UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DAVID MCCOY,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 25-cv-3531-ZMF
YELP INC.,
Defendant.
OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff David McCoy brings this action against his former employer, Yelp Inc., alleging
that Yelp discriminated against him, refused to rehire him because of his disability, and retaliated
against him for engaging in protected activity, all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act
(“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. See Compl. ¶¶ 22–33, ECF No 1-1.
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Yelp’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot. to Dismiss”),
ECF No. 8. For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s motion will be GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began working for Yelp in January 2019 as a Trainee before receiving a series of
promotions to Account Executive, Junior Account Executive, and Senior Account Executive. See
Compl. ¶ 4. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff generally met or exceeded his sales quotas and
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was selected for Yelp’s Management Training Program, which Plaintiff alleges was reserved for
high-performing employees. See id. ¶¶ 5–7.
In late 2021, Plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer and underwent chemotherapy
treatment. See id. ¶ 8. During his treatment, Plaintiff remained in contact with Yelp’s leave
specialists concerning medical documentation, fitness-for-duty requirements, requests for
accommodation, and his anticipated return to work. See id. Plaintiff alleges that Yelp management
and Human Resources repeatedly encouraged him to return to work while he was still undergoing
chemotherapy and rehabilitation. See id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff’s cancer recurred in 2022. See id. ¶ 9. This caused significant breathing difficulties
while conducting sales calls. See id. Human Resources instructed him to stop making sales calls.
See id. On October 22, 2022, Yelp terminated Plaintiff’s employment. See id. ¶ 10. Yelp allegedly
informed Plaintiff that he could not perform his job because of his cancer. See id. Plaintiff alleges
that Yelp advised him at the time of his termination that he could contact Human Resources to
seek reemployment once he was able to return to work. See id. ¶ 13.
On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff applied for an Account Manager position with Yelp. See id. ¶ 16.
Plaintiff completed both a telephone screening interview and a video interview. See id. Plaintiff
alleges that his interviewer focused extensively on Plaintiff’s cancer diagnosis and treatment
history rather than his qualifications. See id. ¶ 17. Two days later, Yelp informed Plaintiff that it
had selected another candidate whose qualifications more closely matched the position’s needs.
See id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that the position remained posted after his rejection. See id. ¶ 19.
On September 4, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action in Superior Court. See Not. of
Removal 1, ECF No. 1. On October 1, 2025, Yelp removed this action to federal court. See id.
Count I alleges wrongful termination under the DCHRA. See Compl. ¶¶ 22–25. Counts II and III
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allege disability discrimination based on Yelp’s refusal to hire Plaintiff for the Account Manager
position in violation of the ADA and DCHRA. See id. ¶¶ 26–30. Count IV alleges that Yelp refused
to rehire Plaintiff in retaliation for his requests for medical leave and accommodations, as well as
his participation as a witness in another matter adverse to Yelp. See id. ¶¶ 31–33.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12, a complaint is subject to dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the purposes of this motion, dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) may be appropriate on two grounds: (1) the complaint is facially time-barred; and/or
(2) the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
“a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v.
D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Furthermore, the court must construe the
complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Ordinarily, a statute-of-limitations defense is an affirmative defense that is not resolved on
a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1); see also Rudder v. Williams, 47 F. Supp. 3d 47, 50
(D.D.C. 2014) (“Because statute of limitations defenses often are based on contested facts, the
court should be cautious in granting a motion to dismiss on such grounds.”). Nevertheless,
“dismissal [under Rule 12(b)(6)] is appropriate [] if the complaint on its face is conclusively timebarred.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Statute of Limitations
The DCHRA requires a private civil action to be filed within two years of the alleged
unlawful discriminatory practice. See D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(b)(1). A discrimination claim
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accrues when the plaintiff learns of the discriminatory employment decision, not when its
consequences are ultimately felt. See Brown v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 844 A.2d 1113, 1118 (D.C.
2004).
