IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
State of Indiana, Aug 27 2026, 9:30 am
Appellant-Plaintiff CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Scott L. Manges,
Appellee-Defendant
August 27, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-710
Interlocutory Appeal from the Hendricks Circuit Court
The Honorable Robert W. Freese, Senior Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32C01-2309-FA-1
Opinion by Judge Bradford
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 1 of 13
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Scott Manges has been accused of committing fourteen acts of sexual abuse
against Victim between January of 2013 and April of 2017. Manges attempted
to discover a video or audio recording of Victim’s initial interview with police,
claiming that a police case report indicated that such a recording was available.
The trial court included the recording in its discovery order. Although the State
partially complied with the trial court’s discovery order, it did not provide
Manges with a copy of the recording, claiming that, after completing a
comprehensive search, no recording had been found. Manges filed a motion to
dismiss, which the trial court denied. However, as a discovery sanction, the
trial court excluded Victim from testifying at trial. The State challenges the
trial court’s order excluding Victim from testifying. We reverse the trial court’s
order and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 5, 2022, Victim reported to Plainfield police officers, including
Detective Sergent Brian Bugler, that Manges had committed numerous acts of
sexual abuse against her. Based on Victim’s allegations, on September 21,
2023, the State charged Manges with the following: one count of Class A
felony child molesting, two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting, one count
of Class C felony child molesting, two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting,
four counts of Level 4 felony incest, three counts of Level 5 felony sexual
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 2 of 13
misconduct with a minor, and one count of Class A misdemeanor contributing
to the delinquency of a minor.
[3] On September 29, 2025, Manges moved to compel discovery. Manges
requested, inter alia, the audio/visual recording of Victim’s initial interview with
police on July 5, 2022, which Manges claimed the police department’s case
report indicated was available.1 The trial court granted Manges’s motion to
compel on October 1, 2025. Afterwards, the Plainfield Police Department
“began a comprehensive file review[,]” which included “working with the
Information Technology Department to attempt to retrieve” Detective Bugler’s 2
files relating to the case. Supp. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 175. After
completing the review, Detective Taylor Wilson confirmed that “there is no
existing body cam or other video footage from this case including the interview
with” Victim. Supplemental Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 175. The State
informed Manges of this fact on October 9, 2025.
[4] On December 21, 2025, Manges moved to dismiss the case, alleging that the
State had failed to comply with the discovery order. Manges specifically argued
that
This is a single witness case, and due to the delayed reporting,
there is no physical evidence to support the allegations, thus the
credibility of the single witness is essential to the State’s case and
crucial to the Defendant’s. In fact, the victim’s statement is the
1
The parties have not provided us with a copy of this report on appeal.
2
Detective Bugler retired from the Plainfield Police Department in February of 2024.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 3 of 13
only evidence the State of Indiana had to support the filing of
charges which, due to the Defendant’s age, could result in a life
sentence. The victim’s audio/visual recorded statement would
not only reveal the victim’s body language while she made the
critical incriminating allegations, but it would reveal her body
language when she provided false information to the Detective
regarding Sprint/T-Mobile’s ability to provide deleted text
messages. Additionally, the audio/visual recording will provide
critical evidence regarding the victim’s credibility. Finally, the
Defendant has been denied the ability to review the only
evidence the State of Indiana and law enforcement relied on to
file charges and arrest the Defendant.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 45. The State responded to Manges’s motion,
stating that
2. Det. Bugler of the Plainfield Police Department retired
from the Department in February 2024. As the Investigator in
charge of the case Bugler was responsible for the collection and
retention of evidence in the case. Since Defense counsel entered
his appearance and his demand for discovery in this case, Det.
Taylor Wilson of the Plainfield Police Department has made all
possible efforts to see what if anything was retained by Det.
Bugler including going through archived files from Det. Bugler’s
department issued computer. The State has turned over every
file that has been discovered in this retrieval process.
3. The State has no reason to believe at this time that the
audio/video files requested by Defense counsel nor the phone
records that were collected pursuant to search warrant are
retained anywhere by the Plainfield Police Department at this
time.
4. In this case Defense requests the most serious and
irreversible sanction for discovery violations that counsel
concedes are not willful or in bad faith.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 4 of 13
5. Both the rule and case law referenced by defense counsel
considers cases where a party had access to the discovery items
requested but refused to produce them. That is not the case here.
6. Indiana Trial Rule 37(B)(2) states that the sanctions listed
in this subsection are for parties who fail to obey the order; it
does [not] address parties who are incapable of obeying an order.
7. While Defense is absolutely permitted to reference the lack
of investigation and/or evidence retention in this case in
argument before a jury as a way to impeach the credibility of
involved law enforcement, counsel has not demonstrated that the
State has intentionally disregarded the Court’s order.
