[Cite as Moufawad v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2026-Ohio-3341.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
SAMI MOUFAWAD, M.D., :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 115983
v. :
STATE MEDICAL BOARD OF OHIO, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 27, 2026
Administrative Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-24-107917
Appearances:
Friedman, Nemecek, Long & Grant, L.L.C., and Eric C.
Nemecek; Rolf Martin Lang L.L.P., and Christopher G.
Kuhn, for appellant.
Andy Wilson, Attorney General of Ohio, Kyle C. Wilcox, D.
Grant Wilson, and Christie Limbert, Assistant Attorneys
General, for appellee.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Appellant Sami Moufawad, M.D. (“Moufawad”), appeals the judgment
of the trial court affirming the indefinite suspension of his medical license by the State Medical Board of Ohio (“Board”). He raises three assignments of error for our
review:
1. The trial court erred/abused its discretion by failing to conclude that
the Board’s actions violated Dr. Moufawad’s constitutional right to due
process of law and/or should have been barred under the doctrine of
laches.
2. The trial court erred/abused its discretion by affirming the Board’s
order despite the absence of any evidence establishing that Dr.
Moufawad exploited the licensee-patient relationship.
3. The trial court abused its discretion by affirming the Board’s 2024
order despite the absence of reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence supporting the same.
After a careful review of the record and applicable law, we find that
Moufawad has not shown that the common pleas court erred by failing to conclude
that his constitutional right to due process was violated or that the Board’s action
was barred by the doctrine of laches. He further has not demonstrated that the court
erred or abused its discretion in affirming the Board’s indefinite suspension of his
license to practice medicine. There was reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
to support the decision of the Board.
We overrule the assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
I. Factual and Procedural History
This appeal arose from the Board’s indefinite suspension of
Moufawad’s license to practice medicine in Ohio for a violation of the Board’s sexual
misconduct rules.
The salient facts in this matter are largely undisputed. Moufawad had
been licensed to practice medicine in Ohio since 2004. He practiced physical
medicine, rehabilitation, and pain management. In 2007, he saw a woman for
chronic pain in her back and abdomen (“the patient ”). His treatment of the patient
included prescribed opioids and injections. She saw Moufawad every month for six
months. During this time, on two separate occasions, the patient inquired as to
whether the size of her breasts was causing her pain. As she made the inquiry, she
raised her shirt and bra, exposing her breasts to Moufawad.
Both times, Moufawad “lifted” the patient’s breasts to perform a
cursory breast exam. He did not offer the patient a gown or the presence of a
chaperone. Moufawad advised the patient that he did not believe her breast size was
the cause of her pain. Neither breast exam was documented in the patient’s medical
record.1 Moufawad stated that he did not document them because he felt her breast
size was not the cause of her pain.
Sometime after the patient’s last visit in 2007, Moufawad implemented
an office policy requiring a member of his staff to be present during all patient visits.
The patient did not return to Moufawad’s office until December 2010.
She had an appointment with him for lower back, abdominal, and pelvic pain.
Moufawad’s medical assistant was present during this visit. The patient again
inquired as to whether her breast size was contributing to her lower back pain;
1 Moufawad acknowledged that he did not perform a complete and proper breast
exam because that is not part of his routine practice.
Moufawad advised her to see a surgeon. Moufawad recognized the patient from her
previous appointments but later said that he did not remember that she had exposed
her breasts to him twice in 2007.
The patient told her primary care physician about Moufawad’s actions
in touching her breasts. The patient’s doctor advised her to go to the police or the
hospital advocate. The record does not reflect that the patient took either action.
In January 2011, the patient again saw Moufawad. His medical
assistant was also present in the room. The patient asked why the medical assistant
was necessary and objected to her remaining in the room. Moufawad then asked his
assistant to leave; the door to the exam room remained partially open, and the visit
continued. During his examination of the patient, she lifted her shirt and bra as she
had previously and asked whether she needed surgery. Moufawad again “lifted” the
patient’s breasts and told her he did not believe her breasts were causing her pain.
Moufawad did not offer the patient a gown or a chaperone and did not document his
touching of her breasts; he stated that it was not part of her medical treatment
because she had come to him about her back and he did not believe her breast size
was related to her back pain.