Plaintiff does not dispute that Count I was filed outside of the limitations period. See Pl.’s
Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) 3–4, ECF No. 15. Thus, “the complaint on its face
is conclusively time-barred.” Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1209. However, Plaintiff argues that the
limitations period should be excused because his cancer treatment equitably tolled the period and
because Yelp’s post-termination communications regarding possible reemployment lulled him into
delaying suit. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3–4. The Court rejects these arguments in turn.
i. Equitable Tolling
Equitable tolling “is granted only in ‘extraordinary and carefully circumscribed
circumstances.’” Harris v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 442, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Smith-Haynie v.
District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). A litigant “seeking equitable tolling
bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 418 (2005).
1. Diligence
To demonstrate diligence, a plaintiff must show that he actively and continuously pursued
his legal rights throughout the limitations period. See Norman v. United States, 467 F.3d 773, 776
(D.C. Cir. 2006). Courts reject equitable tolling where a plaintiff cannot explain why he failed to
timely file despite having the ability to do so: for example, where a plaintiff had the “presence of
mind to consult a lawyer” before the filing deadline. Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 580.
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Plaintiff alleges no effort to challenge his termination, investigate a potential legal claim,
or otherwise pursue his rights before the statute of limitations expired. See generally Compl. Nor
does Plaintiff allege that he sought legal advice, pursued administrative remedies, or otherwise
attempted to preserve his claim during that period. See id. As such, the Complaint does not
plausibly allege diligence. See Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 580.
2. Extraordinary-circumstances
To satisfy the extraordinary-circumstances element, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an
obstacle “beyond his control” prevented timely filing. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United
States, 764 F.3d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Dyson v. District of Columbia, 710 F.3d 415, 422
(D.C. Cir. 2013)). The obstacle must be external to the litigant. See id. at 59. The obstacle cannot
result from a misunderstanding of the law, litigation strategy, or other circumstances within the
plaintiff’s control. See id. at 58.
Where a plaintiff alleges exceptional circumstances based on a medical condition, he must
demonstrate that the condition rendered him unable to “comprehend [his] legal rights” or “handl[e]
[his] own affairs.” Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 580 (addressing mental incapacity); see also Harper
v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (addressing physical incapacity). Courts have
consistently declined to find extraordinary circumstances based on generalized allegations of
mental anguish or other significant medical hardship absent a particularized showing that the
plaintiff was incapacitated. See, e.g., Charles v. Brennan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 97, 102–03 (D.D.C.
2016) (finding depression was not an extraordinary circumstance); Barbett v. Logistics
Application, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding mental anguish was not an
extraordinary circumstance). Accordingly, courts have looked for objective indicia of incapacity,
such as adjudications of incompetence, the appointment of a guardian or caretaker, or the execution
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of a power of attorney. See Speiser v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 380, 385
(D.D.C. 1986). For example, the plaintiff in Speiser was hospitalized on five separate occasions
for a total of sixty-five days after resigning from her employment. See id. at 382. Nevertheless, the
court declined to find exceptional circumstances because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
her illness rendered her incapable of managing her affairs or understanding her legal rights. See id.
at 384–85. Although the record showed that she suffered from depression and was preoccupied
with the circumstances surrounding her resignation, plaintiff understood her legal rights at the time
of her resignation and was represented by counsel in the months that followed. See id. at 385. And,
critically, plaintiff had never been adjudicated incompetent, executed a power of attorney, had a
guardian or caretaker appointed, or otherwise taken steps to have another person manage her
affairs. See id. In short, while the plaintiff “clearly suffer[ed] from a legitimate mental illness,” she
failed to show that it disabled her “to the requisite degree.” Id.
