Lett v. U.S. Department of Justice

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTHONY LETT,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 23 - 3942 (SLS)

v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Anthony Lett is currently an inmate in federal custody. In May 2023, Mr. Lett submitted

requests to the Executive Office of the United States Attorneys (EOUSA) under the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act, seeking records related to state and federal criminal

prosecutions against him roughly a decade ago. He believes that the records may provide him with

evidence to challenge his convictions. EOUSA denied Mr. Lett’s Privacy Act request. But it

disclosed various documents under FOIA while relying on statutory exemptions to withhold

others. Mr. Lett then sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Prisons

(BOP) alleging violations of FOIA and the Privacy Act. The Defendants now move for summary

judgment. The Court grants the Defendants’ motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background

“FOIA ‘implements a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.’” Informed Consent

Action Network (ICAN) v. NIH, No. 23-cv-926, 2026 WL 585104, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2026)

(citation modified) (quoting DOJ v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754

(1989)). The statute “requires every federal agency, upon request, to make ‘promptly available to any person’ any ‘records’ so long as the request ‘reasonably describes such records.’”

Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(3)). “Agencies must construe FOIA requests liberally and can only withhold or redact

documents if the information requested ‘falls within one of nine statutory exemptions.’” ICAN,

2026 WL 585104, at *1 (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. NIH, 745

F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). “These exemptions demonstrate

that the public’s right to information is ‘not absolute and that disclosure of certain information may

harm legitimate governmental or private interests.’” Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. v. FBI, No. 22-cv3711, 2026 WL 1585366, at *1 (D.D.C. June 3, 2026) (citation modified) (quoting Martin v. DOJ,

488 F.3d 446, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). “The agency bears the burden of establishing that an

exemption applies” and ordinarily “must disclose all reasonably segregable, nonexempt portions

of the requested record(s).” PETA, 745 F.3d at 540 (cleaned up).

B. Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Lett is currently serving a federal sentence. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (Mot.) 1,

ECF No. 25; Finney Decl., Ex. 2 at 19, ECF No. 25-1.1 In May 2023, he mailed two requests for

records to EOUSA, concurrently invoking FOIA and the Privacy Act. Finney Decl., Ex. 2–3;

Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (Defs.’ SOMF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 25-3. He sought “all records

related to [his] detainment and arrest on or about April 30, 2016,” including those pertaining to:

(1) Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, case number 605940-16-CR; (2) CR-16-608959-A from Cleveland, Ohio; (3) the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, case number

16-CR-198; (4) a Heckler and Koch, 9 mm firearm, serial number 27-171439; (5) a Kahr Arms,

Where filings are not independently paginated, the Court refers to numbering assigned by the Court’s electronic filing system (ECF) for ease of reference.

Model: CW45, .45 caliber pistol, serial number 5G7855; (6) a Kahr Arms, Model: CW45, .45

caliber pistol, serial number: CA3372; and (7) a warrant, booking report, investigation reports, and

video surveillance from the local Cleveland, Strongsville, and Berea police departments and jails

“on or around” April 30, 2016. Defs.’ SOMF ¶¶ 2–4; Finney Decl. Exs. 2–3. In December 2023,

Mr. Lett filed this suit pro se against DOJ and BOP, asserting his claims under FOIA and the

Privacy Act. Mot. 2; Compl., ECF No. 1.

In response to his requests, the Defendants conducted searches for Mr. Lett’s name and

case number within several file systems. Galvin Decl. ¶¶ 8–9, ECF No. 25-2. The U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the Northern District of Ohio, which had prosecuted Mr. Lett’s federal case, submitted

656 pages of documents to EOUSA, and EOUSA in turn determined that they were all responsive

to Mr. Lett’s requests. Mot. 7; Finney Decl. ¶ 13; Defs.’ SOMF ¶ 7. EOUSA then conducted a

“page-by-page, line-by-line review” of the documents, Finney Decl. ¶ 37, and determined to

release 452 pages in full, release 118 pages in part, and withhold 86 pages in full pursuant to 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E) (FOIA Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), and 7(E),

respectively) and a court-ordered seal on some requested records, id. ¶¶ 13–34; Defs.’ SOMF ¶¶ 7,

9–12; see Finney Decl., Ex. 1 (Vaughn Index). EOUSA also withheld six pages that it determined

were “duplicates” of pages already provided. Vaughn Index at 10; Reply 3, ECF No. 34. It is

unclear whether those duplicates are six “of the” 656 pages originally furnished by the Northern

District of Ohio U.S. Attorney’s Office, Mot. 7; Finney Decl. ¶ 13; Defs.’ SOMF ¶ 7, or

“[an]other” six pages of unknown origin, Vaughn Index at 10.2

The Defendants’ Vaughn Index appears to account for all 204 pages that EOUSA withheld in full or in part under various justifications, but it does not account for purported duplicates. See, generally, Vaughn Index. Those 204 pages, together with the 452 pages that EOUSA released in full to Mr. Lett, total 656.

