Marquez v. State

majority opinion

Luis Ivan Marquez v. State of Maryland, No. 1563, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Getty, Joseph M., J.

HEADNOTES:

PUBLIC SAFETY — RESTRICTION ON FIREARM POSSESSION BASED ON

DISQUALIFYING OFFENSE — JUVENILE ADJUDICATION

When a party is charged with unlawful firearm possession based on a disqualifying offense, the disqualifying offense is a juvenile adjudication, and the party declines to stipulate to the offense, the Maryland Public Safety Article creates a limited exception to the prohibition against admission of a juvenile record in a criminal proceeding prior to conviction solely for the purpose of establishing the required disqualified legal status. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. C-16-CR-23-001823

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 1563

September Term, 2024

LUIS IVAN MARQUEZ

STATE OF MARYLAND

Berger,

Leahy,

Getty, Joseph M.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Getty, J.

Filed: August 28, 2026

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal

Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State

Government Article) this document is authentic.

2026.08.28

'00'04- 11:25:53

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

When faced with two statutory provisions that appear to conflict, this Court

presumes that the legislature “intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and

harmonious body of law.” Len Stoler, Inc. v. Wisner, 223 Md. App. 218, 234 (2015)

(internal quotations omitted). We likewise presume “that the General Assembly had, and

acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law . . . and

the policy of the prior law.” Id. We seek to “harmonize these seemingly inconsistent

statutory mandates,” or, failing that, to determine which statute controls the facts before

us. Aleman v. State, 242 Md. App. 632, 643–44 (2019), aff’d, 469 Md. 397 (2020).

Whenever reasonably possible, we interpret statutes to avoid repeal by implication. See

Wisner, 223 Md. App. at 234.

In the case before us, we consider whether Section 5-133(b)(15) of the Public Safety

Article (“PS”) of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which prohibits a person under the age

of thirty from possessing a regulated firearm if he was previously adjudicated delinquent

for a disqualifying offense, poses a conflict with Section 3-8A-23 of the Courts and Judicial

Proceedings Article (“CJP”), which provides that a juvenile adjudication is inadmissible as

evidence against the adjudged in a criminal proceeding prior to conviction. We are not

aware of any prior case in Maryland that has remarked upon this tension.

In the early morning hours of February 20, 2023, Maurice Chase (“Mr. Chase”), an

off-duty security guard, got into an altercation with Appellant Luis Ivan Marquez (“Mr.

Marquez”), who was smoking in the lobby of the building where Mr. Chase lived and

worked. The altercation resulted in Mr. Marquez shooting Mr. Chase. Mr. Marquez argued

that he shot Mr. Chase in self-defense.

Mr. Marquez was charged, among other things, with a violation of the unlawful

possession of a firearm statute PS § 5-133(b)(15). At trial, Mr. Marquez declined to

stipulate to the disqualifying event that supported this charge because it was a juvenile

adjudication. As a result, the court exercised its discretion to allow limited evidence of Mr.

Marquez’s juvenile record to support the existence of the disqualifying event. Mr. Marquez

submits that, under CJP § 3-8A-23, this evidence was not admissible.

A jury convicted Mr. Marquez of second-degree murder, use of a firearm in a crime

of violence, illegal possession of a regulated firearm by one under the age of thirty, wearing

and carrying a handgun, and illegal possession of ammunition. Mr. Marquez submits four

questions for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in failing to strike the prosecutor’s improper closing

argument?

2. Did the trial court err in restricting Mr. Marquez’s ability to present a defense?

3. Did the trial court err in permitting the State to introduce Mr. Marquez’s juvenile

record and in permitting it to be called a conviction?

4. Are Mr. Marquez’s convictions and sentences for one count of possession of a

regulated firearm by one under the age of thirty and three counts of wearing and

carrying a handgun illegal?

We answer questions one through three in the negative and affirm. As to question

four, we remand to correct the sentence accordingly.

BACKGROUND

A. Legislative History

In addressing Mr. Marquez’s contention that CJP § 3-8A-23 conflicts with PS § 5-133(b)(15), we find a brief overview of the origin of these provisions provides important

context.

CJP § 3-8A-23 aims to protect juvenile offenders from carrying the same burden,

and in particular the same civil disabilities, that a criminal record would impose. The

current iteration of the statute took shape in the early 1970s, following a comprehensive

restructuring of the law concerning juvenile court proceedings in Maryland in 1969. See

Folk v. State, 11 Md. App. 508, 510 (1970). The 1969 Acts were codified into Article 26,

§ 70-1, et seq., and those provisions were recodified into the Courts and Judicial

Proceedings Article in 1973. This section of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,

often called the Juvenile Causes Act, was recodified in 1975 to make juvenile procedures

uniform across the state. Modifications to the law since then have made no substantive

changes regarding juvenile delinquency.1

The underlying policy of the juvenile justice system has evolved significantly over

the last few decades. Since 1997, the juvenile justice system has incorporated a model of

Balanced and Restorative Justice. This approach aims to move away from both the

traditional view of juvenile justice as purely rehabilitative and the more punitive view that

See Comm’n on Juvenile Justice Jurisdiction, Final Report to the Governor and General Assembly (2001).

arose in the 1980s,2 and to balance the objectives of public safety, accountability to victims

of juvenile offenders, and promoting “competency and character development to assist

children in becoming responsible and productive members of society.” CJP § 3-802.

The purpose of the provision that is now PS § 5-133(b)(15) was to extend

Maryland’s longstanding prohibition against firearm possession by adults convicted of

certain crimes to those adults with certain juvenile offenses.

