J-M03004-26 2026 PA Super 190
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
PETITION OF: C.L. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 59 WDM 2026
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered May 19, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-02-JV-0000379-2026
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: AUGUST 28, 2026
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1612, C.L. seeks
expedited review of an out-of-home placement that was ordered on May 19,
2026, in this juvenile delinquency matter.1 We grant expedited review, ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 We conclude that the May 19, 2026 order is a final order because, although
it provided that “disposition is deferred with permission to place at an appropriate placement,” Juvenile Court Order, 5/19/26, it directed out-ofhome placement at Adelphoi Village Manor.
On May 27, 2026, C.L. was then placed at George Junior Republic, though no formal order reflecting that placement was entered as of the filing of C.L.’s instant petition.
On May 29, 2026, which was ten days after entry of the May 19, 2026 dispositional order, C.L. filed the instant counseled petition seeking our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1612(a).
On June 2, 2026, this Court ordered that: (1) the juvenile court expressly state on the record its reasons for the May 19, 2026 dispositional order, see Pa.R.A.P. 1612(f); (2) the juvenile court send this Court the hearing (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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pursuant to In the Interest of N.E.M., 311 A.3d 1088 (Pa. 2024), and
reverse and remand for further proceedings because the juvenile court’s outof-home placement was not the least restrictive option consistent with both
C.L.’s individualized needs and the protection of the public, under 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 6301(b)(3)(i), 6352(c).
C.L. is a 13-year-old, who, following a colloquy at an adjudicatory
hearing on May 19, 2026, admitted to, and was adjudicated, delinquent of one
count of possession of a firearm by a minor, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.1(a), in
the Family Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. In
exchange for C.L.’s admission, and pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the
Commonwealth withdrew two additional charges: one count of firearms not
to be carried without a license2 and one count of receiving stolen property.3
transcript, see Pa.R.A.P. 1612(g); and (3) the Commonwealth file a response to the instant petition. The Commonwealth filed its response on June 8, 2026. The juvenile court forwarded the hearing transcript on June 24, 2026, and filed a signed statement on July 7, 2026.
This Court’s review of the juvenile court docket revealed that a second dispositional hearing was held on June 9, 2026, and placement at George Junior Republic was ordered at that time, otherwise reiterating the conditions imposed in the May 19, 2026 order, and providing that C.L. will remain at the facility where he was transferred on May 27, 2026.
As C.L. timely appealed from the May 19, 2026 order, we conclude that he has properly preserved his claims as to his out-of-home placement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1612(a).
2 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
3 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).
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At the dispositional hearing, the court heard testimony from: (1)
Shannon Gabos, C.L.’s probation officer; (2) J.W., C.L.’s mother; (3) E.L.,
C.L.’s father; and (4) Robert Jones, President of the Brothers and Sisters
Emerging Program and a youth football coach who has an established
relationship with C.L.’s family.
Gabos testified that C.L. was detained at Adelphoi Village Manor since
April 17, 2026, and that there were no reported behavioral issues during his
detention. See N.T. Hearing, 5/19/26, at 7. Gabos confirmed C.L.’s present
adjudication is C.L.’s first time as the subject of a delinquency petition. See
id. She further noted that C.L.’s pre-dispositional report reflected a moderate
score on the Youth Level of Service risk assessment. See id. at 11. She
explained that, prior to his detention, C.L. was in seventh grade at
Westinghouse High School/Middle School and had adequate attendance but
poor grades due to being easily distracted. See id. at 7-8. Regarding C.L.’s
mental health, Gabos noted that C.L.’s school was in the process of arranging
therapy for him, but that arrangement never materialized because of the
present matter. See id. at 9. Gabos’s pre-dispositional report reflected no
prior mental health hospitalizations, and C.L. was not prescribed any
medication. See id. at 9-10. Gabos testified that C.L. underwent a mental
health evaluation and was found competent. See id. at 7. Also, she stated
that C.L. had prior diagnoses of both attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”) and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). See id. at 8. She
observed that the evaluator recommended Multisystemic Therapy (“MST”),
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which is a form of treatment that is not available in a residential placement
setting, as it involves the participation of the entire family. See id. at 7, 10,
13-15.
Regarding C.L.’s home circumstances, Gabos testified that C.L.’s
parents share custody, alternating in approximately six-month intervals, that
they co-parent effectively, and they are consistently present at court
proceedings. See id. at 11-12. Gabos described both parents as invested in,
and supportive of, C.L.’s well-being. See id. at 12.
