Rel: August 28, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2026-0123 and CL-2026-0124
M.C.G.
v.
Houston County Department of Human Resources, M.T., C.W.T.,
and C.T.
Appeal from Houston Juvenile Court
(JU-24-446.01 and JU-24-447.01)
BOWDEN, Judge.
In July 2024, the Houston County Department of Human Resources
("DHR") filed dependency petitions in the Houston Juvenile Court ("the
juvenile court") seeking orders finding T.W.T. and N.S. ("the children")
CL-2026-0123 and CL-2026-0124
dependent. DHR's petitions alleged that the children's mother, M.C.G.
("the mother"), had committed acts of domestic violence and abuse while
intoxicated. The petitions resulted in a finding of dependency, and DHR
required the mother to complete services that were tailored to reducing
the risks posed by alcohol use and domestic violence, which she did. In
January 2026, the juvenile court entered judgments finding that the
children remained dependent and awarding legal custody of the children
to T.W.T.'s paternal grandparents M.T. and C.W.T. ("the paternal
grandparents"), i.e., the parents of C.T., T.W.T.'s father.1 The mother
appeals.
On appeal, the mother argues that the evidence did not support the
juvenile court's finding that the children were dependent because, she
says, she completed the services DHR required and the initial conditions
that precipitated DHR's intervention no longer exist. But a trial court can
find a child to be a dependent child for reasons other than the initial
reasons that caused the child to be found dependent. Here, the juvenile
court reasonably could have found that there was clear and convincing
1C.T. was adjudicated T.W.T.'s legal father during the proceedings
below.
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evidence demonstrating that the children remained dependent because
of the mother's limited financial means. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgments of the juvenile court.
Procedural History
DHR filed dependency petitions in July 2024. In November 2024,
the juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing and entered orders ("the
dependency orders") that found the children to be dependent children.
The juvenile court then held a dispositional hearing over four days:
August 7, 2025, September 15, 2025, October 27, 2025, and January 12,
2026. On January 12, 2026, the juvenile court entered judgments ("the
dependency judgments") that found the children to be dependent and
transferred legal custody of the children to the paternal grandparents.
The dependency judgments did not contain specific findings of fact, but
the mother filed a postjudgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the dependency judgments on January 20, 2026. The
mother's postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on
February 3, 2026, and she timely filed notices of appeal on February 16,
2026.
Analysis
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The mother presents two arguments. Her first argument is that
DHR failed to present clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that
the children were dependent. Her second argument is that, because the
children are not dependent children, the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to transfer custody of the children to the paternal
grandparents. The mother's first argument is not persuasive, and we
pretermit discussion of the mother's second argument, which is
contingent on the success of her first argument.
I. Did DHR produce sufficient evidence to establish that the children
were dependent?
A. Standard of review
When a trial court presides over a bench trial, receives oral
testimony, and issues a judgment, we decide if the evidence was sufficient
to support that judgment using the ore tenus standard of review. W.S. v.
Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 426 So. 3d 838, 852 (Ala. Civ. App.
2025). In this case, the ore tenus standard of review requires us to
determine whether the juvenile court reasonably could have found that
there was clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the children
were dependent. See § 12-15-311, Ala. Code 1975 (requiring finding of
dependency based on clear and convincing evidence); Ex parte Bodie, 377
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So. 3d 1051, 1056 (Ala. 2022)(describing the quantum of evidence that is
necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual
finding when the standard for a factual decision by the trial court was
clear and convincing evidence). Put simply, we must determine if the
evidence could have produced in the juvenile court " ' "a firm conviction
as to each element [of dependency] and a high probability of the
correctness of the conclusion." ' " Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v.
N.B., 196 So. 3d 1205, 1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)(citations omitted).
"In passing on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
as to a finding of dependency, this court does not reweigh the
evidence; instead, this court determines whether the juvenile
court, acting in its fact-finding role, reasonably could have
determined from its own weighing of the evidence that the
dependency of the child was proven by clear and convincing
evidence as that standard is defined above."