Maryland has prohibited adults convicted of certain crimes from possessing

regulated firearms since the early twentieth century, a restriction that predates the federal

prohibitions put into place by the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968. Maryland extended

this prohibition to those who had committed certain acts as juveniles as part of the

Responsible Gun Safety Act of 2000. The language therein stated:

A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: […]

(3) Is less than 30 years of age at the time of possession and has been

adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for committing:

(i) A crime of violence;

(ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State; or

(iii) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that carries a

statutory penalty of more than 2 years.

S.B. 211, 2000 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Third Reader).

The relevant portion of this Act was codified into Article 27 of the Maryland Code,

Section 445, under the heading “Regulated Firearms.” Article 27 §§ 441 to 449 were then

See Panel on Juvenile Crime: Prevention, Treatment, and Control, Nat’l Rsch. Council & Inst. of Med., Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice (Joan McCord, Cathy Spatz Widom & Nancy A. Crowell eds., 2001).

recodified in 2003 into Sections 5-128 through 5-144 of the Public Safety Article. The

language in PS § 5-133 was “derived without substantive change” from its predecessor.

See Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 488 (2004) (quoting PS § 5-133 (2003) (Special

Revisor’s Note)).

PS § 5-133 was again modified by the Firearm Safety Act of 2013. This Act

mandated a handgun qualification license, banned certain types of assault weapons, and

expanded limits on firearm ownership to include individuals involuntarily committed or

voluntarily admitted to a mental health facility for more than 30 days.

The current text of PS § 5-133 reads, in relevant part:

[A] person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person:

[…] (15) if under the age of 30 years at the time of possession, has

been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for an act that would

be a disqualifying crime if committed by an adult.

PS § 5-133(b)(15).

Thus, although CJP § 3-8A-23 predates PS § 5-133 by several decades, these two

provisions have coexisted since 2000.

Recent cases before this Court and before our Supreme Court have examined the

effect of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) on Maryland’s

firearm regulations. In State v. Fields, No. 784, Sept. Term 2022, slip op. at *12 (App. Ct.

Md. July 2, 2026), this Court undertook a thorough analysis of whether PS § 5-133(d),

which prohibits possession of regulated firearms by those under the age of twenty-one, was

consistent with the nation’s history and tradition of firearms regulation as outlined in

Bruen. This Court in Fields concluded that PS § 5-133(d) remained constitutional under

Bruen.3

In Fooks v. State, 490 Md. 458 (2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1644 (2026), our

Supreme Court held that PS § 5-133(b)(2), which prohibits regulated firearm possession

by a person who “has been convicted of a violation classified as a common law crime and

received a term of imprisonment of more than 2 years[,]” remained constitutional under

Bruen. The Court reasoned that this provision is analogous to a felon dispossession statute,

which the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed presumptively lawful. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at

81; United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 682 (2024).

B. Factual Background

Around midnight on February 20, 2023, Maurice Chase’s fiancée called him from

a McDonald’s where she was experiencing car trouble. Mr. Chase was in his apartment at

the Takoma Towers apartment building, which he shared with Brandon White. The two

worked as security guards for the building, but they were off duty that night.

Mr. White agreed to drive Mr. Chase to pick up his fiancée and her children from

the McDonald’s, and the two left the apartment. Mr. Chase remained on a video call with

his fiancée as he and Mr. White entered the building’s lobby. In the lobby, they noticed

The Court reasoned that those under the age of majority, which was twenty-one in the Founding era, were subject to “pervasive” restrictions on legal rights, including restrictions on purchasing firearms. Fields, slip op. at *26–29. The Court also noted that even though Bruen rendered Maryland’s previous “good and substantial reason” requirement for firearm licensure unconstitutional, the unconstitutional provision was severable from the rest of the applicable statute, which remained valid. Fields, slip op. at *17.

Appellant Mr. Marquez, along with four other individuals they did not recognize, smoking

near the back exit to the building.

Mr. Chase approached Mr. Marquez and told him to leave the building. Mr. Chase

asked Mr. Marquez, “Who do you know here?” to which Mr. Marquez responded by

knocking on the door of apartment T9. Another building resident, Mary Mboe, testified

that shortly after midnight, she heard a knock at the door of apartment T9. She answered,

and asked what the visitor wanted, to which he responded that “he wanted to come in.”

She denied him entry and closed the door.

Mr. Marquez then walked up to Mr. Chase and Mr. White, uttered a colorful array

of expletives, and turned to leave through the front door. According to Mr. White, as Mr.

Marquez turned away, he spit on Mr. Chase. Mr. Chase then punched Mr. Marquez in the

jaw, knocking him to the floor. Mr. White pulled Mr. Chase away from Mr. Marquez, and

Mr. Marquez stood up and again headed for the front door.

Mr. Marquez stepped outside, and Mr. Chase and Mr. White turned around and

headed back into the building. At this point, Mr. White testified that he heard gunshots.

Mr. Chase’s fiancée, who was still on the video call, also heard gunshots, and called 911.

Mr. White and Mr. Chase then ran toward the rear exit. Mr. Chase grabbed Mr. White and

told him that “he was hit[,]” and the two fell to the floor. Mr. White called 911.

Corporal Richard Carlson responded to the call and arrived on the scene while Mr.

Chase was still alive. Corporal Carlson recognized Mr. Chase as a security guard who

worked in the building. While Corporal Carlson was rendering first aid to Mr. Chase, Mr.

Chase told him that he was shot by “a Hispanic male, with a black shirt, black jacket or

coat and a black ski mask,” and indicated the direction the shooter had fled. Mr. Chase

was pronounced dead at 4:40 a.m. at the MedStar Washington Hospital Center.

Dr. Kristinza Giese, the medical examiner who performed Mr. Chase’s autopsy,

testified that Mr. Chase suffered six gunshot wounds: three to his torso, two to his left leg,

and one to his right arm.