Plaintiff’s circumstances fall short of the ones rejected in Speiser. Plaintiff argues that “[he]
was incapacitated due to Stage IV lung cancer treatment, including chemotherapy, difficulty
breathing, and rehabilitation to regain mobility.” Compl. ¶ 12. But he does not allege an extended
hospitalization or other extraordinary circumstances that rendered him unable to timely pursue his
claims. See generally Compl. Indeed, the Complaint contains no allegations that Plaintiff was
unable to comprehend his legal rights, unable to communicate with others, or “incapable of
handling his own affairs.” Craig-Davidson v. McDonough, 35 Vet. App. 281, 293 (2022); see
generally Compl. Nor does Plaintiff allege any of the objective indicia of incapacity identified in
Speiser, such as the appointment of a guardian, execution of a power of attorney, or reliance on
another individual to handle his affairs. See generally Compl. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that
throughout the relevant period he communicated with Yelp regarding his leave, requested
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accommodations, and discussed his eventual return to work. See id. ¶ 8. Those allegations
demonstrate that Plaintiff remained capable of managing his affairs, not that he was so
incapacitated that he could not timely pursue his legal rights. See Craig-Davidson, 35 Vet. App. at
284–85, 293 (finding equitable tolling appropriate for an appeal filed 82 days late where the
claimant’s terminal lung cancer required hospice care, treatment caused him to sleep most of the
day, and he was periodically unconscious, all during the COVID-19 pandemic). As such, the
Complaint does not plausibly allege an extraordinary circumstance. See Speiser, 670 F. Supp. at
385.
ii. Lulling
Alternatively, a defendant may be estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense
where he has “done anything that would tend to lull the plaintiff into inaction, and thereby permit
the limitation prescribed by the statute to run.” East v. Graphic Arts Indus. Joint Pension Tr., 718
A.2d 153, 156–57 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Bond v. Serano, 566 A.2d 47, 50 (D.C. 1989)). This
doctrine is “a very narrow equitable exception to rigorous filing requirements.” Bradford v. George
Washington Univ., 249 F. Supp. 3d 325, 336 (D.D.C. 2017). Accordingly, a plaintiff must allege
that “the defendant did ‘something that amounted to an affirmative inducement to plaintiff[ ] to
delay bringing action.’” Z-Modular, LLC v. MCN Build, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2024)
(quoting Bailey v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934, 937 (D.C. 1986)). The misconduct “must generally
be ‘designed’ to prevent a plaintiff from litigating in time.” Id. (quoting William J. Davis, Inc. v.
Young, 412 A.2d 1187, 1191 (D.C. 1980)). Mere silence or vague assurances are insufficient. See
id.
Plaintiff contends that Yelp’s continued communications with him after his termination
lulled him into delaying the filing of this action. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Yelp informed
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Plaintiff post-termination that he could “contact HR to initiate reemployment” once he was able to
return to work. Compl. ¶ 13. He further alleges that he remained in contact with Yelp’s Human
Resources and leave personnel regarding medical leave, return-to-work documentation, and his
anticipated recovery. See id. ¶ 8. Finally, he alleges that, after recovering, he applied for a new
Account Manager position in May 2025 and interviewed for that position before Yelp ultimately
declined to hire him. See id. ¶¶ 16–18.
But these allegations only reflect that Yelp informed Plaintiff he could seek reemployment
once he recovered. An employer’s willingness to consider or even promise future reemployment
does not automatically suggest that the prior termination was unlawful or that the employee need
not timely challenge it. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 n.15 (1980) (explaining
that an employer’s later reconsideration of an adverse employment decision does not toll the
limitations period). A representation that Plaintiff could seek reemployment after recovering from
cancer concerns an employment decision separate from Plaintiff’s October 2022 termination. See
Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff has made no allegations, nor can the Court draw any inferences that Yelp
implied it would rescind the earlier termination or otherwise remedy the alleged employment law
violation without litigation. Under these circumstances, a reasonable employee should believe both
that he might be rehired in the future and that he remained obligated to timely pursue any legal
challenge to his prior termination. See Nono v. George Wash. Univ., 245 F. Supp. 3d 141, 146 &
n.1 (D.D.C. 2017).
In Nono, the plaintiff argued that he delayed filing an EEOC complaint because his
employer had promised to rehire him after his termination. See id. The court rejected that as a basis
for equitable tolling. See id. The court first noted that the complaint alleged no facts identifying
who made the alleged promise to rehire or the communication in which it was conveyed. See id.
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at 146 n.1. And, in any event, the court explained that even if the employer had made such a
promise, it would not have “prohibit[ed] him from filing a timely EEOC charge.” Id.