Moufawad saw the patient three more times in 2011. At each
appointment, Moufawad’s medical assistant acted as a chaperone and remained in
the exam room the entire time. The patient requested that the chaperone leave, but
Moufawad refused. After the third visit in 2011, Moufawad terminated his doctorpatient relationship with the patient.
In May 2011, the patient sent Moufawad a handwritten letter that
referenced the instances of Moufawad touching her breasts. Moufawad testified that
he panicked and shredded the letter; he later realized that his staff had read the letter
and had likely made a copy. Several weeks later, the patient sent him another
handwritten letter, referencing the same actions.
In August 2011, Moufawad was informed that an investigation had
been opened by the Board regarding a complaint made by the patient.2 As part of
the investigation, Moufawad was interviewed by a Board investigator. During the
interview, Moufawad denied ever touching the patient’s breasts. One week later,
Moufawad sent a letter to the investigator and admitted to not being “completely
truthful and candid” during the interview. He explained that the patient had
exposed her breasts by raising her shirt and bra and that he had briefly lifted her
breasts. He admitted to all three instances where he had touched the patient’s
breasts and acknowledged that he had not conducted himself appropriately with the
patient or with the investigator during the interview. He further acknowledged that
he had not documented his touching or examining of the patient’s breasts and that
he had not used proper technique for a breast exam.
The investigation was closed with no action taken.
2 It is unclear whether the patient or her physician had reported the incidents that
started the investigation.
In 2012, Moufawad received a letter from the patient’s attorney stating
that the patient intended to file suit against him for medical malpractice and assault.
An affidavit by the patient was attached to the letter.
Less than two months later, the patient’s attorney sent a second letter
reiterating the intent to file a lawsuit and demanding the patient’s medical records.
Moufawad provided the records but did not otherwise respond to the letters. No
suit was ever filed, and the patient passed away in 2016.
In March 2023, the Board issued a “Notice of Opportunity for
Hearing” to Moufawad stating that it was considering taking disciplinary action
against him based upon allegations of sexual misconduct — specifically, touching
the patient’s breasts without a chaperone or gown on two occasions in 2007 and
again in 2011. The notice further informed Moufawad of his right to request a
hearing, which he subsequently did.
At the hearing, the State presented an affidavit from the patient
detailing her experiences as Moufawad’s patient.3 Moufawad testified at the hearing
and presented the testimony of his medical assistant, several other physicians and a
nurse with whom he had worked, and patient surveys depicting favorable responses
regarding his treatment.
3 The affidavit was the same one that had been attached to the patient’s attorney’s
letter to Moufawad stating the intention to file suit against him. Moufawad’s counsel did not object to this exhibit, even though the patient was deceased and could not be crossexamined about it. Ultimately, the hearing examiner stated that he gave little weight to the affidavit.
Moufawad admitted that he had lied to the investigator about
touching and lifting the patient’s breasts. Moufawad was asked if his failure to offer
a gown or the presence of a chaperone was a violation of the Board’s rules, and he
said yes. Nevertheless, Moufawad stated that he believed that he had implied
consent to perform the exam and that he was unaware that he should have offered a
gown or chaperone before performing a breast exam under the Board’s rules. But
he admitted that he violated his own policy by asking the chaperone to leave the
room and that he should have brought a chaperone into the room as soon as the
patient exposed her breasts. Moufawad further acknowledged that he did not
conduct a proper breast exam and that he should have documented everything that
happened.
Moufawad testified that he did not recall that the patient had
previously exposed her breasts to him and only remembered after the January 2011
visit. Moufawad stated that the patient was the only patient who had ever exposed
her breasts to him during an exam.
The Board’s hearing examiner issued a “Report and
Recommendation” finding that Moufawad violated R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) and (B)(20),
and Adm.Code 4731-26-02. He found the violations were committed three times —
twice in 2007 and once in 2011.
The hearing examiner found that Moufawad did not offer the patient
a gown or note any breast exam in her chart on each of the three occasions and he
did not offer her a chaperone on two occasions. He determined that Moufawad’s motivations for the exam were not medically driven and lacked therapeutic
justification, which warranted a harsh sanction.
The hearing examiner further found that the allegations against
Moufawad had been proven and recommended a suspension of his medical license.
He did not find Moufawad to be credible when he stated that in 2011 he had not
recalled the patient previously exposing her breasts to him.