Around 8:30 a.m. that same morning, officers were alerted to an ongoing incident

at a Walgreens near the Takoma Towers building involving an individual believed to be

armed. Based on a description from a Walgreens employee, officers put out a bulletin

stating that the individual was on foot in the surrounding area. Officers apprehended Mr.

Marquez in a nearby parking lot and patted him down. They recovered a loaded firearm

and “a box of half-used ammunition.”

After Mr. Marquez was arrested, he waived his Miranda rights and spoke with

detectives on three occasions. Mr. Marquez initially told Detective Linden Edwards, the

lead detective in the case, that he had been at his mother’s house all evening. Later, during

interviews conducted on May 16 and May 25, 2023, Mr. Marquez gave detectives his

account of the events at Takoma Towers, and asserted that he had acted in self-defense.

A jury trial proceeded in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County from March

19–27, 2024. At trial, cell phone forensics examiner Detective Aven Odhner testified that

call records from Mr. Marquez’s phone placed the phone near Takoma Towers at midnight

on the evening of the incident in question. Firearms examiner Jamie Smith testified that

shell casings and bullets recovered from the scene of the shooting were consistent with

having been fired from the gun recovered from Mr. Marquez.

As we have noted above, Mr. Marquez was charged, among his other offenses, with

a violation of PS § 5-133(b)(15), which provides, in relevant part, that “a person may not

possess a regulated firearm if the person: […] (15) if under the age of 30 years at the time

of possession, has been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for an act that would be

a disqualifying crime if committed by an adult.” PS § 5-133(b)(15). This charge rested on

Mr. Marquez’s previous juvenile delinquency adjudication for a robbery.

Counsel for Mr. Marquez in this case elected not to stipulate to this fact, and

simultaneously argued that counsel for the State was precluded from introducing evidence

of Mr. Marquez’s juvenile record. The court heard arguments and held its ruling in

abeyance. Ultimately, the court permitted the State to introduce a certified copy of Mr.

Marquez’s juvenile delinquency adjudication. During testimony from Detective Edwards,

the following exchange occurred:

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: [W]hat, if any, further investigation did you do to the

Defendant regarding his ability to possess a handgun?

[DETECTIVE EDWARDS]: The Defendant is -- Luis Ivan Marquez –

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[…]

[DETECTIVE EDWARDS]: The Defendant, Luis Ivan Marquez, is prohibited from

owning a firearm based on a previous conviction for a disqualifying crime.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. Move to strike.

A bench conference followed, wherein the court clarified that the prior incident

should not be described with any specificity, and some of the juvenile record might require

redaction. Mr. Marquez’s counsel stated:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: And I would just like the record being corrected. It

is not a conviction, so I just want that to be clear for the jury because that is –

THE COURT: Okay. And that is why if you were able to do the stipulation, the

language the Court was referencing or to reference is an involvement (inaudible)

possible conviction. And that is -- I mean, that is just right from the statutes. And so

it will be up to the jury to make a determination whether this certified conviction

that comes in and whether based on the series of convictions or categories there are,

whether he has that conviction.

But, again, you know, I agree that the Defendant has various rights, and if you don’t

want to stipulate to something, you do not have to stipulate. But, again, we are not

going to be disingenuous that an involvement and a conviction is not the same thing.

That would be disingenuous, and unless you have a case that states otherwise, the

language that needs to be articulated to the jury is such that it is still not -- that is

why we do that five, four (inaudible). We are not going to have the pieces or

misleading information to a jury.

At trial, Mr. Marquez testified in his own defense. The court sustained objections

to several portions of Mr. Marquez’s testimony regarding Mr. Chase’s behavior, beginning

with the following:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: So when they approached you, did Mr. Chase speak

to you? Did he say something to you?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: Yeah. He was just -- he was angry that I was in the building

smoking. He was –

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for speculation.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[MR. MARQUEZ]: He –

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: You can’t say what you think he was feeling, but

you can tell us what –

[MR. MARQUEZ]: No, I said he was mad. That’s what he said.

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls –

[MR. MARQUEZ]: He said he was mad.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay.

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Hearsay.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Counsel then requested a bench conference, citing to Wallace-Bey v. State, 234 Md.

App. 501 (2017), to support the proposition that a murder defendant claiming self-defense

may testify to statements made to her by the victim that established her fear of the victim.

In Wallace-Bey v. State, this Court held that the circuit court improperly excluded

statements made by the victim, the defendant’s boyfriend, that showed the victim had

repeatedly abused the defendant prior to the murder. Id. at 546.

Next, the court sustained the following objections:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: After you weren’t allowed into T-9, okay, where

did you go next?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: I started walking towards the front of the door, like the out --the entrance.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL:] Did those two individuals -- Mr. Chase and Mr.

White follow you?

[MR. MARQUEZ:] Yeah.

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Leading.

THE COURT: I am sorry? It is. Sustained as to leading.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: What were the two individuals that you were

talking about doing?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: He just kept -- he was angry that they didn’t let me in and –

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for speculation.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Mr. Marquez testified that Mr. Chase continued to shout at him while he attempted

to leave. Defense counsel then asked whether Mr. Marquez knew that Mr. Chase and Mr.

White were employed by the building, and whether Mr. Marquez knew Mr. Chase and Mr.

White’s intentions in following him, both of which sustained objections as leading and

calling for speculation, respectively.

After a ten-minute recess, defense counsel’s questioning continued:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: What did Mr. Chase say to you?

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: No.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Now, we already talked about how you weren’t

allowed into T-9. At that point, did Mr. Chase say other things to you?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: Yeah, he was just being really aggressive.

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Counsel approached the bench seeking clarification on the court’s ruling. The court

explained, “If he is going to say a statement that -- of assaults or threats, then that would

be admissible. But if you are seeking to get statements of something other than that, are

not [admissible].”