R.F.W. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 70 So. 3d 1270, 1272 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2011). "We are not allowed to substitute our judgment for that
of the trial court, even when this court might have reached a different
result, unless the trial court's resolution of the facts is plainly and
palpably wrong." J.B. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 992 So. 2d
34, 39 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
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Thus, when determining if the evidence was sufficient to support
the dependency judgments, we must examine the elements of dependency
and the evidence that DHR produced in support of those elements. We
must then determine if, based on that evidence, the juvenile court could
have had a "firm conviction" that DHR had established each element of
dependency and whether there is a "high probability" as to the
correctness of the juvenile court's conclusion that the children were
dependent, and we must do so without reweighing the evidence or
substituting our judgment for that of the juvenile court.
B. The elements of dependency
A child is dependent if he or she meets the statutory definition of a
dependent child, Ex parte L.E.O., 61 So. 3d 1042, 1046 (Ala. 2010), which
is set out in § 12-15-102, Ala. Code 1975. Under § 12-15-102, a dependent
child is a child who is in need of care and supervision, has been
adjudicated dependent, and who meets any of the circumstances
described in § 12-15-102(8)1. - (8)8. Sections 12-15-301(8)1. - 7. are
specific circumstances, and we have interpreted § 12-15-102(8).8. to mean
that a trial court can find a child dependent based on the "totality of the
circumstances." See Martin v. State ex rel. Dep't of Hum. Res., 502 So.
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2d 769, 771 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)(interpreting former § 12-15-1(10)(m),
Ala. Code 1975, which contained substantially similar language as § 12-15-102(8)8., and stating that "this proposition gives the juvenile court the
authority to determine a child to be dependent under the totality of the
circumstances"). Thus, a child is dependent if (1) the child is in need of
care and supervision, (2) the child has been adjudicated dependent, and
(3) the child meets any of the specific circumstances set out in § 12-15-102(8)1. - .7. or the totality of the circumstances indicates that the child
is in need of the state's protection under § 12-15-102(8)8.
The juvenile court did not indicate in its dependency judgments
what circumstance or circumstances of dependency listed under § 12-15-102(8)1. – 8. apply. When a trial court does not make specific factual
findings in support of its dependency finding, as in this case, this court
must "presume that the juvenile court made those findings necessary to
support its judgment, provided that those findings are supported by the
evidence." J.C. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 313 So. 3d 1137,
1139 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (citing K.C. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 54 So. 3d 407, 413 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)). Thus, we presume that
the juvenile court made the factual findings necessary to find that the
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children are in need of care and supervision and that it found the
existence of one of the circumstances listed in §12-15-102(8)1. - 8.
DHR argues that the circumstances described in § 12-15-102(8)2.
and § 12-15-102(8)6. are relevant to these appeals. Those circumstances
describe a child "[w]ho is without a parent, legal guardian, or legal
custodian willing and able to provide for the care, support, or education
of the child," § 12-15-102(8)2., and a child "[w]hose parent, legal
guardian, legal custodian, or other custodian is unable or unwilling to
discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child," § 12-15-102(8)6.
Relying on those provisions, we have held that "a parent's inability to
provide care for his or her child because of limited financial means can
serve as a basis for a finding of dependency." B.O. v. C.T., 416 So. 3d 1101,
1105 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(citing K.D.S. v. M.P., 392 So. 3d 760 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2023), citing in turn § 12-15-102(8)2. and § 12-15-102(8)6.).
The time at which a trial court finds a child dependent is also
relevant to appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a dependency adjudication. Dependency proceedings occur in two stages:
an adjudicatory hearing, after which the trial court determines if the
child is dependent, and a dispositional hearing, after which the trial court
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determines what custody arrangement would serve the best interests of
the child. See § 12-15-310, Ala. Code 1975 ("Conduct of Adjudicatory
Hearings"); § 12-15-311 ("Dispositional Hearing"). The dispositional
hearing can occur immediately after the adjudicatory hearing or at a
later trial setting. Rule 25, Ala. R. Juv. P.; M.A. v. C.S., 382 So. 3d 1263,
1269 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023)("A juvenile court may either hold its
adjudicatory and dispositional hearings on the same date or it may hold
them on different dates.").
The evidence, however, must clearly and convincingly establish
that the child is dependent at the time of the disposition of custody.
A.N.F. v. D.F., [Ms. CL-2025-0736, May 1, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ.
