In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-25-00319-CV
BRADLEY TUTTLE, Appellant
V.
DANIEL PLAKE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 457th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 25-06-10304
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bradley Tuttle filed a lawsuit against Daniel Plake, the Assistant County
Attorney defending a Montgomery County employee in a separate lawsuit filed by
Tuttle.1 The trial court dismissed Tuttle’s lawsuit against Plake. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
91a. Tuttle appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The appeal from the dismissal of that lawsuit has been docketed as Appeal
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Number 09-25-00289-CV, Bradley Tuttle v. Shelly Black.
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Background
Tuttle sued Shelly Black, a court administrator for County Court at Law
Number 3 of Montgomery County. Plake, acting in his capacity as an Assistant
County Attorney for County Attorney B.D. Griffin, filed an answer and special
exceptions as counsel of record for Black. The trial court sustained Black’s special
exceptions and ordered Tuttle to amend or supplement his pleadings. Tuttle did not
amend his pleadings and the trial court dismissed the case.
On June 27, 2025, Tuttle filed “Plaintiff’s Notice of Demand and Petition for
‘Trial by Jury’ Tribunal Regarding Rights Violation Against one of the People.”
Tuttle alleged:
[A] judicial court of record requires the maxims of law, by which the
jury finds and declares law conveying jurisdiction over the Defendant.
Any inferior form of tribunal brought by a magistrate, including of rules
of procedure, court doctrines, or enactments by the legislature, etc., may
produce a non-judicial tribunal, which becomes a private attack upon
the people’s constitutions.
Tuttle alleged that in Tuttle v. Black, Plake “did use inferior ‘rules of
procedure’ and non-jurisdictional case motions to block Plaintiff (one of the people)
from exercising his inviolate right of a ‘trial by jury’ tribunal.” Tuttle alleged that
Plake, “as a government attorney, has been granted NO authority over the people’s
‘liberty right’ in the constitutions, yet did continue to block Plaintiff’s right of trial
by jury, even after a written notice of warning. Defendant did commit
maladministration by his private acts of insubordination and breach of trust.” Tuttle
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alleged, “Defendant was shown that his adverse actions against Bradley Tuttle, as
Plaintiff in the 457th District Court Case No. 25-03-04585, are a violation of the
terms in his Contract and Trust Indenture with the people of Texas. In the written
notice, Defendant’s non-performance of contract was documented.” Tuttle alleged,
“Defendant was instructed to remedy his ‘unofficial acts’ by rescinding his suit
filings and recusing himself from the 457th District Court suit; which he has refused
to do.” No request for damages, declaratory, or injunctive relief was requested in
Tuttle’s pleading.
On July 15, 2025, Plake filed a General Denial and a Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Rule 91a. Plake alleged Tuttle’s alleged causes of action have no basis
in law or fact because attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients for
actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.2 Plake argues,
“Tuttle’s attempt to hold Mr. Plake liable for simply filing a pleading in another suit
is without merit and his case should be dismissed.”
Tuttle filed a “Notice and Motion to Transfer This Case # 25-06-10304 to
Different Montgomery County District Court.” As grounds for transferring the case
to a different district court in Montgomery County, Tuttle stated, “in a recent case
25-03-04585 brought by Plaintiff Bradley Tuttle, Judge Santini used procedural
grounds to block Plaintiff’s constitutional right of Due Process of Law. By private
2
See Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015).
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act on July 12th 2025, Judge Santini dismissed Plaintiff’s case and Justice was not
served.” Plake objected to the motion to transfer.
On August 14, 2025, the trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Rule 91a and dismissed “all causes of action with prejudice.” Tuttle appealed.
Issues
Tuttle presents five issues in his Appellant’s Brief:
1) Given the Texas Supreme Court acknowledges its TRCP was
never passed by the Texas Legislature, did the trial court err when no
law was declared during the course of the judicial proceeding?
2) In August, 2025 did the trial court err when it took personal
jurisdiction over Plaintiff and dismissed his case without due process
of law?
3) Is Plaintiff’s right of due process of law impervious to judicial
discretion, obligating the court to proceed at the common law by
delivering Plaintiff Tuttle’s “regular allegations” to a grand jury of
inquiry, fulfilling the 1845 TX Const. SEC. 11 promise that “every
person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law[?]”
4) In Texas does the judicial court trustee have the power to turn
a common law allegation into an accusation-- or is it the people’s grand
jury of peers that wields the powers of inquiry and accusation by
indictment?
5) After an indictment is returned to the trial court, does the trial
by jury tribunal have the power to “say what the law is[?]”
