In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00102-CR
EX PARTE WILSON CARSTAFFIN, JR.
On Appeal from the 202nd District Court
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 26C0608-202
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Wilson Carstaffin, Jr., acting pro se, appeals the trial court’s order denying his
application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his parole conditions. We dismiss for want of
jurisdiction.
I. Background
Carstaffin was convicted of sexual battery, child molestation, and enticing a child in the
State of Georgia, for which he served ten years’ incarceration in the Georgia Department of
Corrections. The record before us does not contain the Georgia judgment, nor does it otherwise
indicate the length of Carstaffin’s sentence. Carstaffin was released on parole in 2021 and
approved for transfer to Texas under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision
(ICAOS).1 At the time he filed his application, Carstaffin’s parole was apparently being
supervised by the Texarkana District Parole Office of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
located in Bowie County, Texas.
Carstaffin’s application in the trial court challenged “the constitutionality of conditions
and findings enforced by” his Texas parole officers. Specifically, Carstaffin alleged that the
1
The ICAOS “provides a mechanism for Texas parolees to serve parole in other compact states, and vice-versa.” Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar, 538 S.W.3d 89, 102 (Tex. 2017) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 510.017, art. 1). Among other functions of the ICAOS, “a ‘sending’ state ‘transfer[s] supervision authority’ over a parolee to a ‘receiving’ state, which in turn must let a sending state’s officials enter the receiving state to ‘retake’ an offender for parole violations.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 510.017, art. 1); see Sledge v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 5:11-CV-78, 2014 WL 869356, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2014) (“The [ICAOS] allows participating states to transfer supervision of adult offenders across state lines, and to return offenders to originating jurisdictions if necessary.”). Carstaffin urged that the trial court had “jurisdiction to review unlawful restraints imposed within the State of Texas,” and specifically to review the “constitutionality of conditions and findings enforced by Texas authorities acting under the [ICAOS].” Carstaffin argues that the ICAOS “does not diminish constitutional protections,” and he alleges that the Texas officials acted under the ICAOS. But Carstaffin expressly states that “a receiving state may possess authority under the [ICAOS] to impose supervision conditions it lawfully imposes upon similarly situated offenders,” and he expressly does not “contend that acceptance of interstate supervision exempts him from Texas’s lawful supervision requirements.”
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conditions of supervision imposed upon him by his Texas parole officers “[v]iolated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;[2] [r]elie[d] on unsupported and arbitrary findings;
[f]ail[ed] to comply with minimum procedural safeguards required under clearly established law;
[and] [r]etaliated against [him] for protected First Amendment[3] activity.”
Carstaffin filed his application on May 5, 2026. Without holding a hearing, on May 21,
2026, the trial court issued an order denying Carstaffin’s application, stating that it was “not well
taken and should be DENIED.” From that order, Carstaffin appeals.
II. Jurisdiction
“A threshold issue in any case is whether the court has the jurisdiction to resolve the
pending controversy.” State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled
in part on other grounds by State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “This
issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored. Accordingly, a court may sua sponte
address the issue because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement of the
parties; jurisdiction must be vested in a court by constitution or statute.” Id.; see Baines v. State,
418 S.W.3d 663, 671 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction
is a threshold matter which an appellate court must address, sua sponte, if not raised by the
parties, before deciding substantive issues.” (citing Roberts, 940 S.W. at 657)). “In short, each
court has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction.” Roberts, 940 S.W.2d at 657.
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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On appeal, Carstaffin argues that “[b]ecause Appellant alleges continuing
unconstitutional restraints upon his present liberty, his claims fall within the scope of Chapter 11
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.”
“Article 11.07 provides the exclusive means to challenge a final felony conviction.” Bd.
of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Ct. of Appeals for Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding). “Jurisdiction to grant post conviction
habeas corpus relief on a final felony conviction rests exclusively with [the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals].” Id.; Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Bovee, 632 S.W.3d 244, 251–52 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Under Article 11.07, the Court of Criminal Appeals
has exclusive and original jurisdiction to grant postconviction habeas corpus relief from a final
felony conviction.”); see Ex parte Bowman, Nos. 02-25-00481-CR & 02-25-00482-CR, 2026
WL 627958, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (same) (collecting cases).
Carstaffin expressly does not challenge his conviction. But, “[f]or habeas purposes,
parole is a form of confinement.” Bovee, 632 S.W.3d at 252 (citing Keene, 910 S.W.2d at 483).
“And relief from confinement is relief from a conviction.” Id. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (“suit must be brought under habeas statute if it ‘necessarily require[s] the
plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement’” (alteration in original))).
“The general rule is that a suit seeks relief from confinement if it challenges the fact or
duration of confinement, but not if it merely challenges the rules, customs, and procedures
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affecting the conditions of confinement.” Id. (citing Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice
Transitional Plan. Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994)).
There is, however, an important exception for the latter type of suits. If a suit
challenges a rule, custom, or procedure affecting the conditions of confinement,
and establishing the basis for the requested relief will necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of a condition imposed, the suit must be brought as a habeas petition,
regardless of whether it actually seeks relief from the condition.
Id. at 252–53 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). “But
if establishing the basis for the requested relief will not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
a condition imposed, the suit may be brought as a civil action in trial court (in the absence of
some other bar to the suit).” Id. at 253.
“Applying the law here, we arrive at the dispositive issue: whether [Carstaffin] will
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a condition of his parole by establishing the basis for
the [relief] he seeks.” Id. “If so, jurisdiction rests with the Court of Criminal Appeals,” id., and
Carstaffin’s application was improperly brought in the district court.
Carstaffin asserts that the challenged conditions of parole are constitutionally invalid. In
his habeas petition, Carstaffin sought a determination that certain of his conditions of parole
violated constitutional due process, that his parole officer retaliated against him in violation of
the First Amendment, and that the imposed parole conditions were arbitrary and unreasonable.
Carstaffin requested “removal of conditions that are unsupported by constitutionally sufficient
findings” and prohibition of “enforcement of arbitrary or retaliatory restrictions.”
Consequently, “jurisdiction rests with the [Texas] Court of Criminal Appeals.” Id. at
252; see Ex parte Wood, 125 S.W.3d 805, 806 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, orig. proceeding).
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III. Conclusion
We dismiss Carstaffin’s application for want of jurisdiction.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: August 14, 2026
Date Decided: August 25, 2026
Do Not Publish
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