App. 2026); J.P. v. D.P., 260 So. 3d 862, 871 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). Thus,
a trial court's initial finding of dependency, following an adjudicatory
hearing, is not necessarily dispositive as to the question of dependency at
the final disposition of the case. See M.D. v. S.C., 150 So. 3d 210, 213
(Ala. Civ. App. 2014)(holding that juvenile court's finding that child was
dependent at time of initiation of dependency proceedings was
insufficient to permit juvenile court to enter custody award or disposition
of child at time of dispositional hearing three years after proceedings
9
CL-2026-0123 and CL-2026-0124
were initiated). And we examine whether the evidence supports a finding
that a child is dependent at the time of the disposition of custody.
As a corollary to the requirement that a child be dependent at the
time of the trial court's custody disposition, a trial court must make its
determination that a child is a dependent child based on a parent's
"current circumstances," L.A.R. v. J.B.R., 401 So. 3d 1171, 1180 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2024). "There is no established formula for or time limitation on the
determination of what constitutes 'current circumstances' in the context
of a dependency action." Id.
With those principles in mind, we turn to the evidence before the
juvenile court.
C. The relevant evidence before the juvenile court
"The fundamental principle is that the decision of a court must be
based on evidence produced in open court lest the guaranty of due process
be infringed." Ex parte Berryhill, 410 So. 2d 416, 418 (Ala. 1982). The
juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing in November 2024. Eleven
months later, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing set over four
days: August 7, 2025, September 15, 2025, October 27, 2025, and January
12, 2026.
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CL-2026-0123 and CL-2026-0124
A court reporter's transcript of the November 2024 adjudicatory
hearing is not in the record. It does not appear, however, that the juvenile
court relied on evidence received at the November 2024 adjudicatory
hearing when entering its dependency judgments. The dependency
judgments do not reference evidence received or stipulations made at the
November 2024 hearing, and it is apparent that the juvenile court was
aware of its obligation to make a new dependency finding at the
conclusion of the dispositional hearing because the juvenile-court judge
stated, at the September 15, 2025, setting of the dispositional hearing,
that "[t]here must still be dependency, but it's disposition." Thus, transfer
of these appeals because of a lack of a transcript from the November 2024
adjudicatory hearing, is not necessary. Cf. S.J. v. K.J., 206 So. 3d 641,
644-45 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)(transferring appeal because juvenile court's
judgment indicated that juvenile court had considered witness testimony
for which no transcript existed); C.J. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 76 So. 3d 268, 269 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(transferring appeal because
juvenile court relied on factual stipulations at hearing for which there
was no court reporter's transcript).
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The court reporter's transcripts from the dispositional hearing held
on August 7, 2025, September 15, 2025, October 27, 2025, and January
12, 2026, are in the record on appeal.2 The juvenile court did not take
judicial notice of any prior proceedings, cf. Ex parte State Dep't of Hum.
Res., 890 So. 2d 114, 118 (Ala. 2004) (listing evidence that can be
appropriately admitted by judicial notice at an adjudicatory hearing), but
it received two exhibits: an individualized-service plan dated June 27,
2025, and a "payment history," purporting to show support payments
that the mother had -- and had not -- made to the paternal grandparents.
1. Evidence received at the August 7, 2025, setting of the
dispositional hearing
2Those transcripts indicate that the juvenile court admitted
hearsay evidence over the mother's objection. The juvenile court
reasoned, correctly, that hearsay evidence is admissible at a dispositional
hearing. But a trial court cannot rely on hearsay evidence when making
a finding of dependency, and we have held that a trial court must make
a finding of dependency when it makes a custody disposition. The mother,
however, does not argue that the juvenile court improperly relied on
hearsay evidence when making its dependency finding at the time of the
custody disposition, nor did she assert a due-process argument below, see
Ala. R. Juv. P. 25A ("A dependency hearing shall be conducted consistent
with legal and due-process requirements …."), and we cannot preserve or
make those arguments for her.
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The mother testified about her employment history spanning the
period of July 2024 to August 7, 2025. She testified that she had been
employed as a service advisor at two car dealerships, had done
contracting work for Best Choice Roofing company, and had worked at
an Olive Garden restaurant. The mother testified that she receives
financial support from her family and that her grandmother has sent her
money to assist her in paying rent. She testified, however, that she is not
behind on her bills. She testified that she receives child-support
payments from the father of N.S. and that she forwards those payments
to the paternal grandparents.
