[Cite as A.H. v. N.H., 2026-Ohio-3375.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
A.H. Court of Appeals No. {87}WD-25-065
Appellee Trial Court No. 2025 DV 0103
v.
N.H. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: August 28, 2026
*****
Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.
*****
SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant N.H. appeals the judgment of the Wood County Court of
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, which entered a domestic violence civil
protection order against him. The petitioner, A.H., has not filed an appellate brief. For
the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On September 8, 2025, appellee A.H. petitioned the trial court for a
domestic violence civil protection order against N.H. The trial court entered an ex parte
order on that date and set the matter for a full hearing on September 23, 2025.
{¶ 3} The following evidence and testimony were presented at the hearing.
{¶ 4} A.H.’s mother, K.H., testified that she has known N.H. for approximately 18
months. She stated that A.H. was a traveling nurse who resided with N.H. in Texas and
later had a baby with him. She described that A.H. was happy initially, but the first
indication of a problem occurred in September 2024. At that time, A.H. and N.H. had
just moved into a house together. They had an argument and N.H. made her leave the
house at 11:30 at night, when A.H was eight and one-half months pregnant. She was not
allowed back inside the home.
{¶ 5} The next month, the child G.H. was born. In the lead-up to the birth, K.H.
noticed little things like A.H. was not permitted to choose the car seat that she wanted for
the child; everything had to be the same as what N.H. had done with his other two
children. At the time of the birth, K.H. was still traveling, and she arrived at the hospital
approximately six hours later. When she arrived, N.H. was asleep on the couch. He then
woke up and left the room. K.H. asked her daughter, who had just had an emergency csection, if N.H. was bipolar, and A.H. admitted that he was and that he had stopped
taking some of his medication.
{¶ 6} K.H. described that in the two weeks after G.H. was born, N.H. was in a
manic phase. He would sleep all day and offered no help with the baby. She described
that he would send text messages to A.H. even though they were in the same house. K.H.
stated that A.H. was “terrified to be alone,” and they had to lock the bedroom door “so he
wouldn’t take the baby or hurt my daughter.” K.H. took A.H. and the baby to a hotel, but
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the next day, A.H. returned to N.H. After K.H. flew home, A.H. reported that N.H. had
set up an appointment and started taking his medication again.
{¶ 7} K.H. testified that she went to Texas every six to eight weeks to visit her
daughter. During that time, she “watched [her] daughter go from a strong independent
fearless woman to one that was terrified to even have a different opinion.” She said
A.H.’s mental health suffered and she noticed A.H. losing more and more weight.
{¶ 8} After an interlude following the death of her father, K.H. returned to Texas
to visit A.H. in August 2025. She recalled that she was “petrified” for A.H.’s physical
health. She described that A.H. “cowered” when N.H. walked into the room, and she
“jumped” if he opened a door. A.H. disclosed to her that N.H. threatened to take G.H.
from her if she did not do what he wanted sexually or otherwise. K.H. testified that N.H.
“used anything that he could to scare her into staying. He would use closed fists. He had
loaded guns in the house that were not locked up.”
{¶ 9} On August 18, 2025, K.H. awoke to A.H. and N.H. engaging in a verbal
argument having something to do with a haircut for G.H. She stated that N.H. “was
totally losing his shit.” It was 6:00 a.m. and N.H. forced his two-year-old daughter into
clothes and said that he was going to drop A.H. off at the police station. He would not
tell K.H. why he was going to take her to the police station. He took his other two
children and left the house and told A.H. to get out. When he returned later, he locked
himself in a bedroom and told A.H. she had six hours to get out of the house. K.H.
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helped A.H. pack and they went to a hotel. K.H. later took A.H. and G.H. back to her
home in Wood County, Ohio.
{¶ 10} K.H. testified that N.H. came to Ohio in September 2025. She said this
invaded their “safe place.” She said N.H. “blew up [her] phone” and came to her work.
K.H. called the police. She testified that they “can’t even keep our windows open”
because A.H. is “that terrified that [N.H.]’s going to hurt her and take that baby and do
exactly what he said he was going to do.”
{¶ 11} K.H. also recounted a time when she was in Texas in August 2025 that
N.H. touched her inappropriately. She later learned from A.H. that N.H. would tell her
about sexual fantasies that he had about K.H.
{¶ 12} Finally, K.H. testified that A.H. is a different person now: “She jumps.
You walk in a room, and she jumps. She’s scared to take a walk with her baby. He
broke her. My carefree girl is gone. She’s scared. Like she’s scared. I’ve never seen
her this way.”
{¶ 13} N.H.’s ex-wife, Ga.H., testified next. Ga.H. stated that she was married to
N.H. for over three years and they had two children together, ages five and two. They
were divorced in April 2024. She explained that her divorce started when she obtained a
temporary protective order in Texas against N.H. based on threats of violence against her.
Specifically, she described that N.H. would intentionally bump her with his shoulder
when they passed in the hall even where there was plenty of room for them to both walk.
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He also physically stood in front of a door trying to prevent Ga.H. from going to the gym
with her mother.
{¶ 14} Ga.H. also recalled two events that she did not include in her application
for the protection order. In 2022, N.H. had multiple guns on him and threatened that if
Ga.H. called the cops he would shoot her. Then, in April 2023, in front of their kids,
N.H. threatened to slit Ga.H.’s throat.
{¶ 15} On August 22, 2025, Ga.H. sought a temporary restraining order and a
request for extraordinary relief in her custody case against N.H. based on the incident that
occurred between N.H. and A.H. on the morning of August 18, 2025. A.H. submitted an
affidavit in support of Ga.H.’s petition. A hearing on the custody matter occurred on
September 18, 2025, in Johnson County, Texas, five days before the present domestic
violence civil protection order hearing. A.H. testified in person. Following that hearing,
the Texas court modified Ga.H.’s and N.H.’s custody rights such that Ga.H. now has full
custody of their children and N.H. has four hours of supervised visitation per week.
{¶ 16} Ga.H. also generally described her relationship with N.H. as “walking on
egg shells trying to keep things, keep the peace.” She stated that over time it calmed and
she has just tried to keep the peace as best as she could, but whenever she is in N.H.’s
presence she feels “a little anxious or on edge or the walking on egg shells feeling.”
{¶ 17} A.H. also testified. She stated that she filed her petition for a domestic
violence civil protection order based on events that occurred in Ohio, but that also
“triggered things with [her] back to Texas.” Specifically, she cited “the flooding of text
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messages,” numbering around 40, which she described as “apologetic” and “apathetic”
towards her. She also cited the fact that he bought a plane ticket and flew to Ohio. She
was scared that N.H. would show up at her place of residence and take her son. Notably,
A.H. also testified that shortly after she arrived in Ohio, she filed for emergency custody
of G.H. in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.
{¶ 18} In addition, A.H. described that she felt unsafe around N.H. She alleged
prior “sexual abuse” where he would use threats to take their son away as a bargaining
chip to compel her to “comply with his needs sexually, financially.” He has kicked her
out of the home. She alleged that he had also locked her in a room, explaining that after
arguments he would close the door behind him and lock the door, blocking her ability to
leave. Further, she stated that N.H. has expressed his sexual fantasies involving K.H. to
her, and he has “mirrored me as a young 14-year-old girl while we were having sex.”
A.H. said that she was “very scared” not to do what he has asked because he has “stepped
up to me before,” and “there’s a reason that I jump every time he walked in a room.”
{¶ 19} When asked if she “ever felt threatened that he was going to hit [her] or
intimidate [her],” A.H. responded, “Intimidate me, yes.” She described that N.H. will go
into moments of “not really understanding where his thoughts are.” In those moments,
A.H. does not try to reason with him or stand up for herself, because when she does “he
stands up to me, his fists closed, and his eyes get dark . . . [a]nd his whole body tenses.”
She stated that any danger she is in puts G.H. at risk as well.
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{¶ 20} A.H. also discussed N.H.’s behavior towards his other two children. She
admitted that she has not seen N.H. inflict violence or harm on the children, but she
offered that he “has certainly neglected basic care needs for the children.” She further
testified that N.H. has emotionally harmed the children, identifying the August 18, 2025
incident. She explained that the two-year-old was drug around the house to get ready
quickly when she should have been spending the day with K.H. She also described that
while she was in the car buckling the children into their car seats, N.H. was in the house
telling K.H. to get A.H. out of the car or he was going to drop her off at the police station.
A.H. said that the two-year-old looked at her and said she was scared. A.H. also testified
that the five-year-old “has seen too much,” meaning he has seen A.H. and N.H. argue.
{¶ 21} Finally, A.H. submitted two sets of text messages between her and N.H. In
the first set, which were sent on May 4, 2025, N.H. stated,
You have been disrespectful, unappreciative, and have taken
advantage of me for far too long. You have shown no interest in meeting
my needs, knowing my problems, or improving our relationship. You have
lied about our sex life time and time again and have been controlling and
hypocritical. After what you just said I feel you have been emotionally
unfaithful and are only trying to cover for it. Your selfish ways have once
again driven me to a place where I feel unseen, unheard, and alone. That’s
what’s wrong
You have no idea what I want, or what I want to hear. That is no
excuse for your words, actions, and behavior towards me.
Your constant jumping in fear every time I walk in the room has
crushed me, and for some reason I am ashamed to admit that it has
triggered horrible feelings and memories for me. I am having nightmares
about you every night, along with the ones I already have to face every
night and the morning after.
I sit here every day alone with only you to talk to. I don’t dare talk
to anyone else or even like anybody’s posts on Facebook because I know
the consequences of doing so and it’s just not worth it.
7.
And when anything is brought up, it’s all invalidated by you because
I said some curse words.
How can you so blatantly mislead me and apparently only tell me
what you think I want to hear and expect me to have any kind of trust in
you.
I deserve better than this.
Your apathy is heartbreaking. You’ve lost me.
(Emphasis added.) A.H. used these messages to show that she was “jumping in fear” as
far back as May 2025.
{¶ 22} The second set of messages was sent on September 7, 2025. A.H. told
N.H. that “the amount of texting and showing up unannounced is scaring me. Please
respect my need for space. I’ll continue to keep you updated on [G.H.], but beyond that I
need less communication right now.” N.H. responded,
Well that’s not fair [A.H.]. I didn’t show up anywhere, I was in
Toledo. I told you where I was going to be and offered to see you and
[G.H.]. I respected your space and didn’t go anywhere near you. You sent
mixed signals that I misinterpreted. I wanted to give us a chance to work
things out because I believed in what we had.
Look, I see what you’re trying to do, and this is dumb. You have
never been scared of me in any way, shape, or form and nobody is going to
believe that. I’m not going to stoop to that level though. You’re an
amazing mother and I would never lie about that. And up until the past 3
weeks, we’ve a (sic) great relationship full of love and kindness. While I
will never understand how you could tell the disgusting lies you did in the
affidavit, I tried to give you the benefit of the doubt because I have
compassion for your mental health struggles. I never imagined that you
were capable of such evil, but you’re the one who has to live with yourself
for the rest of your life.
I will fight for [G.H.], but I would never try to keep him away from
you because he needs you. Your obsession with turning this into a battle
helps nobody. [The kids] don’t deserve this. I will continue to do
everything I can to make sure they are being put first. While I think that
you’re also capable of that, you are failing them right now.
Here’s the reality of the situation. I’ve already made sure [my other
two children] will soon be out of the hell you’ve put them in. I did
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everything in my power to have a peaceful resolution with you for the sake
of [G.H.], but you’re making it impossible. When I establish jurisdiction
for [G.H.], he’s coming right back home to Texas where he belongs.
Unlike you however, I’m going to make sure he has both of his parents in
his life because that’s what he needs. None of this works like you think it
does. You need to get your head out of your ass and stop playing games
with the lives of the kids. They aren’t tools you can use for your scheming.
You should be ashamed of yourself.
I haven’t received a single update on [G.H.] since you disappeared
with him almost a month ago despite me asking several times. I will
continue to ask for updates as I see necessary.
I appreciate you giving me the closure I asked for. Let me know
when you want to start co-parenting.
N.H. then sent a screenshot of a conversation he had with K.H.:
(N.H.:) Hi [K.H.], I wanted to reach out to you to ask
something. I know [A.H.] needs space—I want to respect that and give her
the time she needs. Would you be willing to talk at some point so we’re
not stuck in this no-contact phase?
I love and miss all of you dearly. Hope to hear from you soon.
(K.H.:) Hi [N.H.] I really don’t want to be in this process
between you two. I simply am providing a safe place and helping with
financial care for your son and my daughter while you both figure this out,
she is making all her own choices and decisions. I am positive she will
continue to update you.
(N.H.:) I respect that, [K.H.]. I appreciate you being there for
them. Thank you for taking the time to reply.
The screenshot was followed by a message to A.H. in which he stated, “For your own
sake, be careful taking advice from people who bear none of the consequences.
Especially when you’re the smartest person in the room.” A.H. testified that she felt
threatened by the text messages because N.H. was “trying to flatter me but also trying to
manipulate me away from my own family, the people that took [G.H.] and I in when we
had nowhere to go. He’s tried to turn her against me, turn me against her.”
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{¶ 23} Following A.H.’s testimony, she rested.
{¶ 24} N.H. then testified. He stated that the previous testimony has “largely been
a character assassination and allegations against [him] with no evidence to support them.”
He believed that his previous relationship with Ga.H. and the custody proceedings in
Texas were not relevant to the question of whether he posed a danger to A.H., G.H., and
K.H. He further suggested that in the Texas case he presented an entirely different set of
facts than those from Ga.H.
{¶ 25} In support of his argument, N.H. submitted additional text messages
between himself and A.H. and K.H. in August and September 2025, which he claimed
showed that there were never any threats of violence.
{¶ 26} The August 2025 text messages between N.H. and A.H. largely concerned
the logistics of paying their rent, ending their lease, and paying for appliances following
their split. The discussion was civil and respectful. N.H. expressed that she and G.H.
still had his support, and he was asking for communication and clarity since they had to
co-parent G.H. He stated that he was willing to give A.H. “space,” but he would like to
talk about G.H.
{¶ 27} In the text messages to A.H. that were sent September 5 through 7, 2025—
covering the time that he flew to Ohio and returned to Texas—N.H. expressed his love
for her and his desire to talk to her and work through the issues they were having. He
apologized for what he said, presumably on August 18, 2025, and stated that he deeply
regretted hurting A.H., but he “did not mean any of it.” At all times, his tone was
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apologetic, conciliatory, and hopeful that the relationship could be repaired. He
referenced a playlist to which A.H. was adding songs about their relationship. He
interpreted the songs as an indication that A.H. was still invested in the relationship, and
he expressed dismay that she was no longer communicating with him. While he was in
Ohio, N.H. shared his location with her through his phone and said that he would not go
to K.H.’s house unless he was invited.
{¶ 28} Before he left to go back to Texas, N.H. messaged that he did not regret
flying to Ohio to fight for their relationship. He offered to go for a walk or get coffee,
which, like all the other messages, went unanswered. He then expressed some of his
feelings for her. In so doing he recognized that she was “deeply hurt and felt alone
because of the things [he] said.” He hoped that she could forgive him. He also
acknowledged to A.H. that before their fight “I wasn’t giving you the support you
deserved. I see all the ways I was wrong and I’m putting in a lot of work to make sure
you always get the best version of me.” N.H. ended his messages by telling A.H. to let
him know if she needed anything for G.H. and requesting some updates and pictures of
their child.
{¶ 29} After these messages, on September 7, 2025, and after N.H. had returned to
Texas, A.H. sent the message to him that “the amount of texting and showing up
unannounced is scaring me.”
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{¶ 30} Finally, in the messages to K.H. that were sent on September 5, 2025,
before his flight, N.H. indicated his concern for A.H. and his desire to open lines of
communication to begin to repair the relationship. He offered that if he was not wanted,
he would not fly to Ohio. K.H. responded that she would speak to A.H. about it, and she
gave an update and sent a picture of G.H. N.H. did not receive any other messages
before his flight. In his other messages, N.H. expressed his gratefulness that K.H. was
helping to take care of A.H. and G.H. He again mentioned his desire to reconcile and
professed his love for A.H. He also apologized for what he said “that morning,” but
wanted K.H. to know that “I did not mean one word that came out of my mouth. I hold
myself accountable for my mistakes and hope that one day [A.H.] will see that.” He
entreated K.H. to listen to him and judge for herself before she dismissed him.
{¶ 31} Following the hearing, the trial court entered a domestic violence civil
protection order lasting three years. The order is “subject to any custody orders issued
from a court of competent jurisdiction.” Notably, in entering the order, the trial court
found that A.H. was a resident of Wood County, Ohio.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 32} N.H. timely appeals the judgment entering the domestic violence civil
protection order, asserting two assignments of error for review:
1. The trial court committed reversible error when it found that
Appellee was a resident of Wood County, Ohio based on the residential
history of the parties, and the facts of the case, in which case it arguably did
not have jurisdiction to grant the DVCPO.
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2. In the alternative, the trial court’s grant of a Civil Protection Order
in favor of appellee and the minor child pursuant to R.C. 3113.31 was not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
III. Analysis
{¶ 33} In his first assignment of error, N.H. argues the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to grant the domestic violence civil protection order because neither he nor
A.H. were residents of the state of Ohio. Notably, although N.H. does not specify that he
is contesting the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, his arguments pertain to that
issue.1
{¶ 34} Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that
is reviewed de novo. Adamski v. Adamski, 2022-Ohio-32, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing Cirino
v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2018-Ohio-2665, ¶ 17.
{¶ 35} “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power
of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case, . . . and a court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in
a particular case.” (Internal quotations omitted for readability.) Ostanek v. Ostanek,
2021-Ohio-2319, ¶ 21, quoting Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-5220, ¶ 14.
1
Furthermore, although not directly raised by N.H., this court notes that N.H. did not object to the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. He has therefore waived the issue. See 84 Lumber Co., L.P. v. Houser, 2010-Ohio-3683, ¶ 18-19 (11th Dist.) (Out-of-state defendant waived defense of lack of personal jurisdiction where he did not raise the issue, appeared before the court, and actively participated in the case).
13.
{¶ 36} “‘Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution grants exclusive
authority to the General Assembly to allocate certain subject matters to the exclusive
original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the courts of common pleas.’” Adamski at ¶
20, quoting State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 24. “To that end, R.C. 3113.31 vests the
domestic relations division of the court of common pleas (among others) with
‘jurisdiction over all proceedings under this section,’ including civil protection orders.”
Id., quoting R.C. 3113.31(A)(2) and (B).
{¶ 37} This court has recognized that “[t]here is a ‘territorial limitation with
respect to civil protection orders.’” Id. at ¶ 21, quoting M.W. v. D.M., 2018-Ohio-392, ¶
12 (8th Dist.). “Thus, ‘when a petitioner seeks a civil protection order from a common
pleas court in a county in which [s]he does not reside, the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.’” Id., quoting Vilk v. Dinardo, 2016-Ohio-5245, ¶ 12 (8th
Dist.). But see Hernandez v. Hamdy, 2024-Ohio-4754, ¶ 12-25 (11th Dist.) (holding that
R.C. 3113.31 does not “specify a requirement to file in a specific county in the case of an
adult respondent,” and thus trial court did not lack jurisdiction over a petition for a
domestic violence civil protection order that was filed in a county different from the
petitioner’s county of residence). Here, N.H. argues that A.H. was not a “resident” of
Wood County, Ohio, and therefore the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
enter the domestic violence civil protection order.
14.
{¶ 38} “Resident,” at least as it is used for establishing proper jurisdiction and
venue in divorce actions under R.C. Chapter 3105, “means one who possesses a
domiciliary residence, a residence accompanied by an intention to make the state of Ohio
a permanent home.” (Emphasis sic.) Barth v. Barth, 2007-Ohio-973, ¶ 12, quoting
Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St.2d 155, 162 (1972). While “[a] trial court’s decision as
to whether it has jurisdiction is a legal determination, which is reviewed on appeal de
novo; its weighing of the evidence as to a party’s intent to establish a domiciliary
residence in the state is a factual question, which we review for an abuse of discretion.”
Botello v. Gonzalez, 2025-Ohio-1390, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.); see also Mullinix v. Mullinix,
2023-Ohio-1053, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.) (“Ohio appellate courts have specifically held that the
question of a party’s residence and/or domicile presents a question of fact.”). An abuse
of discretion connotes that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 39} N.H. argues that there were no facts elicited at the hearing that would
support a finding of residency in Wood County, Ohio. Specifically, he identifies that
there was no testimony about A.H.’s living expenses, employment, vehicle registration,
or any other facts surrounding everyday living that would demonstrate her intent to
establish a domiciliary residence in Ohio.
{¶ 40} Upon review, the trial court’s finding that A.H. resided in Wood County,
Ohio, was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. The testimony revealed that
N.H. told her to leave their home in Texas. A.H. returned to Ohio with G.H. and began
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living with her mother. The record contains no evidence that she desired to return to
Texas. Further, shortly after her arrival in Ohio, A.H. sought an emergency custody
determination for G.H. from the Wood County Juvenile Court, which suggests an intent
to remain in Ohio permanently. From this evidence, this court cannot hold that the trial
court’s finding of residency was an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 41} Accordingly, N.H.’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 42} In his second assignment of error, N.H. argues that the record does not
support the trial court’s entry of a domestic violence civil protection order.
{¶ 43} “To be entitled to a protection order under R.C. 3113.31, a petitioner must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has committed domestic
violence, as defined in R.C. 3113.31(A)(1), against a person with whom he has or had a
family, household, or dating relationship, as defined in R.C. 3113.31(A)(3), (8), or (9).”
K.H. v. P.M., 2025-Ohio-263, ¶ 74 (6th Dist.), citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34
(1997), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 44} The trial court’s decision to issue a domestic violence civil protection order
is reviewed under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Id. at ¶ 78. “In a
manifest-weight review, we weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trial court clearly lost its way
in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the trial court’s judgment must be reversed.” Id., citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20; see also State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 26. “We will not reverse the
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trial court’s decision if it is supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all
the essential elements of the case.” Id., citing Edwards v. Reser, 2007-Ohio-6520, ¶ 25
(6th Dist.), citing C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978),
syllabus.
{¶ 45} Here, N.H. argues that the evidence does not show that he committed
domestic violence against A.H. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a) defines “domestic violence” as:
(i) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury;
(ii) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent
serious physical harm or committing a violation of section 2903.211 or
2911.211 of the Revised Code;
(iii) Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in
the child being an abused child, as defined in section 2151.031 of the
Revised Code;
(iv) Committing a sexually oriented offense.
{¶ 46} R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(ii) includes a violation of menacing by stalking
under R.C. 2903.211 in the definition of domestic violence. R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)
provides that “[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause
another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or
a family or household member of the other person or cause mental distress to the other
person or a family or household member of the other person.” As used in that section and
relevant here, “pattern of conduct” means “two or more actions or incidents closely
related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those
actions or incidents.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). Further, a person acts “knowingly” when,
“regardless of purpose, . . . the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably
cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). “Intent
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is not required; only an awareness of the probable consequences of one’s actions is
required.” State v. Crawl, 2025-Ohio-2799, ¶ 17.
{¶ 47} N.H. maintains that while A.H. evidently found his behavior disturbing or
concerning, nothing in the record suggests that he caused or attempted to cause bodily
injury to her or G.H. Nor did he threaten to use force, thereby placing A.H. in fear of
imminent serious physical harm. Furthermore, N.H. suggests that A.H. filed the petition
as a way of controlling his access to G.H. following the juvenile court’s denial of her
emergency motion for custody that she filed shortly after arriving in Ohio.
{¶ 48} Having reviewed the record, this court cannot say that the trial court clearly
lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice when it entered the domestic
violence civil protection order. In conducting a manifest-weight review, this court “must
give deference to fact-finders.” Reillo at ¶ 32. This is because “the factfinder, ‘as the
trier of fact, is in the best position to determine the weight and credibility of the evidence,
including inconsistencies, along with witness manner and demeanor, and is in the sole
position to believe or disbelieve all or any of the testimony presented at trial.’” Id.,
quoting State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2424, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 49} In this case, K.H. and A.H. testified that A.H. was afraid or terrified of
N.H. After their fight on the morning of August 18, 2025, N.H. kicked her and his infant
son out of his home and threatened to take A.H. to the police station. In addition, A.H.
described that N.H. would previously “step up” to her with his eyes darkened and his fists
clenched. She stated that she would “jump” when he entered the room, and she recalled a
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time that he locked her into a room after an argument. Her professed fear was consistent
with the testimony of Ga.H., who detailed instances where N.H. threatened to shoot her
and slit her throat, and who stated that she continued to walk on eggshells when she was
around him.
{¶ 50} This court recognizes that A.H. has not alleged any instances of actual
physical violence directed towards her, G.H., or N.H.’s other two children. This court
also recognizes that N.H.’s text message conversations do not contain any threats of
violence or incendiary rhetoric. Nevertheless, some testimony exists that N.H. put
himself in a posture that caused A.H. to fear imminent physical harm, which would
constitute domestic violence under the first part of R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(ii). Further,
some evidence exists that following their explosive breakup he committed a violation of
the menacing by stalking statute when he engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused
A.H. to fear physical harm, which would constitute domestic violence under the second
part of R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(ii). Specifically, considering their previous argument and
his awareness that A.H. jumped when he entered the room, the evidence could support
that he knew his conduct would cause her to fear physical harm when he sent numerous
unrequited text messages and then flew to Ohio. Consequently, given the deferential
standard of review, this court holds that the trial court’s entry of the domestic violence
civil protection order is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 51} Accordingly, N.H.’s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
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IV. Conclusion
{¶ 52} For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Wood County Court of
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed. N.H. is ordered to pay the
costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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