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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 23-10003
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REGINALD HERMAN SMITH, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cr-00007-JA-PRL-1
Before NEWSOM and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and LEIBOWITZ,∗ District Judge.
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
∗ Honorable David S. Leibowitz, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10003
Having previously been convicted of multiple cocaine-related felonies in state court, Reginald Smith was then caught with
a shotgun and ammunition. He was charged with and convicted
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession
statute, and, based on his prior state felony convictions, sentenced
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1), to a mandatory minimum 15-year prison term.
On appeal, Smith challenges both his conviction and sentence. As to the former, he asserts that § 922(g)(1) violates both the
Second Amendment and the Commerce Clause. As to the latter,
he argues that the district court committed reversible error (1) by
classifying his state crimes as “serious drug offense[s]” and thereby
triggering ACCA’s application, (2) by engaging in judicial fact-finding in violation of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), and
(3) by mistakenly applying the Sentencing Guidelines. After careful
review, we reject each of Smith’s contentions and affirm his conviction and sentence.
I
A
The facts here are straightforward. In December 2019, Florida law enforcement officers were investigating illegal hunting
when they heard gunshots. They spotted Smith, who was holding
a loaded shotgun. The officers arrested and searched him, at which
point they discovered a hunting knife, rifle rounds, and nine pills of
MDMA, a Schedule I drug. An agent with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives subsequently determined that
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23-10003 Opinion of the Court 3
Smith’s shotgun was made in the United States but outside Florida,
which meant that it had traveled in interstate commerce.
B
The procedural history is anything but straightforward. It’s
important, though, especially to the sentencing issues in the case,
so readers are advised to pay attention.
A grand jury indicted Smith on two counts: (1) possession of
a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e);
and (2) possession of MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
Smith pleaded guilty to both counts. At a hearing prior to Smith’s
guilty plea, the magistrate judge advised him that he would face a
15-year mandatory minimum sentence if the court determined that
he had at least three previous convictions for (as relevant here) “serious drug offense[s]” and thus qualified as an armed career criminal within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
Smith had three prior state felony convictions that were potential ACCA predicates. He was twice convicted of selling cocaine: The first conviction resulted from a sale of two rocks of
crack cocaine to an undercover officer on July 14, 1993, and the
second resulted from a sale of $20 worth of crack to an undercover
officer on July 20, 1993. Nearly a decade later, in 2001, Smith was
convicted of trafficking cocaine.
Smith’s initial presentence-investigation report (PSI) didn’t
apply an ACCA enhancement. Under then-existing law, it wasn’t
clear whether his third, cocaine-trafficking offense qualified as a
“serious drug offense” within the meaning of ACCA. At the time,
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this Court was considering in United States v. Conage (Conage I), 976
F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020), whether one species of Florida trafficking—namely, trafficking by purchase—necessarily involved possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 1254. If it didn’t, then Florida’s
cocaine-trafficking statute would sweep in some conduct that
didn’t qualify as a “serious drug offense” under ACCA, meaning
that a conviction under Florida’s law wouldn’t qualify as an ACCA
predicate offense. See id. at 1247. Accordingly, to calculate Smith’s
base offense level, rather than use U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4—the Guidelines
provision applicable to ACCA violations—the initial PSI employed
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1—the provision applicable to garden-variety violations of § 922(g). Shortly after receiving the PSI, Smith filed an unopposed motion to continue sentencing for six months, which the
district court granted.
At the conclusion of those six months, the probation office
issued a revised PSI. We hadn’t definitively resolved Conage at that
point, but we had certified a question to the Florida Supreme
Court, asking it to explain the meaning of key terms in the Florida
trafficking statute. The PSI again omitted the ACCA enhancement
and set a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months. The government
objected, arguing that Smith’s three state cocaine-related convictions—the two for sale and the one for trafficking—triggered the
ACCA enhancement. The district court concluded that it couldn’t
decide whether Smith’s trafficking conviction was an ACCA predicate until the Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in Conage, so it stayed sentencing once again.