According to its determinations, EOUSA released records to Mr. Lett in two batches in

January and June 2025. Vaughn Index at 10. The agency then notified Mr. Lett that it considered

his request fulfilled. Finney Decl., Ex. 5 at 34. The Defendants now move for summary judgment.

Mot. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 32; Reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

A “court shall grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden

is on the movant to make the initial showing of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.”

Ehrman v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D.D.C. 2006). “The evidence of the non-movant

is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Estate of Parsons v.

Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

FOIA requires federal agencies to “conduct an adequate search for responsive records”

upon a request from a member of the public. Rodriguez v. DOD, 236 F. Supp. 3d 26, 34 (D.D.C.

2017) (cleaned up). And “an agency is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are in

dispute and if it demonstrates ‘that each document that falls within the class requested either has

been produced . . . or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection requirements.’” Students Against

Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d

339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). “The agency can make this showing through the submission of an

index of documents, known as a Vaughn index, sufficiently detailed affidavits or declarations, or

both.” Sarras v. DOJ, No. 19-cv-0861, 2023 WL 6294164, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2023) (cleaned

up). A court will accord an agency’s declarations “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be

rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.”

Shapiro v. DOJ, 40 F.4th 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Bartko v. DOJ, 898 F.3d 51, 74 (D.C.

Cir. 2018)). A court may likewise rely on agency declarations to support exemptions under the

Privacy Act. See Chambers v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 568 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Lett argues that the Defendants failed to produce five categories of documents under

FOIA: (1) a firearm transaction report of a Kahr Arms .45 caliber pistol with the serial number

#CA3372, (2) records of a warrant issued on April 30, 2016, from the Cleveland Police

Department warrant and suspect unit and/or the Cleveland Municipal Court, (3) a booking report

or video from April 30, 2016, in the Strongsville Police Department (Jail) or Berea Police

Department (Jail), (4) six pages that they determined to be duplicates of pages already provided or

not responsive, and (5) ATF Form 4473. Opp’n 1–3.3 The Defendants argue that categories (1) and

(5) were properly withheld pursuant to the Tiahrt Rider under FOIA Exemption 3; that (2) and (3)

were disclosed and properly redacted under FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C); and that (4) was

properly withheld as non-responsive or duplicative. Mot. 7–15. The Court addresses each

argument in turn. It ultimately determines that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

with respect to all withholdings except the six documents withheld as duplicative or nonresponsive.

The Court instructed Mr. Lett to respond to each of the assertions that he disputed in the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Fox/Neal Order (Jan. 30, 2026), ECF No. 26. Yet in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Lett did not argue that the Defendants failed to comply with the Privacy Act; he challenged only the Defendants’ response to his “FOIA request.” See Opp’n 3, 5. Accordingly, Mr. Lett has conceded any arguments about the Privacy Act. See Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of 2 Glob. Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (“It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”).

A. Firearm Report

Mr. Lett argues that the Defendants improperly withheld an “official firearm transaction

report” for a “Kahr Arms .45 caliber pistol” #CA3372 and an ATF “Form ‘4473[.]’” Opp’n 1–3.

According to the Vaughn index, the only firearm transaction report is ATF Form 4473, so only

one document is at issue. See Reply 2; Vaughn Index, at 16; Finney Decl. ¶ 17. And the Court

concludes that the Defendants correctly withheld that document pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3

and/or the Tiahrt Rider.

Exemption 3 permits an agency to withhold information “specifically exempted from

disclosure by statute” if that statute “(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in

such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue” or “(ii) establishes particular criteria for

withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A).

Here, the Defendants rely on the “Tiahrt Rider” as the statute that bars disclosure. Mot. 9 (citing

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, 125 Stat. 552,

609–10 (2011) (Tiahrt Rider) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 923 note)); Vaughn Index at 15–16. Since

2003, Congress has repeatedly enacted Tiahrt Riders in federal appropriations bills. See Mayor &

City Council of Balt. v. ATF (Baltimore), 816 F. Supp. 3d 107, 111 (D.D.C. 2026). These riders

place certain restrictions on the disclosure of data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,

and Explosive’s (ATF) Firearms Tracing System (FTS) database. Id. Congress conceived of the

Tiahrt Rider out of a specific “‘concern[ ] that certain law enforcement databases may be subject

to public release under the Freedom of Information Act’ and that the release of firearms trace data

would ‘jeopardiz[e] criminal investigations and officer safety’ and ‘pose a risk’ to ‘the privacy of

innocent citizens.’” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 107-575 at 20 (2002)). But the rider has not

expressly referenced FOIA since 2004. Id. The current version, passed in 2012, provides that FTS

data “shall not be used, relied on, or disclosed in any manner . . . in a civil action in . . . Federal

court” and “shall be immune from legal process” except in circumstances not relevant here.

18 U.S.C. § 923 note.

Prior to 2009, “federal courts uniformly understood the Tiahrt Riders to exempt FTS data

from FOIA disclosure.” Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund v. ATF, 984 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir.

2020). But in 2009, Congress enacted the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009. Department of Homeland

Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 564, 123 Stat. 2142, 2184 (2009) (codified at

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B)). That law “amended Exemption 3 to provide that covered withholding

statutes enacted after October 28, 2009, must ‘specifically cite[]’ to section 552(b)(3)” to be

exempted from FOIA’s disclosure requirement. Baltimore, 816 F. Supp. 3d at 112 (quoting

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B)). The Tiahrt Rider has been repeatedly reenacted after 2009 without any

express reference to Section 552(b)(3). Id.

Since 2009, courts have diverged on whether the Tiahrt Rider triggers Exemption 3. See

Michael v. DOJ, No. 17-cv-0197, 2018 WL 4637358, at *8 (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2018) (collecting

cases). The “predominant[]” view in this District is that reliance on the Tiahrt Rider remains a

valid basis to withhold covered documents. Id. But courts have arrived at that conclusion by

different paths. Some courts have held that “the disclosure prohibitions set forth by Congress in

the 2005 and 2008 appropriations bills are still effective prospectively” irrespective of the language

in the operative 2012 rider. Abdeljabbar v. ATF, 74 F. Supp. 3d 158, 175 (D.D.C. 2014). Others

have concluded that because Congress “continued to use this antidisclosure language throughout

the 2000s and courts uniformly held that the Tiahrt Riders exempted FTS data from FOIA

disclosure,” “[t]he interceding enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act’s specific-citation requirement

does not overcome the elementary principle that Congress uses the same language to accomplish

the same objective.” Everytown for Gun Safety, 984 F.3d at 41–42; see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous.

& Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 536 (2015) (“If a word or

phrase has been . . . given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts . . ., a later version of that act

perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation.” (cleaned up)). And still

others have held that the 2012 Tiahrt Rider merely supersedes the OPEN FOIA Act’s specific

citation requirement and thus serves “as a standalone basis for declining” to disclose documents

in response to a FOIA request. Baltimore, 816 F. Supp. 3d at 125.

In light of the limited briefing in this pro se action and the weight of these persuasive

authorities, the Court agrees that “whether referred to as an Exemption 3 withholding or a Tiahrt

Rider withholding,” data covered by the Rider may not be disclosed under FOIA. Id. Here, the

ATF Form 4473 at issue clearly “fall[s] within [the Rider’s] coverage” and is thus exempt from

disclosure under FOIA. Labow v. DOJ, 831 F.3d 523, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Newport

Aeronautical Sales v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 684 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). The ATF form

4473 comes from the FTS database. Finney Decl. ¶ 15; Vaughn Index at 15–16; Finney Decl. ¶ 15.

And the Tiahrt Rider provides that materials from that database “shall not be . . . disclosed in any

manner . . . in a civil action.” 18 U.S.C. § 923 note. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the

Defendants properly withheld the ATF Form 4473.

