In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00175--CV
JOSE NAVARRETE, APPELLANT
V.
REY & K SERVICES, REYNOL GAYTAN AND KARINA GAYTAN D/B/A REY & K
SERVICES, APPELLEES
On Appeal from the 84th District Court
Ochiltree County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV15395, Honorable Curtis W. Brancheau, Presiding
August 25, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
This appeal arises from an incident which occurred during the plugging of an oil
well. Appellant, Jose Navarrete, challenges the granting of summary judgment in favor
of the Appellees, Rey & K Services, Reynol Gaytan and Karina Gaytan, d/b/a “Rey & K
Services” (collectively “Rey & K”). Navarrete contends the trial court should not have
granted summary judgment because: (1) genuine issues of material fact existed
precluding the granting of a traditional summary judgment; (2) he presented sufficient
evidence to preclude the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment; (3) the trial court resolved disputed fact issues by relying on extra-record knowledge; and (4) the trial court
should not have struck his attached evidence which demonstrated the existence of
genuine issues of material fact. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On October 18, 2022, Jose Navarrete, an employee of Phil Dollar Oilfield Services,
Inc. (PDOS), was assisting a well-plugging crew with the removal of a wellhead.
Navarrete and his coworkers unearthed the wellhead using a backhoe and some shovels.
The wellhead needed to be separated from the casing of the well before the plugging
process could be completed. To cut the casing, Navarrete and his coworkers raised the
wellhead by rigging it to a chain wrapped around the teeth of the backhoe. Navarrete
operated the backhoe and created tension in the chain, suspending the wellhead while
his coworkers cut the inner and outer casing. At some point, Navarrete left the backhoe
running unattended and climbed into the pit to help with the final cut. Unfortunately, during
this process, the backhoe shifted; the chain came loose; and the wellhead fell, striking
Navarrete and pinning him to the side of the excavation. The injury left Navarrete
paralyzed from the waist down.
Since 2018, Rey & K had provided periodic safety training to PDOS’s workforce.
These training sessions included SafeLand training, H2S certification, first aid/CPR, and
topic-specific classroom sessions (protective gear, lockout/tagout, safe driving,
hazardous chemicals, hand/power tools). Specifically, in the two months prior to the
incident, Rey & K conducted a lockout/tagout session and a fall-protection session. After
the incident, PDOS hired Rey & K to assess the incident and determine its causes. Rey
& K’s report cited the backhoe being left “ON” and unattended, attributing the unsafe
2
conditions to “NOT FOLLOWING BASIC STEPS/PROCEDURES” and the cause of the
unsafe acts to “MACHINERY UNATTENDED (BACKHOE), HUMAN ERROR.”
Following the incident, Navarrete sued the owner of the well, the operator of the
well, and Rey & K under theories of negligence and premises liability. Navarrete also
sought damages for gross negligence. Rey & K moved for both a no-evidence summary
judgment and a traditional summary judgment on Navarrete’s claims. Navarrete
responded with evidence of Rey & K having provided training to PDOS employees.
Navarrete did not contest the premises-liability claim and waived his gross-negligence
claims, leaving negligence as the only claim at issue. He argued Rey & K breached its
duty to provide sufficient training which proximately caused Navarrete’s injuries.
The trial court held a hearing on Rey & K’s motions for summary judgment on
March 15, 2026. At the hearing, Rey & K urged the trial court to strike Navarrete’s
affidavit, his interrogatory responses, and certain evidence referenced in, but not attached
to, Navarrete’s response. The trial court overruled the objection to the affidavit, but he
granted the other evidentiary objections. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial
court granted summary judgment and granted Rey & K’s motion for severance, making
the summary judgment final and appealable. Navarrete timely filed his notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
By his four issues, Navarrete argues summary judgment should not have been
granted by the trial court. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, taking
as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulging every reasonable inference
in the nonmovant’s favor. JLB Builders, L.L.C v. Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex.
2021) (citations omitted). To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, the movant has
3
the burden to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. By contrast, a party may obtain a no-evidence
summary judgment when there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a
claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Id.
A properly filed no-evidence motion shifts the burden to the nonmovant to present
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested in
the motion. Id. “[A] no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted if the
respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine
issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751
(Tex. 2003). Where, as here, a trial court does not specify the grounds on which it granted
the motion for summary judgment, we must affirm if any of the grounds asserted in the
motion are meritorious. Cmty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d
671, 680 (Tex. 2017). Further, when the motion asserts both no-evidence and traditional
grounds, we review the no-evidence grounds first, Navarrete’s second issue.1 Id.
Rey & K’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment averred Navarrete lacked
evidence for the elements of his claims for negligence, premises liability, and gross
negligence. Because Navarrete failed to respond by pointing out evidence supporting
each element of his claim for premises liability and gross negligence, a no-evidence
summary judgment dismissing those claims against Rey & K was proper. TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a(i) (West 2025, amended 2026); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Therefore, we only address
Navarrete’s challenge to the summary judgment in favor of Rey & K on his claim of
1 By his second issue, Navarrete claims the trial court erred in granting a no-evidence summary
judgment because he produced more than a scintilla of probative evidence on each challenged element of his negligence claim.