Gabos testified that, if C.L. were released on probation, electronic home
monitoring (“EHM”) would be appropriate, and she confirmed that the court
could order participation in the Community Intensive Supervision Program
(“CISP”), which provides educational support, gun violence prevention
programs, and other group programs, typically five days a week at the outset.
See id. at 12-13.
Based on the foregoing, the probation department’s recommendation
was that: (1) disposition be deferred until June 1, 2026, with permission to
make referrals to other detention centers; (2) C.L. be ordered to complete
forty hours of community service; (3) C.L. be ordered to pay court and crime
laboratory fees; and (4) C.L. be ordered to participate in the “Impact of Crime”
curriculum. See id. at 8.
J.W.’s testimony confirmed that C.L. resides with each parent
approximately six months of the year. See id. at 17. J.W. explained that, if
C.L. were released from detention, he would attend school in E.L.’s area of
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residence, and that if C.L. were placed with her, C.L.’s transition to the school
in J.W.’s area of residence would be “fairly seamless”. See id. at 17, 22. J.W.
testified that C.L. was previously involved in organized sports, after-school
activities, and church activities. See id. at 17. She further testified that her
wife is among the members of J.W.’s household who would be able to assist
with C.L.’s morning routine. See id. at 21. J.W. confirmed that there are no
firearms in her home or vehicles; although she had previously owned a gun,
she does not own one currently, and her license to carry one expired. See
id. at 21-23.
Regarding C.L.’s mental health, J.W. testified that he was enrolled in
outpatient treatment when he was twelve to thirteen years old, but that
treatment was terminated because C.L. missed two sessions due to J.W.’s
work schedule. J.W. stated that if C.L. were released, she or E.L. would be
able to transport C.L. to therapy sessions. See id. at 18. J.W. testified that,
in her communications with C.L. during his detention, she observed he had
become more emotional and that this was the longest separation she and he
had experienced. See id. at 19. She noted that he cried frequently and
expressed a desire to return home. See id.
J.W. further testified that she fully supported C.L.’s release on
probation, acknowledging that although he had “lost his way” over the last
year or two, C.L. could be redirected with support and appropriate services.
See id. at 19-20. J.W. characterized C.L. as neither bad nor violent and stated
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that she did not believe placement in a group home would benefit him. See
id. at 20.
E.L. also confirmed C.L.’s custody arrangement and testified that no
other adults resided in his home. See id. at 24, 27. E.L. described his
commitment to providing comprehensive supervision for C.L., stating that he
had stepped down from his position at work and was currently on leave to
restructure his schedule around C.L.’s needs. See id. at 24–25. E.L. further
stated that, if C.L. were ordered to participate in community-based therapy,
he would be able to provide transportation. See id. at 25. He testified that
there were no firearms in his home or vehicle and that he had never owned a
firearm. See id. at 27.
E.L. also testified about the emotional toll that C.L.’s detention had on
him as a parent and stated that C.L. had no prior experience with detention.
See id. E.L. described the challenges inherent in C.L.’s alternating between
two households and two different peer groups, and observed that, at twelve
or thirteen years of age, a child is still forming his identity and is emotionally
vulnerable. See id. at 25-26. E.L. further noted that C.L.’s existing diagnosis
of an emotional disturbance compounded his impulsiveness during this
developmental period of C.L.’s life. See id. at 26. E.L. expressed his view
that C.L. “lost a bit of his way,” but that his conduct was not reflective of his
true character, and that with proper understanding and support, C.L. could
return to the right path. See id.
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Jones testified that he knew C.L.’s family for years, and that C.L. had
previously participated in his football program and would be welcomed back
into the program’s decades-old mentorship program and other weekly
activities if released by the court. See id. at 29-31. Jones described the
community programming as an opportunity for C.L. to interact with positive
male role models, and learn pride, responsibility, and respect for others. See
id. at 30-32.
Following Jones’s testimony, C.L.’s counsel read into the record a letter
addressed to the judge and written by C.L. See id. at 33. In the letter, C.L.
acknowledged the seriousness of his charge, accepted accountability for his
conduct, and requested the opportunity to participate in the CISP program
while remaining at home. See id. C.L. also specifically committed to attend
school daily, maintain focus in his academic work, contribute to his community
through football and clean-up efforts, and comply with all conditions imposed
by the court, including adhering to authorized boundaries rather than acting
on his own initiative. See id. C.L. expressed an understanding of the
consequences of any future deviation from appropriate conduct. See id.
At the close of the hearing, C.L.’s counsel requested that C.L. be
released on EHM, committed to CISP, and ordered to participate in MST.
The juvenile court acknowledged the strong family support and
community resources available to C.L. and expressed its view that C.L. is not
a bad child. See id. at 37. The court nonetheless ordered that C.L. continue
in detention at Adelphoi Village Manor and deferred formal disposition, with
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permission to later transfer C.L. to an appropriate out-of-home placement.
See id. at 38-39. The court emphasized that its obligation extended not only
to C.L.’s best interests but also to the safety of the broader community. See
id. at 37–38. The court noted that although MST was not available in
placement, C.L. could receive it later, and the court would order that C.L. do
so later. See id. at 38. The judge commented that in over 20 years on the
bench nothing had ever convinced him that a child in possession of a firearm
was safe to remain in the community.4 See id. at 38-39. The court further
ordered that C.L. complete forty hours of community service, pay all court
costs and the crime laboratory fee, continue his education while in placement,
and engage in all recommended mental health treatment. See id.
In his petition for review filed in this Court, C.L. presents one issue for
our review: “whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing
C.L. to an out-of-home placement facility[?]” Petition for Review at 13.
In support of that claim, C.L. contends that the juvenile court abused
its discretion in ordering out-of-home placement because its decision was ____________________________________________
4 On this point, the court specifically stated:
There is nothing in the world that convinces me a child with a
firearm is safe in the community. Nothing. And I’ve been doing
this for over [twenty] years, and I haven’t seen it. I’ve seen just
the opposite. I’ve seen other people get killed by mistake or on
purpose as well[. I]t’s not going to happen. It’s whatever I can
do to make sure that does not happen. So, he will be placed at
this particular time as well.
N.T. Hearing, 5/19/26, at 38-39.
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driven primarily, if not exclusively, by the nature of the charge against C.L.—
namely, that a firearm was involved—rather than by the totality of his
individual circumstances, as the Juvenile Act5 requires. See id. at 18. In
making his assertion, C.L. first notes that the court-ordered mental health
evaluation recommended that he enroll in MST, a treatment that is unavailable
in a placement setting and only available in in-home placements; therefore,
out-of-home placement directly contravenes C.L.’s identified treatment needs.
See id. Second, C.L. asserts that no evidence was presented that he could
not be treated adequately in the community or that out-of-home placement
represented the least restrictive appropriate alternative. See id. Third, C.L.
contends that, apart from the fact that the adjudicated offense involved a
firearm, no evidence was presented that he posed a specific danger to the
community. See id. at 19. Taken together, C.L. argues that these
deficiencies reflect a disposition based on the offense category rather than on
his individual facts and circumstances, which is an approach this Court has
characterized as a prohibited “one-size-fits-all” policy. See id. (citing In re
R.W., 855 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Super. 2004)). C.L. maintains that the Juvenile
Act mandates a disposition “best suited to the child’s treatment, supervision,
rehabilitation, and welfare, under the individual circumstances of each child’s
case,” id., and that community-based treatment was the least-restrictive
5 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375.
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dispositional alternative consistent with both public protection and his
rehabilitative needs. See id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(c)).
C.L. proposes that he be placed on probation, subject to a review
hearing to assess his progress, with the following conditions: (1) commitment
to CISP; (2) EHM for a period to be determined by the court; (3) participation
in MST and any additional recommended mental health treatment; (4) daily
school attendance; (5) completion of the Impact of Crime Curriculum; (6)
community service; and (7) payment of court costs and restitution. C.L.
requests that this Court grant his petition, vacate the juvenile court’s May 19,
2026 dispositional order committing him to an out-of-home placement facility,
and remand for a new dispositional hearing at which he would be ordered to
participate in and successfully complete CISP. In the alternative, C.L.
requests any other relief that “law, justice, and fundamental fairness require.”
Petition for Review at 21 ¶ 45. For the following reasons, we reverse the order
directing out-of-home placement and remand for a new dispositional hearing
consistent with this decision.
Our standard of review of a petition for specialized review under Rule
1612 is for an abuse of discretion, as follows:
When reviewing a petition filed pursuant to [Rule] 1612, this Court
shall not consider any challenge to the juvenile court’s selection
of a specific agency or specific institution as the site of the out-ofhome placement and instead may consider only a challenge to the
fact that the placement is out-of-home. This Court also shall not
consider any challenge to the underlying adjudication of
delinquency. Our review is therefore limited to the juvenile court’s
decision to place the petitioner outside of his or her home. The
juvenile court is granted broad discretion in determining the
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appropriate disposition for a petitioner and will not disturb its
decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion. The juvenile court
has considerable power to review and modify the commitment,
taking into account the rehabilitative progress or lack of it of the
juvenile.
Interest of A.R.A., 315 A.3d 877, 881-82 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citations,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
This appeal also requires us to interpret the Juvenile Act, a question of
statutory construction, for which our standard of review is de novo. See
Commonwealth v. M.W., 39 A.3d 958, 962 (Pa. 2012).
The following rules generally govern cases of statutory interpretation:
When interpreting the language of a statute, we are guided by the
polestar principle that we must ascertain and effectuate the intent
of the General Assembly in enacting the statute. In so doing, we
must give effect to all of the provisions. Further, when the words
of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it
is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
Generally, the best indication of the General Assembly’s intent in
enacting a statute may be found in its plain language.
Id. at 963-64 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
The Juvenile Act sets forth its purposes and how it should be interpreted:
(b) Purposes.—This chapter shall be interpreted and construed
as to effectuate the following purposes:
(1) To preserve the unity of the family whenever possible
or to provide another alternative permanent family when the unity
of the family cannot be maintained.
(1.1) To provide for the care, protection, safety and wholesome
mental and physical development of children coming within the
provisions of this chapter.
(2) Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to provide
for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision,
care and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the
protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for
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offenses committed and the development of competencies to
enable children to become responsible and productive members
of the community.
(3) To achieve the foregoing purposes in a family
environment whenever possible, separating the child from
parents only when necessary for his welfare, safety or health
or in the interests of public safety, by doing all of the following:
(i) employing evidence-based practices whenever
possible and, in the case of a delinquent child, by using
the least restrictive intervention that is consistent
with the protection of the community, the imposition
of accountability for offenses committed and the
rehabilitation, supervision and treatment needs of the
child; and
(ii) imposing confinement only if necessary and for the
minimum amount of time that is consistent with the
purposes under paragraphs (1), (1.1), and (2).
(4) To provide means through which the provisions of this chapter
are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a
fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights
recognized and enforced.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b) (emphases added). In other words, the Juvenile court
must strive to keep the family unit intact and separate a delinquent child from
his parents only when necessary; and, in making this decision, the juvenile
court must use the least restrictive intervention available consistent with
protection of the community and in light of the individualized needs of the
child. See id.
Pursuant to Section 6352(a) of the Juvenile Act, a dispositional order
must “be consistent with the protection of the public interest and best suited
to the child’s treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and welfare” and must, “as
appropriate to the individual circumstances of the child’s case, provide
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balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of
accountability for offenses committed and the development of competencies
to enable the child to become a responsible and productive member of the
community.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(a).
Before entering a dispositional order, the juvenile court must state its
disposition and the reasons therefore, in open court, along with the goals and
terms of the disposition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(c). Where the disposition
requires out-of-home placement, the court must additionally identify the
specific facility or type of facility and state the findings of fact and conclusions
of law on which the decision is based. See id. The court must explain why
commitment constitutes “the least restrictive placement that is consistent
with the protection of the public and best suited to the child’s treatment,
supervision, rehabilitation and welfare.” Id. (emphasis added).
Instantly, in its July 7, 2026 statement, the juvenile court found that
C.L. entered an admission to possession of a firearm by a minor, which was
supported by a written colloquy reviewed with counsel. Juvenile Court
Opinion, 7/7/26, at 2. The court further found that C.L. needed court
supervision and treatment. See id.
The juvenile court’s decision to order out-of-home placement rested on
three central points. First, regarding C.L.’s behavioral and mental health
history, the court noted that C.L. had existing diagnoses of ADHD and PTSD,
had undergone a competency and mental health evaluation resulting in a
competency finding, and had been recommended for MST treatment therapy.
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The court acknowledged that MST treatment is only available in a home setting
and not in placement. See id. at 3.
Second, regarding C.L.’s home environment, the court observed that
C.L. was dismissed from outpatient therapy sessions because his mother’s
work schedule prevented her from transporting him to sessions. The court
also observed that, although C.L.’s father had since left his employment to be
more available to C.L., this change indicated that he previously was not
accessible. The court acknowledged that both parents demonstrated good
intentions but found that their expressed commitments were prospective in
nature. The court discussed its view of a demonstrated pattern of conduct
leading to the instant offense, which jeopardized C.L.’s and the community’s
safety. See id. at 3-4.
Third, regarding public safety and C.L.’s welfare, the court found, as
mentioned above, that C.L.’s possession of a firearm placed both him and the
community at risk. Therefore, the court concluded that placement was
necessary to address C.L.’s mental health needs in a structured environment,
while allowing his education to continue. The court further concluded that the
delinquency adjudication and the out-of-home placement were supported by
clear and convincing evidence and opined that this Court should affirm its
decision. See id. at 4.
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On appeal, the Commonwealth relies primarily on our decision in In the
Interest of D.W., 220 A.3d 573 (Pa. Super. 2019).6 Nevertheless, we find
that case is distinguishable from the instant facts.
Therein, police discovered D.W. (who was 17 years old at the time) with
four cohorts sitting in a parked automobile smoking marijuana. Following a
pat-down frisk for weapons, police recovered a handgun on D.W.’s person.
After the court subsequently adjudicated D.W. delinquent, it ordered out-ofhome placement for D.W.
This Court affirmed that determination on appeal, and explained our
analysis as follows:
The juvenile court, in its role as the ultimate arbiter of fact,
highlighted the history of D.W.’s persistent truancy during the
2018-2019 academic year when he missed approximately onehalf of the 186 school days. It also considered the fact that D.W.’s
educational needs were not being satisfied at home and that the
juvenile lacked accountability or adult supervision. These
concerns are exemplified by Mother’s validation of D.W.’s failure
to return to school during Spring 2019, including missing his final
exams, following a ten-day suspension from school for the
disorderly conduct that was the genesis of the additional charges
leveled at juvenile action number 879. The juvenile court noted
Mother’s concession during the juvenile proceeding that “A lot of
him missing school was all my doing. Like I said, I didn’t enroll
him in school right away. I had a problem with sending him to
that school.” In this vein, we also observe that, while Mother
testified that D.W. had made the honor roll, his drug and alcohol
evaluation revealed that, “Based on his report card, his
performance in school is relatively low[.] He has C’s and D’s in
English, Geometry, Algebra, Physics, Chemistry.”
6 The Juvenile court judge in this case is the same judge who presided over
the case in D.W.
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Likewise, the record contradicts Mother’s sentiments that D.W.’s
biological father was among the individuals who would be
available to occasionally supervise the juvenile at home. Mother
testified, “I have a 24-year-old daughter that’s there, and D.W.’s
father is also there sometimes.” However, the psychiatric report
reveals that D.W. “does not have any contact with his biological
father.”
In addition to the foregoing problems with Mother’s credibility, the
juvenile court was also concerned that Mother did not intercede in
her son’s decision to carry a firearm. In sum, the court
determined that, after weighing the testimony presented by
Mother, Probation Officer Gray, and the CYF case worker, and
considering the psychiatric and substance abuse evaluations, inhome placement would not achieve the treatment and
rehabilitative concerns outlined in the Juvenile Act. For the
following reasons, we agree.
None of the foregoing considerations that the juvenile court
identified in support of out-of-home placement equates to an
abuse of discretion, even when viewed in the light cast by the
probation department’s recommendation of in-home placement,
and the psychiatrist’s apparent endorsement of that position.
Phrased differently, the record supports the court’s determination
that in-home placement is inappropriate under the particular
circumstances of this case.
While Mother claimed to have familial support, and CYS confirmed
that it offered the family in-home services for approximately
eighteen months, to date, those resources proved ineffectual in
meeting D.W.’s needs. D.W. was chronically truant from
school and he regularly carried a firearm while under
Mother’s supervision. Mother’s decisions to engineer her
son’s truancy and accept, if not tacitly endorse, his illegal
possession of a handgun, erode the underpinnings of the
probation officer’s recommendation for in-home
placement.
Similarly, the juvenile court consistently cited the fact that D.W.
presented a danger to himself and a risk to the community. The
juvenile’s history with gun violence is ensconced in the record. He
witnessed the shooting death of a close acquaintance, his
stepfather died as a result of gun violence, and he was shot in the
leg approximately seven months prior to the instant arrest. D.W.
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suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being
shot.
D.W., 220 A.3d at 579-80 (citations and original brackets omitted; emphasis
added).
This Court further rejected D.W.’s assertions that the juvenile court had
applied a blanket imposition of commitment simply based on his possession
of a firearm, noting:
In actuality, the juvenile court’s principal concerns throughout
these proceedings focused on D.W.’s individualized needs and the
consequences of the juvenile’s unsettling behavior on the
community. The juvenile court’s consideration of D.W.’s
possession of a concealed weapon exceeded the simple fact that
a minor possessed a gun. In reality, the juvenile court considered
how gun violence affected D.W. in particular and determined that
those specific considerations militated in favor of out-of-home
placement.
Id. at 580.
This Court further observed that D.W. had been arrested for disorderly
conduct one month before the arrest at issue:
While the juvenile’s prior conduct did not result in an adjudication
of delinquency due to the victim’s failure to attend the hearing, it
undermines the probation officer’s perspective that D.W. was new
to delinquency proceedings and, more importantly, it further
illustrates D.W.’s need for a level of supervision and rehabilitation
that he cannot receive at home. Similarly, by engaging in this
behavior one month before the instant arrest, D.W.’s actions
refute his argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in declining to adopt the probation officer’s recommendation in
favor of leniency.
Id. at 580-81.
Thus, the following facts at issue in D.W. supported the court’s
determination that out-of-home placement was necessary: (1) D.W.’s need
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for substance abuse and mental health treatment; (2) D.W.’s history of
truancy from school; (3) D.W.’s lack of support at home from a non-present
father and a mother who had tacitly endorsed her son’s possession of a firearm
and truancy; (4) D.W.’s disorderly conduct incident that took place one month
before the arrest at issue; and (5) D.W.’s personal history with gun violence,
which resulted in D.W. being shot and suffering from PTSD.
Instantly, the case before us involves distinguishable facts insofar as
this petitioner is a child who was 13 years old and in 7th grade at the time of
the offense,7 with no prior history of any juvenile allegations or proceedings.
See N.T. Hearing, 5/19/26, at 8, 10. Although C.L. admittedly had poor
grades due to a lack of focus, his attendance in school was good. See id. at
8. C.L. lives with each parent for six months of the year and the parents
coparent “pretty well.” Id. at 11. Both of C.L.’s parents are invested in his
well-being, supportive, and were present at all hearings. See id. at 12. C.L.’s
father even stepped down from his position at work so that he could focus on
and attend to C.L.’s needs to get him proper supervision to be in a “better
situation.” Id. at 24. Nothing in the record suggests that C.L. has any
substance abuse issues or history with drugs. C.L.’s mother also discussed
how C.L. had become more emotional since being detained, “crying a lot
more[,]” and expressing how he wants to come home, based on the separation
7 The record does not disclose the circumstances of how C.L. came to possess
a firearm or how he was discovered in possession of one.
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from his parents. Id. at 19. Jones also testified that he has known C.L.’s
family for a long time and that he could help by enrolling C.L. in the
mentorship program and the youth football program. See id. at 30-31. C.L.
also wrote a letter to the court taking accountability for his actions,
acknowledging the severity of the charge against him, and promising that
when he is back home, he will not “goof around” in school, he will stay on
task, clean up around the community, help out on the football fields, and will
“not deviate because [he] know[s] where it’s going to lead to.” Id. at 33.
Consequently, we find D.W. readily distinguishable.
Moreover, in conducting our review, we observe that the juvenile court’s
analysis focused primarily on the offense at issue (possession of a firearm)
and the safety of the public, without adequately considering C.L.’s
“rehabilitation, supervision[,] and treatment needs[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. §
6301(b)(3)(i).
Here, in ordering out-of-home placement for C.L., the juvenile court
stated on the record as follows:
I’ve heard a lot from both of [C.L.’s] parents. There is no question
that [C.L.] has a lot of love in his family, both his mother and
father, and as well as our community leaders, and different things
as well, yet, here we are, still here today.
I am not—and in regard to [C.L.], as with any other juvenile that
comes before me, this is not an issue of not being bad or violent,
you know, kids do things that they shouldn’t do. I understand
that as well. I do not consider [C.L.] to be a bad child, but, you
know, there are some directions, some new directions he needs
to take that he hasn’t taken at this particular time.
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You know, he’s been living with his mother and father, you know,
different times. I believe both of them love him like crazy and
want only the best thing for him as well.
But let me just tell you a little bit what my job is: My job is just
to—in regard to [C.L.], what’s the best thing for him—but also the
safety of the community at large as well, and I take both of those
things seriously as well. One of the things that sort of isolates
[C.L.] because he’s the one that’s here today. But I just want him
and his parents to understand that, you know, this is a lovable
child. I love him. He’s not my child. But any other child that
comes in here, I treat the same way, if they were my own children
as well.
So, there’s no question he needs mental health treatment. Yet,
at the same time, in regard to mental health in regard to MST, I
understand it’s not available in the community, but it doesn’t have
to happen here today. That’s something that can happen later on,
and I’m going to put that in my order as well; MST treatment will
occur later down the line. But at this time, here today, he will be
detained. He will be placed in appropriate placement as well.
And in regard to how his parents feel and different things, I mean,
even myself, I mean, it’s difficult to send children to placement as
well. I understand that, you know, but that’s my job in regard to
the safety of others as well. There is nothing in the world that
convinces me a child with a firearm is safe in the
community. Nothing. And I’ve been doing this for over 20
years, and I haven’t seen it. I’ve seen just the opposite.
I’ve seen other people get killed by mistake or on purpose
as well, it’s not going to happen. It’s whatever I can do to
make sure that does not happen. So, he will be placed at this
particular time as well. He will continue with all recommendations
in regard to his mental health as well. He will complete 40 hours
of community service and pay court costs, as well as the Crime
Lab fee, continue with education while in placement as well, and
his mental health.
N.T. Hearing, 5/19/26, at 36-39 (emphasis added). In its Rule 1925(a)
opinion, the court continued:
The court finds that while both [J.W.] and [E.L.] clearly have the
best intentions for C.L., their expressed efforts before this court
are for the future. The court focuses on the path that C.L. had
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been following which led him to the instant situation and the case
at hand. This path resulted in C.L. being in possession of a
firearm, thereby jeopardizing C.L.’s safety, as well as the safety
of the community. The court finds that C.L. is in need of
placement to better address his mental health needs while
continuing with his education.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 7/7/26, at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
After our review, although the court stated that C.L. requires placement
to better address his mental health needs, the record reflects that the
recommended treatment for C.L. was MST based on a previous mental health
diagnosis of ADHD and PTSD. See N.T. Hearing, 5/19/26, at 7-8.8 Notably,
Gabos testified that MST is “a very intensive mental health treatment, which
does involve the entire family. It usually takes place [. . . two] days a week
in the home.” Id. at 10. She further testified that MST treatment “cannot be
provided at a placement” as it “is a very, very intensive” treatment. Id.
Moreover, she explained that “[n]othing can replace the type of treatment
that is given as MST because it [. . .] involves the whole family.” Id. at 14.
Although C.L. would receive alternate therapy in a placement facility, the court
acknowledged that “it’s just not the same level of treatment that MST is[.]”
Id. at 15. Thus, although the court stated that C.L. required placement to
better address his mental health needs, the court ultimately deferred the
recommended treatment by ordering placement for C.L., as MST treatment
can only take place in the home.
8 C.L. had no prior mental health hospitalizations and was not prescribed any
medications at the time of the hearing. See N.T. Hearing, 5/19/26, at 9-10.
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In our view, the court abused its discretion in failing to give due
consideration to the least restrictive intervention consistent with both C.L.’s
individualized needs and the protection of the public considering the
circumstances of this case. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301(b)(3)(i), 6352(c).
Although this Court appreciates the severity of the offense at issue and does
not minimize the need to protect the public from firearms, the Juvenile Act
requires that these factors be weighed alongside the delinquent child’s
individualized needs. See id. Accordingly, based on C.L.’s age, the nature of
C.L.’s delinquency, C.L.’s recommended treatment, C.L.’s supportive family
and community, and the other circumstances of this case (including C.L.’s
school situation and lack of delinquency history), we find that the juvenile
court abused its discretion in failing to implement the least restrictive
intervention available consistent with protection of the community and in light
of C.L.’s individualized needs. See A.R.A., 315 A.3d at 881-82. Accordingly,
we reverse the order of the court placing C.L. out-of-home and remand this
case for a new dispositional hearing—to be held as soon as possible and no
later than 5 days after remand of the record in this case—wherein the court
places C.L. in an in-home placement and requires him to participate in MST.
Petition for expedited review of out-of-home placement granted. Order
reversed. Remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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DATE: 8/28/2026
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