RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1110-MR
DARRYL SHIELDS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE SARAH E. CLAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-CI-004044
MT. LEBANON KENTUCKY, LLC
AND HAYES GIBSON PROPERTY
SERVICES, LLC APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, L. JONES, AND KAREM, JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: Darryl Shields (“Shields”) appeals from the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s dismissal of his claims against his landlord, Mt. Lebanon
Kentucky, LLC, and his landlord’s property manager, Hayes Gibson Property
Services, LLC (collectively, “Mt. Lebanon”). Shields brought his claims under the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“URLTA”), which is codified at KRS1 383.505 to 383.715. The circuit court concluded that district courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under URLTA. We reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The only issue Shields raises is whether the circuit court properly
dismissed his complaint on jurisdictional grounds.
Shields has resided at an apartment owned by Mt. Lebanon since
2023. Shields receives housing assistance from the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Specifically, Shields pays $185 per
month in rent to Mt. Lebanon and HUD pays the remainder, $562 monthly.
Beginning in April 2024, Shields began organizing a tenants’ union.
Within the next year or so, Mt. Lebanon sent Shields four written notices of
deficiencies. Three notices alleged Shields owed additional rent and the fourth
alleged Shields had not kept his utility services current. The rent-based notices
stated that Mt. Lebanon “shall immediately take legal action to evict” Shields if he
did not rectify the deficiencies. See, e.g., Trial Court Record (“R.”) at 40. The
utility-based notice stated that Shields’ failure to correct the utility issue “may
force” Mt. Lebanon “to take further action and terminate your [Shields’] lease and
file [for his] eviction.” R. at 41.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-Shields alleges he did not owe additional rent, and the three rent-based
notices were issued in retaliation for his union activities. See KRS 383.705.2
However, Shields admitted in his complaint that he contacted the utility company
“to switch the utility services for the unit where he resides into his name” soon
after he received the utility-based notice. R. at 6.
In May 2025, Shields filed the two-count complaint at issue. Count
one alleges improper retaliation by Mt. Lebanon. Count two nonspecifically
alleges Mt. Lebanon “willfully diminished services” to Shields. R. at 8. In
addition to damages, Shields also requested injunctive relief.
Shields also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. The
circuit court quickly issued an order denying the motion for restraining order.3 In
2
KRS 383.705 provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in this section, a landlord may not retaliate by increasing
rent or decreasing services or by bringing or threatening to bring an action for
possession after:
(c) The tenant has organized or become a member of a tenant’s
union or similar organization.
(2) If the landlord acts in violation of subsection (1) of this section, the tenant is
entitled to the remedies provided in KRS 383.655 and has a defense in any
retaliatory action against him for possession. In an action by or against the tenant,
evidence of a complaint within one (1) year before the alleged act of retaliation
creates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retaliation . . . . 3
Shields does not contest the denial of his motion for a restraining order. We express no opinion on that decision beyond noting that Shields’ requests in his complaint for a temporary and a permanent injunction have not been resolved.
-3-that order, the court also stated it believed “circuit courts do not have subject
matter jurisdiction over . . . actions asserting violations of the URLTA, except
when they are acting in their appellate capacity.” R. at 80. The court ordered
Shields to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.4 Unpersuaded by Shields’ response, the circuit court dismissed
Shields’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Shields then filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue before us is whether the circuit court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over Shields’ complaint. We have examined the parties’ briefs
but have concluded that any arguments raised therein which we do not discuss in
this Opinion are irrelevant or are otherwise unnecessary for us to resolve the
narrow jurisdictional issue before us.
Determining whether the Jefferson Circuit Court has jurisdiction over
Shields’ complaint largely rests on statutory interpretation. We review issues of
statutory interpretation and jurisdiction de novo. Davis v. Davis, 563 S.W.3d 105,
108 (Ky. App. 2018).
As our Supreme Court has succinctly explained:
4
The court’s denial on the merits of Shields’ motion for a temporary restraining order is at odds with its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction since “[t]he determination by any court that it lacks authority to decide the controversy constitutes an express declaration that it is without power to decide any other issue.” Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan v. Telcom Directories, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Ky. 1991).
