Rel: August 28, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2026-0550
Ex parte Cameron Brock Love
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Cameron Brock Love
v.
Karen Campmire Love)
(Etowah Circuit Court: DR-16-900101)
EDWARDS, Judge.
In February 2018, the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court")
entered a judgment divorcing Cameron Brock Love ("the former
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husband") and Karen Campmire Love ("the former wife"). Among other
things, the divorce judgment provided that
"[t]he [former wife] shall receive one-half of the balance of the
retirement funds in the name of the [former husband] as of
March 7, 2016, the date of the original filing of the complaint
for divorce in this matter, which shall be transferred to her
pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to
be entered by the [c]ourt once prepared. The [former
husband], through counsel, shall provide the necessary
information to the attorney for the [former wife] for
preparation of the QDRO and counsel for the [former
husband] shall assist as may be necessary in order for 1/2 of
the retirement funds to be transferred to the [former wife]."
On April 20, 2018, after postjudgment practice had concluded, the trial
court entered a qualified domestic-relations order ("QDRO") that had
been prepared by the former wife's counsel. On May 14, 2018, the trial
court entered an amended QDRO ("the second QDRO").
At some point in February or March 2026, the former wife
submitted to the trial court a proposed QDRO. The former wife did not
file a complaint or petition, pay a filing fee, or otherwise institute an
action seeking to modify the second QDRO; she simply filed a copy of the
proposed QDRO in the trial court. On March 3, 2026, the trial court
entered the former wife's proposed QDRO ("the third QDRO"). On March
30, 2026, the former husband filed a motion seeking clarification of the
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third QDRO, which, he contended, was inconsistent with the divorce
judgment because it awarded the former wife "interest, earnings, and/or
gains on her awarded portion of the retirement benefits for the period
between 2018 and 2026." The trial court set the former husband's motion
for a hearing. The former husband also filed a motion to freeze
distribution of the retirement benefits, which the trial court granted.
After a hearing at which both parties testified, the trial court
entered an order on June 11, 2026, which stated:
"1. In accordance with the order of divorce entered by
this [c]ourt on February 14, 2018[,] and Code of Alabama
[1975,] § 30-2-51(d), the [former wife] is entitled to and shall
receive one-half of the retirement benefits in the name of the
[former husband] as of March 7, 2016, the date of the parties'
original separation, together with any passive increase or
decrease associated with her portion of the retirement
benefits from the effective date of the award to the date of
distribution. No increases or decreases resulting from
contributions, withdrawals, or accruals to the retirement
benefit from the effective date of the award shall be included
in the valuation.
"2. A separate order entitled 'Qualified Domestic
Relations Order' consistent with this order and that otherwise
meets the retirement benefit plan requirements shall follow."
The former husband filed a motion pursuant to both Rule 59, Ala.
R. Civ. P., and Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which he argued that the
June 11, 2026, order was void because, he asserted, the trial court had
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lacked jurisdiction to amend the property-division provisions of the 2018
divorce judgment. The trial court denied the former husband's motion.
The former husband then filed this petition for the writ of mandamus in
this court.
" 'Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and
will be granted only where there is "(1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." '
"Ex parte Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala.
1991)). Mandamus will lie to direct a trial court to vacate a
void judgment or order. Ex parte Chamblee, 899 So. 2d 244,
249 (Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Ala. 2004).
In his mandamus petition, the former husband first argues that the
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the third QDRO
and that all orders entered by the trial court after the entry of the third
QDRO are void. Relying on Montgomery v. Montgomery, 37 So. 3d 168
(Ala. Civ. App. 2009), the former husband contends that the former wife's
failure to institute an action to modify the second QDRO and to pay a
filing fee associated with her filing of the third QDRO prevented the trial
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court from acquiring subject-matter jurisdiction over the former wife's
attempt to modify the second QDRO.
The facts of Montgomery are similar to those in the present case.
The Russell Circuit Court had divorced Clark Daniel Montgomery ("the
husband") and Cynthia C. Montgomery ("the wife") by a judgment
entered in May 1999. In conjunction with the divorce judgment, the
Russell Circuit Court had entered a QDRO to effectuate the division of
the husband's 401(k) account ("QDRO A"). In May 2005, the wife
requested, and the Russell Circuit Court entered, a QDRO relating to the
division of the husband's retirement account ("QDRO B"). The wife paid
no filing fee at the time she requested the entry of QDRO B. In December
2007, the wife filed a motion requesting that the Russell Circuit Court
modify the terms of QDRO B. The wife paid no filing fee with her motion
to modify QDRO B. In February 2008, the Russell Circuit Court "set
aside" QDRO B and entered an amended QDRO ("QDRO C"). In a
postjudgment motion, the husband challenged the jurisdiction of the
Russell Circuit Court to enter QDRO B and QDRO C, but the trial court
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denied his motion.1 He then appealed, arguing that the wife's failure to
pay a filing fee had deprived the Russell Circuit Court of jurisdiction to
enter QDRO B and QDRO C.
This court agreed that the Russell Circuit Court had lacked
jurisdiction to enter QDRO B and QDRO C. We explained:
"The issue at the heart of this case is whether a trial
court retains jurisdiction over a divorce judgment in order to
implement or enforce its judgment. This court has held that
'[a] court rendering a judgment has the inherent power to
enforce its judgment and to make such orders as may be
necessary to render it effective.' King v. King, 636 So. 2d 1249,
1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994); see also Patchett v. Patchett, 469
So. 2d 642 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). We conclude that a trial court
has the inherent power to issue a QDRO subsequent to the
entry of a divorce judgment in an effort to implement or
enforce the judgment or to render the divorce judgment
effective. Cf. Jardine v. Jardine, 918 So. 2d 127, 131-32 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2005) (discussing and quoting Haney v. Haney, 50
Ala. App. 79, 81, 277 So. 2d 356, 357 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973), in
which this court held that a trial court had the power to order
the sale of a marital residence, even though a provision for the
sale of the marital residence was not set forth in the parties'
original agreement or the divorce judgment, because 'the
parties' original divorce agreement and resulting judgment
"was final only under the circumstances existing at the time,
1During the pendency of the husband's postjudgment motion, the
wife filed a separate contempt petition, which the Russell Circuit Court
denied. The wife filed an appeal from that judgment, and the appeals
were consolidated. The issues raised in the wife's appeal from the
judgment in the contempt action are not relevant to the issue in this case,
and we therefore do not discuss that aspect of the Montgomery opinion.
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but [was] subject to modification for the purpose of
implementing" the result intended by that judgment').
"However, we agree with the husband that the wife
should have filed separate actions, paid the appropriate filing
fees, and given the husband proper notice of her filings
because the wife was seeking to implement or enforce the
divorce judgment.4 Cf. Colburn v. Colburn, 14 So. 3d 176, 178
(Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter a judgment of contempt 'because the
parties filed their [contempt] motions after the entry of a final
judgment in the case, [and, therefore,] their motions
constituted independent proceedings over which the trial
court could gain jurisdiction only if the parties paid the filing
fees required to commence such proceedings'). Section 12-19-71(a), Ala. Code 1975, sets forth the amount of filing fees to
be paid in civil actions, and subsection (7) states the dollar
amount required 'for cases filed in the domestic relations
docket of the circuit court seeking to modify or enforce an
existing domestic relations order.'
"Because the wife did not pay any filing fees when filing
her motion requesting the entry of a QDRO, the [Russell
Circuit C]ourt was never vested with jurisdiction to enter
QDRO [B], and, therefore, its judgment of May 11, 2005,
purporting to enter QDRO [B] is void.5 See Vann v. Cook, 989
So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (holding that '[a]
judgment entered by a court lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction is absolutely void'). We further conclude that the
[Russell Circuit C]ourt did not have jurisdiction to enter
QDRO [C] for the same reasons that it did not have
jurisdiction to enter QDRO [B] and that, therefore, the
[Russell Circuit C]ourt's judgment of February 8, 2008, is void
as well.6
"_________________________
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"4We note that there was some indication that the
husband had actual notice of the wife's intent to initiate the
proceedings seeking the entry of the QDROs, but the parties
do not dispute the fact that the wife did not pay any filing fees.
"5Although the husband did not object to the entry of
QDRO [B], subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See
Riley v. Hughes, 17 So. 3d 643, 648 (Ala. 2009) ('subjectmatter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the failure to argue it
as an issue').
"6Because we have concluded that the [Russell Circuit
C]ourt lacked jurisdiction to enter QDRO [B], the wife's
argument that QDRO [C] was entered pursuant to Rule
60(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] to correct a clerical error contained in
QDRO [B] is without merit. ..."
Montgomery, 37 So. 3d at 172-73.
As we recently explained in Hall v. Mock, [Ms. CL-2025-0417, May
22, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026), "[i]n 2004, the
legislature amended Ala. Code 1975, § 12-19-71, to establish a specific
filing fee of $248 'for cases filed in the domestic relations docket of the
circuit court seeking to modify or enforce an existing domestic relations
court order.' Ala. Acts 2004, Act No. 2004-636, § 1, codified at Ala. Code
1975, § 12-19-71(a)(7)."2 Although § 12-19-71(a)(7)b. provides an
2In her answer to the petition, the former wife argues that this court
should reexamine its holding in Hall and other cases holding that a filing
fee is a necessary prerequisite to an enforcement action and relies, in
part, on the special writing in Hall and the principle that courts retain
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exception to the requirement that a filing fee be collected, it does so only
"for a motion for a qualified domestic relations order which is filed within
120 days of the date of the final order." The former wife's filing of the
proposed third QDRO occurred eight years after the entry of the 2018
divorce judgment and was therefore not exempt from the filing fee
imposed by the legislature in § 12-19-71(a)(7)a.
Because the former wife failed to pay a filing fee to institute an
action to modify the second QDRO, we agree with the former husband
that the trial court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction regarding
the third QDRO and that the third QDRO and all orders entered
thereafter are void for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly,
we grant the former husband's petition and direct the trial court to vacate
the third QDRO and all orders entered after March 3, 2026. Because we
have determined that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over the former wife's request to issue the third QDRO based on her
residual jurisdiction to enforce their judgments. See Hall, ___ So. 3d at
___ (Bowden, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).
In Hall, we adequately explained our rejection of the same argument the
former wife makes, and we see no need to reexamine the argument in
this opinion. Moreover, the former wife's filing, in essence, sought a
modification of an existing QDRO.
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failure to pay a filing fee, we pretermit consideration of whether the third
QDRO, or the trial court's subsequent orders, were void for any other
reason advanced by the former husband in his mandamus petition.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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