IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE :
:
v. : I.D. No.: 2408004105
:
ERIC BROWN, :
:
Defendant. :
ORDER
Submitted: June 2, 2026
Decided: August 28, 2026
On this 28th day of August, 2026, after considering Defendant Eric Brown’s
Motion for Postconviction Relief, Mr. Brown’s plea counsel’s affidavit, the State’s
opposition, the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, and the record in this
case, IT APPEARS THAT:
1. On April 16, 2025, Mr. Brown pled guilty to Carrying a Concealed
Deadly Weapon and Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substance – Fentanyl.1 The
Court sentenced Mr. Brown to two years of incarceration at Level V, followed by
probation.2 Mr. Brown did not file a direct appeal of his convictions.
1
D.I. 25 (Apr. 17, 2025).
2
Id.
1
2. Mr. Brown filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief on October
6, 2025.3 Mr. Brown asserts three grounds in support of postconviction relief. Mr.
Brown first challenges the legality of his arrest and subsequent search by police
officers.4 Second, Mr. Brown argues lack of probable cause to justify his arrest.5
Mr. Brown’s third ground asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
stemming from his representation during his guilty plea (“Plea Counsel”).6
3. Contemporaneous to his Motion for Postconviction Relief, Mr. Brown
filed a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel7 and a letter to the Court implying
his guilty plea resulted from coercion by Plea Counsel.8 On October 8, 2025, the
Court referred Mr. Brown’s matter to a Superior Court Commissioner pursuant to 10
Del. C. § 512(b) and Superior Court Criminal Rule 62.9 On October 9, 2025, the
Court denied Mr. Brown’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, finding Mr. Brown
failed to meet the criteria established by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(3).10
3
Mot. for Postconviction Relief, D.I. 28 (Oct. 6, 2025).
4
Id. at 4.
5
Id. at 4-5.
6
Id. at 6-9.
7
D.I. 29 (Oct. 6, 2025).
8
D.I. 30 (Oct. 6, 2025).
9
D.I. 31 (Oct. 8, 2025).
10
D.I. 32 (Oct. 9, 2025).
2
4. The Commissioner established a briefing schedule on October 10,
2025, requiring Plea Counsel submit an affidavit addressing Mr. Brown’s
contentions.11 As to Mr. Brown’s first two grounds for postconviction relief, Plea
Counsel averred he found “no legitimate basis to file a Motion to Suppress.”12 Plea
Counsel noted that Mr. Brown indicated a different attorney had advised Mr. Brown
a motion to suppress was likely to succeed, but that both Plea Counsel and his
supervisor disagreed with that analysis.13 Plea Counsel denied any coercion of Mr.
Brown, asserting he reviewed the evidence with Mr. Brown “on multiple
occasions.”14
5. The State filed its Response to Mr. Brown’s Motion for Postconviction
Relief on January 7, 2026.15 The State opposed Mr. Brown’s request for relief,
contending any motion to suppress would have been futile.16 The State further
argued Mr. Brown remained bound by the representations he made during his plea
colloquy with the Court.17 Mr. Brown did not file a Reply.
11
D.I. 33 (Oct. 10, 2025).
12
Plea Counsel’s Affidavit, D.I. 35, at 1-2 (Dec. 9, 2025).
13
Id. at 2.
14
Id. at 3.
15
State’s Resp., D.I. 36 (Jan. 7, 2026).
16
Id. at 6-7.
17
Id.
3
6. The Commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation (the
“Report”) on April 7, 2026.18 The Report found that Mr. Brown’s claims were
premised, at least in part, on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.19
Accordingly, the Report determined Mr. Brown’s claims were not procedurally
barred.20 As to the merits of his claims, the Report concluded, “it is abundantly clear
that [Mr.] Brown has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claims
that his attorney was ineffective.”21 The Report recommended the Court deny Mr.
Brown’s Motion for Postconviction Relief.22
7. Superior Court Criminal Rule 62(b) provides that any party “appealing
the findings of fact and recommendations of a Commissioner under subparagraph
(5) who fails to comply with the provisions of this rule may be subject to dismissal
of said motion for reconsideration or appeal.” Any objections to the Commissioner’s
proposed findings of fact and recommendations must be filed within 10 days of
18
The Report, D.I. 39 (Apr. 7, 2026).
19
Id. at 5.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 7.
22
Id. at 10.
4
Commissioner issuing her report.23 Mr. Brown has not filed any objections to the
Report, nor has he asked this Court to reconsider any of the Report’s findings.
8. When Mr. Brown entered his guilty plea, the Court conducted a guilty
plea colloquy with him.24 Mr. Brown affirmed he (1) understood the charges against
him; (2) understood the elements of those charges; (3) understood the evidence
against him; (4) understood whatever rights he maintained regarding suppression of
evidence; (5) had not been forced to enter his guilty plea; (6) had discussed the matter
fully with Plea Counsel; (6) was satisfied with Plea Counsel’s representation; and
(7) knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea because he was, in fact, guilty of
Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, a firearm, and Illegal Possession of a
Controlled Substance, Fentanyl.25 Mr. Brown remains bound by those answers.
9. The Court’s review of Mr. Brown’s Motion for Postconviction Relief
reveals Mr. Brown seeks to litigate the sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence
against him. By entering a guilty plea, Mr. Brown waived his right to contest the
evidence against him. As to Mr. Brown’s allegations against Plea Counsel, Mr.
Brown appears dissatisfied that his original attorney was removed from his case
23
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(ii).
24
Tr. of Mr. Brown’s Guilty Plea, D.I. 37 (Apr. 16, 2025).
25
Id. at 9-18.
5
when she relocated to a different county.26 The Court adopts the Report’s finding of
fact that Mr. Brown’s assertions regarding any deficiency in Plea Counsel’s conduct
lack credibility.
10. Based upon Mr. Brown’s filings, it appears Plea Counsel advised Mr.
Brown to accept a guilty plea because Mr. Brown faced a significant minimum
mandatory sentence had he proceeded to trial and been unsuccessful. 27 Mr. Brown
may regret taking that advice, but Mr. Brown has failed to show Plea Counsel’s
conduct fell to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel established by Strickland
v. Washington.28 Further, Mr. Brown has not demonstrated that, but for Plea
Counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, Mr. Brown would not have entered his
guilty plea.29
NOW, THEREFORE, after a de novo review of the record in this action, and
consideration of the parties’ arguments and the Commissioner’s Report dated April
7, 2026;
26
Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 7.
27
D.I. 30 at 1.
28
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29
See Sommerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (“In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires a defendant to show that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”) (internal quotations omitted).
6
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation is Adopted by this Court. Mr. Brown failed to file any objections
to the Commissioner’s Report within the ten-day window outlined by Superior Court
Criminal Rule 62. As such, Mr. Brown waives any objections to the Report. Mr.
Brown has failed to establish Plea Counsel’s performance was deficient, or, that, but
for Plea Counsel’s conduct, Mr. Brown would have insisted on going to trial. Mr.
Brown’s Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Rule 61 is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
7