In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00310-CR
ADISA AKANBI KAREEM, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 9
Tarrant County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 1848341, Honorable Brian Bolton, Presiding
August 25, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Adisa Akanbi Kareem, appeals from his placement on deferred
adjudication community supervision for the offense of driving while intoxicated. By what
we construe as three issues, Appellant argues (1) the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress; (2) the State suppressed production of favorable evidence in violation
1 This case was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to a docket
equalization order from the Supreme Court of Texas. We apply that court’s precedent to the extent it conflicts with our own.
of Brady v. Maryland; and (3) the trial court violated Appellant’s due process rights by
increasing his bond in retaliation for his decision to appeal. We overrule the first two
issues. Because the notice of appeal did not invoke our jurisdiction to review the appeal
bond, we dismiss the third issue. We affirm the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
The State charged Appellant with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.
Appellant moved to suppress. His motion raised twenty-one numbered grounds. Among
them were claims that the officers followed him for an unreasonable length of time, that
they lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop, that they questioned him without warnings
against self-incrimination, that they denied him counsel, and that they failed to warn him
of the consequences of refusing to provide a specimen.
The parties stipulated at the outset of the hearing that the arrest was warrantless.
No officer testified. The State responded to the motion ground-by-ground and offered two
recordings. State’s Exhibit 1 contains dash-camera footage. State’s Exhibit 2 contains
body-worn camera footage. Appellant did not object to either exhibit, and the trial court
admitted both.
The State published Exhibit 1 from the beginning. The dash-camera recording
opens with the patrol unit behind Appellant, who is traveling in the center of three lanes
with his passenger-side tire on the lane divider. Appellant signals a right turn and takes
a two-lane exit. As he exits, his passenger-side wheels cross the white dotted line twice
before he returns to his lane. In returning, he brings his driver-side wheels within inches
of the divider on his left. His right turn signal then remains active for roughly fifteen
2
seconds. During that interval he again crosses into the lane to his right, remains there
about four seconds, and returns to his own lane rather than completing the lane change.
When Appellant returned to his lane, his driver side tires contacted the left-hand line.
The officer activated his emergency lights. Appellant pulled onto the left shoulder.
While in the police cruiser, one officer is heard making reference to an odor and instructing
the other officer to make observations during their interaction with the driver. He says,
“They could be on their phone, who knows?”
The State published Exhibit 2, the body-worn camera video, in two segments. The
first began near the nine-minute mark and showed the officer administering the field
sobriety tests. The second began near the thirty-two-minute mark and showed the officer
reading Appellant the statutory warnings required by § 724.015 of the Transportation
Code, along with Appellant’s written consent to provide a specimen.
3
After the State rested, defense counsel asked that the first minute and five seconds
of “the last video” be played. Counsel indicated he meant the body cam video. The State
then played State’s Exhibit 2 from the beginning. In those opening minutes, Appellant’s
passenger explained that the two had been at the Ice House in Euless. Asked whether
he had been drinking, Appellant said no. The officer explained that he asked because he
could smell alcohol. The passenger then volunteered that he had been drinking. Asked
a second time to confirm that he had not been drinking at all, Appellant again said no.
When the officer said that he had stopped Appellant for swerving, Appellant answered
that he had been avoiding another driver. The officer directed Appellant out of the vehicle
for field sobriety tests. At the conclusion of those tests, the officer asked once more
whether Appellant had been drinking. This time Appellant said he had two drinks. The
officer then arrested Appellant.
Appellant then testified. He agreed that his vehicle moved from lane to lane. He
testified that no other vehicles were around him at the time and that nothing about the
lane changes was unsafe. He explained that he moved “to avoid the cones and devices
on the road.”
