In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00001-CR
JERRY JORDAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 5th District Court
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 24F0653-005
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Bowie County jury convicted Jerry Jordan of continuous sexual abuse of a child
younger than fourteen years of age, Jane, a first-degree felony.1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.02. The jury assessed punishment of life imprisonment without parole.2 In one issue on
appeal, Jordan claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Within that
one issue, Jordan contests the sufficiency of the evidence in general (asserting that Jane’s
testimony was “vague and not sufficiently specific to satisfy the elements necessary to prove
continuous sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt”), and specifically, timing (asserting “it was
unclear as to when the sexual abuse allegedly began in Texas and whether it occurred for more
than [thirty] days in duration”).
Because we find that the evidence, including the evidence regarding timing, was
sufficient to support Jordan’s conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Standard of Review
“The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a conviction be
supported by legally sufficient evidence.” Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 596, 607 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Cochran, J. concurring)). “Evidence is legally
1
We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the victims, who were minors at the time of the offenses. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (conferring crime victims with “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect to the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3); McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
2
The jury also convicted Jordan of indecency with a child by exposure, a third-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(d), and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment, to run consecutively. Although Jordan states in his brief that this appeal is brought from both convictions, he assigns no separate error to the indecency conviction.
2
sufficient to support a conviction if, when viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict, any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Parker v. State, 727 S.W.3d 38, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (citing
McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
We measure “[t]he sufficiency of the evidence . . . against the hypothetically correct jury charge,
defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging instrument.” Id. (citing Malik v.
State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The hypothetically correct jury charge is
one that accurately states the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not increase the State’s
burden of proof, and adequately describes the offense with which the defendant is charged.” Id.
(citing Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
“When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial,
including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted.” Id. (citing Winfrey v.
State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “We do not sit as the thirteenth juror, and we do not substitute our
judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence.”
Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023)). “The jury is
permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at trial.” Id. (citing Metcalf
v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020)). “Additionally, the jury may use
common sense, common knowledge, personal experience, and observations from life when
drawing inferences.” Id. (citing Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)).
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“We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the
verdict, and we defer to that resolution.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608 (citing Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 922; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778). “However, juries are not permitted to come to
conclusions based on ‘mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.’”
Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we should look at ‘“events occurring
before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant
which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.”’” Hammack v.
State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Each
fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of a defendant, as long as the
cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.”
Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at
13).
Where the testimony of a child victim is at issue, we are mindful of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeal’s admonition that:
[W]e cannot expect the child victims of violent crimes to testify with the same
clarity and ability as is expected of mature and capable adults. To expect such
testimonial capabilities of children would be to condone, if not encourage, the
searching out of children to be the victims of crimes such as the instant offense in
order to evade successful prosecution.
Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). By statute, the testimony of a
child victim, standing alone, can support a jury verdict. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.07(a)–(b)(1).
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II. Applicable Law, Indictment, and the Jury Charge
A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if,
(1) during a period that is [thirty] or more days in duration, the person
commits two or more acts of sexual abuse,[3] . . . and
(2) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor
is [seventeen] years of age or older and the victim is
(A) a child younger than [fourteen] years of age[.]
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b)(1)–(2)(A).
The amended indictment4 alleged that Jordan:
during a period that was [thirty] or more days in duration, to wit: beginning on or
about December 3, 2021, and continuing until on or about May 31, 2023, when
the defendant was [seventeen] years of age or older, commit[ted] two or more acts
of sexual abuse against Jane Doe (a pseudonym), a child, younger than [fourteen]
years of age, namely:
• Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child (P.C. 22.021) the defendant
did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the sexual
organ of Jane Doe (a pseudonym), a child who was then and there
younger than [fourteen] years of age, to contact or penetrate the
mouth of the defendant.
• Indecency with a Child by Sexual Contact (P.C. 21.11), with intent
to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the defendant, engage in
sexual contact with Jane Doe (a pseudonym), a child who was then
and there younger than [fourteen] years of age, by causing Jane
Doe (a pseudonym) to touch the genitals of the defendant.
3
An “act of sexual abuse” includes, among other violations of penal laws, “indecency with a child under Section 21.11(a)(1)” of the Texas Penal Code (limited in a manner not applicable here) and “aggravated sexual assault under Section 22.021” of the Texas Penal Code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(c)(2), (c)(4); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1), § 22.021 (Supp.).