B. Investigative Records

Next, Mr. Lett challenges EOUSA’s withholding of “a warrant issued on April 30th, 2016,

from the Cleveland Police Department warrant and suspect unit and/or the Cleveland Municipal

Court,” as well as “a booking report or video surveillance on April 30th, 2016 from the Strongsville

Police Department (Jail) or Berea Police Department (Jail).” Opp’n 2. But EOUSA released both

a warrant and a “Berea police department statement form” to Mr. Lett. See Vaughn Index, at 16–

17. And the Vaughn index does not reflect that the Defendants have any other records that are

responsive to Mr. Lett’s request. The Court understands that Mr. Lett did not receive documents

that are important to him, but “speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other

documents” are insufficient to challenge the adequacy of an agency’s search for responsive

records. Am. Oversight v. HHS, 101 F.4th 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Ground Saucer

Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). FOIA “does not obligate agencies to

create or retain documents; it only obligates them to provide access to those which it in fact has

created and retained.” Kissinger v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152

(1980).

To the extent that Mr. Lett intended to challenge the redactions of third-party personal

information from those records, that contention fails, too. Relying on Exemptions 6 and 7(C), the

Defendants withheld identifying information of “(1) detectives and investigating agents; (2) other

government employees; and (3) private third parties mentioned in . . . criminal investigative files.”

Finney Decl. ¶ 26; see Vaughn Index at 11–15. Exemptions 6 and 7(C) cover personal identifiable

information of “investigators, suspects, witnesses, and informants.” Schrecker v. DOJ,

349 F.3d 657, 661, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (collecting cases); see also ACLU v. DOJ, 655 F.3d 1, 6

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that Exemption 7(C) establishes a comparatively “lower bar” for

withholding materials, so the Court need only consider whether the agency properly invoked

Exemption 7(C) when an agency relies on both Exemptions 6 and 7(C)). And “[i]t is well

established that an individual’s personal interest in challenging his criminal conviction” does not

override the privacy interest of individuals covered by these exemptions. Carzoglio v. Exec. Off.

for U.S. Att’ys, No. 24-cv-2080, 2026 WL 295387, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2026) (cleaned up).

Mr. Lett appeals to this Court’s sense of “justice” having “spent the last 10 years of [his]

life fighting for freedom . . . with one arm behind [his] back.” Opp’n 5. The Court sympathizes

with Mr. Lett’s struggles and understands his quest to find potentially exonerating information.

But FOIA is not “a substitute for discovery in criminal cases or in habeas proceedings.” Carzoglio,

2026 WL 295387, at *4 (quoting Roth v. DOJ, 642 F.3d 1161, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Commonly,

“habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy when a [prisoner] challenges the fact or duration of his

confinement” under federal law. Feaster v. BOP, No. 10-cv-502, 2010 WL 2169503, at *1 (D.D.C.

May 27, 2010) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005)). Meanwhile, the purpose of

FOIA is “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of

public scrutiny” through “a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects [various]

interests,” including those of the “Executive branch[.]” Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,

361 (1976) (cleaned up). Mr. Lett’s “ability to challenge his conviction, though understandably

important to him, is generally not considered a cognizable public interest under FOIA” since that

Act is focused on the public’s interest in “an agency’s own conduct” and not a plaintiff’s “personal

stake in the release of the requested information[.]” Carzoglio, 2026 WL 295387, at *4

(cleaned up). This Court may not convert FOIA into a tool to “obtain[] whatever information might

bolster . . . collateral attacks on [one’s] conviction.” Id. (quoting Roth, 642 F.3d at 1177).

Ultimately, the Court concludes that the Defendants complied with their FOIA obligations

with respect to the investigative records. See Beck v. DOJ, 997 F.2d 1489, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

C. Non-Responsive and Duplicative Pages

Finally, EOUSA withheld six pages because they “were either not responsive or duplicative

of other pages[.]” Mot. 7. Mr. Lett contests that those pages were “duplicates” or otherwise

irrelevant. Opp’n 2; see also Reply 3 (construing Mr. Lett’s argument similarly). And the

Defendants offer only two sentences in response, parroting conclusory language from their

declarant: “This argument does not address any of the claimed exemptions but only EOUSA’s

withholding of the six pages. EOUSA had properly determined that the pages were either not

responsive or duplicative of other pages that had already been provided.” Reply 3; see Finney

Decl. ¶ 13 (“EOUSA determined that six of the pages were either not [responsive] or duplicative

of other pages that had already been provided.”); see also SOMF ¶ 7 (“EOUSA determined that

six of the pages were either not or duplicative of other pages that had already been provided.”);

Lett v. U.S. Department of Justice

Summary · law.co

Key issues

Procedural posture

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain