting in a high risk if ever released.
On October 17, 2024, the trial court held a chapter 394 probable cause
hearing. Shaw attended via the Zoom platform. At the commencement of the
proceedings, there was a delay as Shaw announced that he was in a “suicide
cell” with no clothes on, in a restrictive smock, and without his legal
documents. The hearing recessed for a little over half an hour to allow Shaw
to put on clothes and obtain his legal papers. Thereafter, Shaw objected to
the hearing stating he had a pending motion and a right to have a doctor
present to support his defense. The trial court disagreed, stating that section
394.918(1) entitled Shaw to an examination, of which he had two, and
provided a method for requesting another person to evaluate him, which the
court may appoint. Following Shaw’s objection, the hearing continued, and
the trial court gave Shaw the opportunity to present evidence that his
condition had changed, in response to which he abruptly logged off. The trial
court then gave Shaw over ten minutes to sign back on and, after receiving
confirmation from the center that Shaw had intentionally logged off, the trial
court concluded the hearing, allowed the State to submit a proposed order
based on the evidence, and found that Shaw had an opportunity to be heard.
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In its order, dated October 17, 2024, the trial court found that, “[u]pon
the Court’s consideration of the April 30, 2024, treatment report and Dr.
Swan’s September 16, 2024, evaluation report, and the Respondent
presenting no evidence that his condition has changed so that he is safe for
release,” Shaw continues to meet the criteria for civil commitment as a
sexually violent predator pursuant to sections 394.910-394.931, Florida
Statutes. Shaw timely appealed the order.
II. Analysis
A. Due Process4
We first address Shaw's multiple, conclusory claims that he was denied
due process. We conclude that Shaw was not deprived of due process
because (i) he was provided with the statutorily required notice of his right to
request a probable cause hearing, and (ii) at the probable cause hearing,
Shaw was provided with an opportunity to be heard. A & S Ent., LLC v. Fla.
Dep't of Revenue, 282 So. 3d 905, 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“[W]here a
government entity provides notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
satisfying the requirements of procedural due process, a defendant's
4
We review de novo a due process challenge. Alan v. West, 420 So. 3d 566, 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).
7
voluntary failure to meaningfully participate in those proceedings will not
vitiate the protections accorded.”).
B. Competent Substantial Evidence5
The record in this case supports the trial court’s findings. The trial court
relied on ample evidence, including two expert reports by Doctors Swan and
Mercado, coupled with Shaw’s failure to present any evidence to the
contrary. Nothing in the record suggests probable cause exists that Shaw’s
condition has changed.
In sum, both experts deemed him to be a sexually violent predator
based on, among other things, twenty BMRs that mirrored the behavior and
the findings of previous professionals who had access to Shaw in the more
than sixteen years he has been committed. Critically, Dr. Swan’s findings are
based on an actual interview with Shaw in which he continues, to this day,
to deny all accusations – claiming all are lies. Against a considerable amount
of contrary evidence, Shaw’s only support in favor of release amounted to
statements that he is impotent, including a seven-page, self-serving missive.
The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Shaw should be
5
We review a trial court’s no probable cause findings under section 394.918(3) to determine whether the order's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Gelish v. State, 394 So. 3d 114, 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (citing Abaunza, 278 So. 3d at 210).
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released and the trial court’s order was supported by competent and
substantial evidence. See Abaunza, 278 So. 3d at 210.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that Shaw, having been accorded both notice and an
opportunity to be heard, was not deprived of his right to due process. The
trial court’s findings are supported by ample competent, substantial record
evidence.
Affirmed.
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