Moufawad filed objections to the “Report and Recommendation”
wherein he outlined the statements that he believed were not accurate and provided
additional context, including his lack of awareness as to the patient’s mental-health
issues, addiction to pain medication, and lack of reporting of the incidents.
The Board considered the hearing examiner’s report at a Board
meeting in November 2024 and subsequently issued an “Entry of Order”
suspending Moufawad’s license. The suspension was indefinite but would last not
less than one year. The order set forth certain conditions that were to be met before
Moufawad’s license could be reinstated, including applying for reinstatement and
completing certain courses in ethics and patient boundaries. In addition, upon
reinstatement, Moufawad would be subject to certain probationary terms for at least
two years.
Moufawad appealed the decision of the Board to the Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court under R.C. 119.12(B)(2). He asserted that the Board’s decision
was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was not in
accordance with the law.
The parties filed their respective briefs and later presented their
positions via oral argument. Moufawad argued that (1) the Board violated his dueprocess rights and its actions should have been barred by the doctrine of laches; (2)
the Board’s order was contrary to law because there was no evidence that he had
exploited the licensee-patient relationship; and (3) the Board’s decision was not
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
The common pleas court entered an order affirming the decision of
the Board and issued a written opinion, finding no merit to any of Moufawad’s
assignments of error. Moufawad then filed the instant appeal.
II. Law and Analysis
Administrative appeals of an agency’s decisions are governed by
R.C. 119.12. The first appeal is to the common pleas court, which must uphold the
decision of an administrative agency when, after considering the entire record, it
determines the agency’s decision is supported by “reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence and is in accordance with the law.” R.C. 119.12(N); Pons v. Ohio
State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993); Reed v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2021-Ohio-4314, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.) (citing R.C. 119.12(M), now renumbered to
R.C. 119.12(N)).
This standard requires the “‘common pleas court to conduct two
inquiries: a hybrid factual/legal inquiry and a purely legal inquiry.’” Reed at ¶ 11,
quoting Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 2008-Ohio-4826, ¶ 37. Under the factual and
legal inquiry, the common pleas court is required to give deference to the administrative agency’s factual findings. Id., citing Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad,
63 Ohio St.2d 108, 111 (1980). However, the Board’s findings are not conclusive and
the common pleas court may reverse, vacate, or modify an administrative order if it
determines that “‘“there exist legally significant reasons for discrediting certain
evidence relied upon by the administrative body, and necessary to its determination
. . . .”’” Bartchy at id., quoting Ohio Historical Soc. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 66
Ohio St.3d 466, 470-471 (1993), quoting Conrad at 111. With respect to the
administrative agency’s legal conclusions, the common pleas court “‘must construe
the law on its own’” — in other words, conduct a de novo review — without deference
to the Board’s findings. Bartchy at ¶ 38, quoting id. at 471.
An appellate court’s review of the common pleas court’s decision is
even more limited. Appellate review of the court’s evidentiary rulings is for an abuse
of discretion. McClendon v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 2017-Ohio-187, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.),
citing Pons at 621. An “abuse of discretion” occurs where “a court exercise[s] its
judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has
discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. As further
explained by the Ohio Supreme Court:
Stated differently, an abuse of discretion involves more than a
difference in opinion: the “‘term discretion itself involves the idea of
choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between
competing considerations.’” State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222,
15 Ohio B. 311, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984), quoting Spalding v. Spalding,
355 Mich. 382, 384, 94 N.W.2d 810 (1959). For a court of appeals to
reach an abuse-of-discretion determination, the trial court’s judgment
must be so profoundly and wholly violative of fact and reason that “‘it
evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise
of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather
of passion or bias.’” Id., quoting Spalding at 384-385.
State v. Weaver, 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24.
However, this court reviews purely legal questions, e.g., the
construction of a statute or constitutional provisions, under the de novo standard of
review. McClendon at ¶ 9.
A. Due Process and Laches
In his first assignment of error, Moufawad argues that the trial court
erred in not finding that the Board’s actions violated his constitutional right to due
process. Moufawad asserts that the delay caused the unavailability of key witnesses
that could have exculpated his actions, including the patient, who had passed away,
and the Board investigator, who had retired from the Board. Moufawad further
contends that the Board’s actions should have been barred by the doctrine of laches
because the Board reopened his case over ten years after it first became aware of the
allegations.