Thus advised, defense counsel continued:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: All right, so, Mr. Marquez, I am not trying to

confuse you, but just going back to before you went to [apartment] T-9, did Mr.

Chase say anything to you before you went to T-9 that made you do that?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: Yes.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: What did he say?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: “What the” -- “What the fuck you doing in my building?”

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And did you know what he meant by “my

building”?

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for –

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: No.

Mr. Marquez continued his testimony, relaying without objection that Mr. Chase

said to him, “Why the fuck you lying to me? See, you don’t know nobody here[,]” and,

“Why the fuck you smoking in my building?” Mr. Marquez alleged that he responded,

“Well, I don’t know why you’re so upset, but you can have the building[,]” after which

Mr. Chase struck him. Mr. Marquez denied spitting on Mr. Chase.

Defense counsel’s questioning continued:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. When [Mr. Chase] hit you, what happened?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: I fell. And there was a girl there with me. She screamed my

name. And Mr. White like was holding her back. And he just screaming and

screaming. And then I’m trying to leave out the door, but he’s like, “Yeah, I hit you.

So what? So what? What are you going to do about it?”

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Hearsay.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we approach on that?

THE COURT: No.

Mr. Marquez then testified without objection that after Mr. Chase struck him, he

said some variation of, “What are you going to do about it?” which Mr. Marquez perceived

as threatening.

Mr. Marquez testified that he “felt like it was a set up” because Mr. Chase did not

engage with the others who were with him, and the others left while he was arguing with

Mr. Chase.

[MR. MARQUEZ:] He just came straight to me and he was just like asking me what

I told he asked me. Just kept saying that same thing. Just kept asking me, asking me,

and I kept telling him I’m here -- he wanted me to prove it to him. And, I don’t

know. I feel like -- I don’t know. Just the -- I didn’t get aggressive with him. I think

that made him mad. And when I told him he could have the building –

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection as to –

THE COURT: Sustained.

[…]

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Request to strike that last portion.

THE COURT: Stricken. Please disregard the last part of the statement.

The court clarified that “I think that made him mad” should be stricken due to its

speculative nature.

Near the conclusion of direct examination, defense counsel asked:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Now, I know you said that you didn’t tell Detective

Edwards that, but I just want you to tell the members of the jury, did you shoot Mr.

Chase because you felt disrespected in any way?

[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we –

THE COURT: Leading.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: It is leading.

[…]

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Why did you shoot Mr. Chase?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: I just wanted him to stop hitting me. I wanted -- I was scared

also. I just wanted him to stop hitting me for –

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Were you scared for your life?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: Yeah.

During closing arguments, counsel for the State said:

[STATE’S COUNSEL:] […] You also have second degree specific intent murder.

Right? All murder, if it is not first degree murder, is presumed to be second degree

murder unless proven otherwise. Right? And now the State –

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court has instructed you as to what the law is and those

instructions are binding upon you. Closing arguments are not evidence.

Counsel for Mr. Marquez objected on the belief that the State’s words implied a

burden of proof on the defendant.

The jury convicted Mr. Marquez of second-degree murder, use of a handgun in the

commission of a crime of violence, illegal possession of a regulated firearm by one under

the age of thirty, wearing and carrying a handgun, and illegal possession of ammunition.

Mr. Marquez now appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. The prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof during closing argument, and

the circuit court sufficiently cured any error.

A. The Parties’ Contentions

Mr. Marquez asserts that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof

during closing arguments by stating that “[a]ll murder, if it is not first-degree murder, is

presumed to be second degree murder unless proven otherwise.” Mr. Marquez interprets

this to place a burden of proof on the defendant instead of the State.

The State responds that the prosecutor intended the comment to mean that if the

State were to prove murder, that murder charge would be presumed second-degree murder

unless the State proved a mens rea for first-degree murder. The State asserts that this was

an accurate, if ineloquent, statement of the law.

B. Standard of Review

“Where a party complains that the trial judge’s action abridged a constitutional

right, . . . our review is de novo.” Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 157 (2017). The

prohibition against comments that may shift the burden of proof to the defendant arises

from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Article 22 of the

Maryland Declaration of Rights. This amounts to a claim that the defendant’s

constitutional right was violated, and we therefore review a claim of improper burden

shifting de novo. See Molina v. State, 244 Md. App. 67, 174 (2019).

C. Analysis

It is well-established that “attorneys are afforded great leeway in presenting closing

arguments to the jury.” Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 429 (1999). However, “counsel

may argue law to the jury only where a dispute . . . exists as to the law of the crime.” Tetso

v. State, 205 Md. App. 334, 410 (2012) (quoting White v. State, 66 Md. App. 100, 118

(1986)). “Arguing law includes stating, quoting, discussing or commenting upon a legal

proposition, principle, rule or statute.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

The prohibition against comments that may shift the burden of proof to the

defendant in a criminal trial arises from the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which protect a criminal

defendant’s right not to testify at trial. Although indirect comments regarding a

“defendant’s failure to produce evidence to refute the State’s evidence” may constitute

improper burden shifting even if not “tantamount to [a comment that] the defendant failed

to take the stand[,]” not every such comment will necessarily amount to shifting the burden

of proof. See Molina, 244 Md. App. at 174.

“Not every improper comment by the prosecutor requires reversal, as error in

closing argument is subject to harmless error review.” Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 321

(2017). An error is harmless if “a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the

record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way

influenced the verdict[.]” Id. (quoting Simpson v. State, 442 Md. 446, 457 (2015)). The

State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Here, the prosecutor stated during closing argument: “You also have second degree

specific intent murder. Right? All murder, if it is not first-degree murder, is presumed to

be second degree murder unless proven otherwise.” The applicable law for murder and its

degrees was not in question in this case. Thus, it was improper for the prosecutor to

comment upon the law.