Appellant also contended that the State’s video recordings were incomplete,
describing the omitted material as the “zero-to-five” portion. He said that portion captured
the officers remarking that his weaving might be explained by phone use, and that it would
show the traffic-control devices as well. Appellant testified that he possessed a copy of
that footage from his former counsel, that his current counsel possessed a copy, and that
the footage was on his phone in the courtroom. He offered to play it. His counsel then
redirected him to other matters, and neither offered the footage as an exhibit. On cross4
examination, Appellant repeated that the recording omitted the officers’ remark and any
view of traffic-control devices. The prosecutor advised the court that the State did not
possess any dash-camera or body-worn camera footage predating what had been
admitted.
In closing, defense counsel conceded that Appellant failed to drive as nearly as
practical within a single lane, telling the court that Appellant “was all over the place.” He
argued that the second element of the statute went unproven because nothing
established that the movement was unsafe. He pointed to the absence of officer
testimony on that element and to Appellant’s testimony that no other vehicles were
present. Counsel raised no other ground. The trial court denied the motion.
ANALYSIS
A. Reasonable Suspicion for the Stop
Appellant’s first issue attacks the denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds.
He argues the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. He also argues the
officers questioned him in custody without the warnings against self-incrimination as
required under the U.S. Constitution.
We review a suppression ruling under a bifurcated standard. We give almost total
deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and to its credibility findings.
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review the application
of law to those facts de novo. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). The trial court made no express findings here, so we view the evidence in the light
5
most favorable to the ruling and imply the findings the record supports. State v. Kelly,
204 S.W.3d 808, 818–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
An officer may stop a motorist without a warrant on reasonable suspicion of a traffic
violation. See Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015);
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 913–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The reasonable
suspicion standard requires only “some minimal level of objective justification” for the
stop. See United States v. Sokolow, 400 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d
432, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Proof that the offense was actually committed is not
required. Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Drago
v. State, 553 S.W.,2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). We measure the suspicion
against the totality of the circumstances known to the officer when he detained the driver.
See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The officer’s subjective
intent has no place in the analysis. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005).
Section 545.060 of the Transportation Code supplies the substantive rule. A driver
on a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes shall drive as nearly as
practical entirely within a single lane. He may not move from the lane unless the
movement can be made safely. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.060(a)(1)(2). The two clauses
describe one offense: (1) when a driver leaves his lane and (2) does so unsafely. State
v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (concluding that single, brief moment
of lane departure by a box truck without unsafe maneuvers does not provide reasonable
suspicion because it did not violate § 545.060); but see Adams v. State, No. 02-24-00249-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 3903 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 5, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem.
6
op., not designated for publication) (distinguishing facts from Hardin where driver of sedan
crossed into lane twice, remained partially in the lane for five seconds, and did so with
multiple vehicles in the proximity).
Applied here, State’s Exhibit 1 shows conduct that Hardin does not describe.
Appellant crossed a lane divider three times in roughly half a minute. On the third crossing
he traveled about halfway into the adjacent lane and stayed there some four seconds.
He then returned to his own lane and made contact with the line on the opposite side.
His turn signal remained active throughout, about fifteen seconds, without a completed
lane change. These are objective facts, drawn from an exhibit admitted without objection,
and they supply the minimal justification the standard requires.
Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that transportation code § 545.060 was
the sole basis for the stop. Rather, that appears to be based on Appellant’s own
speculation, making his reliance on Hardin, which involved neither using a mobile device
nor driving while intoxicated, misplaced. See Hardin, 664. S.W.3d at 878.
Appellant next points to the second officer’s remark that the driver could be on a
phone. He reads the remark as an admission that the officers observed no violation. The
record counters Appellant’s argument in two ways. First, reasonable suspicion is
measured objectively. What the officer believed, suspected, or said aloud does not
control the analysis. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492; Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.2 Second, the
remark came as one officer directed the other to consider odors and other signs during
2 Appellant insists his “swerving” was to avoid traffic control devices in the other lanes; however,
the video evidence establishes that the traffic control devices were not even present at the time of his maneuvers between lanes. Additionally, it was up to the trial court to determine whether Appellant’s excuse was true or not, and the trial court apparently determined it was not.