Additionally, there is nothing in the Rule or case law provided by
counsel that suggests that negligent evidence retention should be
the sole basis for dismissal of a criminal case. Essentially the
issue goes to weight before the jury, not the submiss[i]bility of the
case.
8. The recorded interview requested by Defense is also not
admissible at trial; as the State encounters frequently with great
trauma to the victim, that the State is not allowed to submit the
prerecorded statement of a victim. The victim must testify live in
court with the perpetrator present in order to satisfy the
Confrontation Claus[e]. While the recorded interview may assist
in preparation for the trial, since it is not even allowed to be
admitted at trial for the purpose of showing the truth of the
matter asserted (it would be considered a hearsay violation) it is
hard to imagine why lack of its production in the discovery phase
should rise to the level of sanction of dismissal. Especially when
there is another remedy; the same information may be gleaned
from the Victim in this case via a deposition.
9. All of the questions raised by counsel in his motion
regarding where the interview took place, how the recording was
handled, etc. are questions that may be asked upon cross
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 5 of 13
examination at trial but do not indicate a case so lacking in
fairness that it would be unjust to proceed. Put simply, for many
decades prior to recorded interviews or body camera footage,
cases of child molest were tried based on the testimony of the
lone victim.
****
11. While the State is sympathetic to and shares counsel’s
frustrations regarding discovery issues in this case, there is
nothing in either Defense’s motion or Supporting Brief that
suggests why evidence that is not being provided because it
cannot be produced is the basis for a measure so extreme as
dismissal.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 47 (emphases in original). On February 2, 2026,
Manges filed a reply brief in support of his motion to dismiss, in which he
argued that the State’s failure to comply with the discovery order had denied
him due process.
[5] On February 20, 2026, the trial court issued the following order:
1. The parties have conceded that this is, in reality, a one
witness case, that person being the alleged victim.
2. The audio/video statement of the witness taken close in
time to the charging of the case could very well be the critical
piece of evidence for the Defendant to use to cross-exam or
impeach the witness.
3. The statement made to the police was never provided to
the Defendant.
4. No evidence exists that the statement was with anyone
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 6 of 13
other than an agent of the State.
5. Dismissing any case is an extreme remedy that the Court
cannot take lightly.
6. The Court is hereby excluding any testimony from the
alleged victim who gave the statement from testifying at the jury
trial in this matter.
7. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 53.
Discussion and Decision
[6] The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting
Victim to testify at trial as a sanction for their inability to discover the recording
of her initial interview with police. “Trial courts maintain broad discretion to
manage discovery, and that includes sanctioning parties to enforce discovery
rules and orders.” State v. Lyons, 211 N.E.3d 500, 505 (Ind. 2023) (internal
citation omitted). “We presume that the trial court will act in accord with what
is fair and equitable in each case, and thus we will only reverse if the trial
court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Where there has been a failure to comply
with discovery procedures, the trial judge is usually in the best position to
determine the dictates of fundamental fairness and whether any resulting harm
can be eliminated or satisfactorily alleviated.” State v. Tyree, 237 N.E.3d 685,
692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 7 of 13
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Excluding
Victim’s Testimony as a Discovery Sanction.
[7] “Trial Rule 37 authorizes courts to impose sanctions for discovery violations
through such orders in regard to the failure as are just, including orders
prohibiting a party from introducing designated matters in evidence[.]” Lyons,
211 N.E.3d at 505 (internal quotations omitted). “Exclusion of evidence is the
most extreme sanction and is appropriate only when it avoids substantial
prejudice to the defendant’s rights.” Tyree, 237 N.E.3d at 692 (internal brackets
and quotation omitted). Excluding evidence due to a discovery violation is not
generally preferred “and is only appropriate if the defendant shows that the
State’s actions were deliberate or otherwise reprehensible, and this conduct
prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial.” Tavake v. State, 131 N.E.3d
696, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied.
“Courts exclude evidence only as a last resort because that remedy frustrates a
trial’s truth-seeking function.” Lyons, 211 N.E.3d at 506. “Thus, while
sanctions for failure to comply with discovery are within the trial court’s
discretion, the primary factors which a trial court should examine are whether
the breach was intentional or in bad faith and whether substantial prejudice has
resulted.” Id. (internal brackets and quotation omitted). Moreover, “[w]hen
considering whether an order excluding evidence is the sole remedy to avoid
substantial prejudice, a court can only consider real—not hypothetical—
prejudice.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 8 of 13 [8] Manges has not alleged that the State acted in bad faith, and there is no
evidence of such. Manges claims that a police report had indicated that an
audio/visual recording of Victim’s initial interview with police was available
but, following a comprehensive review, the Plainfield Police Department
discovered that no recording is available. There is no allegation or indication in
the record that the Plainfield Police Department acted in bad faith by destroying
the recording. From the record before us, the Plainfield Police Department can,
at most, possibly be said to have been negligent in its retention of potential
evidence. We also agree with the State that Manges asks us “to engage in pure
speculation” as to the level of prejudice stemming from the State’s failure to
disclose recording. Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 7. Victim’s allegations are detailed
in the probable cause affidavit, which is available to Manges. Manges has
therefore been made aware of the allegations and could minimize any potential
prejudice of not having access to the recording by deposing Victim and/or
members of the Plainfield Police Department regarding Victim’s statements and
demeanor during the interview prior to trial. Furthermore, the State concedes
that Manges also has the ability to mention the State’s negligent retention of
evidence during trial, as a means of impeaching the State’s witnesses.
[9] We have referred to exclusion of an alleged victim’s testimony as “the nuclear
option[,]” which is disfavored absent a showing of substantial prejudice. Tyree,
237 N.E.3d at 693. In this case, no substantial prejudice exists, as Manges has
other opportunities available to him to examine Victim’s credibility. We also
disagree with Manges’s assertion that the State’s failure to preserve the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 9 of 13
recording amounted to an egregious act that would justify excluding Victim’s
testimony from trial. As such, we conclude that the trial court’s order
excluding Victim from testifying at trial constituted an abuse of discretion as it
was against the logic and effect of the attendant facts and circumstances. See id.
II. The State’s Failure to Preserve the Recording of Victim’s
Initial Interview with Police did not Violate Manges’s
Due-Process Rights.
[10] The State also asserts that its failure to preserve the recording of Victim’s initial
interview with police did not violate Manges’s due-process rights.
When determining whether a defendant’s due process rights have
been violated by the State’s failure to preserve evidence, we must
first decide whether the evidence is potentially useful evidence or
material exculpatory evidence.
Evidence is materially exculpatory if it possesses an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and
is of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
Exculpatory evidence is defined as evidence tending to establish
a criminal defendant’s innocence. A prosecutor’s duty to
preserve exculpatory evidence is limited to evidence that might
be expected to play a significant role in the defendant’s defense.
Failure to preserve material exculpatory evidence violates due
process regardless of whether the State acted in good or bad faith.
Evidence is merely potentially useful if no more can be said than
that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which
might have exonerated the defendant. The State’s failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 10 of 13
violation of due process rights unless the defendant shows bad
faith on the part of the police.
State v. Durrett, 923 N.E.2d 449, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal brackets,
citations, and quotations omitted). “We cannot assume that the destroyed
evidence contained exculpatory material when the record is devoid of such
indication.” Taylor v. State, 236 N.E.3d 700, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal
brackets and quotation omitted).
[11] Manges claimed below that the State’s failure to retain the recording of Victim’s
interview violated his due-process rights. In support, Manges pointed to the
trial court’s statement that it “could very well be the critical piece of evidence
for [Manges] to use to cross-exam or impeach the witness.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 53. The trial court’s statement, however, at most indicates that the
recording could have contained critical impeaching evidence, not that it
contained exculpatory material. The trial court’s statement assumes that the
recording contained impeaching material without any evidence indicating that
it did or that such evidence would be exculpatory.
[12] Manges also pointed to two statements in the probable-cause affidavit: (1) that
Victim had said that she had been told that her cellular phone carrier had access
to certain text messages but the carrier subsequently indicated that it did not
and (2) that Victim had obtained birth control at the age of thirteen. Again,
exculpatory evidence is defined as “evidence tending to establish a criminal
defendant’s innocence.” Durrett, 923 N.E.2d at 453 (internal brackets and
quotation omitted). Neither of these statements tend to establish Manges’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 11 of 13
innocence as it relates to the fourteen charged offenses. At most, they relate to
Victim’s credibility, which Manges could explore via deposition or crossexamination at trial. Stated plainly, these statements are not exculpatory
evidence but rather are, at most, potential impeachment evidence.
[13] Because we cannot assume that the recording of Victim’s initial statement to
police contained exculpatory material, see Taylor, 236 N.E.3d at 713, we
conclude that it was merely potentially useful. Again, in order for the failure to
preserve “merely potential useful” to constitute a due-process violation, the
defendant must show that the police acted in bad faith. See Durrett, 923 N.E.2d
at 453. Manges has made no such showing in this case. We therefore conclude
that the State’s failure to preserve the recording of Victim’s initial interview
with police did not violate Manges’s due-process rights.
Conclusion
[14] Having concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Victim’s
testimony from trial as a discovery sanction and that the State’s failure to
preserve Victim’s initial interview with police did not constitute a violation of
Mangus’s due-process rights, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand
the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
[15] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and we remand for further
proceedings.
Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 12 of 13 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Kelly A. Loy
Section Chief, Criminal Appeals
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Stacy R. Uliana
Bargersville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-710 August 27, 2026 Page 13 of 13