With respect to her then-current employment status, the mother
testified that she was not employed on August 7, 2025. She testified that
she had an interview with Mercedes-Benz ("Mercedes") the next day.
2. Evidence received at the September 15, 2025, setting of
the dispositional hearing
The mother testified that she had worked for Mercedes for two
weeks but that her employment had been terminated. She testified that
her employment had been terminated because she had suffered a
bleeding disorder, despite having provided a doctor's excuse to Mercedes.
With respect to her employment status as of the September 15, 2025,
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setting of the dispositional hearing, the mother testified that she was
employed as an assistant general manager at a restaurant called "CB's."
She testified, however, that she had not yet started working but would
make $60,000 a year "plus bonuses."
The mother also provided testimony about her expenses. She
testified that her vehicle is paid off and that she has a monthly carinsurance premium of $90. She testified that her monthly phone bill is
$166 and that her electric bill usually runs between $200 and $250 per
month. She testified that she pays rent in the amount of $1,425 per
month and that she is required to pay rental insurance of $26 per month
and that her expenses average $300 a month for gasoline and $500 a
month for food. The mother testified that she would earn $4,800 per
month as assistant general manager at C.B.'s. She testified that that
income would meet the needs of her children. She testified that she had
a letter of employment from C.B.'s.
Lillian Nelson, the DHR caseworker assigned to the children's
cases, testified that her only concern regarding the mother's ability to
resume custody of the children was her financial stability.
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"[DHR's Counsel:] Do you have concerns at this time
related to whether it would be in the children's best interest
to be returned to [the mother]?
"[Nelson:] I am concerned about [the mother's] financial
stability.
"[DHR's Counsel:] Any other concerns?
"[Nelson:] No sir.
"[DHR's Counsel:] Do you perceive [the mother's]
situation to be stable?
"[Nelson:] No sir. "
Nelson testified that she knew where the mother worked, "but [the
mother] never gave [her] proof of employment."
3. Evidence received at the October 27, 2025, setting of the
dispositional hearing
The mother did not testify at the October 27, 2025, setting of the
dispositional hearing. Nelson testified that she had never seen a paystub
or letter of employment from the mother. According to Nelson, the longest
period of employment that the mother had reported to her was 90 days.
4. Evidence received at the January 12, 2026, setting of the
dispositional hearing
The mother testified that she had never started work at C.B.'s,
because, she testified, the schedule that she had been offered did not
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accommodate her duties as a mother. The mother testified that she was
not employed. She testified that she had "income, ways to make money."
She testified that she offered cleaning services for people who have homes
that have too many items. She testified that she has received around
$400 from that service. She testified that she still receives financial
support from family and that her family members has stepped in to assist
her.
The mother also testified about her support obligations. She
testified that she had received support from N.S.'s father every month,
that she had been ordered to forward that support to the paternal
grandparents, and that the last time she sent support to the paternal
grandparents was on July 11, 2025. The mother testified that she had
failed to send support since July 2025 because she had had the children
during her visitation periods and that she provides for them during that
time.
D. Whether the evidence supports a finding of dependency
If the evidence sufficiently establishes that a parent lacks a source
of income sufficient to provide for his or her expenses, this court will not
reverse a judgment finding that child dependent. A.T. v. A.G., 81 So. 3d
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385 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); K.D.S. v. M.P., 392 So. 3d 760 (Ala. Civ. App.
2023). In A.T., the mother in that case, A.T., was not employed and
occasionally earned $250 per month in income as a babysitter or a
housecleaner. A.T. acknowledged that she relied on family members for
much of her support and to pay her court fines. She also testified that she
may have been eligible for Social Security disability benefits but that she
had not explored that option and, therefore, that possible source of
income was not yet available to her. The trial court found that A.T.'s
financial circumstances could improve but that, at that time, she was
unable to meet the children's needs. We affirmed the judgment finding
A.T.'s children dependent, reasoning, in part, that there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's finding that A.T. was unable to meet
the children's needs.
In K.D.S., the trial court received evidence regarding the income
and expenses of K.D.S., the mother in that case. K.D.S. received income
from her employment as a waitress, and her expenses included cost-ofliving expenses as well as court costs and support obligations. The
evidence demonstrated that K.D.S. was behind in making payments
toward court costs and child support. The trial court's judgment found
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the children dependent, and we affirmed that judgment. We reasoned
that "[t]he [trial] court could properly have drawn the inference from
[the] evidence that [K.D.S.'s] ability to earn income was insufficient to
cover all of her existing expenses, much less to cover those plus provide
support for teen and 'tween' children." K.D.S., 392 So. 3d at 764. We
stated:
"Although the mother's brief cites S.K. v. Madison County
Department of Human Resources, 990 So. 2d 887 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008), which recites the proposition that poverty
' "should not be the criteria for taking away a wanted child
from the parents," ' 990 So. 2d at 903 (quoting In re Hickman,
489 So. 2d 601, 602-03 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)), we would note
that both S.K. and Hickman involved appellate review of final
judgments terminating parental rights, whereas these
appeals involve determinations of dependency. To the extent
that the mother contends that the [trial] court could not
properly find the children dependent based solely upon her
inability to support them, this court held to the contrary in
A.T. v. A.G., 81 So. 3d 385 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), affirming a
judgment determining that two children were dependent
because their mother was ' "unable to provide for the[ir] care,
support, and education at this time" '; this court noted that the
record in that case contained evidence indicating that the
mother had earned no more than $250 per month from odd
jobs and had relied on family members for her support and
paying court fees. See A.T., 81 So. 3d at 388, 389. The [trial]
court thus did not err in finding the children dependent."
K.D.S., 392 So. 3d at 764 (emphasis added).
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As in A.T. and K.D.S., the evidence in this case supports the
juvenile court's implicit determination that the children are dependent
based on the mother's limited financial circumstances. The mother was
consistently unemployed throughout the dependency proceedings. When
asked about her income at the most recent setting of the dispositional
hearing -- the setting in January 2026 -- the mother testified that she
was not employed but that she had other means to earn income. When
asked about those other means, the mother testified that she had earned
only $400 from cleaning houses. In contrast, the mother testified in detail
about her monthly expenses at the September 15, 2025, setting of the
dispositional hearing. She also acknowledged in January 2026 that she
was behind on her support payments to the paternal grandparents.
In light of the mother's testimony, and our holdings in A.T. and
K.D.S., we cannot say that the juvenile court could not have properly
concluded that, at the time of the January 2026 setting of the
dispositional hearing, the children were dependent "based solely on [the
mother's] inability to support them." K.D.S., 392 So. 3d at 764.
The mother argues, capably, that other evidence established that
that the children were not dependent due to her limited financial
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resources. The mother points out that the evidence was undisputed that
she had lived in the same three-bedroom rental home for over two years
and was current on all her bills. She points out that, if she were to again
receive custody of the children, she would retain the child-support
payments that she is currently required to forward to the paternal
grandparents. And she points out that not a single witness testified that
the children ever lacked food, shelter, clothing, or other basic necessities
while in the mother's care, even during the period when the mother had
unsupervised custody of the children four days per week. We also note
that Nelson testified that she had been in the mother's residence in June
2025 "to make sure that she had basic necessities for the boys," and
Nelson had agreed that the residence had appeared safe at that time.
The mother's argument, however, asks this court to reweigh the
evidence, which we cannot do. R.F.W., 70 So. 3d at 1272. Nor can we
substitute our judgment for the juvenile court's, even if we might have
reached a different result. J.B., 992 So. 2d at 40.
Lastly, we acknowledge the mother's well-reasoned argument that
the circumstances that led to the commencement of the dependency
proceedings could not have served as a basis for the juvenile court's
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subsequent dependency judgments. But, as the mother concedes in her
reply brief, a juvenile court can find a child dependent based upon
grounds not asserted in the initial dependency petition. M.M.S. v. D.W.,
735 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
Conclusion
Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the
children are dependent because of the mother's limited financial
circumstances. Therefore, the judgments are affirmed.
CL-2026-0123 -- AFFIRMED.
CL-2026-0124 -- AFFIRMED.
Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.
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