Mr. Marquez interprets the prosecutor’s comment to place a burden on the defendant

to “prove[] otherwise” with regard to second-degree murder. Mr. Marquez also asserts that

even if the State did not intend the comment to shift the burden of proof, the jury could

have interpreted it that way.

Section 2-204(a) of the Maryland Criminal Law Code provides: “A murder that is

not in the first degree under § 2–201 of this subtitle is in the second degree.” Phrased

differently, any murder that is not proven to be in the first degree is a second-degree

murder. This is not a misstatement of the law, and Mr. Marquez’s interpretation relies

heavily on the addition of the phrase “unless proven otherwise” to support a considerable

leap in logic. We therefore conclude that although the prosecutor improperly commented

upon the law during closing argument, the comment did not shift the burden of proof.

We turn now to whether the prosecutor’s comment constitutes harmless error. “In

determining whether the error was harmless, we ask the following: absent the prosecutor’s

improper reading of the law to the jury, is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury

would have returned a verdict of guilty?” White, 66 Md. App. at 120.

Similar to Tetso, where the prosecutor during closing argument improperly

remarked on the weight the jury could give to circumstantial evidence, in this case, the

prosecutor “did not go beyond the law of the case by presenting argument which

substantively altered the binding instructions[.]” 205 Md. App. at 412–13 (quoting White,

66 Md. App. at 123). “The prosecutor’s argument as to the law was neither incorrect nor

materially inconsistent with the circuit court’s instructions.” Id.

Moreover, unlike in Tetso, where the circuit court overruled defense counsel’s

objection to the prosecutor’s comment on the weight of circumstantial evidence, here, the

circuit court issued a curative instruction to the jury. The instruction was sufficient to draw

attention to the State’s ineloquent comment and redirect the jury to the correct statement

of the law.

Accordingly, we hold that although the State improperly commented upon the law

where the law was not in question, the State’s comments during closing argument did not

shift the burden of proof, and the court’s instruction to the jury sufficiently cured any error.

II. The court did not deprive Mr. Marquez of an opportunity to present a defense.

A. The Parties’ Contentions

Mr. Marquez argued that he shot Mr. Chase in self-defense. Accordingly, Mr.

Marquez testified at trial that Mr. Chase made threatening statements to him such that he

feared for his life. The court sustained objections to portions of Mr. Marquez’s testimony

on the grounds that they were hearsay, or else speculative as to Mr. Chase’s internal thought

process. Mr. Marquez argues that these objections should not have been sustained, because

preventing Mr. Marquez from testifying to exactly what Mr. Chase said deprived him of a

meaningful opportunity to present his defense.

The State responds that the court properly exercised its discretion to limit Mr.

Marquez’s testimony, and, perhaps more importantly, that the limits on Mr. Marquez’s

testimony did not in fact prevent him from supporting his defense, because Mr. Marquez

was able to testify to similar or even more detailed actions and statements at other points

during his testimony.

B. Standard of Review

Ordinarily, a trial judge is afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility

of evidence, and we will not disturb such determinations absent an abuse of that discretion.

See Kelly v. State, 392 Md. 511, 530 (2006) (citing Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 158

(1998)). The admissibility of hearsay evidence, however, is a legal question we review de

novo. See Dulyx v. State, 425 Md. 273, 285 (2012).

C. Analysis

A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to “a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)

(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 495 (1984)). This right, “albeit

fundamental, is nonetheless subject to two paramount rules of evidence, embodied both in

case law and in Maryland Rules 5-402 and 5-403. The first is that evidence that is not

relevant to a material issue is inadmissible. The second is that, even if relevant, evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Taneja v. State, 231 Md. App.

1, 11 (2016) (internal quotations omitted).

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying, admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. See Md. R. Evid. 5-801. A circuit court has no discretion to admit hearsay unless it meets an exception.

Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8 (2005); Md. R. Evid. 5-802. Also relevant here is

Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-701, which limits lay witness testimony to “opinions or

inferences which are: (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful

to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.”

A lay witness’s observations must be “rationally based and premised on the personal

knowledge of the witness,” which generally precludes speculation as to another person’s

internal and unobservable thought process or motivation. See State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680,

699 (2014).

Here, Mr. Marquez takes issue with the circuit court’s ruling on several portions of

his testimony as we have outlined supra. These rulings fall into a few distinct categories,

hearsay and speculation chief among them. Before we reach the meat of these issues, we

first briefly address Mr. Marquez’s frustration with the circuit court’s rulings where “[t]he

prosecutor did not have to give a basis for her objection before the court sustained it[,]” or

the court did not give an explanation for sustained objections or allow counsel to approach

for a bench conference.

Although it is “the better practice for trial courts […] to articulate on the record the

reasons for the decision to exclude evidence[,]” neither the Maryland Rules nor our case

law bears such a requirement. See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 100 (2004) (citing Streater

v. State, 352 Md. 800, 810 (1999)). In this case, instances where the court gave a limited

explanation for sustaining the State’s objections appear to retread the same ground as

objections already made earlier in the same testimony. While defense counsel

understandably asked for clarification on the court’s rulings as to specific statements to be

excluded, the record does not indicate any baseless rulings that would suggest an abuse of

discretion.

We turn now to the crux of Mr. Marquez’s claim: the court’s rulings as to hearsay

and speculation. On the matter of hearsay, Mr. Marquez draws a parallel to Wallace-Bey,

234 Md. App. at 546, where this Court held that the circuit court improperly excluded

statements made by the victim, the defendant’s boyfriend, that showed the victim had

repeatedly abused the defendant prior to the murder. In that case, this Court determined

that the victim’s statements were not hearsay because they were largely commands or

threats, which could not be offered to prove the matter asserted therein. Id. at 540.