The same is true here. The Complaint neither identifies the communication in which Yelp
promised to rehire Plaintiff or who allegedly made such representation. See Compl. ¶ 13 (“Yelp
advised Plaintiff at termination that he could contact HR to initiate reemployment once he was
able to return.”). And Plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting that Yelp induced him to forgo timely
legal action. Like the plaintiff in Nono, Plaintiff offers only the conclusory assertion that “Plaintiff
relied on this assurance [of reemployment], further delaying pursuit of legal action.” Id. The
promise of reemployment, standing alone, does not constitute affirmative misconduct by the
defendant designed to induce delay and reasonable reliance on that misconduct. See Jankovic v.
Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As such, the Complaint does not plausibly
allege lulling. See id.
B. Qualified Individual
To state a claim for disability discrimination under either the ADA or the DCHRA, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege, among other things, that he was a “qualified individual.” See Epps
v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 53, 62 (D.D.C. 2019). A “qualified individual” is one
whom, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C.,
139 F. Supp. 3d 295, 310 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). “[C]ourts generally view
a dispute over the definition of a job’s essential functions as a question of fact that should be
resolved by a jury.” Baker v. Potter, 294 F. Supp. 2d 33, 44 (D.D.C. 2003). Consequently, it is
“rare on a motion to dismiss” to resolve disputes concerning essential job functions. Pappas v.
District of Columbia, 513 F. Supp. 3d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2021).
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Defendant argues that Counts II and III fail because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that
he was a “qualified individual.” 1 See Mot. to Dismiss at 5–6. Counts II and III concern Yelp’s
alleged failure to hire Plaintiff for the position of Account Manager nearly three years after his
termination as a Senior Account Executive. See Compl. ¶¶ 4, 16.
Defendant’s argument rests on Plaintiff’s allegation that, in October 2022, he had trouble
breathing during telephone calls while employed as a Senior Account Executive. See Mot. to
Dismiss at 6. But that allegation does not establish that Plaintiff remained unable to perform the
essential functions of the Account Manager position nearly three years later. The Complaint alleges
the opposite: that Plaintiff sought reemployment after recovering from his cancer treatment. See
Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15–16. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court must draw all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, including that his condition had materially improved by May 2025.
Defendant’s reliance on Baron v. Dulinski is misplaced. See Mot. to Dismiss at 6 (citing
928 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2013)). In Baron, the complaint itself established that the plaintiff
could not perform the essential functions of her position. See 928 F. Supp. 2d at 41–42 (finding
that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual where the complaint alleged that she was
permanently disabled because of a workplace injury and therefore could not perform the essential
functions of her former position). Here, by contrast, the Complaint contains no factual allegations
demonstrating that Plaintiff was incapable of performing the essential functions of the Account
Manager position. See generally Compl. Rather, Plaintiff alleges facts supporting the opposite
inference. Plaintiff alleges that he had fully recovered before seeking reemployment, advanced
1
Defendant made the same argument as to Count I. But the Court need not address it because Count I is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See supra Part IV.A.
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through Yelp’s interview process, and had previously excelled in a similar sales role at Yelp, where
he received multiple promotions and consistently met sales expectations. See id. ¶¶ 4–7.
Plaintiff’s allegations are similar to those found sufficient in Epps v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2019). There, the plaintiff alleged that she previously held two
positions with the defendant and that the defendant had identified a new position for her. See Epps,
389 F. Supp. 3d 53 at 65. The court concluded that those allegations were sufficient at the motionto-dismiss stage to support an inference that the plaintiff was a qualified individual. See id.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was healthy, his prior employment with Yelp, his successful
performance in a similar role, and Yelp’s decision to advance him through multiple stages of the
hiring process support a reasonable inference that he was qualified for the Account Manager
position. See Compl. ¶¶ 4–7, 16; see, e.g., Epps, 389 F. Supp. 3d at 63–65. “The Court’s reluctance
to conclude that Plaintiff was not qualified for any position with Defendant[] at this stage in the
litigation is supported by the D.C. Circuit’s caution that a plaintiff ‘need not plead facts showing
each of [the] elements’ of a discrimination claim ‘in order to defeat a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).’”
Epps, 389 F. Supp. 3d at 65 (quoting Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 161–62 (D.C.
Cir. 2015)).
C. Retaliation
To state a retaliation claim under the ADA or the DCHRA, Plaintiff must plausibly allege
that he engaged in protected activity, suffered a materially adverse action, and that the adverse
action was taken because of the protected activity. See Jones v. District of Columbia, 314 F. Supp.
