United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1426
CITATION INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Peter T. Damore,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
BROAN-NUTONE LLC; JAKEL MOTORS INCORPORATED,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Margaret R. Guzman, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Lipez and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
Mark E. Utke, with whom Cozen O'Connor, Patrick J.
Loftus, III, Katherine C. Loftus, and Loftus and Loftus, P.C. were on brief, for appellant.
Christopher A. Duggan, with whom Andrew D. Black and Smith
Duggan Cornell & Gollub LLP were on brief, for appellees.
August 28, 2026
BARRON, Chief Judge. This appeal arises from a lawsuit
that Citation Insurance Company ("Citation") has brought against
Broan-NuTone LLC ("Broan") and Jakel Motors Incorporated ("Jakel")
(together, the "defendants"). Citation is suing as the subrogee
of its insured, a Massachusetts homeowner whose home was damaged
in a fire. The suit alleges that the defendants, the manufacturers
of a bathroom exhaust fan and fan motor in that home, are liable
for that fire under Massachusetts law. The District Court granted
summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.
I.1
A.
On September 15, 2020, a fire broke out at Peter
Damore's home in Burlington, Massachusetts. Damore was at his
home that day, as was a Verizon technician who was working in the
basement to upgrade the home's Wi-Fi system. Sometime after the
Verizon technician arrived that morning and began working, he
informed Damore that a fuse on the circuit breaker panel in the
basement tripped when he tried to use it. Shortly thereafter,
smoke detectors began to go off on one of the upper floors of the
home, and Damore hurried upstairs to investigate. Upon opening
1 "We draw the facts from the summary judgment record that
was before the [D]istrict [C]ourt, and we array [those facts] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." O'Horo v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 131 F.4th 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation
modified).
- 2 -the stairway to the attic, Damore discovered heavy smoke and heard
the crackling of a fire. He and the Verizon technician vacated
the home, and Damore called 911.
The Burlington Fire Department responded and determined
that the main fire was located in the ceiling of the master
bathroom, above the bathroom ceiling fan. A lieutenant observed
"a heavy glow of fire around the metal ceiling fan and darkened
drywall on [the] ceiling next to that glow." After extinguishing
the fire, the Fire Department prepared an incident report, which
documented findings of "obvious charring in [the] area of [the]
ceiling fan, roof joists and rafters immediately above the
[bathroom ceiling] fan," as well as "a lot of charring of [the]
plywood floor above [the] fan." The report recounted the
determination of a trooper that the "fire started with [the]
bathroom vent fan," was "accidental," and had "no connection to
Verizon working on [the] scene."
Damore thereafter submitted an insurance claim pursuant
to his policy with Citation. In response, Citation made
approximately $726,000 in payments to Damore in connection with
damage sustained as a result of the fire.
B.
Citation, as Damore's subrogee, filed suit against the
defendants in federal district court in the District of
Massachusetts based on diversity jurisdiction. Its complaint
- 3 -alleged that the fire in the Damore residence "originated at or
around a defective bathroom exhaust fan manufactured and placed
into the stream of commerce by Broan." It further alleged that
the fire was "caused by the catastrophic failure of [the fan's]
electric motor," which was "designed, manufactured[,] and sold by
Jakel."
As relevant here, the Jakel motor in the Broan fan
contained a thermal cutoff device ("TCO") manufactured by Tamura.2
As the District Court explained, a TCO "is a thermal fuse that is
supposed to melt open when [a] [m]otor reaches a certain
unacceptable temperature," thereby causing power to the motor to
be cut off so that it does not become too hot and ignite a fire.
Citation Ins. Co. v. Broan-NuTone LLC, 793 F. Supp. 3d 299, 303-04
(D. Mass. 2025).
As relevant to this appeal, Citation's complaint set
forth claims against both defendants for negligence and breach of
implied warranty of merchantability.3 As relief, Citation sought
"damages sustained as a direct and proximate cause of the" fire,
as well as "interests and costs."
2 Tamura is not a party in this case.
3 Citation also asserted a claim for breach of implied
warranty in tort. The parties and the District Court treated Citation's implied warranty claims as the same. Neither party argues on appeal that the two claims should be considered
differently, so we follow suit.
- 4 -1.
Citation designated two experts in support of its
claims: Stephen M. Harris, a fire analyst; and Michael Wald, an
electrical engineer.
Harris submitted an expert report stating that the fire
originated at "the mounting position for the master bathroom air
exhaust fan." The report included Harris's opinion "that the fire
originated within the exhaust fan[,] as there [were] no other
competent ignition source(s)" at the location of the fire's origin.
The report did not identify "the specific failure mode within the
exhaust fan."
Wald also submitted an expert report. Because that
report is central to the present dispute, we describe it in some
detail.
In his report, Wald began by detailing his observations
from an examination of the fan (completed jointly with Broan's
representatives), which included the following:
▪ "The fire damage patterns . . .
demonstrate[d] a fire originating at the
fan and then spreading up and out into
the attic."
▪ "Examination of the fan motor coil
revealed two distinct areas of localized
damage to the coil windings." (Citation
omitted.)
▪ "Examination of the [TCO] revealed that
the internal element had melted open and
one of the leads had separated from the
- 5 -body of the device. This supports the
conclusion that this device was exposed
to temperatures well beyond its rating at
some point during the event."
Wald then opined, in relevant part, as follows:
▪ "The damage on the fan motor coil is
quite clearly the result of abnormal
electrical activity (arcing)."
▪ "The presence of electrical activity on
the motor coil, but nowhere else in the
fan supply wiring, not only confirms that
the fan was energized at the time of the
fire but also precludes any damage inside
the fan from having been caused by
external fire attack. . . . Thus, the
possibility of a fire originating at any
other wiring [in the attic] can be
eliminated."
▪ "[T]he short amount of time between when
the breaker was being operated [by the
Verizon technician] and the detection of
the fire precludes the resetting of the
breaker from having been associated with
causing the fire."
▪ "The root cause of these failures is
deficiencies in the design and
manufacture of [Broan fans equipped with
Jakel motors and Tamura TCOs] such that
the motor coil can be subjected to
temperatures which damage the insulation
on the coil windings. Once this occurs
there is an unintended flow of
electricity from one winding to adjacent
windings . . . . and eventually arcing
failures develop."
▪ "There is no evidence that this fan was
improperly installed, improperly
maintained, or modified since it was
purchased. It was being used in its
originally intended manner. Thus, it is
concluded that this fan was in a
- 6 -deficient condition when it left the
hands of the manufacturer."
Finally, Wald's expert report additionally stated:
▪ "The propensity of Broan fans equipped
with Jakel motors and Tamura [TCOs] to
start fires is well known and discussed
in several papers on the subject . . . .
This investigator has examined dozens of
fans that have caused fires which have
th[e] same damage pattern [as the fan
here]."
▪ "While the installation of a [TCO] can
often detect an overheating event before
it develops into winding failures, the
Tamura [TCO] is known to be particularly
unreliable. Testing performed by others
has demonstrated the inability of this
device to remove power from overheating
windings. Moreover, as noted above, this
investigator has seen numerous
real-world examples of Tamura [TCOs]
failing to prevent coil winding
failures."
The defendants deposed Wald. At that deposition, Wald
described three specific deficiencies that have been documented to
occur in TCOs, including: (1) degradation of the TCO as a result
of exposure to the fan's normal operating temperature; (2) a
failure that allows TCOs to continue conducting electricity even
after they have melted open; and (3) improper bending of the TCO
lead wire during installation. As to the fan in question, Wald
testified that the TCO lead wire had "been bent in violation of
the [TCO] instructions," but that he "could not tell after the
fire" whether the bend had caused specific further damage likely
- 7 -to lead the TCO to fail. He further stated, "I don't know why the
TCO failed. I just know it did."
Wald also testified that numerous alternative designs
would, in his view, improve fan reliability and/or reduce the risk
of fire, including: encasing the fan motor in metal, using
noncombustible or fire-resistant plastics, or installing a
mechanical TCO or multiple TCOs. As to those alternatives,
however, he stated that he did not know how much they would cost
or what specific modifications to the subject fan's design would
be necessary to accommodate them.
2.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The
motion argued that Citation had not introduced sufficient expert
evidence to prevail on its implied warranty claims under either
(1) a manufacturing defect theory or (2) a design defect theory.
As to Citation's implied warranty claims insofar as they
were based on a manufacturing defect theory, the defendants pointed
to Wald's deposition testimony stating that he could not opine as
to the specific TCO defect that caused the fire. They argued that
the absence of expert evidence on that score was fatal to a
manufacturing-defect-based implied warranty claim. See Fernandes
v. Union Bookbinding Co., 507 N.E.2d 728, 735 (Mass. 1987) ("In
order to invoke the implied warranty of merchantability under
[Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106,] § 2-314, a plaintiff must
- 8 -demonstrate that the damages complained of were proximately caused
by a defect or breach which existed at the time of the sale.").
As to Citation's implied warranty claims insofar as they
were based on a design defect theory, the defendants argued that
Citation also could not prevail. Here, they pointed to the fact
that Wald had testified that he was not aware of the costs or
ramifications of adopting the alternative designs he had
identified. See Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 990 N.E.2d 997,
1024 (Mass. 2013) ("In claims alleging . . . a design defect in
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the plaintiff
must show an available design modification which would reduce the
risk without undue cost or interference with the performance of
the product . . . ." (citation modified)).4
Citation opposed the defendants' summary judgment
motion. First, as to its evidentiary burden under a
manufacturing-defect-based theory of its claims, Citation argued
that Massachusetts courts do not require plaintiffs to identify
"the exact" cause of an accident so long as "they can rule out
other potential causes." (Quoting Collins v. Sears, Roebuck &
4 The defendants argued that the negligence claims similarly
failed because Citation failed to show (1) that a defect caused the fire or (2) that the defendants were negligent in failing to adopt an alternative design. On appeal, Citation does not dispute that it cannot prevail on its negligence claims unless it makes one of those showings, and so we proceed to treat its negligence and breach of implied warranty claims together.
- 9 -Co., 583 N.E.2d 873, 874 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).) Citation
contended that, "[i]n Massachusetts, negating all other sources of
injury is not treated as a distinct legal theory but is instead
considered another factor in determining whether the plaintiff can
show a greater probability than not that the relevant accident or
injury resulted from the defendant's negligence." (Citing Walker
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 968 F.2d 116, 119-20 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation
modified).)
Citation argued that summary judgment was not warranted
under that standard on a manufacturing defect theory of its claims
because it had shown "'a greater probability than not' that the
fire was caused by the [f]an's faulty TCO." It first pointed to
the fact that Harris, the Burlington Fire Chief, and Wald had all
concluded that "the fire originated in the area of the bathroom
exhaust fan." It then noted, citing Wald's deposition, that Wald
had "consistently reiterated his expert finding that the fire was
caused by a manufacturing defect in the TCO." Citation
acknowledged that Wald "also identified three well-documented
deficiencies with the TCO at issue," but it argued that it was
"unnecessary" for him to specify which of those deficiencies caused
the fire, as "such specificity is not necessary" under
Massachusetts law "where, as here, the fire destroyed important
pieces of evidence . . . that would help to prove how the coil in
the TCO failed."
- 10 -Citation then argued as to a design-defect-based theory
of its claims that all it needed to do to survive summary judgment
was "offer evidence that th[e alternative] design is currently
being used in similar products in the market or, at least, that
such a design could have reasonably been produced." (Citing Evans,
990 N.E.2d at 1015.) It contended that it had satisfied that
standard because Wald identified several design alternatives in
his deposition testimony that "are already being used or are
available in the market."
The District Court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on all claims. Citation Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 3d at
303. In doing so, the District Court began by analyzing the
"[t]hreshold [q]uestion" of whether Citation had violated Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). Id. at 309. That Rule
requires parties, in disclosing expert witnesses, to provide "a
written report" containing, among other things, "a complete
statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis
and reasons for them." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). The
District Court determined that Citation had violated that Rule
with respect to Wald because Wald had opined on three matters that
had not been clearly identified in his expert report: (1) an
alleged specific manufacturing defect; (2) how any such defect
caused the fire at issue; and (3) potential design alternatives
and their feasibility. Citation Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 3d at
- 11 -309-10. The District Court concluded that the "most appropriate"
sanction for those violations was exclusion of those portions of
Wald's deposition testimony. Id. at 311.
The District Court reasoned that those exclusions
provided a sufficient basis for granting summary judgment to the
defendants. Id. That was so, the District Court explained,
because "the first two" pieces of excluded testimony "relate to
essential elements of [Citation]'s manufacturing defect
claim" -- namely, the identification of a specific defect that
caused the fire. Id.; see also id. at 309-10. The District Court
further explained that the third piece of excluded evidence
"relates to an essential element of [Citation]'s design defect
claim" -- namely, available design modifications and their
potential costs and ramifications. Id. at 311; see also id. at
310.
The District Court went on to consider, "in the interest
of completeness," the merits of Citation's claims had it not
excluded the testimony in question. Id. at 311. It began by
explaining that, "given the complexity of the product at issue,"
expert testimony was necessary to prevail on either a manufacturing
or design defect theory. Id. at 313. It then found that the
defendants were entitled to summary judgment under a manufacturing
defect theory for "two independently sufficient reasons": (1) the
record did not establish that the particular fan at issue "deviated
- 12 -from its intended design" and (2) expert testimony was necessary
on the issue of causation, yet Wald had "conceded at [his]
deposition that he did not know whether the alleged manufacturing
defect that he identified caused the fire." Id. at 313-14. The
District Court then concluded that the defendants were also
entitled to summary judgment on a design defect theory because of
the absence of expert testimony as to whether an alternative design
"would be unduly costly and/or would affect performance of the
machinery." Id. at 314.
Citation timely appealed.
II.
We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment
to the defendants de novo. See Miceli v. JetBlue Airways Corp.,
914 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2019). "Summary judgment is appropriate
where the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party" -- here, Citation -- "discloses no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and demonstrates that the
movant[s]" -- here, the defendants -- are "entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." McCoy v. Town of Pittsfield, 59 F.4th 497, 504
(1st Cir. 2023) (citation modified); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In conducting our review, "[w]e are not bound by the [D]istrict
[C]ourt's reasoning" but "may affirm the entry of summary judgment
on any ground apparent from the record." McGunigle v. City of
Quincy, 835 F.3d 192, 202 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
- 13 -"A federal court sitting in diversity applies state
substantive law." Levin v. Dalva Bros., 459 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir.
2006). Under Massachusetts law, a warranty of merchantability is
implied in contracts for the sale of goods when sold by merchants
of such goods. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-314 (West
2026).
To prevail on a breach of warranty of merchantability
claim under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must establish the
following elements:
(1) that the defendant manufactured or sold
the product; (2) that a defect or unreasonably
dangerous condition existed at the time the
product left the defendant's hands so that it
was not reasonably suitable for the ordinary
uses for which goods of that kind were sold;
(3) that at the time of his injury, the
plaintiff was using the product in a manner
that the defendant intended or that could
reasonably have been foreseen; and (4) that
the defect or unreasonably defective condition
was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 43 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1998) (citation modified).
As relevant here, a product may be considered defective
under the second element "because of [(1)] a manufacturing defect,
[(2)] a design defect, or [(3)] a warning defect." Evans, 990
N.E.2d at 1010. A manufacturing defect occurs when a product
deviates from its intended design due to an error in manufacturing.
See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978) (stating
- 14 -that, in "a case involving a manufacturing defect, the jury might
simply compare the propensities of the product as sold with those
which the product's designer intended it to have"). A design
defect, in contrast, occurs when a product is manufactured as
intended, but the product's design poses "foreseeable risks of
harm" that "could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of
a reasonable alternative design." Evans, 990 N.E.2d at 1011
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) (A.L.I. 1998)).
III.
On appeal, Citation argues that the District Court erred
in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the breach of
implied warranty claims by premising its ruling on Citation's
failure to provide admissible expert evidence as to a specific
manufacturing or design defect that could support such a claim.
In so contending, Citation faults the District Court for failing
to apply the "malfunction theory." In support of this challenge,
Citation contends that Massachusetts courts have recognized the
malfunction theory and that the theory permits a plaintiff to show
circumstantial evidence of a defect without showing that defect to
have been caused by the product's design or how it was
manufactured.
The defendants dispute whether Massachusetts law
recognizes the malfunction theory at all. They further dispute
- 15 -whether Massachusetts law does so even when, as here, no expert
opined that destruction of the assertedly malfunctioning product
made it impossible to identify the defect in that product that
caused the malfunction. We need not resolve either dispute,
however, to reject Citation's challenge on appeal. As we will
explain, even if we were to resolve each of these disputes in
Citation's favor, we still would reject its challenge to the grant
of summary judgment.
A.
We can easily dispense with the portion of Citation's
malfunction-theory-based challenge to the grant of summary
judgment that takes aim at the District Court for faulting Citation
for failing to provide admissible expert evidence sufficient to
show a design defect. See Citation Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 3d at
314. The reason that we may do so has to do with the arguments
that Citation made to the District Court in opposing the
defendants' motion for summary judgment.
In doing so, Citation did not rely on the malfunction
theory that it now invokes on appeal. It instead argued that it
had introduced sufficient evidence of alternative designs to
create a genuine dispute of material fact as to a design defect
theory of its claims. And, in support of that contention, Citation
relied solely on Wald's deposition testimony.
- 16 -Citation does not challenge on appeal, however, the
District Court's exclusion of Wald's deposition testimony. It
instead contends that it introduced "sufficient circumstantial
evidence and evidence excluding secondary causes of the fire" to
survive summary judgment under the malfunction theory. Nor does
Citation develop an argument that other evidence in the record
suffices to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to
reasonable alternative designs.
Citation did not argue below that, under the malfunction
theory, it did not need to introduce evidence of alternative
designs to prevail on a design defect theory of its claims. As a
result, it cannot now challenge the District Court's ruling on
that ground. See Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42, 49
(1st Cir. 2004) ("It is a bedrock rule that when a party has not
presented an argument to the district court, he may not unveil it
in the court of appeals." (citation modified)). We therefore see
no basis for concluding that the District Court erred in granting
the defendants' summary judgment motion as to Citation's
design-defect-based theory of its implied warranty claims.
B.
There remains to address Citation's challenge to the
District Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants as to
the manufacturing-defect-based theory of those same claims. Here,
the District Court faulted Citation for failing to provide
- 17 -admissible expert evidence supportably showing a manufacturing
defect. See Citation Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 3d at 313-14.
Citation contends that the District Court erred in so ruling.
Citation argues that the malfunction theory applies to those claims
and that, under that theory, it did not need to provide such expert
evidence.
Citation is in a stronger position in advancing this
challenge than it was in advancing its design-defect-related
challenge. After all, it did advance the malfunction theory below
as to its manufacturing-defect-based theory. Nonetheless, we
still conclude that the challenge is without merit, given the
District Court's reasons for granting summary judgment and the way
that Citation deployed the malfunction theory in the proceedings
below.
Specifically, in granting summary judgment with respect
to Citation's manufacturing-defect-based argument, the District
Court reasoned in part as follows. It explained that Citation
failed to introduce evidence showing how the fan or its motor
"deviated from their intended design." Id. at 313. It then
determined that, accordingly, "no factfinder would be able to
perform their duty to 'compare the propensities of the product as
sold with those which the product's designer intended it to have.'"