Here, by contrast, Mr. Marquez’s testimony that Mr. Chase “said he was mad” may

have been hearsay if the statement was being offered to prove that Mr. Chase was indeed

angry. Similarly, Mr. Marquez’s assertion that Mr. Chase said, “Yeah, I hit you. So what?”

may have been hearsay if the statement was being offered to prove that Mr. Chase did

indeed hit Mr. Marquez.

The circuit court also sustained objections to portions of Mr. Marquez’s testimony

when Mr. Marquez offered speculative observations as to Mr. Chase’s internal thought

process without personal knowledge, i.e. “I think that made him mad.” Although Maryland

Rule of Evidence 5-701 allows for the introduction of a lay opinion on the mental state of

another as a “shorthand” statement of fact, such an observation must be derived from firsthand knowledge, rationally connected to the underlying facts, and, crucially, helpful to the

jury. See Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104, 118 (1997), overruled on other grounds by

Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706 (2005). The assertion that something Mr. Marquez did or

said “made” Mr. Chase mad reaches beyond a rational interpretation of Mr. Marquez’s

observation and into drawing an impermissible conclusion on the effect of Mr. Marquez’s

actions on Mr. Chase’s internal thought process. Moreover, Mr. Marquez was permitted

to convey his observation that Mr. Chase spoke and acted aggressively toward him through

other testimony, and thus the speculation that Mr. Marquez’s actions “made” Mr. Chase

mad did not amount to a helpful shorthand for the underlying facts. The court properly

struck or told the jury to disregard these speculative statements because they violate

Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-701.

We see no error in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. Moreover, as the State

points out, Mr. Marquez was permitted to testify without objection to substantially similar

or even more detailed observations about Mr. Chase’s behavior and statements throughout

his testimony. Mr. Marquez testified that he found several of Mr. Chase’s statements

threatening, including, “Why the fuck you lying to me? See, you don’t know nobody

here[,]” and “Why the fuck you smoking in my building?” Although the court sustained

the State’s objection to “Yeah, I hit you. So what? So what? What are you going to do

about it?”4 Mr. Marquez testified that Mr. Chase said some variation of “What are you

going to do about it?” several more times during his testimony, and indicated that he

perceived this as a threat. Finally, near the end of direct examination, the following

exchange occurred unchallenged:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Why did you shoot Mr. Chase?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: I just wanted him to stop hitting me. I wanted -- I was scared

also. I just wanted him to stop hitting me for –

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Were you scared for your life?

[MR. MARQUEZ]: Yeah.

We note that “So what?” and “What are you going to do about it?” are not hearsay because they are questions, and perhaps threats, that cannot be offered to prove the matter asserted therein because no matter has been asserted. See Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372, 388 (2010).

These exchanges show that Mr. Marquez was permitted to offer testimony to

support his argument that he shot Mr. Chase in self-defense. Accordingly, we hold that the

circuit court did not deprive Mr. Marquez of a meaningful opportunity to present a defense.

III. The court properly permitted a reference to Mr. Marquez’s juvenile record

and referring to the juvenile adjudication as a “conviction” was not reversible

error.

A. The Parties’ Contentions

Mr. Marquez contends that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of his

juvenile delinquency record to support the assertion that he was disqualified from carrying

a firearm due to a prior disqualifying event. Counsel for Mr. Marquez declined to stipulate

that Mr. Marquez had previously been found delinquent for a robbery. Mr. Marquez

submits that a copy of his juvenile record should not have been admitted into evidence, and

a witness should not have been permitted to refer to the juvenile adjudication as a

“conviction.”

The State responds that Mr. Marquez was charged with illegally possessing a

firearm when he had been adjudicated delinquent “for an act that would be a disqualifying

crime if committed by an adult.” PS § 5-133(b)(15). The State must therefore show that

Mr. Marquez had been so adjudicated. As counsel for Mr. Marquez elected not to stipulate

to this fact, the State had no option but to introduce evidence of Mr. Marquez’s prior

disqualifying offense to support its claim.

B. Standard of Review

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. Brown v.

State, 454 Md. 546, 550 (2017). “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous,

we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Occasionally we

see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of

a statute’s plain language. In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute,

the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.”

Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180, 196–97 (2017) (internal quotations omitted).

C. Analysis

As we have outlined above, although these two provisions have coexisted since the

enactment of the Responsible Gun Safety Act of 2000, we have found no other Maryland

case that has remarked upon the potential conflict between PS § 5-133(b)(15) and CJP § 3-8A-23. This may owe in part to a strategy by defense attorneys of stipulating to the prior

disqualifying offense. A criminal defendant has a “clear and compelling interest in

avoiding introduction of prior crimes evidence. This interest exists because introduction

of evidence of prior conviction has the potential for grave mischief because of its tendency

to divert the attention of the jury from the question of the defendant’s responsibility for the

crime charged to the improper issue of his bad character.” Hemming v. State, 469 Md. 219,

244 (2020) (cleaned up, internal quotations and citations omitted).

PS § 5-133 provides, in relevant part, that “a person may not possess a regulated

firearm if the person: […] (15) if under the age of 30 years at the time of possession, has

been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for an act that would be a disqualifying

crime if committed by an adult.”

CJP § 3-8A-23 states, in relevant part:

(a) (1) An adjudication of a child pursuant to this subtitle is not a criminal conviction

for any purpose and does not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed

by a criminal conviction.

[…]

(b) An adjudication and disposition of a child pursuant to this subtitle are not

admissible as evidence against the child:

(1) In any criminal proceeding prior to conviction[.]

CJP § 3-8A-23(a)–(c).