4
The amended indictment also charged Jordan with indecency with a child by exposure, as mentioned above; aggravated sexual assault of a child; and four counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The State did not proceed to trial on the aggravated assault or indecency by sexual-contact counts, and because Jordan did not assign separate error to his conviction for indecency by exposure, we do not discuss it here.
5
The jury charge tracked the statutory language of Section 21.02(b) of “during a period
that is [thirty] or more days in duration.” “The statutory language reflects that the Legislature
intended to permit one conviction for continuous sexual abuse based on the repeated acts of
sexual abuse that occur over an extended period of time against a single complainant . . . .”
Price v. State, 434 S.W.3d 601, 605–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). However, this Court and others
have held that jurors need more guidance via the trial court’s charge to explain that “during” in
the context of the entire statute, means that “the first and last acts must occur thirty or more days
apart.” Lewis v. State, No. 06-21-00021-CR, 2022 WL 630288, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
Mar. 4, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Turner v. State, 573
S.W.3d 455, 462 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.)). Thus, for purposes of our review, we
use a hypothetically correct jury charge with such additional guidance. Id. at *1; Parker, 727
S.W.3d at 51.
In any event, the statutory language permits conviction “even if the jury lacks unanimity
as to each of the particular sexual acts or their time of occurrence, so long as the jury members
agree that at least two acts occurred during a period that is thirty or more days in duration.”
Price, 434 S.W.3d at 606 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b), (d)). Thus, the
hypothetically correct jury charge does not require unanimity regarding “each of the particular
sexual acts or their time of occurrence.” Id.
III. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Verdict of Guilt
In order to convict Jordan of continuous sexual abuse of Jane, a young child,
the State had to prove four elements: (1) [Jordan] committed two or more acts of
sexual abuse; (2) over a span of thirty days or more; (3) against [Jane]; and
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(4) that at the time of the sexual abuse [Jordan] was seventeen years of age or
older and [Jane] was younger than fourteen years of age.
Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.); see TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.02(b).
Jordan contests the first three elements but does not dispute that his age and Jane’s met
the statutory requirements. Jane was younger than fourteen years of age, and Jordan was
approximately forty years older than Jane.
While Jordan seemingly challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the
timing element of the acts of sexual abuse, to the extent that he implies that Jane’s testimony on
cross-examination created reasonable doubt as to whether the acts constituted sexual abuse, we
address both the alleged acts and their timing.
Jordan points to what he asserts is equivocal testimony by Jane about whether or not she
was wearing panties when he had her place her genital area on his face. Jane, however, gave
testimony from which a jury could believe that she was not wearing panties. A reasonable jury
could believe that testimony, and thus conclude that Jordan, as alleged in the indictment,
committed aggravated sexual assault of a young child as a predicate offense to continuous sexual
assault of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b), (c), § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(B).
Jane testified to other acts by Jordan which would constitute indecency with a child by
sexual contact, including rubbing his penis between her inner-upper thighs while Jane was up
against the counter in her bathroom;5 making Jane lather up Jordan’s penis with soap while they
5
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1), (c)(2).
7
were in the shower and, afterwards, rub his penis with baby powder;6 rubbing his penis on her
inner thighs until “stuff” got on her thighs. Jane testified that these incidents of abuse happened
“every few months.” Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Jordan committed two or more
acts of sexual abuse against Jane over a timespan of thirty days or more.
Focusing specifically on timing, Jane testified that the incident regarding placing her
genital area on Jordan’s face happened about a month after moving to Wake Village, Texas, in
December 2021, and the incident in the bathroom happened over a month after that, as did the
incident in the shower. Again, Jane testified that those incidents happened “every few months.”
On sufficiency review, “we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial.” Parker, 727
S.W.3d at 51. Accordingly, we note that Jane made an outcry to her grandmother in June 2024.
Jane’s grandmother testified, as did Maureen Fletcher, a forensic interviewer and director of the
Texarkana Children’s Advocacy Center, who spoke with Jane in June 2024. The jury also heard
from Chris Cobb, a detective with the Wake Village Police Department, who conducted the
investigation and arrested Jordan. The jury also heard from MJ, an adult witness, who testified
that Jordan sexually abused her when she was a child living in the same household as Jordan.
The evidence is sufficient to support Jordan’s judgment of conviction for continuous
sexual abuse of a young child younger than fourteen years of age. We overrule Jordan’s sole
issue.
6
See id.
8
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: August 21, 2026
Date Decided: August 24, 2026
Do Not Publish
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