-4-In Kentucky, circuit courts are courts of general
jurisdiction, which means that circuit courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in
some other court. Jurisdiction, when used here, refers to
subject-matter jurisdiction: the authority not simply to
hear this case[,] but this kind of case. Narrowing these
broad concepts, constitutional provisions and statutes
[may] assign[ ] to the courts specific types of claims and
causes of action[.] A court acts outside its jurisdiction,
accordingly, only where [it] has not been given, by
constitutional provision or statute, the power to do
anything at all.
Davis v. Wingate, 437 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks,
footnotes, and citations omitted). And, though the circuit court here seemed to
view jurisdiction as a binary, “all or nothing at all” matter, our Supreme Court has
noted that “there are times when more than one court may have subject matter
jurisdiction[.]” Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 738 (Ky. 2007).
“In Kentucky, circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, which
means that circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not
vested in some other court.” Wingate, 437 S.W.3d at 725 (italics in Wingate)
(internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted). Therefore, we must
determine whether the Jefferson Circuit Court had jurisdiction over Shields’
URLTA claims by ascertaining whether the General Assembly vested district
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.
KRS 24A.010(1) provides that a district court “is a court of limited
jurisdiction; it has original jurisdiction in all matters specified in KRS 24A.110 to
-5-24A.130.” KRS 24A.120(1) provides in relevant part that a district court has
“exclusive jurisdiction” over “[c]ivil cases in which the amount in controversy
does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), exclusive of interest and costs,
except matters affecting title to real estate and matters of equity . . . .”
The General Assembly’s express statement that district courts lack
jurisdiction over “matters of equity” is in direct conflict with the circuit court’s
conclusion that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over URLTA claims.
Shields requested injunctive relief (temporary and permanent). Various statutes
within URLTA explicitly allow a tenant (e.g., KRS 383.625(2)) or landlord (e.g.,
KRS 383.660(3)) to obtain injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is a matter of equity.
See, e.g., Bartman v. Shobe, 353 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Ky. 1962) (discussing
injunctive relief as being equitable in nature); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 306 (April
2026 Update) (“An injunction is an equitable remedy.”).
We have held that a party was “[o]bviously . . . correct in his assertion
that district courts are prohibited from entertaining ‘matters of equity.’” Kelley v.
Nationwide Auto Restoration, LLC, 246 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Ky. App. 2007). In
addition, the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) generally only allow
circuit courts to grant injunctions. See CR 65.01 (“A party may obtain injunctive
relief in the circuit court by (a) restraining order, (b) temporary injunction, or (c)
-6-permanent injunction in a final judgment.”) (emphasis added).5 The General
Assembly’s statement that a district court “may” exercise jurisdiction over URLTA
claims does not expressly override its statement in KRS 24A.120(1) that a district
court lacks the jurisdiction to resolve matters of equity. The language providing
that a district court “may” exercise jurisdiction over URLTA claims also does not
explicitly override the plain language of CR 65.01 providing that “[i]njunctive
relief shall not be granted in any action in the district court except as specifically
authorized by statute.” URLTA does not unambiguously and “specifically” allow
a district court to grant injunctive relief. A request for injunctive relief in an
URLTA complaint invokes the circuit court’s jurisdiction.
The circuit court relied on the principle that “[w]here the statute both
declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedies available to the aggrieved
party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the statute.” Hill v.
Kentucky Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412, 421 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). That principle is sound. And the specific URLTA statutes
cited as avenues for relief by Shields in his complaint do not expressly provide for
5
The extremely narrow exception in CR 65.03(2) allowing a district judge to issue a restraining order “if no judge of that circuit court is present in the county” is clearly inapplicable here. Moreover, Shields’ complaint also requested a temporary and a permanent injunction, and such requests do not fall within the narrow, rare exception in CR 65.03(2) allowing a district court to issue a restraining order.
-7-the issuance of injunctive relief. But that general principle does not deprive circuit
courts of jurisdiction over all URLTA claims.