“R.C. Chapter 119 does not include any provision such as a statute of
limitations that places a time limit on an agency’s ability to begin the administrative
adjudication process.” Morgan v. Liquor Control Comm., 2009-Ohio-3232, ¶ 12
(10th Dist.) However, “administrative agencies must give licensees a fair hearing
and determination as expeditiously as possible under the circumstances . . . .”
Griffin v. State Med. Bd., 2009-Ohio-4849, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), citing Gourmet
Beverage Ctr., Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 2002-Ohio-3338, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.). (“[I]t is the duty of an administrative agency to hear matters pending before
it without unreasonable delay and with due regard to the rights and interests of the
litigants.”).
The common pleas court determined that Moufawad had not
demonstrated that he suffered material prejudice from the delay. While the court
recognized that witnesses were unavailable after ten years, the court found that this
“did not affect the fact that Moufawad admitted and testified to the actions at issue.”
(Dec. 30, 2025 journal entry, p. 17.)
Moufawad relies on Mowery v. Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy, 1997
Ohio App. LEXIS 4414 (11th Dist. Sept. 30, 1997), where a pharmacist was notified
that his license was in jeopardy five years after an investigation had been started.
The Mowery Court noted that the Board did not provide any credible basis for the
delay and found that the pharmacist’s due-process rights had been violated.
Moufawad argues that his position is even more compelling because the time lapse
in Mowery was only five years while there was a ten-year delay in his case.
“[W]hen evaluating a due-process argument within the context of an
agency’s delay in bringing formal accusations against a professional license
holder . . . we focus our analysis on whether the licensee suffered any material
prejudice as a result of the agency’s delay.” Griffin, 2009-Ohio-4849, at ¶ 9 (10th
Dist.), citing Smith v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3229, *5 (10th
Dist. July 19, 2001) (“[W]e find that appellant failed to demonstrate how he has been materially prejudiced by the Board’s delay, and that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by rejecting the affirmative defense of laches.”).
In its briefing, the Board offers no explanation for the over ten-year
delay between the investigation and the proceedings.4 At oral argument, the panel
questioned counsel for the Board regarding the reason for the extraordinary delay
in finally hearing the matter. Counsel offered no justification but maintained that it
was appropriate and necessary for the matter to still be adjudicated because of
“public interest.” This explanation is disingenuous and defies logic. In the over ten
years between the closing of the original investigation and the subsequent
reopening, Moufawad continued to treat patients, all of whom were most likely
unaware of the allegations against him and the fact that he had fully admitted to
engaging in the behaviors alleged. The best way to serve the “public interest” would
have been to address this matter in a timely fashion, which would have protected
Moufawad’s patients, along with any other prospective patients.
While we are very troubled by such a lengthy delay, particularly one
without any stated justification, we cannot find that Moufawad has demonstrated a
violation of his due-process rights. The concern with delayed proceedings is that
memories will fade and witnesses may disappear. It is true that The patient was
unavailable to appear and testify at the 2023 hearing and that the board investigator
4 The delay was discussed during the November 2024 Board meeting, and several
members acknowledged that the case was “older” but still remained important to adjudicate.
had retired; however, it was Moufawad’s own testimony and admissions that
provided the evidence to find that he engaged in sexual misconduct.5 Moufawad has
therefore not demonstrated any prejudice by the delay.
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has addressed the application of
laches, noting that “it is well settled that in the absence of a statute to the contrary,
laches is generally no defense to a suit by the government to enforce a public right
or protect a public interest.” Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 51 Ohio St.3d
143, 146 (1990). “[T]o impute laches onto the government would be to erroneously
impede the government in the exercise of its duty to enforce the law and protect the
public interest.” Sutton v. Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
2051, *10 (11th Dist. Apr. 30, 2002), citing Frantz at id. Moufawad has not cited an
applicable statute, and we find that laches does not apply.
Moufawad’s first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Statutory Interpretation
In his second assignment of error, Moufawad argues that the trial
court erred in affirming the Board’s order, which was predicated on an erroneous
interpretation of the applicable statutes. Specifically, Moufawad contends that the
Board failed to specifically determine that his conduct with The patient had
5 It is unclear whether the investigator could have appeared and testified at the
hearing. The Board argues that Moufawad had the opportunity to subpoena her but also notes that her testimony would have been limited pursuant to confidentiality rules under R.C. 4731.22(F)(5).
exploited the licensee-patient relationship and that the Board misinterpreted the
definition of sexual misconduct with regard to his actions with The patient.
The hearing examiner determined that Moufawad had violated
Adm.Code 4731-26-02, which precludes a licensee from engaging in sexual
misconduct with a patient.6 The code provides the following pertinent definitions:
(H) “Sexual misconduct” means conduct that exploits the licenseepatient relationship in a sexual way, whether verbal or physical, and
may include the expression of thoughts, feelings, or gestures that are
sexual or that reasonably may be construed by a patient as sexual.
Sexual misconduct includes sexual impropriety, sexual contact, or
sexual interaction as follows:
(1) “Sexual impropriety” means conduct by the licensee that is
seductive, sexually suggestive, disrespectful of patient privacy, or
sexually demeaning to a patient, including but not limited to, the
following:
(a) Neglecting to employ disrobing or draping practices respecting the
patient’s privacy;
(g) Failing to offer the patient the opportunity to have a third person or
chaperone in the examining room during an intimate examination
and/or failing to provide a third person or chaperone in the examining
room during an intimate examination upon the request of the patient.
(2) “Sexual contact” includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(a) Touching a breast or any body part that has sexual connotation for
the licensee or patient, for any purpose other than appropriate health
care services, or where the patient has refused or has withdrawn
consent [ ]
6 A licensee means, inter alia, “[a]n individual holding a license to practice medicine and surgery, osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and surgery under Chapter 4731. [sic] of the Revised Code.” Adm.Code 4731-26-01(A)(2).
(3) “Sexual interaction” means conduct between a licensee and patient,
whether or not initiated by, consented to, or participated in by a
patient, that is sexual or may be reasonably interpreted as sexual,
including but not limited to, the following:
(g) Performing an intimate examination without clinical justification.
Adm.Code 4731-26-01(H).
The Board argues that it is not required to make an express finding
that Moufawad “exploited” the licensee-patient relationship, as that term is used in
the definition of “sexual misconduct.” And even if such a finding were required,
there was ample evidence to support a finding of exploitation.
The Tenth District addressed this issue in Klickovich v. State Med. Bd.
of Ohio, 2025-Ohio-2783 (10th Dist.). The Klickovich Court analyzed the principles
of statutory construction, noting that such principles also apply to administrative
rules.
Under the rules of statutory construction, the use of the word “means”
in defining the term “sexual conduct” has the clear import that this is
the exclusive meaning of the term. Indeed, the use of the word “means”
in defining “sexual misconduct” results in the term and its definition
being interchangeable equivalents. Diller v. Diller, 2021-Ohio-4252, ¶
39, 182 N.E.3d 370 (3d Dist.). Put another way, there can be no finding
of “sexual misconduct” in the absence of “conduct that exploits the
licensee-patient relationship in a sexual way” because they are one
[and] the same thing. Adm.Code 4731-26-01(H).
Id. at ¶ 26. Consequently, the Klickovich Court determined that “a finding of sexual
misconduct necessarily includes a finding of exploitation.” Id. at ¶ 28. While we recognize that Klickovich is not binding upon us, we agree with the analysis of the
Tenth District and find that the Board was not required to make a specific finding of
“exploitation.”
We further find no error in the Board’s interpretation of the rule
defining sexual misconduct. As noted above, sexual misconduct includes sexual
impropriety. And sexual impropriety includes failing to offer a chaperone or a gown
to a patient. There is no dispute that Moufawad admitted to both of these actions.
This alone was sufficient to establish sexual impropriety and, consequently, sexual
misconduct by Moufawad.
We cannot find that the common pleas court abused its discretion in
finding that Moufawad engaged in sexual misconduct. The court was not required
to make a separate finding regarding exploitation, and the second assignment of
error is overruled.
C. Reliable, Probative, and Substantial Evidence
Moufawad’s final assignment of error asserts that the Board’s decision
was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, in particular with
regard to the Board’s finding of lack of therapeutic justification and Moufawad’s
intent. He contends that the hearing examiner considered inadmissible and
unreliable evidence in the form of The patient’s affidavit. He further asserts that
some of the hearing examiner’s factual findings were not based upon evidence in the
record.