Here, Mr. Marquez was charged with a violation of PS § 5-133 because he had a

firearm, was under the age of thirty, and had previously been adjudicated delinquent for a

robbery, which would have been a disqualifying conviction if he had been an adult at the

time. Defense counsel declined to stipulate to Mr. Marquez’s prior juvenile adjudication,

which placed the State in a difficult position: the State was required to show evidence of

the event that disqualified Mr. Marquez from possessing a firearm under PS § 5-133, but

was prohibited from doing so under CJP § 3-8A-23. Therefore, a conflict existed whereby

the least prejudicial means of establishing Mr. Marquez’s legal status as a person

disqualified from carrying a regulated firearm was unavailable.5

See generally Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding that the court abused its discretion when it “spurn[ed] defendant’s offer to admit to evidence of prior conviction element of offense and instead admit[ted] full record of prior judgment” when the sole purpose of the admission was to establish the prior conviction element and the nature of the prior offense was likely to be prejudicial).

When this Court is called upon to interpret a statute, “[o]ur goal is to ascertain and

effectuate the intention of the legislature[.]” Trimble v. State, 491 Md. 378, 410–11 (2025)

(quoting Woodlin v. State, 484 Md. 253, 279–80 (2023)). We divine this intent first from

the statute’s plain language, and look to other sources only in the event of some

ambiguity. See id.

Although our review of statutory interpretation is de novo, we note that in this case,

the circuit court resolved the statutory ambiguity in a similar manner to one interpretation

argued by the State before this Court: by reading the plain language of CJP § 3-8A-23

excessively literally. The circuit court stated, and the State argues before us, that CJP § 3-8A-23 is not applicable here because the statute provides that “[a]n adjudication and

disposition of a child pursuant to this subtitle are not admissible as evidence against the

child . . . [i]n any criminal proceeding prior to conviction,” and Mr. Marquez is not a child.

CJP § 3-8A-23(b) (emphasis added). This misapprehends the purpose of the statute. Under

this interpretation, a juvenile adjudication would become admissible against the

adjudicated as soon as he turned eighteen. Given that the General Assembly expressly

intended that “[a]n adjudication of a child pursuant to this subtitle is not a criminal

conviction for any purpose and does not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily

imposed by a criminal conviction[,]” shielding a child adjudicated delinquent from

admissibility of his juvenile record in a criminal proceeding only as long as he remains a

child does not hold with the intent of the statute.

In the case before us, where one statute mandates disclosure of a juvenile record

while the other prohibits it, the plain language of the two statutes presents an ambiguity

that bears resolution.

We interpret statutes, whenever reasonably possible, to avoid repeal by implication.

See Wisner, 223 Md. App. at 234. We presume that the legislature “intends its enactments

to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law,” and seek to harmonize

and give effect to both statutes wherever possible. Id.

We likewise presume “that the General Assembly had, and acted with respect to,

full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law . . . and the policy of the prior

law.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus, if two statutes should irreconcilably conflict,

“the same presumed legislative intent requires that the statute whose relevant substantive

provisions were enacted most recently be held to have repealed by implication any

conflicting provisions of the earlier statute.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). That is to

say, generally speaking, the most recently enacted statutory provision controls.

Here, as we have outlined above, the language in CJP § 3-8A-23 appears as early as

the 1960s, while the relevant provision in PS § 5-133 was enacted in 2000. PS § 5-133 is

not a new statute, but was enacted considerably later than the comprehensive juvenile

justice reform that established CJP § 3-8A-23. Presuming that the General Assembly was

aware of the law and its policy, and acted in accordance with that knowledge, to the extent

that PS § 5-133(b)(15) is incompatible with CJP § 3-8A-23, PS § 5-133(b)(15) controls.

We do not read PS § 5-133(b)(15) to repeal CJP § 3-8A-23 by implication; instead, PS §

5-133(b)(15) creates a limited exception to CJP § 3-8A-23, the scope of which is

exemplified in the case before us.

Moreover, we find it relevant to note that CJP § 3-8A-23’s prohibition against

admission of acts committed as a juvenile is not absolute. In Thompson v. State, our

Supreme Court contemplated whether CJP § 3-8A-23 “trumped” Maryland Rule 5-404(b)6

and, specifically, Maryland Rule 5-413, when the State introduced evidence of uncharged

sexual misconduct allegedly perpetrated against the same victim when the defendant was

a juvenile. 412 Md. 497, 505 (2010). In that case, the Court determined that CJP § 3-8A23 contained no language on uncharged conduct and thus did not preclude introduction of

the evidence pursuant to Rules 5-404(b) and 5-413. Id. at 506. At the appellate level, this

Court “decline[d] to construe [CJP] § 3–8A–23 so that it prohibits the introduction of the

very evidence that the Court of Appeals has declared to be of ‘special relevance’ in a sex

crime case[.]” Thompson v. State, 181 Md. App. 74, 87 (2008), aff’d, 412 Md. at 497.

Here, similarly, we decline to construe CJP § 3-8A-23 in such a manner as to render

PS § 5-133(b)(15) unenforceable. Under Mr. Marquez’s interpretation of the two statutes,

Md. Rule 5-404(b) states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, including delinquent acts […], is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in the conformity therewith. Such evidence, however, may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or in conformity with Rule 5-413.

Rule 5-413 provides that “[i]n prosecutions for sexually assaultive behavior . . . , evidence of other sexually assaultive behavior by the defendant occurring before or after the offense for which the defendant is on trial may be admitted[.]

faced with a similar circumstance, the State would have no means of establishing a criminal

defendant’s status as disqualified from carrying a regulated firearm except by a stipulation

from the defendant. Not unlike the case exemplified in Thompson, where evidence of prior

sexual misconduct is admissible for its special relevance despite its highly prejudicial

nature, here, evidence of a prior juvenile adjudication is an essential element required to

establish the legal status in PS § 5-133(b)(15). Although any “prior crimes” evidence bears

a risk of prejudice to a criminal defendant, attempting to exclude the evidence in this

circumstance would considerably prejudice the State. Reading CJP § 3-8A-23 to preclude

minimal evidence that establishes the required legal status in PS § 5-133(b)(15) when the

criminal defendant declines to stipulate to that status would render PS § 5-133(b)(15)

unenforceable and thus meaningless.