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In the meantime, Smith filed a notice of supplemental authority based on our decision in United States v. Jackson (Jackson I),
36 F.4th 1294 (11th Cir.), superseded by 55 F.4th 846 (2022) (Jackson
II), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024). In Jackson I, we had held that a defendant’s Florida convictions for sale of
cocaine and possession with intent to sell cocaine were not ACCA
predicates because the state law’s definition of “cocaine” as it existed at the time he committed his drug crimes swept more
broadly—by including ioflupane, a cocaine derivative—than did
the federal definition as it existed at the time he committed his gun
crime—which had been revised to exclude ioflupane. 36 F.4th at
1304. Smith asserted that, based on Jackson I’s logic, none of his
cocaine offenses were ACCA predicates.
Before Smith’s sentencing, our law developed in two additional—and important—ways. First, based on the Florida Supreme
Court’s answer to the certified question in Conage, see Conage v.
United States (Conage II), 346 So. 3d 594, 596 (Fla. 2022), we held that
Florida cocaine trafficking is an ACCA predicate offense, see United
States v. Conage (Conage III), 50 F.4th 81 (11th Cir. 2022). Second,
the Jackson I panel sua sponte vacated its opinion and issued a new
one holding that, when determining whether a drug offense is an
ACCA predicate, a court should ask whether there was a match
between the state and federal definitions of the drug that were in
effect when the defendant was convicted of his drug crime, not
those that applied when he possessed the firearm underlying his
ensuing § 922(g) offense. See Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 854. The revised
Jackson opinion posed a problem for Smith, because when he was
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10003
convicted of his cocaine offenses, both Florida and the federal government included ioflupane in their definitions of cocaine. See Fla.
Stat. § 893.03(2)(a)4 (1993); id. § 893.03(2)(a)4 (2001); 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(Schedule II)(a)(4) (1993); id. § 812(Schedule II)(a)(4) (2001).
Also before Smith’s sentencing, the probation office issued
another revised PSI. As before, it calculated a base offense level
using U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, but this time it also applied the ACCA enhancement, concluding that Smith’s three cocaine offenses were
indeed qualifying “serious drug offense[s].” Accordingly, the PSI
calculated Smith’s Guidelines range based on the ACCA calculations in § 4B1.4. Accounting for ACCA’s mandatory minimum, the
PSI prescribed a range of 180 to 210 months’ imprisonment. Smith
objected to the PSI. In particular, he pointed to a case called United
States v. McCobb that was then pending before this Court. McCobb
involved a question similar to the one in Jackson: whether Florida’s
definition of cocaine was broader than the federal government’s
because, unlike the federal definition, it included all of cocaine’s
stereoisomers. 1
At his sentencing hearing, Smith reiterated that he objected
to the ACCA enhancement based on Jackson I and McCobb, which,
he said, both involved the “same issue”—namely, whether Florida’s definition of cocaine was overbroad. Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 5–
6, Dkt. No. 82. He also referenced his prior argument that a Florida
1 We ended up deciding McCobb in an unpublished opinion without addressing
the stereoisomer issue. United States v. McCobb, No. 20-12263, 2024 WL
4512220, at *2 n.3 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2024).
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23-10003 Opinion of the Court 7
trafficking conviction wasn’t an ACCA predicate. Id. at 4–5. Smith
nevertheless acknowledged that, in light of Jackson II and Conage III,
he “d[idn’t] believe [h]e [had] an argument before th[e] [c]ourt on
those matters.” Id. at 6. Smith said he raised the issues simply because he wanted “to preserve them for [appellate] review.” Id. Following Smith’s statements, the court confirmed that he thought his
ACCA designation was proper, asking whether he “would say that
the proposed [G]uideline calculations, including the ACCA designation, are correct under the . . . existing law . . . of the Eleventh
Circuit.” Id. Smith responded, “Yes.” Id. Later in the hearing,
Smith reiterated that “legally, [he] d[idn’t] have any objection to
the [probation office’s] scoring,” even though he was “frustrated”
that his decades-old small-time drug sales had triggered an ACCA
enhancement. Id. at 8–9.
The district court adopted the PSI’s findings that Smith had
the necessary three ACCA predicates—the two cocaine-sale offenses in 1993 and the one cocaine-trafficking offense in 2001. The
court sentenced Smith to 180 months’ imprisonment—the ACCA
minimum—on the § 922(g) count and 12 months’ imprisonment
on the MDMA-possession count, to run concurrently.
II
Smith challenges his conviction and sentence on five
grounds. In particular, he argues (1) that § 922(g)(1) violates the
Second Amendment, (2) that § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce
Clause, (3) that his Florida cocaine convictions are not “serious
drug offense[s]” within the meaning of ACCA, (4) that the district
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-10003
court committed reversible error under Erlinger v. United States, 602
U.S. 821 (2024), because it sentenced him under ACCA despite the
absence of a jury finding that he had committed his predicate offenses on different occasions, and (5) that the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines. We will address Smith’s
contentions in turn.
A
Smith first argues that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second
Amendment, both facially and as applied to him. We disagree.
When, as here, a defendant failed to present his constitutional challenge to the district court, we review the question of a
statute’s constitutionality only for plain error. United States v. Edwards, 142 F.4th 1270, 1285 n.9 (11th Cir. 2025); see also Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(b). More than a decade ago, we held that felons are
“disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). We recently reaffirmed Rozier, concluding that the Supreme Court’s decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1
(2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), didn’t abrogate its holding. See United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887,
893 (11th Cir. 2025). So § 922(g)(1) facially survives Second Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 894. And because Smith is a felon, § 922(g) is
constitutional as applied to him. See Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771. There
was no Second Amendment error, plain or otherwise.
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B
Second, Smith asserts that § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause—again, both facially and as applied. And again, he is
incorrect.
Smith didn’t present his Commerce Clause challenge to the
district court either, so we review only for plain error. Section
922(g)(1) doesn’t facially violate the Commerce Clause because it
has an express jurisdictional element. United States v. Edwards, 142
F.4th 1270, 1285 (11th Cir. 2025). And it is constitutional as applied
to Smith because his shotgun was manufactured outside Florida,
which means that it necessarily traveled across state lines to reach
him. That establishes the requisite “minimal nexus” between interstate commerce and his possession. See id. Again, no error, plain
or otherwise.
C
Third, Smith argues that his three Florida cocaine offenses
don’t qualify as “serious drug offense[s]” within the meaning of
ACCA. This one requires more explanation. In the end, though,
we hold that Smith invited any error in the misclassification of his
cocaine convictions and, therefore, that he is not entitled to reversal.
1
We begin with some necessary background on ACCA. As
relevant here, ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for anyone convicted of violating § 922(g) who has three or
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more prior convictions for “serious drug offense[s]” that were
“committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1). A “serious drug offense” includes “an offense under
State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing
with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or
more is prescribed by law.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
To determine whether a state conviction qualifies as an
ACCA predicate under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), we apply the “categorical
approach.” Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154, 160 (2020). In doing so, we “look only to the state offense’s elements, not the facts
of the case or labels pinned to the state conviction,” id., and ask
whether “the State’s definition of the drug in question matches the
definition under federal law,” Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101,
106 (2024) (citation modified). As already explained, we compare
the state and federal definitions at the time when the defendant was
convicted of the predicate drug offense. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 854.
2
Smith argues that his Florida cocaine convictions fail this
matching exercise. He asserts that at the time of his 1993 and 2001
offenses, Florida’s definition of cocaine at least arguably encompassed more “isomers” than did the federal definition. In plain English, an isomer is a molecule that contain the same atoms as another, but in which those atoms are arranged in a different configUSCA11 Case: 23-10003 Document: 68-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2026 Page: 11 of 23
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uration. Smith argues that because the government bore the burden to show a match between the state and federal statutes, the
alleged isomeric mismatch renders Florida’s cocaine definition
overbroad. And that, in turn, fatally undermines his ACCA enhancement.
We find that we needn’t wade into the chemistry—or the
ensuing matching analysis—because Smith invited any error in
classifying his cocaine convictions as ACCA-qualifying serious drug
offenses. Under the invited-error doctrine, “a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that
party.” United States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quoting United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 988 (11th Cir. 1997)). In
United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2020), for example,
we held that a defendant had invited any erroneous application of
an ACCA enhancement because he (1) told the court that he
“wanted to object” to the enhancement but had determined after
researching the caselaw that he “couldn’t file a legal objection” and
(2) later “conceded that ‘it look[ed] like the calculations [we]re correct that [he] d[id] qualify’” for an ACCA sentence. Id. at 1085.
This case is quite similar. At his sentencing hearing, Smith
expressly acknowledged that “the proposed guideline calculations,
including the ACCA designation, are correct . . . [u]nder existing
law . . . of the Eleventh Circuit.” Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 6. And he
later stated that although he was “frustrated,” “legally, [he] d[idn’t]
have any objections to the [probation office’s] scoring”—which,
importantly, included the ACCA enhancement. Id. at 9. So, like
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the defendant in Innocent, Smith twice told the court that ACCA
applied to his case under governing law. He can’t now turn around
and argue that it didn’t.
To be sure, Smith has a response, and we take it seriously.
In particular, he posits a distinction between this case and Innocent:
Smith says that he conceded ACCA’s applicability only “in the context of maintaining his objections,” Reply Br. at 4 n.4, whereas the
defendant in Innocent didn’t provide any similar “context,” see 977
F.3d at 1081. That distinction matters, Smith contends, because his
“objections” “includ[ed] the stereoisomer-overbreadth issue”—
meaning, the argument goes, that he didn’t invite the error that he
now raises on appeal. Reply Br. at 4 n.4.
After carefully reviewing the record, we disagree with
Smith’s characterization of the sentencing proceeding. During his
hearing, Smith highlighted his previous overbreadth objections to
Florida’s definition of cocaine. See Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 5. He referenced Jackson I, which addressed the question whether the definition was overbroad because it included ioflupane, and McCobb,
which involved the question whether Florida’s definition was overbroad because it encompassed more isomers than the federal definition. Id. Smith described those two cases as “addressing the same
issue.” Id. He also reiterated his earlier objection that his cocainetrafficking offense couldn’t be an ACCA predicate because one
form of trafficking—trafficking by purchase—didn’t necessarily involve possession, id., an argument that we rejected in Conage III, see
50 F.4th 81–82. Smith then stated that he was “maintaining [his]
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objections,” but that, in light of Jackson II and Conage III, he didn’t
“have an argument before [the district court] on those matters but
would like to preserve them for review.” Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 6.
Importantly, the court then asked Smith whether he “would say
that the proposed [G]uideline calculations, including the ACCA
designation[,] are correct under the . . . existing law . . . of the Eleventh Circuit,” and Smith responded “[y]es.” Id. And, as already
explained, he later reiterated that despite his “frustrat[ion],” he
“d[idn’t] have an objection to the [probation office’s] scoring.” Id.
at 9.
Based on his own statements, we are constrained to conclude that Smith maintained the overbreadth arguments that were
foreclosed by Jackson II and Conage III but invited any error in the
district court’s conclusion that the ACCA enhancement applied under existing law. Put differently, while Smith can argue on appeal
that we should overturn precedent that he views as erroneous, he
can’t argue that, under current precedent, ACCA doesn’t apply to
his case. And yet, that’s precisely the position he takes. Smith asserts that because (1) the federal and Florida definitions of cocaine
facially mismatch and (2) the government failed to show that the
definitions nevertheless covered the same substances, the district
court erred by concluding that his cocaine convictions were valid
ACCA predicates. See Br. of Appellant at 15–21. But if Smith “believed that” his convictions didn’t qualify as serious drug offenses
under current law, he “should not have [told] the court” that the
ACCA designation was correct under existing precedent. See In re
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Carbon Dioxide Indus. Antitrust Litig., 229 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.
2000).
Smith, naturally, resists this conclusion. For support, he invokes our recent decision in United States v. Miller, 157 F.4th 1365
(11th Cir. 2025), and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown
v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024). Smith suggests that Miller and
Brown—which he characterizes as “intervening precedent,” Notice
of Suppl. Auth. at 1, Mar. 18, 2026, App. Dkt. No. 66—changed the
relevant law, vitiating any invited-error failure, see id. at 2. “After
Miller and Brown,” Smith contends, “any overage in Florida’s cocaine statute renders the state convictions not ‘serious drug offense[s].’” Id. And crucially, Smith says that this proposition
“wasn’t established at [the time of his] sentencing.” Id.
We disagree with Smith’s characterization of Miller and
Brown. Those cases didn’t “establish[]” the rule that a conviction
under an overbroad state statute can’t trigger ACCA; that principle
is little more than a recitation of at least one variation of the categorical approach, which has long been part of ACCA jurisprudence. For example, in Jackson II—which Brown affirmed, and
which Smith addressed at sentencing—we explained that “[u]nder
[the categorical] approach, a state conviction cannot serve as an
ACCA predicate offense if the state law under which the conviction
occurred is categorically broader—that is, if it punishes more conduct—than ACCA’s definition of a ‘serious drug offense.’” 55 F.4th
at 850. So, as we see things, the principle that Smith attributes to
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Miller and Brown was plenty well established when, at his sentencing hearing, he expressly conceded that existing law justified the
ACCA enhancement.
* * *
In sum, Smith “invited the district court to impose” an
ACCA-enhanced sentence. Love, 449 F.3d at 1157. He may not
now claim that the court erred in doing so.
D
Fourth, Smith asserts that his ACCA sentence violates the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments as interpreted in Erlinger, which held
that ACCA’s different-occasions element “must be resolved by a
unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in
a guilty plea),” 602 U.S. at 854—neither of which, Smith says, happened here. Because Smith didn’t raise this issue before the district
court, our review is limited to plain error. “To find reversible error
under the plain error standard, we must conclude that (1) an error
occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected substantial rights. If these three criteria are met, we may reverse for plain
error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302,
1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). Here, notwithstanding
the fact that the Supreme Court decided Erlinger after Smith was
sentenced, we conclude that the district court plainly erred under
Erlinger. See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 269 (2013)
(holding that an “error is ‘plain’ within the meaning of [Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)]” if it’s “plain as of . . . the time
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of appellate review”). Because the error didn’t affect Smith’s substantial rights, however, we decline to disturb his sentence.
1
The first two plain-error criteria—that there be an error, and
the error be plain—are easily satisfied. An error is plain “if ‘the explicit language of a statute or rule’ or ‘precedent from the Supreme
Court or this Court directly resolv[es]’ the issue.” Innocent, 977
F.3d at 1081 (quoting United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1325
(11th Cir. 2015)). In Erlinger, the Supreme Court squarely held that
for an ACCA enhancement to comport with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, the fact that the predicate offenses occurred on “occasions different from one another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), must be
either (1) found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) admitted in a guilty plea. 602 U.S. at 834. Neither happened here, so the
court erred in applying ACCA. And because Erlinger speaks directly
to this issue, the error is plain. See Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1081 (“An
error is plain if it is clear or obvious—that is, if the explicit language
of a statute or rule or precedent from the Supreme Court or this
Court directly resolves the issue.” (citation modified)). 2
2 The government resists this conclusion. It insists that when Smith failed to
object to the fact, contained in his PSI, that his offenses occurred on different
occasions, he admitted to ACCA’s different-occasions requirement. Smith, for
his part, denies that he even conceded that his offenses occurred on different
occasions. He asserts that the PSI’s different-occasions finding is an elemental
fact—i.e., it’s an element of the ACCA enhancement—and, therefore, that the
failure to object doesn’t amount to an admission. The parties’ dispute is beside
the point; even if we were to agree with the government that Smith’s nonUSCA11 Case: 23-10003 Document: 68-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2026 Page: 17 of 23
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2
That brings us to the substantial-rights prong of the plainerror analysis. To establish a violation of his substantial rights,
Smith must “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different”—i.e.,
“a reasonable probability that a jury would have concluded that he
committed the three predicate crimes on fewer than three occasions.” Edwards, 142 F.4th at 1281–82. This requirement sets a high
bar for Smith; clearing it is “anything but easy.” Id. at 1281.
The timing of Smith’s infractions convinces us that there is
no reasonable probability that a jury could find the different-occasions requirement unsatisfied. Determining whether offenses occurred on different occasions is a “multi-factored” inquiry that involves “[t]iming,” “[p]roximity,” and “the character and relationship of the offenses.” Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 369
(2022). That said, “a single factor—especially of time or place—can
decisively differentiate occasions.” Id. at 370. The Supreme Court
has suggested that, if offenses occurred more than even one day
apart, the different-occasions requirement is likely satisfied. See
objection constituted an admission, Erlinger makes clear that there are only
two ways to satisfy ACCA’s different-occasion element: Again, it must be either (1) proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) admitted in a guilty
plea. 602 U.S. at 834. Neither occurred here, and Erlinger doesn’t countenance
a third, admission-by-failure-to-object-at-sentencing option. So Smith’s purported acquiescence to the PSI doesn’t negate the Erlinger error that occurred
here, or make it less than plain.
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id. (“Courts, for instance, have nearly always treated offenses as occurring on separate occasions if a person committed them a day or
more apart . . . .”). And we’ve said that “a close[] case—but by no
means an easy one—would be one involving ‘a defendant who sells
drugs to the same undercover police officer twice at the same street
corner one hour apart.’” United States v. Penn, 63 F.4th 1305, 1318
(11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Wooden, 595 U.S. at 386 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)).
Here, the PSI recited that Smith’s state cocaine offenses occurred on (1) July 14, 1993, (2) July 20, 1993, and (3) July 15, 2001.
The only offenses that even arguably could have occurred on the
same occasion are the two from 1993, but even those took place
almost a full week apart. Given the Supreme Court’s suggestion
that one day’s gap is generally dispositive, as well as our holding
that even an hour’s gap would make for a close case, we conclude
that Smith hasn’t met his burden to show a reasonable probability
that a jury wouldn’t find that his week-apart sales occurred on different occasions.
Smith advances two primary counterarguments. First, he
points out that the PSI’s information about his predicate offenses
likely came from Shepard documents3 or arrest reports, which he
3 Shepard documents “include ‘the charging document, . . . a plea agreement
or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual
basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or . . . some comparable
judicial record of this information.’” United States v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301, 1304
(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)). USCA11 Case: 23-10003 Document: 68-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2026 Page: 19 of 23
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says makes the PSI unworthy of consideration in the substantialrights analysis. But as the Supreme Court has observed, when deciding whether error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, a
court “may consider the entire record”—“includ[ing] information
contained in a pre-sentence report.” Greer v. United States, 593 U.S.
503, 511 (2021). Unsurprisingly, then, we have looked at the PSI
when deciding whether an Erlinger error affected a defendant’s substantial rights. See Edwards, 142 F.4th at 1283. We deem it appropriate to do so again here.
Second, Smith argues that even if the facts pertaining to his
predicate offenses were before a jury, there’s a reasonable probability that the jurors wouldn’t find that the 1993 sales occurred on
different occasions. To support this claim, Smith cites Erlinger’s
dicta that a jury may or may not have concluded that the defendant’s ACCA predicates there—three burglaries over a “span of
days”—occurred on different occasions. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 826,
835. But Erlinger didn’t arise on plain-error review, and the Court
expressly “decide[d] no more than” that the defendant was entitled
to a jury determination of ACCA’s different-occasions inquiry. Id.
at 835. Accordingly, the Court declined to opine on the likelihood
that a jury would find the different-occasions requirement satisfied.
See id. (“Presented with evidence about the times, locations, purpose, and character of those crimes, a jury might have concluded
that some or all occurred on different occasions. Or it might not
have done so. All we can say for certain is that the sentencing court
erred in taking that decision from a jury of Mr. Erlinger’s peers.”).
The Court’s equivocal language doesn’t help Smith. Under plainUSCA11 Case: 23-10003 Document: 68-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2026 Page: 20 of 23
20 Opinion of the Court 23-10003
error review, the defendant must show a reasonable probability of
a favorable outcome, not just uncertainty about the result. And
the Court’s analysis in Erlinger doesn’t demonstrate (or really even
suggest) a reasonable probability that the jury wouldn’t have found
that the defendant there committed his predicate offenses on different occasions, much less that a jury would reach that conclusion
in this case. 4
* * *
Our caselaw establishes that when offenses were committed
a week apart, it will be exceedingly difficult for a defendant to show
the required reasonable probability that a jury would conclude that
the offenses occurred on the same occasion. Smith hasn’t persuaded us that his case is the rare exception. Accordingly, he hasn’t
4 Smith also cites two unpublished district court cases in which juries rejected
the government’s different-occasions argument. In United States v. Pennington,
No. 1:19-cr-455 (N.D. Ga. Sep. 20, 2022), the government presented evidence
that the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute on June 10, 2013, and then convicted of possession of marijuana and
cocaine with intent to distribute on October 30, 2013. But the documents that
Smith cites don’t provide any information about the offense dates—just the conviction dates. Pennington, therefore, isn’t particularly probative of whether a
reasonable jury could conclude that Smith’s 1993 cocaine sales occurred on
the same occasion. In United States v. Willis, No. 4-21-cr-548 (E.D. Mo. July 16,
2024), the indictment alleged that the defendant had been convicted of three
first-degree robberies, with each offense about two weeks apart. But we don’t
have any information about what evidence the government presented—or
didn’t present—about when the robberies occurred; all we know is what was
alleged in the indictment. So, like Pennington, Willis doesn’t tell us much. USCA11 Case: 23-10003 Document: 68-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2026 Page: 21 of 23
23-10003 Opinion of the Court 21
established prejudice to his substantial rights, and his Erlinger claim
fails.
E
Lastly, Smith contends that the district court erred by classifying his Florida cocaine-trafficking conviction as a “controlled substance offense” under § 4B1.2(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines. 5
Because we have determined that the ACCA enhancement was
proper, any error was harmless. Here’s why: Normally, when a
defendant is convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, his base
offense level is calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). If the defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm at the time of his offense, his base offense level is set at 14. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6). But
if the defendant had previously sustained a felony conviction for a
“controlled substance offense,” his base offense level jumps to 20.
Id. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The term “controlled substance offense” is defined in § 4B1.2(b). Id. § 2K2.1 Application Note 1.
5 “[W]e review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of
the sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2004). If an error in the district court’s Guidelines calculations is harmless,
reversal isn’t warranted. See United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2015).
The parties dispute whether Smith preserved his challenge to the controlled-substance-offense enhancement; if he didn’t, our review is limited to
plain error. See United States v. Bankston, 945 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019).
Because we conclude that any error in the district court’s application of the
Guidelines was harmless, we need not resolve the standard-of-review dispute. USCA11 Case: 23-10003 Document: 68-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2026 Page: 22 of 23
22 Opinion of the Court 23-10003
A different Guidelines framework applies, however, if the
defendant is sentenced as an armed career criminal. In that case,
he faces a minimum base offense level of 33. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b).
So here, even though the district court determined that Smith’s
base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) would have been 20—
based on Smith’s prior controlled-substance-offense conviction—it
applied the ACCA-enhanced base offense level of 33. Accordingly,
any error in bumping Smith’s base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)
from 14 to 20 was harmless, because the court ultimately applied
the higher base level applicable to armed career offenders. Cf.
United States v. Chirino-Alvarez, 615 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“[W]hen . . . the district court correctly imposes a statutory mandatory minimum sentence that is greater than a defendant’s Guidelines range, any error in the guidelines calculations is harmless
. . . .” (citation modified)). 6 And because any error was harmless,
we won’t disturb Smith’s sentence on these grounds.
III
In sum, we conclude that § 922(g) violates neither the Second Amendment nor the Commerce Clause, that Smith invited
any error in the district court’s determination that his cocaine convictions qualified as “serious drug offense[s]” within the meaning
of ACCA, that the district court’s Erlinger error didn’t affect Smith’s
6 To his credit, Smith concedes that if we conclude that ACCA applies, any
error in the application of § 4B1.2(b)(1) is harmless.
USCA11 Case: 23-10003 Document: 68-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2026 Page: 23 of 23
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substantial rights, and that any error in calculating Smith’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) was harmless. Accordingly,
we affirm Smith’s conviction and ACCA-enhanced sentence.
AFFIRMED.