4
negligence. Wilson v. Nw. Tex. Healthcare Sys., Inc., 576 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (“We will affirm a no-evidence summary judgment if the record
shows . . . there is no evidence on the challenged element[.]”).
The elements of a negligence cause of action are: (1) the existence of a legal duty,
(2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. Tenaris
Bay City Inc. v. Ellisor, 718 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. 2025). Proximate cause has two
elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2) foreseeability. Id. Cause in fact, in turn, also has two
essential components: (1) “but for” causation, and (2) “substantial factor” causation. Id.
(quotations orig.). The plaintiff must establish both elements of cause in fact in order to
prevail on a negligence claim. Id.
Rey & K moved for a no-evidence summary judgment on Navarrete’s negligence
claim arguing there is no evidence of a duty owed to Navarrette, no evidence of a breach
of any duty, and no evidence any such breach proximately caused Navarrete’s injuries.2
Attached to his response, Navarrete presented his affidavit; copies of his answers to
interrogatories from Rey & K; Rey & K’s incident report; transcript of the deposition of Lori
Dollar, Vice President and Secretary of PDOS; safety records from PDOS, including
certificates of training issued by Rey & K to Navarrete; transcript of the deposition of
Reynol Gaytan; and an OSHA lockout/tagout fact sheet.3 In the body of his response,
Navarrete also cited evidence Rey & K provided “lockout/tagout” training of some sort.
2 While Navarrete’s petition raised a general claim of negligence against all the defendants and
listed a variety of acts he attributed to all defendants, he conceded in his response that “Mr. Navarrete sued . . . [Rey & K] for negligence in its [sic] training of PDOS employees, including himself.”
3 The trial court excluded Navarrete’s interrogatory responses from the evidence pursuant to Rey
& K’s motion to strike. It appears from the pleadings, however, Navarrete only pointed to his interrogatory response as evidence he suffered paralysis from the incident. However, because our disposition does not turn on evidence of damages but rather evidence of causation, we do not address the exclusion.
5
Navarrete contends this is more than a scintilla of evidence demonstrating Rey & K, by
providing training, owed him a duty to train him adequately, and by not training him
adequately Rey & K breached that duty and caused the incident. Assuming, arguendo,
Navarrete presented sufficient evidence of a duty owed by Rey & K, he still failed to
present more than a scintilla of evidence demonstrating Rey & K breached that duty and
Rey & K’s breach proximately caused his injuries.4
Navarrete points to his affidavit as evidence demonstrating breach of duty and
proximate causation. The affidavit only makes the following relevant statements:
• “I left the backhoe unattended and turned on so that I could help other
workers plugging the well.”
• “When I left the backhoe unattended and turned on, I was acting
consistently with the training that I received while working at Phil Dollar
Oilfield Services.”
However, neither of these statements tie Navarrete’s actions to any specific training he
received (or did not receive) from Rey & K. Nor do they articulate any appropriate
standard of care in training of this kind or causation of the incident. He also points to the
deposition of Reynol Gaytan—a principal of Rey & K Services—for the proposition Rey &
K breached their duty by inadequately training him. However, Gaytan only confirmed the
use of the backhoe by Navarrete was not “consistent with proper training.” Gaytan’s
testimony does not indicate Rey & K gave him inadequate training. Neither does it
4 At the moment, the Texas Supreme Court has yet to recognize a cause of action for negligent
training, and whether a corresponding duty exists is still an open question. See Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499, 505 (Tex. 2017). However, we need not address whether Rey & K owed a duty as a matter of law because, as described infra, Navarrete failed to provide more than a scintilla of the remaining elements of his negligence claim.
6
elucidate any training details, or whether, but for Navarrete following that training, the
incident would not have occurred.
Lastly, Navarrete insists the evidence is more than a scintilla, arguing that Rey &
K’s training was deficient because Rey & K’s accident report stated a cause of the
accident was “NOT FOLLOWING BASIC STEPS/PROCEDURES.” He argues this is an
“admission” by Rey & K that they inadequately trained Navarrete which caused the
accident. But, again, there is no evidence of what procedures or basic steps were taught
to Navarrete, whether he actually followed the procedures on the day of the accident, and
whether, but for following the procedures, Navarrete would not have suffered his injuries.
Simply put, presenting evidence that Rey & K trained Navarrete is not enough.
Navarrete failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence for the essential elements
of breach of duty and proximate causation for his negligence claim. Therefore, the trial
court did not err in granting Rey & K’s motion for a no-evidence summary judgment on
Navarrete’s claims. We overrule Navarrete’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
Because the no-evidence summary judgment was properly granted, we need not
address his remaining issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Laura A. W. Pratt
Justice
7