Id. (quoting Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970).
- 18 -We fail to see how the malfunction theory undermines
that reasoning. In the proceedings before the District Court,
Citation chose to rely on the malfunction theory solely to show
that there was a manufacturing defect. That choice necessarily
invited the District Court to conclude that Citation had to show
how, via circumstantial evidence, an inference could be drawn that
a manufacturing defect caused the fire. Citation does not point
to anything in the record, however, that supports that more
particularized inference, even accounting for the malfunction
theory.
After all, on Citation's own account of the malfunction
theory, it does not, in and of itself, necessarily distinguish
between manufacturing and design defects. So, even if the District
Court had applied the malfunction theory to infer the existence of
a defect, we fail to see how the application of that theory could
have led the District Court to conclude that a factfinder could
"compare the propensities of the product as sold with those which
the product's designer intended it to have." Back, 378 N.E.2d at
970.
To be sure, we might conclude differently if Citation
could show that the record reveals circumstantial evidence from
which a fact finder could infer not only that a defect caused the
fire but also that it was a manufacturing rather than a design
defect. But Citation has not done so.
- 19 -In its filing in opposition to summary judgment with
respect to a manufacturing-defect-based theory of its claims,
Citation identified three potential "deficiencies with the TCO at
issue that could have ignited the fire":
(1) that the TCO was only rated for 90 degrees
centigrade for an extended period of time and
could degrade when exposed to higher
temperatures, (2) that its eutectic fusible
element can melt but remain in a pool such
that it continues to conduct electricity, and
(3) that bending the TCO in violation of the
instructions that come with it can cause a
fire.
It is far from clear, however, that a layperson would be equipped
to conclude, absent expert evidence, that all those deficiencies
would be due to a defect in manufacturing rather than design. For
example, it is not apparent that the temperature rating of the TCO
at issue here deviated from "identical products issued from the
same manufacturer," Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 377
(D. Mass. 1996), such that such a defect would be attributable to
a manufacturing error.
We recognize that Citation argues on appeal that, under
the malfunction theory, it need not identify a specific
manufacturing or design defect so long as the circumstantial
evidence supports an inference that the product at issue was
generally defective. But, as we have already explained, Citation
did not present that argument below. Instead, it chose to rely on
expert evidence of reasonable alternative designs -- and not the
- 20 -malfunction theory -- to advance a design-defect-based theory of
its implied warranty claims. That choice invited the District
Court to reject Citation's attempt to show there was a genuine
issue of triable fact as to the existence of a design defect, for
the very reason that Citation had failed to provide sufficient
expert evidence to show that any defect was a design defect. See
Citation Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 3d at 314.
In turn, Citation's choice to rely on the malfunction
theory solely for its manufacturing-defect-based theory invited
the District Court to conclude that Citation must show sufficient
circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to infer the existence of
a manufacturing defect. But, as we have explained, Citation has
not explained how the District Court erred in concluding that no
such showing had been made.
We acknowledge that it might appear odd to reject the
application of the malfunction theory to Citation's
manufacturing-defect-based claim on the ground that Citation
failed to provide sufficient evidence specifically showing a
manufacturing defect, given that such specificity is arguably not
required under the malfunction theory. Nonetheless, having
conducted the litigation as it did in the District Court and having
chosen not to rely on the malfunction theory in support of a
design-defect-based claim, Citation is stuck with the consequences
of that approach. See Orenstein v. United States, 191 F.2d 184,
- 21 -193 (1st Cir. 1951) ("An appellant will not ordinarily be permitted
to complain of an error which he himself invited . . . ."); see
also Box Pond Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 758 N.E.2d
604, 615 n.14 (Mass. 2001) (same). We therefore cannot agree that
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the
defendants on Citation's implied warranty claims.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
- 22 -