The circuit court did not meaningfully address the fact that URLTA
specifically envisions a tenant and a landlord being able to obtain injunctive relief,
at least for certain URLTA violations. Arguably, the lack of a specific mention of
injunctive relief in the statutes Shields relies upon in his complaint means he is not
entitled to such relief.6 However, that does not mean that circuit courts are always
deprived of jurisdiction over URLTA claims.
The fact that URLTA explicitly envisions the issuance of injunctive
relief (at least under some circumstances) greatly undercuts the trial court’s
conclusion that URLTA claims must always be decided in district courts since
district courts generally cannot grant injunctions. In short, Shields’ requests for
injunctive relief may prove to be without merit, but the circuit court erred by
holding that circuit courts always lack jurisdiction over URLTA claims. Indeed,
though involving distinguishable facts and issues from the case at hand, there are
published opinions resolving on non-lack-of subject-matter-jurisdiction grounds
URLTA claims which had been brought in circuit courts. See, e.g., Waugh v.
6
“As an appellate court, we review judgments; we do not make them.” Klein v. Flanery, 439 S.W.3d 107, 122 (Ky. 2014). The circuit court has not addressed the merits of Shields’ requests for a temporary and permanent injunction, and so we express no firm opinion on the merits of those requests.
-8-Parker, 584 S.W.3d 748 (Ky. 2019); Miller v. Cundiff, 245 S.W.3d 786 (Ky. App.
2007).
Our conclusion that circuit courts do not lack subject matter
jurisdiction over all URLTA claims is not changed by an analysis of KRS 24A.020
and KRS 383.540. KRS 24A.020 provides that “[w]hen jurisdiction over any
matter is granted to District Court by statute, such jurisdiction shall be deemed to
be exclusive unless the statute specifically states that the jurisdiction shall be
concurrent.” KRS 383.540(1) provides in relevant part that “[t]he District Courts
of this state may exercise jurisdiction over any landlord or tenant with respect to
any conduct in this state governed by KRS 383.505 to 383.715 or with respect to
any claim arising from a transaction subject to KRS 383.505 to 383.715.”
Of course, the word may in a statute is permissive, not mandatory.
See KRS 446.010(26). The General Assembly has used mandatory language to
vest jurisdiction exclusively in district courts in numerous other contexts. See, e.g.,
KRS 387.020(1); KRS 387.520(1); KRS 386B.7-100. But the General Assembly
consciously chose to not use similarly explicit language vesting sole jurisdiction
over URLTA claims in district courts. Instead, by its use of permissive
jurisdictional language while simultaneously explicitly providing that courts may
sometimes grant injunctions for URLTA violations, the General Assembly has
vested district courts with concurrent jurisdiction over URLTA claims not
-9-involving requests for injunctive relief. As our Supreme Court recognized,
sometimes two courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Nordike, 231
S.W.3d at 738.
The takeaway is that the trial court’s sweeping conclusion that circuit
courts never have jurisdiction over URLTA claims is erroneous. Indeed, Mt.
Lebanon concedes as much in its brief. Instead, Mt. Lebanon makes a more
limited argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Shields’ specific
claims because his alleged damages were under $5,000. We disagree that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Shields’ specific complaint due to an
insufficient amount in controversy.
KRS 24A.120(1) provides that, with exceptions for “matters affecting
title to real estate and matters of equity[,]” a district court has exclusive jurisdiction
over civil claims when “the amount in controversy does not exceed five thousand
dollars ($5,000) . . . .” KRS 383.705(2) entitles a tenant to the remedies found in
KRS 383.655 if a landlord engages in illegal retaliatory conduct; KRS 383.655
allows a tenant to “recover an amount not more than three (3) months periodic rent
and a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Rent is defined within URLTA as “all payments
except a security deposit as defined in this section to be made to the landlord under
the rental agreement.” KRS 383.545(10). There is no statutory exclusion from the
definition of rent for payments made by someone besides the tenant (e.g., HUD).
-10-Instead, the definition of rent broadly includes “all payments” made to
a landlord. We may not judicially graft language onto the statutory definition of
rent to make it read “all payments made directly by a tenant” to a landlord.7 “We
are not permitted to add words to a statute, and a legislature making no exceptions
to the positive terms of a statute is presumed to have intended to make none.”
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metropolitan Government v. Moore, 701 S.W.3d 335,
345 (Ky. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thus, we reject Mt. Lebanon’s argument that Shields may recover
only treble the portion of his rent which he personally paid monthly. Accepting
Mt. Lebanon’s argument would mean that a destitute tenant whose entire rent, or
nearly so, is paid by HUD would be unable to recover any meaningful damages
based on a landlord’s misconduct. For URLTA purposes, Shields’ rent includes
both the monthly payments he makes, and the monthly payments HUD makes on
his behalf.
Therefore, Shields may recover $2,241 for each instance of retaliation
upon which he prevails ($747 monthly rent X 3 = $2,241). Shields alleges four
instances of retaliation, so he could potentially receive $8,964 ($2,241 X 4 =
$8,964), as well as any potentially appropriate attorney fees. “[F]or jurisdictional
7
Because rent is broadly, plainly defined by a Kentucky statute, we decline to address the extraterritorial authority cited by Mt. Lebanon involving whether rent includes payments made by another entity on a tenant’s behalf.
-11-purposes, the amount in controversy is determined based on the allegations in the
complaint, not what a party is entitled to.” Hernandez v. Cnty. Investments, LLC,
696 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Ky. App. 2024). As per Shields’ complaint, for
jurisdictional purposes, the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000, and so the
district court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over Shields’ claims.
We also reject Mt. Lebanon’s argument that Shields may only recover
a maximum of $2,241 (three times his monthly rent) even if he prevails on multiple
retaliation claims. Mt. Lebanon points to no statutory language or precedent which
explicitly allows an URLTA tenant to only recover one lump sum representing
three times the tenant’s monthly rent even if the tenant prevails on multiple claims
against a landlord. We refuse to provide a perverse incentive to landlords to
commit second or subsequent acts of misconduct with financial impunity. See,
e.g., Brown v. Funk, 697 S.W.3d 739, 748 (Ky. App. 2024) (noting the ancient
principle of Kentucky law that “for every injury, there should be a compensation
. . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We respectfully decline to address Mt. Lebanon’s argument that
Shields lacks standing. Mt. Lebanon did not present that argument to the circuit
court. Kentucky precedent plainly holds that an appellee may raise alternate
grounds for affirming a trial court “provided only that the alternative ground
was brought to the trial court’s attention and is otherwise supported by the
-12-record.” Klein, 439 S.W.3d at 122 (emphasis added). Cases with a similar
statement of the law include, for example, Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616, 619
(Ky. 1982); Carrico v. City of Owensboro, 511 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Ky. 1974); and
Commonwealth, Corrections Cabinet v. Vester, 956 S.W.2d 204, 205-06 (Ky.
1997). We decline to be the initial decisionmaker regarding Mt. Lebanon’s
argument that Shields lacks standing, especially given the extremely limited record
adduced thus far in the circuit court. Klein, 439 S.W.3d at 122. On remand, Mt.
Lebanon may raise whatever defenses it deems proper, including an assertion that
Shields lacks standing.
In conclusion, the circuit court erred by broadly holding that district
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all URLTA claims. Shields’ complaint also
facially satisfied the amount in controversy requirement necessary for a claim to be
heard in circuit court. We decline to address any hypothetical scenarios created by
the permissive jurisdictional language in URLTA involving potential factual
scenarios under which URLTA claims may only be heard by district courts or any
potential factual scenarios under which both district and circuit courts may have
jurisdiction. Instead, we limit our holding to the facts at hand, and those facts, and
the applicable law, show that the circuit court had jurisdiction over Shields’
complaint. We express no opinion on the merits of any of Shields’ claims or any
potential defenses thereto.
-13-CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed, and
this case is remanded with instructions to reinstate Shields’ complaint.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Andrew Chandler Jaron P. Blandford
Melissa Weinstein Emily D. Penn
Louisville, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
-14-