7
the approach. It identifies a possible explanation for movement the officers had already
seen. And should the suspected offense have been use of a wireless device rather than
failure to maintain a single lane, the same driving would support it. An officer need not
witness the offense itself. See Leming, 493 S.W.3d at 561; Garcia, 43 S.W.3d at 530;
Minor v. State, No. 07-12-00005-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 14076, at *8–10 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Nov. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (collecting
cases finding reasonable suspicion of intoxication absent an observed traffic infraction).
Appellant also contends that Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution, which mirrors
the Fourth Amendment, permits a distinct analysis from the Fourth Amendment. See,
e.g., Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). He offers no
argument, however, explaining how the state provision would yield a different result on
these facts. Developing that argument for him would cast this Court as advocate rather
than adjudicator. The complaint is forfeited. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring
arguments contain citations to applicable authority and to the record).
We overrule Appellant’s first issue as it concerns the traffic stop.
B. Miranda Warnings3
Appellant also faults the trial court for refusing to suppress statements he made
before his arrest. Miranda reaches only custodial interrogation, and a roadside detention
3 The State argues that Appellant’s remaining arguments are unpreserved because, despite including them in his motion to suppress, he abandoned them by not arguing them at the hearing before the trial court. See, e.g., Provence v. State, No. 02-13-00475-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6874, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 2, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that a defendant forfeited a suppression ground that he did not argue to the trial court). However, out of an abundance of caution, we address Appellant’s complaints to the extent they were raised in his motion to suppress.
8
is ordinarily not custody. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 3(a) (requiring warnings only
when interrogation is custodial); see also Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007) (explaining Miranda warnings “safeguard an uncounseled individual’s
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation”).
Custodial interrogation means questioning by officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in a significant way. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602; accord Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 525. Concerns about an
alleged failure to comply with Miranda only arise when the individual is subject to both
custody by a law enforcement officer and an interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86
S. Ct. 1602; accord Warren v. State, 377 S.W.3d 9, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2011, pet. ref’d).
Four situations may place a suspect in custody: when he is physically deprived of
his freedom in a significant way, when an officer tells him he cannot leave, when officers
create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe his freedom of
movement has been significantly restricted, and when probable cause to arrest exists and
officers do not tell him he is free to go. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996). The first three require restraint of the degree associated with arrest rather
than investigative detention. The fourth requires that the officer’s knowledge of probable
cause be communicated to the suspect. Id.
By contrast, a traffic stop usually does not amount to custody due to its
nonthreatening and noncoercive nature. Wexler v. State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 169 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2021) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435 (1984)). This is true
9
even though a detained motorist would not feel free to drive away. Id. Warnings become
necessary only when the motorist is treated in a manner that curtails his freedom to the
degree associated with formal arrest. Id. at 169–70. Field sobriety testing does not by
itself trigger them. Arthur v. State, 216 S.W.3d 50, 55–56 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007,
no pet.). Neither does a driver’s status as the focus of an intoxication investigation.
Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 170 (citing State v. Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997)).
Appellant argues that he was entitled to Miranda protections because: (1) multiple
officers surrounded him; (2) the patrol unit continuously had its emergency lights
activated; (3) the officers commanded, rather than requested, Appellant with regard to his
physical position; and (4) the officers immediately used “accusatory questioning designed
to elicit an admission of guilt.”4 But that is far afield from instances in which courts have
found custody to have begun. Dowthitt, for example, involved fifteen hours of stationhouse questioning. 931 S.W.2d at 256. Officers accompanied the suspect to the
bathroom, refused his request to speak with his wife, and told him he was not free to
leave. Custody was said to have begun after he admitted his presence at the murders.
Id. at 256–57.
Stevenson and Berkemer present facts closer to the present case. In Stevenson,
an officer investigating a single-vehicle collision smelled alcohol, asked questions, and
administered field sobriety tests. 958 S.W.2d at 825. The Court held that warnings were
4 Appellant also cites two cases from this Court that he alleges directly support his proposition.
However, after a diligent search, we could not find the cases using the West Law citation, our own cause numbers, or the names of the appellants.
10
not required under those circumstances. Id. at 829. Berkemer involved a driver seen
weaving for two miles, a stop, roadside questioning, and a sobriety test. 468 U.S. at 423.
The Court emphasized that a traffic stop is brief, public, and ordinarily ends with the
motorist continuing on his way. Id. at 437. The circumstances of the typical stop, it
observed, do not leave a motorist feeling “completely at the mercy of the police.” Id.
Here, the record reflects that Appellant remained in his vehicle for initial questions
asked about drinking and about his driving, beside a highway shoulder, and within
minutes of the stop. The presence of a second officer, the activated emergency lights,
and directions about where to stand do not create custody. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at
437. Nothing in the recording shows that Appellant was told he could not leave, that
probable cause was communicated to him, or that his liberty was restrained to the degree
associated with arrest before the officer placed him under arrest. See Dowthitt, 931
S.W.2d at 255. The trial court did not err in declining to suppress the statements.
We overrule the remainder of Appellant’s first issue.
C. Alleged Brady Violations
By his second issue, Appellant contends the State suppressed a portion of the
video admitted into evidence. A Brady violation occurs when the State suppresses
favorable evidence, whether willfully or inadvertently. State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677,
699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). Reversal requires three showings: that the State failed to
disclose evidence, without regard to good or bad faith; that the evidence was favorable
to the accused; and that the evidence was material, meaning a reasonable probability
11
exists that disclosure would have changed the outcome. Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d
603, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Assuming without deciding that Appellant preserved his Brady violation claim for
appellate review, we conclude that his claim fails.5 Appellant testified that his former
counsel received a copy of the complained-of footage, that his current counsel held a
copy, and that the footage was on his phone in the courtroom. Yet, he never introduced
it. Evidence in the defendant’s hands and in the trial record was not withheld. See
Hampton, 86 S.W.3d at 612. Appellant’s third issue is overruled.
D. Bond Modification
By his final issue, Appellant contends the trial court raised his bond in retaliation
for his notice of appeal. His pretrial bond was a $500 personal appearance bond.6 His
appeal bond was set at $2,500 and carried two conditions: to maintain a mobile alcohol
detection device and an ignition interlock. Appellant moved to strike the interlock
condition; he did not ask that the bond amount be reduced. The amended conditions
retained the interlock requirement, subject to an exception for rental and employer-owned
vehicles.
The State argues that the question is not properly before our Court. Appellant’s
notice of appeal specifically identifies only the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress;
5 See Keeter v. State, 175 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding preservation error
where “[t]he appellant did not mention Brady in his motion or during the hearing on the motion, and did not include any Brady-related cases in his post-hearing submission.”).
6 A personal bond, sometimes referred to as a personal recognizance (PR) or a personal
appearance bond, permits the release of a defendant without the posting of any sureties or other securities. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.03(a).
12
it did not identify the trial court’s bond orders. The Legislature provided a distinct and
preferential avenue for review of bail pending appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
44.04(g). A separate notice of appeal is required. Ex parte Enriquez, 2 S.W.3d 362, 363
(Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.) (per curiam); TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(c)(2) (requiring the
notice of appeal state the order from which appeal is sought).
Appellant’s notice of appeal did not invoke such review. We therefore lack
jurisdiction over the complaint and dismiss the third issue.7
CONCLUSION
Having overruled the issues within our jurisdiction, we affirm the trial court’s order
placing Appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision. We dismiss
Appellant’s third issue for want of jurisdiction.8
Lawrence M. Doss
Justice
Do not publish.
7 Appellant insist he “is not seeking standard interlocutory review of an excessive bail order; rather,
[he] challenges an egregious violation of due process . . . .” We find Appellant’s argument to constitute a distinction without difference. To the extent Appellant intends to argue that his complaint somehow implicates the final judgment rather than the personal bond itself, he provides no authority for such a proposition, and we find none.
8 Appellant filed a motion to expedite the hearing and disposition of this matter. We deny his motion as moot.
13