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3d 36, 55 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Bryant v. District of Columbia, 102 A.3d 264, 268 (D.C. 2014)
(noting that the analysis for DCHRA retaliation is the same as for the ADA).
Defendant moves to dismiss Count IV for failing to state a claim. See Mot. to Dismiss at
7. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a plausible inference
that Yelp declined to hire him in retaliation for protected activity. See id. Specifically, Defendant
contends that Plaintiff “provides no dates, context, or other detail that would allow the Court to
plausibly infer any causal connection between the alleged protected activity and adverse action.”
Id. To survive this argument, Plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim.
Although Rule 8 requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,” it does not require detailed factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Defendant is wrong. Plaintiff does more than simply allege that Yelp retaliated against him.
The Complaint alleges that Yelp was aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition because of his
requested accommodations. See Compl. ¶¶ 9–10. The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff
reapplied for employment after his recovery and interviewed for an Account Manager position.
See id. ¶¶ 16–17. During that interview, Plaintiff alleges that the interviewer focused extensively
on Plaintiff’s lung cancer and treatment history rather than Plaintiff’s qualifications and sales
experience. See id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff further alleges that when he asked about accommodations, the
interviewer expressed unfamiliarity and instead continued discussing Plaintiff’s medical history.
See id. Two days later, Yelp declined to hire Plaintiff. See id. ¶ 18.
These allegations provide sufficient factual context for Plaintiff’s retaliation theory. They
are not merely a conclusory assertion that Defendant acted with retaliatory motive. Indeed, “[i]t is
sufficient at this stage of the proceedings for a plaintiff to plead causation ‘simply by alleging that
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the adverse actions were caused by his protected activity.’” Bartlette v. Hyatt Regency, 208 F. Supp.
3d 311, 323 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 2010)).
Defendant’s reliance on Baker-Notter v. Freedom F., Inc. is misplaced. See Mot. to Dismiss
at 7 (citing No. 18-cv-2499, 2019 WL 4601726, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2019)). There, the
complaint alleged little more than that the defendant had “subjected [her] to retaliation” and that
there was “a causal relationship between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action.” Baker-Notter, 2019 WL 4601726, at *7. That is precisely the sort of formulaic recitation
of the elements that Twombly and Iqbal prohibit. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. The Complaint here contains considerably more. Rather than simply asserting that Yelp
retaliated against him, Plaintiff alleges the facts on which that assertion rests, including the
circumstances surrounding his accommodation requests, the substance of his subsequent interview,
and the timing of Yelp’s refusal to hire him. See Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, 16–18. These facts are sufficient
to plausibly state a retaliation claim. 2 See McNair v. District of Columbia, 213 F. Supp. 3d 81, 89–
90 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that at the motion to dismiss stage, an inference of causation can be
supported through facts establishing a specific retaliatory act and a close temporal proximity to the
protected activity); see also Cavalier v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 306 F. Supp. 3d 9, 38 (D.D.C. 2018)
(“At the motion to dismiss stage, the hurdle of alleging a causal link is not a high one.”). Thus,
Count IV survives Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
2
Plaintiff also alleges retaliation for his protected activity by “participating as a witness in a matter adverse to Yelp.” Compl. ¶¶ 31–32. This allegation is wholly conclusory. The Complaint contains no factual allegations describing the proceeding, the nature of Plaintiff’s participation, or any connection between that activity and Yelp’s hiring decision. Accordingly, that allegation does not independently support Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. See Baker-Notter, 2019 WL 4601726, at *7. However, this does not impact the Court’s holding because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not a vehicle for dismissing individual allegations or theories within an otherwise viable claim. See McDaniel v. Vilsack, 947 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 n.1 (D.D.C. 2013) (“In general, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is not an appropriate device to use to eliminate a portion of a claim.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss as to Count I. The Court DENIES the motion
to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV.
Zia Digitally signed by Zia
M.Faruqui
Date: August 28, 2026
M.Faruqui Date: 2026.08.28 18:31:57
-04'00'
ZIA M. FARUQUI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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