The trial court found as follows:
Applying [the statutory standard found in R.C. 119.12] to the evidence
in the record, as explained previously, the testimony of Dr. Moufawad
is reliable, probative, and substantial. This case is unique due to the
lack of a “he said, she said” situation. Rather, the most critical
testimony throughout these proceedings came from Dr. Moufawad
himself. This Court finds the testimony of Dr. Moufawad to be the main
basis of the Board’s decision and subsequent discipline of Dr.
Moufawad. Additionally, the other evidence contained in the record
does not mitigate the actions of Dr. Moufawad. The evidence and
arguments of counsel certainly shed light on the circumstances and
arguably show Dr. Moufawad did not have malicious intentions with
his actions. However, the arguments are not sufficient to find the
Board’s Order and the [Report and Recommendation] to not be based
on reliable, probative, and substantive evidence. This Court finds the
Board relied heavily on the testimony and actions of Appellant and
limited its findings of fact and conclusions in reliance on the actions
Appellant himself admitted to. Dr. Moufawad did not appear to have
predatory intentions, however, his actions still violated the
Administrative Code in regard to sexual misconduct. This Court finds
the Board’s order was based on reliable, probative, and substantive
evidence.
(Dec. 30, 2025 journal entry, p. 24-25.)
Moufawad argues that the hearing examiner afforded more weight to
The patient’s affidavit than he had previously stated and that the hearing examiner
made a factual finding that was not in the record. He also argues against the hearing
examiner’s finding that Moufawad was not credible when he said that he did not
recall that the patient had previously exposed her breasts to him after she engaged
in the same behavior in 2011.
However, even if there had been a more favorable finding regarding
Moufawad’s credibility and the patient’s affidavit had been entirely disregarded, it
is not apparent that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
Ultimately, it was Moufawad’s own statements that provided all of the evidence needed to find that he had engaged in sexual misconduct with the patient. And to
the extent that Moufawad asks this court to evaluate the testimony below, he is
inviting this court to go beyond the scope of our review. Even if the evidence would
have led us to a different conclusion, “we are not permitted to substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court, but instead are limited to finding whether or not
the trial court abused its discretion in finding the medical board’s order to be
supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence.” Politi v. State Med. Bd.,
2007-Ohio-2240, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the common pleas
court acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably or otherwise erred in
affirming the Board’s decision to indefinitely suspend Moufawad’s license to
practice medicine. The common pleas court’s decision affirming the Board’s order
was detailed and well reasoned. As noted above, it is not our role to weigh the
evidence or to substitute our judgment for that of the Board and/or the common
pleas court. Harrison v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd., 2009-Ohio-2856,
¶ 15 (10th Dist.), citing Pons, 66 Ohio St.3d at 621.
Finally, Moufawad contends that he was given a harsher sanction
because of the hearing examiner’s erroneous findings regarding Moufawad’s intent
and the patient’s vulnerability. It should be noted that the State sought permanent
revocation of Moufawad’s license, but he instead received an indefinite suspension
of at least one year. “Chapter 4731 of the Revised Code vests the Board with broad
authority to regulate the medical profession in Ohio, and to discipline physicians for non-compliant conduct.” Klickovich, 2025-Ohio-2783, at ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), citing
Griffin, 2009-Ohio-4849 (10th Dist.). Under R.C. 4731.22(B)(6), the Board may
discipline a licensee for his or her “departure from, or the failure to conform to,
minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar
circumstances, whether or not actual injury to a patient is established.” Further,
pursuant to R.C. 4731.22(B)(20), the Board may also discipline a licensee for
violating any rule adopted by the Board. “With respect to the punishment selected
by the State Medical Board, neither the common pleas court nor this court is free to
substitute its judgment for that imposed by the State Medical Board if the
punishment imposed is authorized by law.” Politi, 2007-Ohio-2240, at ¶ 18 (10th
Dist.), citing Henry’s Cafe, Inc. v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233 (1959).
Moufawad does not argue that the punishment was unauthorized by law; he is only
arguing that the penalty imposed by the Board was too harsh. We make no finding
regarding the severity of the indefinite suspension imposed. The third assignment
of error is overruled.
All of Moufawad’s assignments of error having been overruled, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR