Pierson v. Illinois State Police

2026 IL App (1st) 250383

No. 1-25-0383

Opinion filed August 28, 2026

Sixth Division

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

)

HEATHER PIERSON, ) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellant,

) Cook County.

v. )

) No. 23 CH 9190

THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, )

) Honorable

Defendant-Appellee. ) Caroline Kate Moreland,

) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Pucinski and Gamrath concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Heather Pierson, a former Illinois State Police dispatcher, alleges her employer violated

the Genetic Information Privacy Act (Act) (410 ILCS 513/1 et seq. (West 2024)) by requiring

her to disclose genetic information as a condition of employment. The trial court dismissed her

claim. The question on appeal is whether the Act waives the State’s sovereign immunity from

monetary damages.

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¶2 Because the Act does not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity for damages

against the State, we affirm.

¶3 Background

¶4 The Illinois State Police (ISP) employed Heather Pierson as a dispatcher from June 2000

until May 2022. She alleges that, during annual meetings between 2018 and 2021, ISP required

her to disclose family medical history—including heart disease, cancer, and diabetes—on

workers’ compensation questionnaires. After leaving ISP, she filed this class action, alleging

those requests violated the Act and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.

¶5 ISP moved to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2024). Although acknowledging that the Act applies to state employees, ISP

argued that sovereign immunity barred Pierson’s claim for monetary damages because the Act

contains no express waiver for claims against the State. ISP also argued that Pierson lacked

standing to seek injunctive relief since she no longer worked there, and, without monetary or

injunctive relief, no actual controversy supported declaratory relief.

¶6 Pierson responded that the Act expressly waives sovereign immunity by defining

“employer” to include the State. 410 ILCS 513/10 (West 2024). According to Pierson, that

definition becomes meaningless if the State is not an “offending party” subject to damages.

¶7 Pierson also asserted that (i) she was an “aggrieved person,” entitled to seek recovery under

section 40 of the Act (id. § 40), and (ii) seeking monetary and injunctive relief presented an

“actual controversy.” The trial court dismissed the case. It held that although the Act applies

to State employers, its damages provision does not expressly waive sovereign immunity, as

“offending party” does not refer to the State. See id. Concerning Pierson’s claim for injunctive

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and declaratory relief, the trial court held that she lacked standing to seek an injunction, so no

“actual controversy” remained between Pierson and ISP.

¶8 Analysis

¶9 Standard of Review

¶ 10 In reviewing a dismissal under either sections 2-615 or 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619

(West 2024)), we construe the pleadings in Pierson’s favor and apply the de novo standard.

See Board of Education of Park Forest-Chicago Heights School District No. 163 v. Houlihan,

382 Ill. App. 3d 604, 608 (2008). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.

Norabuena v. Medtronic, Inc., 2017 IL App (1st) 162928, ¶ 14.

¶ 11 Pierson’s briefs raise one issue—the dismissal of the monetary damages claim. By not

challenging dismissal of the injunctive or declaratory claims, she has forfeited them. See Ill.

S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited ***.”).

¶ 12 The Act and Sovereign Immunity

¶ 13 The Act limits “the use or disclosure of, and requests for, protected health information to

the minimum necessary to accomplish an intended purpose.” 410 ILCS 513/5 (West 2024).

The Act prohibits an employer (including the State) from soliciting, requesting, requiring, or

purchasing genetic testing or genetic information as a condition of employment, among other

protections. Id. § 25. A “person aggrieved by a violation of [the] Act shall have a right of action

in a State circuit court *** against an offending party.” Id. § 40.

¶ 14 The dispositive question is whether the Act expressly authorizes damages against the State.

Pierson argues that the Act waives the State’s sovereign immunity for damages by defining it

as an “employer” prohibited from requesting genetic information (id. § 10) and allowing suit

against an “offending party.” We disagree.

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¶ 15 “The doctrine of sovereign immunity exists in Illinois pursuant to the Immunity Act, which

mandates that the State or a department of the State cannot be a defendant in an action brought

directly in the circuit court, except where the State has expressly consented to be sued.”

Watkins v. Office of the State Appellate Defender, 2012 IL App (1st) 111756, ¶ 21. That

consent needs to be “clear and unequivocal” (internal quotation marks omitted) (In re Special

Education of Walker, 131 Ill. 2d 300, 303 (1989)) and “expressed by specific legislative

authorization,” appearing in “affirmative statutory language.” Williams v. Davenport, 306 Ill.

App. 3d 465, 469 (1999); see Lynch v. Department of Transportation, 2012 IL App (4th)

111040, ¶ 30 (sovereign immunity must be “clearly, unequivocally, or affirmatively” waived).

¶ 16 Pierson relies on Department of Revenue v. Appellate Court, 67 Ill. 2d 392 (1977),

contending, “Statutes that ‘in express terms refer to the State’ manifest a consent to be sued

and are adequate to authorize monetary relief against the State.” That quoted language she

attributes to the decision does not appear in it. More importantly, Department of Revenue

supports the opposite conclusion.

¶ 17 In Department of Revenue, our supreme court reversed an order requiring a State agency

to pay court costs. Id. at 398. The court held that general language imposing costs did not waive

sovereign immunity; consent “must appear in affirmative statutory language.” Id. at 396. And

neither the statute nor a supreme court rule expressly referenced the State. Id. at 398.

¶ 18 Although sections 10 and 25 refer to the State, section 40 on damages speaks only in

general terms to an “offending party.” 410 ILCS 513/40 (West 2024). That general language

does not satisfy Department of Revenue’s express authorization of damages.

¶ 19 Pierson further contends that reading the Act as a whole shows the legislature’s intent to

waive sovereign immunity, relying on Grey v. Hasbrouck, 2015 IL App (1st) 130267. Grey

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does not help Pierson. In Grey, the court held that sovereign immunity did not bar damages

because the statute expressly authorized suit “against the offending unit of government.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 15, 20-21. The Act does not contain comparable

explicit language allowing damages against the State.

¶ 20 In addition, Pierson’s argument conflates two distinct concepts. Expressly subjecting the

State to the Act’s requirements does not mean the State expressly consented to damages. In

other words, regulating the State as an employer does not authorize a damages action against

it. Had the legislature intended to waive sovereign immunity, it knew how to say so. Illinois

State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 35.

¶ 21 Affirmed.

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Pierson v. Illinois State Police, 2026 IL App (1st) 250383

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 23-CH09190; the Hon. Caroline Kate Moreland, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Rachel Minder, of Siri & Glimstad LLP, of New York, New for York, for appellant.

Appellant:

Attorneys Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, for Solicitor General, and Valerie Quinn, Assistant Attorney Appellee: General, of counsel), for appellee.

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