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Charles Duane Parsons v. the State of Texas

2026-08-26

Summary

Holding. The court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court's judgment as modified, correcting the statute citation to properly reflect Texas Penal Code section 19.02(b) and striking the $15 time payment fee.

Charles Duane Parsons appealed his murder conviction after being found guilty in a bench trial and sentenced to 20 years in prison. His court-appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw accompanied by an Anders brief, arguing the appeal presented no reversible error. The court independently reviewed the record and found no non-frivolous issues that would support reversal of the conviction or sentence. However, the court identified two technical errors in the judgment that required correction: the statute of conviction was incorrectly cited as defining "sudden passion" rather than setting forth the elements of murder, and a $15 time payment fee was improperly assessed because the defendant's appeal suspended the duty to pay court costs.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether reversible error existed in the murder conviction and 20-year sentence
  • Correct statutory citation for murder offense in judgment
  • Propriety of time payment fee assessment during appeal

Procedural posture

Appellant appealed his murder conviction from the trial court, and appointed appellate counsel sought to withdraw based on an Anders brief claiming no reversible error.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00387-CR

CHARLES DUANE PARSONS, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 251st District Court

Randall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 31302C, Honorable Ana Estevez, Presiding

August 26, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Charles Duane Parsons, was found guilty of murder and the trial court

made a finding that he acted under the influence of sudden passion. 1 In presenting this

appeal, Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b), (d).

supported by an Anders 2 brief. We grant counsel’s motion, modify the judgment and bill

of costs, and affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder. Following a bench

trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years’ incarceration in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant then brought this appeal.

In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel has certified that he has conducted

a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, it reflects no reversible error

upon which an appeal can be predicated. Id. at 744; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,

406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), counsel has discussed why, under the controlling

authorities, the record presents no reversible error. In a letter to Appellant, counsel

notified him of the motion to withdraw; provided him with the motion, Anders brief, and a

copy of the appellate record; and informed him of his right to file a pro se response. See

Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (specifying appointed

counsel’s obligations on the filing of a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders brief).

By letter, this Court also advised Appellant of his right to file a pro se response to

counsel’s Anders brief. Appellant has not filed a response. The State has not filed a

brief.

By his Anders brief, counsel discusses areas in the record where reversible error

may have occurred but concludes that the appeal is frivolous. We have independently

examined the record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues that were

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).

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preserved in the trial court which might support an appeal, but we have found no such

issues. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988);

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409; Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1969). Following our careful review of the appellate record and counsel’s brief, we

conclude that there are no grounds for appellate review that would result in reversal of

Appellant’s conviction or sentence.

In our review of the record, we have identified two errors in the judgment that

constitute non-reversible error. First, the judgment lists the statute of conviction as Texas

Penal Code section 19.02(a)(2). However, that statutory provision simply defines

“sudden passion.” The elements of the offense of murder are set forth in section 19.02(b).

The judgment must reflect both the degree of offense and the specific offense of

conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.01, § 1(13), (14). We have the authority to

modify incorrect judgments when the necessary information is available to do so. TEX. R.

APP. P. 43.2(b). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s written judgment of conviction to

reflect that the “Statute for Offense” is section 19.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code. 3

Second, the record shows that the judgment and bill of costs assessed Appellant

a time payment fee of $15. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that a

time payment fee like the one imposed here “must indeed be struck for being prematurely

assessed because a defendant’s appeal suspends the duty to pay court costs and

therefore suspends the running of the clock for the purposes of the time payment fee.”

Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Pursuant to Dulin, we strike

3 Elsewhere on the judgment, the “Findings on Sudden Passion” are shown as “True.”

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the time payment fee in its entirety. Id. at 133. We modify the judgment and the bill of

costs by deleting the $15 time payment fee.

We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment as

modified. 4

Judy C. Parker

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

4 Counsel shall, within five days after the opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the

opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motions to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33.

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