In this case, where PS § 5-133(b)(15) required the introduction of Mr. Marquez’s

juvenile adjudication for a disqualifying offense to establish a legal status, and Mr.

Marquez declined to stipulate to the disqualification, PS § 5-133(b)(15) creates a limited

exception to CJP § 3-8A-23. Accordingly, the court did not err in admitting limited

evidence to support that claim.

Finally, we note that although Detective Edwards’s reference to Mr. Marquez’s

juvenile adjudication as a “conviction” was erroneous, the error was harmless. “On review,

we apply the longstanding principle that improperly admitted evidence must be prejudicial

to warrant reversible error.” Beckwitt v. State, 249 Md. App. 333, 400 (2021), aff’d, 477

Md. 398 (2022) (citing Md. Rule 5-103(a)). Improperly admitted evidence is not presumed

prejudicial unless it may have influenced the verdict in some way. Id.

As we have outlined above, the purpose of admitting any evidence at all of Mr.

Marquez’s prior conduct was solely to establish his legal status as a person disqualified

from carrying a regulated firearm. The circuit court admitted no more than was strictly

necessary to establish this status. A juvenile adjudication under CJP § 3-8A-23 “is not a

criminal conviction for any purpose and does not impose any of the civil disabilities

ordinarily imposed by a criminal conviction.” CJP § 3-8A-23(a)(1). For the purposes of

establishing Mr. Marquez’s legal status as a person disqualified from carrying a regulated

firearm, however, any disqualifying event would have the same effect.

We see no indication in the record that briefly referring to Mr. Marquez’s

disqualifying event as a “conviction” instead of an “adjudication” affected the outcome of

the case in any way. Thus, the error was harmless.

IV. The circuit court improperly imposed separate convictions and sentences for

identical charges.

Finally, the parties agree that the court erroneously imposed separate convictions

for two counts of possession of a firearm by one under the age of thirty and four counts of

wearing and carrying a weapon.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,

applicable to state prosecutions via the Fourteenth Amendment, “protects against . . .

multiple punishments for the same offense.” Bey v. State, 259 Md. App. 324, 334 (2023)

(internal quotations omitted). “Even though the Maryland Constitution has no express

double jeopardy provision, there is protection against it under Maryland common law.” Id.

(quoting Koushall v. State, 479 Md. 124, 157 (2022)). “Whether a particular course of

conduct constitutes one or more violations of a single statutory offense depends upon the

appropriate unit of prosecution of the offense[.]” Id. (quoting Richmond v. State, 326 Md.

257, 261 (1992)).

In Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471 (2004), our Supreme Court held that the General

Assembly in enacting the then-newly-codified PS § 5-133 did not intend to allow multiple

convictions on a defendant for illegal possession of a regulated firearm when he possessed

only one firearm on a single occasion. The Court explained that any other result would

permit multiple convictions for belonging to more than one class of people prohibited from

possessing a regulated firearm. The Court likened this result to an illustration contemplated

in Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307 (1993), where the Court contemplated a hypothetical

statute that would allow multiple convictions for sheathing and unsheathing the same

weapon over the course of a few minutes. Melton, 379 Md. at 490–91 (quoting Eldridge,

329 Md. at 314–15). Accordingly, the Court held that the regulated firearm itself was the

proper unit of prosecution. Id. at 502.

Here, Mr. Marquez incurred two charges for illegal possession of a firearm by one

under the age of thirty: one for his presence at Takoma Towers, and one upon his arrest in

a nearby parking lot around eight hours later. Mr. Marquez was likewise convicted of

wearing and carrying a handgun both at Takoma Towers and in the parking lot where he

was arrested, and then for wearing and carrying a loaded handgun at both locations. In

both cases, the proper unit of prosecution is the regulated firearm itself. Mr. Marquez

should have been convicted of only one charge for possession and one charge for wearing

and carrying a firearm.

Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court to vacate all but one of each conviction.

CONCLUSION

The prosecutor’s closing argument did not improperly shift the burden of proof, and

the court sufficiently cured any error. Mr. Marquez was not deprived of his right to present

a defense, and the court did not err in allowing or excluding portions of his testimony.

To the extent that PS § 5-133 conflicts with CJP § 3-8A-23, when a criminal

defendant declines to stipulate to a prior disqualifying offense committed as a juvenile and

the State is required to show evidence of the prior disqualifying event as a necessary

element of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm, PS § 5-133 controls as the laterenacted statute. Accordingly, the court did not err in allowing limited evidence of Mr.

Marquez’s juvenile record for this purpose. Furthermore, a witness erroneously referring

to Mr. Marquez’s prior disqualifying offense as a “conviction” instead of an “adjudication”

was harmless error. On these three counts, we affirm the circuit court’s decision.

Finally, the court erroneously entered multiple convictions for the same offenses.

On this count, we remand to the circuit court to vacate all but one of each conviction: one

for illegal possession of a firearm by a person under the age of thirty with a disqualifying

conviction, and one for wearing and carrying a firearm.

JUDGMENT OF THE

CIRCUIT COURT FOR

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY

AFFIRMED IN PART AND

VACATED IN PART. COSTS

TO BE SPLIT BETWEEN THE

PARTIES, APPELLANT

PAYING 3/4, PRINCE

GEORGE’S COUNTY

PAYING 1/4.

Marquez v. State

Summary · law.co

Key issues

Procedural posture

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain