In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00055-CV
EDWINA EDMONDSON, APPELLANT
V.
ESTER TURNER AND BURK B. TURNER, JR., APPELLEES
On Appeal from County Court at Law Number 3
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2023-002666-3, Honorable Mike Hrabal, Presiding1
August 26, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
By this appeal, we are asked to resolve a “she said, he said” on whether Appellant,
Edwina Edmondson, and Appellees, Ester Turner and Burk B. Turner, Jr., entered into
an oral agreement for the sale of residential property. After several partial summary
judgments, a directed verdict, and a jury verdict, the trial court rendered a take-nothing
1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court
by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. judgment in favor of the Turners. By two issues, Edmondson maintains the trial court
erred in (1) granting summary judgment in favor of the Turners on her claims for breach
of contract, trespass to try title, violations of the Texas Property Code, and on her requests
for declaratory relief because fact issues precluded summary judgment and (2) omitting
her claim for fraud in a real estate transaction from the jury charge. 2 We affirm in part
and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
Edmonson and Ester had previously worked together. According to Edmondson,
Ester approached her in 2011 about a residential property Burk wanted to sell.
Edmondson expressed interest and the parties met at the property for a walk-through.
The property was dilapidated and in need of much work. According to Edmondson, they
agreed on a purchase price of $90,000 with monthly payments of $800 minus deductions
for any repairs made. Edmondson claimed they entered into an oral agreement for sale
of the property, but Burk denied offering to sell, as the property was owned by Burk’s
mother at that time.3 When she passed away without a will in 2012, Burk inherited the
property.
Edmondson claimed that two years after Burk’s mother’s death, Burk asked for an
affidavit of heirship. She arranged for Nedra L. Jones, her friend who also knew the
2 Pursuant to Rule 34.6(c)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Edmondson filed only a
partial reporter’s record and a Statement of Points limiting her appeal to the two issues presented. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(c)(1). Under these circumstances, a reviewing court presumes the partial reporter’s record constitutes the entire record for purposes of reviewing the stated points or issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(c)(4).
3 Edmondson acknowledged Burk was not the rightful owner of the property at the time of the
alleged oral agreement and knew Burk’s mother was the rightful owner. But she believed he had the authority to manage his mother’s affairs because “he acted like it was his house.”
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Turners, to sign the affidavit as a disinterested party to the estate of Burk’s mother. 4
Edmondson filed it with the county clerk. Edmondson testified Ester told her in October
2022, when she was dropping off the November payment, to stop making payments
because Burk had changed his mind about selling and wanted her to move out so they
could move in the following year.
Months later, in March 2023, Ester and her adult son tried to enter the house to
change the locks. Ester told Edmondson that she and Burk intended to move into the
house on April 15, 2023. Edmondson responded by filing suit and through various
pleadings alleged the following causes of action:5
• breach of contract;
• trespass to try title;
• violation of section 5.077 of the Property Code;
• violation of section 5.079 of the Property Code;
• request for a declaratory judgment seeking title to the property;
• common law fraud;
• fraud in a real estate transaction;
• DTPA violations; and
• intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Turners responded with a general denial and the affirmative defense of statute of
frauds alleging that because there was no written agreement for sale of the property,
Edmondson was merely a tenant.6
4 Jones swore she was familiar with Burk’s mother and listed Burk as the only heir.
5 Although she sued the Turners individually, some of the claims were against Burk only as the
rightful owner of property.
6 According to the pleadings and testimony, several months after suit was filed Burk filed a forcible
detainer action which was abated pending the underlying lawsuit.
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The Turners filed several traditional motions for summary judgment asserting
Edmondson’s claim was barred by the statute of frauds because there was no written
contract for the sale of the property, the alleged contract could not be performed within a
year, and there was no applicable exception to the statute of frauds. Edmondson filed
responses and objections to the motions. The summary judgment evidence included
affidavits, proof Burk inherited the property from his mother, copies of money orders
designated as “rent,” invoices from specific repairs, and random text messages.
The trial court granted two partial summary judgments in favor of the Turners on
Edmondson’s claims as follows:
• breach of contract;
• trespass to try title;
• violation of section 5.079 of the Property Code;
• violation of section 5.077 of the Property Code; and
• request for declaratory relief.
The trial court granted the Turners a directed verdict on Edmondson’s claim for statutory
fraud in a real estate transaction. Edmondson’s remaining claims of common law fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and DTPA violations were resolved against her
by a jury and are not part of this appeal as those claims were not included in her Statement
of Points.
ISSUE ONE—SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Edmondson maintains the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of the Turners on her claims for breach of contract, trespass to try title, violations of
sections 5.077 and 5.079 of the Texas Property Code, and on her requests for declaratory
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relief because fact issues precluded summary judgment. She argues the evidence raised
material fact issues. We agree.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo taking as true all evidence favorable to
the nonmovant and “indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in
the nonmovant’s favor.” Keenan v. Robin, 709 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. 2024); Scripps NP
Operating, LLC v. Carter, 573 S.W.3d 781, 790 (Tex. 2019). A defendant is entitled to
summary judgment if it conclusively negates at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause
of action, showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Hillis v. McCall, 602 S.W.3d 436, 439–40 (Tex.
2020). A defendant may also prevail on summary judgment if it pleads and conclusively
establishes each essential element of an affirmative defense that defeats the plaintiff’s
cause of action. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). If the movant meets
its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact
precluding summary judgment. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018).
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The elements of a breach of contract are (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2)
performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and
(4) damages. Wood Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Evangel Temple Assembly of God of Wichita Falls,
Tex., 307 S.W.3d 816, 824 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied). A valid contract
exists if there is (1) an offer; (2) an acceptance; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) each
party’s consent to the terms; and (5) execution and delivery of the contract with the intent
that it be binding. Rainier Southlake DST v. Woodbury Strategic Partners Fund, LP, No.
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02-16-00263-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11407, at *13–14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec.
7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The affirmative defense of statute of frauds requires a contract for the sale of real
estate to be in writing. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 26.01(a), (b)(4); Copano Energy, LLC v.
Bujnoch, 593 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tex. 2020). It also requires any contract which cannot
be performed within one year to be in writing. § 26.01(a). The affirmative defense of the
statute of frauds involves a burden-shifting framework. Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates, 422 S.W.3d
638, 641 (Tex. 2013). If the statute applies, the plaintiff must “establish an exception that
would take the verbal contract out of the statute of frauds.” Id. at 642.
The Turners moved for summary judgment asserting there was no valid contract
or written memorandum for the sale of the property as required by the statute of frauds.
They also alleged any oral contract could not be performed in one year. Summary
judgment evidence included copies of money order receipts from Edmondson. The
amount of rent paid varied depending on whether Edmondson deducted payments for
repairs. Only one payment for April 2022 includes a handwritten notation of “house
payment.” Most of the other payments include the handwritten notation “rent.” The
payments were made from 2011 to 2022 demonstrating any alleged contract could not
be performed within a year. The evidence presented shifted the burden to Edmondson
to show an exception to the statute of frauds.
An exception to the statute of frauds is partial performance of the purported
contract. Boyert v. Tauber, 834 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. 1992). To satisfy that exception,
Edmondson had to show (1) payment of consideration, (2) possession, and (3) the
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making of valuable and permanent improvements to the property with the owner’s
consent. Id.; Owens v. Curry, No. 02-22-00182-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2557, at *17
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth April 20, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Partial performance must
be “unequivocally referable” to the agreement and corroborative of the fact that a contract
was actually made. Owens, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2557, at *17. Partial performance is
generally a question of fact. See id. (citing Burrus v. Reyes, 516 S.W.3d 170, 182 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied)). See also Blackstone Med., Inc. v. Phoenix Surgicals,
L.L.C., 470 S.W.3d 636, 647 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.) (recognizing that whether
an agreement falls within the statute of frauds is a question of law but noting whether an
agreement comes within the partial performance exception is a question of fact).
Edmondson asserts her claim falls within the partial performance exception
because she made payments for over a decade, possessed the property, and arranged
for repairs to the property. In all her petitions, she pleaded partial performance. See
Owens, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2557, at *18 (noting a party seeking to avoid the statute
of frauds based on the partial performance exception must plead, prove, and secure
findings on the exception).
The Burks maintain Edmondson was only renting the property because she was
not obligated to pay property taxes or insurance. Edmondson conceded as much during
her testimony but claimed it was because she had not yet acquired title. In a contract for
deed,7 legal title does not pass until the property is paid for. Morton v. Nguyen, 412
7 A contract for deed is an executory contract, unlike a typical secured transaction involving a deed
of trust, that provides an alternative way to buy real estate without obtaining conventional mortgage financing and allows the seller to maintain title to the property until the buyer has paid for it in full over a period of time. Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd., 185 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 2005).
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S.W.3d 506, 509–10 (Tex. 2013); Arreola v. Brown, No. 02-24-00500-CV, 2026 Tex. App.
LEXIS 5509, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 11, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Thus,
Edmondson’s concession did prove fatal to her claim.
Edmondson presented evidence she arranged for, and filed, an affidavit of heirship
witnessed by a disinterested party to clear title to the property after Burk’s mother passed
away in 2012. A mere tenant would not concern herself with title to a property she was
only renting. Her partial performance was “unequivocally referable” to the agreement she
made with Burk to purchase the property.
By their affidavits, the Turners confirmed they sometimes allowed Edmondson to
arrange for repairs and would allow her to deduct any costs from her rent. The record
includes copies of rent payments minus deductions for certain repairs. The Turners did
not challenge any expenses incurred by Edmondson for repairs.
In her affidavit, Edmondson averred she resided on the property from 2011 to 2022
and paid more than the agreed-to price of $90,000. She satisfied the partial performance
elements of payment of consideration and possession. She further averred that “[o]ver
the years, I personally hired repair persons and contractors to do work at the
Premises . . . . Turner and Ms. Turner did not approve of every repair person or
contractor, or the specific work to be done, in advance.” The record shows Burk
consented to almost all repairs and allowed Edmondson to deduct any expenses from
her payments. Regardless of Burk’s lack of approval on some repairs, at the very least,
Edmondson raised a fact issue on whether Burk consented to repairs. We conclude
Edmondson presented competent summary judgment evidence sufficient to raise a fact
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issue on partial performance. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of the Turners on Edmondson’s breach of contract claim.
TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE AND VIOLATIONS OF THE PROPERTY CODE
Edmondson’s remaining claims of trespass to try title and violations of sections
5.077 and 5.079 of the Property Code are intertwined with her claim she had a valid
contract for the purchase of Burk’s property. Although she acknowledged legal title was
held by Burk’s mother at the time they allegedly entered into a contract for sale of the
property, she believed Burk had authority to represent his mother. Sections 5.077 and
5.079 of the Property Code pertain to annual statements and the transfer of title based
on executory contracts. Because Edmondson’s breach of contract claim is the bedrock
from which her remaining claims arise, they cannot be excluded from our analysis. We
conclude the trial court also erred in granting summary judgment on those claims.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Edmondson sought declarations that she made the required payments to purchase
the property in question, that she fulfilled all the terms of the contract between the parties,
and that the Turners take no action to convey, sell, transfer, or offer for sale the premises
to anyone other than her or to evict or remove her from the premises.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is remedial and meant to settle and afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal
relations. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.002. Section 37.004(a) provides that a
“person interested under a . . . written contract or other writings constituting a contract or
whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected . . . may have determined any
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question of construction or validity . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other
legal relations.” Id. at § 37.004(a). Declaratory relief is proper if there is a justiciable
controversy as to the rights and status of the parties and will “serve[] a useful purpose or
will terminate the controversy between the parties.” Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907
S.W.2d 465, 467–68 (Tex. 1995). Declaratory relief is inappropriate if it adds nothing to
other relief sought. Boatman v. Lites, 970 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, no
pet.).
Edmondson requested declaratory relief for the following: (1) that she made
payments and fulfilled the terms of the contract, (2) to prevent the Turners from conveying,
selling, transferring, or offering the property to another, or to evict her, and (3) for an
award of attorney’s fees. She did not request a declaration of her rights or allege
vagueness or ambiguity in her perceived contract. Her request for declaratory relief did
not reference a written document as required by the statute, nor did she request a
determination on the alleged contract’s construction or validity. Declaratory relief would
have been superfluous, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for
the Turners on that claim.
Issue one is sustained in part and overruled in part. Our disposition renders it
unnecessary to address issue two by which Edmondson asserted the trial court erred in
omitting her claims for statutory fraud in a real estate transaction from the jury charge.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s Final Judgment based on the jury’s verdict on Edmondson’s claims
for deceptive trade practices, fraud in a real estate transaction, common law fraud, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress is reversed and those causes are remanded for
further proceedings.
The trial court’s order granting the Turners’ Second Motion for Traditional
Summary Judgment is affirmed in part as to the request for declaratory relief; the order is
reversed in part on Edmondson’s claims for breach of contract, trespass to try title, and a
violation of section 5.079 of the Texas Property Code and those causes are remanded
for further proceedings.
The trial court’s order granting the Turners’ Third Motion for Traditional Summary
Judgment is reversed on Edmondson’s claim for a violation of section 5.077 of the Texas
Property Code and that cause is remanded for further proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P.
44.1(b); Estrada v. Dillon, 44 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
Alex Yarbrough
Justice
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