Discussion
In issue one, Tuttle argues the trial court deprived Tuttle of due process of law
when it “failed to bring law to a judicial tribunal[.]” Tuttle contends the Texas Rules
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of Civil Procedure, having been created by the Texas Supreme Court, “was not
enacted by the Texas Legislature and is not law.” We disagree with Tuttle’s premise
that a trial court cannot render judgment based on the application of the Rules of
Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 91a in particular.
The Supreme Court adopted Rule 91a to implement the Legislature’s 2011
amendment to the statutory authorization for the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Misc.
Docket No. 12–9191, Adoption of Rules for Dismissals and Expedited
Actions (Tex. Nov. 13, 2012) (eff. Mar. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.txcourts.gov/AII_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/Administrative
Orders/miscdocket/12/12919100.pdf; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.004(g)
(“The supreme court shall adopt rules to provide for the dismissal of causes of action
that have no basis in law or fact on motion and without evidence. The rules shall
provide that the motion to dismiss shall be granted or denied within 45 days of the
filing of the motion to dismiss. The rules shall not apply to actions under the Family
Code.”).
“The commonly understood meaning of ‘law’ includes judicial decisions and
rules promulgated by the judiciary, such as rules of procedure and evidence.” In re
City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding). The
Legislature delegated rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court almost ninety
years ago. See Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 25, § 1, 1939 Tex. Gen.
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Laws 201 (former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1731a). In 1985, people of Texas amended
the Texas Constitution to vest the Supreme Court with the constitutional authority
to promulgate rules of civil procedure. Tex. Const. art. 5, § 31(b) (“The Supreme
Court shall promulgate rules of civil procedure for all courts not inconsistent with
the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration
of justice in the various courts.”). “The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have the
same force and effect as statutes.” Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868,
872 (Tex. 1973).
We conclude that the trial court possessed the authority to dismiss Tuttle’s
lawsuit pursuant to Rule 91a. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. We overrule issue one.
We address Tuttle’s remaining issues together. We understand Tuttle’s
argument in issues two through five to be (1) the trial court dismissed Tuttle’s case
without due process of law, (2) due course of law required the district judge to
present Tuttle’s complaint against Plake to a grand jury, (3) a grand jury must indict
Plake before the trial court may assume jurisdiction over Tuttle’s lawsuit against
Plake, and (4) only a petit jury, not the trial judge, could decide if Plake deprived
Tuttle of his rights under the Texas Constitution. Regarding the trial court’s
dismissal of his lawsuit against Plake, Tuttle limits his complaint in issues two
through five of his Appellant’s Brief to his contention that the trial court failed to
adjudicate the lawsuit using the proper procedure.
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Tuttle cites no constitutional or statutory provision that grants to a district
judge the authority to present a claim—civil or criminal, public or private—to a
grand jury. The authority to present to a grand jury is within the purview of a
different Article 5 department, the District Attorney. See generally Tex. Code. Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 2A.102 (“Each district attorney shall represent the state in all criminal
cases in the district courts of the attorney’s district and in appeals from those
cases.”); see also id. arts. 20A.102 (a District Judge is not one of the persons
authorized to be present in the grand jury room while the grand jury is conducting
proceedings); 20A.103 (“The attorney representing the state is entitled to appear
before the grand jury and inform the grand jury of offenses subject to indictment at
any time except when the grand jury is discussing the propriety of finding an
indictment or is voting on an indictment.”); 20A.104 (“No person may address the
grand jury about a matter before the grand jury other than the attorney representing
the state, a witness, or the accused or suspected person or the attorney for the accused
or suspected person if approved by the attorney representing the state.”).
Tuttle argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Tuttle’s claim of
a violation of his constitutional rights without first securing an indictment from a
grand jury. “To issue a valid and binding judgment or order, a court must have both
subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and personal jurisdiction over the party it
purports to bind.” In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022).
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Subject matter jurisdiction derives solely from the Texas Constitution and state
statutes. Id. “Personal jurisdiction is composed of two elements: (1) the defendant
must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, and (2) the plaintiff must validly
invoke that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant.” Id. at 379-80.
The trial Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Tuttle’s claimed violation
of his constitutional rights. See Tex. Const. Art. 5, § 8 (“District Court jurisdiction
consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings,
and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may
be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or
administrative body.”). The trial court had personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit,
which the plaintiff involved by valid service of process on the defendant, who
answered the plaintiff’s petition. See Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 379. Due process
required notice and a hearing, which Tuttle does not argue he failed to receive before
the trial court dismissed the case. Tuttle has not shown that the trial court used the
wrong procedure in adjudicating Tuttle’s lawsuit. We overrule issues two through
five.
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Having overruled the issues presented in Appellant’s Brief, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
JAY WRIGHT
Justice
Submitted on August 18, 2026
Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.
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