In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00154-CR
MATTHEW MARTINEZ, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 137th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-2024-CR-2880, Honorable John J. “Trey” McClendon III, Presiding
August 25, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Matthew Martinez, appeals from the trial court’s judgments convicting
him, on his open plea of guilty, of two counts of aggravated robbery.1 He was sentenced
to fifty years of confinement on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. His
court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders2 brief in support of a motion to withdraw,
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03.
2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). When appointed
appellate counsel, after a conscientious examination of the record, concludes that an appeal is frivolous, counsel must file a brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Id. concluding that no arguable grounds for reversal exist. Because our independent review
of the record confirms counsel’s assessment, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In the late hours of October 19, 2024, Appellant left his mother’s house on foot,
carrying a machete. His mother called police out of concern for his welfare. Appellant
walked to a Toot’n Totum convenience store a short distance away. Inside, he waved the
machete, screamed, and demanded that the two employees give him the money in the
registers. Appellant took the store’s cash, struck the machete against one register’s
drawer and computer screen, shouted profanities, and gestured at the employees before
leaving.
Appellant returned home. An officer responding to the mother’s welfare call was
flagged down by Appellant in his driveway. Appellant said his mother would not let him
inside. The officer had heard the dispatch describing the robbery suspect, and he
recognized that Appellant matched the description. While waiting for backup, he asked
whether Appellant had any weapons. Appellant answered that he had a knife and a
machete. A second officer arrived, and the two removed both weapons and handcuffed
Appellant. A pat-down turned up wadded cash in his pockets.
Officers placed Appellant in a patrol car and drove him to the store, where an
employee and the surveillance video identified him as the robber. During the
investigation, Appellant slipped his handcuffs and used them to break the rear passenger
window of the patrol car. He screamed slurs and obscenities and threatened the officers.
He was re-cuffed and returned to the car. He continued to curse, spit, and threaten. In
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the course of that tirade, he shouted that he had robbed the Toot’n Totum, that robbery
is “what I do,” and that he would do it again. Because he had broken the window and spit
on an officer, a transport van was called. Officers placed a spit mask over his head and
strapped him to a board for transport to the jail.
A grand jury indicted Appellant on two counts of aggravated robbery, a first-degree
felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE. § 29.03. The indictment included two enhancement
paragraphs alleging sequential prior felony convictions. On February 23, 2026, Appellant
entered an open plea of guilty to both counts and pleaded true to both enhancement
paragraphs. Following a punishment hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty on
each count, found the enhancement paragraphs true, made an affirmative deadly-weapon
finding as to a weapon other than a firearm, and assessed punishment at fifty years of
confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice on
each count. The trial court later signed nunc pro tunc orders correcting clerical matters
in the judgments, including a recitation that the sentences run concurrently. This appeal
followed.
ANDERS FRAMEWORK
An Anders brief must present a professional evaluation of the record and explain
why the appeal presents no arguable grounds for reversal. See In re Schulman, 252
S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Counsel need not identify
specific arguable points where none exist, but the brief must include record references
and pertinent legal authorities. Id.; Davis v. State, 683 S.W.3d 828, 829–30 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2023, no pet.). Counsel must also serve the client with the brief and the motion
to withdraw; he must inform the client of the right to review the record, to file a pro se
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response, and to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d
313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.
Appellate counsel has complied with these requirements. We have carefully
conducted an independent review, examining the record, counsel’s Anders brief, and
Appellant’s pro se response. Our independent review confirms appellate counsel’s
assessment that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Counsel’s brief examines whether the length of Appellant’s sentences supplies an
arguable ground for appeal. A sentence that falls within the range the Legislature
prescribed is ordinarily not subject to challenge as excessive. Ex parte Chavez, 213
S.W.3d 320, 323–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Barrow v. State, 207 S.W.3d 377, 379–81
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). With two sequential prior felony convictions found true, the range
here was twenty-five to ninety-nine years, or life. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(d). The fiftyyear sentences fall within it. The record presents no arguable claim that they are grossly
disproportionate to the offenses.
Appellant filed a pro se response. In it, he complains that officers failed to give
Miranda warnings before he shouted that he had robbed the store and would do so again.
No objection was lodged when that evidence was admitted at the punishment hearing,
which forfeited the complaint. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). The complaint would fail in
any event. Miranda safeguards apply to custodial interrogation. Statements made
voluntarily, and not in response to interrogation, remain admissible. See Warren v. State,
377 S.W.3d 9, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); Badall v. State, 216
S.W.3d 865, 868–69 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. ref’d). Appellant was under arrest
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when he spoke, but he spoke spontaneously, from the back of a patrol car, while no officer
was questioning him. Thus, he presents no arguable claim that his right against selfincrimination was violated.
CONCLUSION
We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgments of the trial court.3
Lawrence M. Doss
Justice
Do not publish.
3 Counsel shall, within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the
opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is informational and ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and continues after this Court grants counsel’s motion to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33.
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