In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-26-00301-CV
IN RE ANGEL MID-JEFF JOINT VENTURE, LLP
Original Proceeding
County Court at Law No. 1 of Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 26CCCV0306
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this mandamus proceeding, Relator Angel Mid-Jeff Joint Venture, LLP
(“AMJ”) asks the appellate court to compel the trial court to rescind its Order
Authorizing Entry Upon Property Pending Condemnation Proceeding, dated July 6,
2026 (the “Entry Order”), and its Order Enforcing Order Authorizing Entry Upon
Property and Confirming Rescheduled Entry Dates, dated July 21, 2026 (the
“Enforcement Order”). Upon receiving the petition, we stayed the trial court’s orders
and requested a response from the Real Party in Interest, Port Arthur Independent
School District (“PAISD”).
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The underlying proceeding is a condemnation action that is presently in the
administrative phase, and the commissioners have been appointed but have not yet
filed an award. 1 We conclude the trial court’s orders are premature, as the judicial
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phase of the condemnation has yet to commence, and the trial court’s jurisdiction to
enforce any rights PAISD possesses to enter on the property has not otherwise been
invoked. Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief.
Background
PAISD filed an Original Petition in Condemnation in April 2026 and served
citation on the landowner through substituted service on June 1, 2026. On June 23,
2026, PAISD filed a motion for an order authorizing entry onto AMJ’s property “to
complete engineering, surveying, environmental review, geotechnical evaluation,
planning, and design activities associate with the public project.” AMJ filed a
Special Appearance to Plea to the Jurisdiction on July 2, 2026, shortly before the
hearing on PAISD’s motion for entry on land. 21F
1
See In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1, 493 S.W.3d 538, 542-43 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (“We have said that condemnation proceedings have two parts. The first part, involving the commissioners, we have characterized as administrative. … The second part of condemnation proceedings, following a proper objection to the commissioners’ award, we have deemed judicial.”) (footnotes omitted).
2
The Special Appearance to Plea to the Jurisdiction is the subject of an accelerated appeal docketed as Appeal Number 09-26-00271-CV, Angel Mid-Jeff Joint Venture, LLP v. Port Arthur Independent School District.
2
PAISD explained in the hearing that it had been negotiating with the
landowner to purchase the property for a new stadium and had appraisals for $2.5
and $2.7 million, but the landowner obtained an appraisal for $30 million. According
to PAISD, the landowner would only agree to allow PAISD to conduct a survey if
PAISD agreed to forego condemnation and accept the landowner’s valuation, and
PAISD needed to perform a “feasibility study.” AMJ argued the condemnation
proceeding must be dismissed for lack of prosecution because the trial court had not
appointed commissioners within thirty days of the filing of the petition. The trial
court signed an Order Authorizing Entry Upon Property Pending Condemnation
Proceeding (the Entry Order). The Order allows PAISD to conduct surveying and
topographical investigations, engineering evaluations, utility-location activities,
environmental assessments, geotechnical investigations and soil borings,
photography and drone operations, site staking and mapping, architectural and
planning activities, and other “reasonably necessary due diligence activities related
to the project.”
After the hearing, the trial court also signed an order appointing the
commissioners, PAISD amended its condemnation petition, and AMJ exercised its
strike of one of the commissioners. Meanwhile, AMJ filed a notice of appeal and
filed a Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order Pending Interlocutory Appeal. On July
21, 2026, the trial court signed an Order Enforcing Order Authorizing Entry Upon
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Property and Confirming Rescheduled Entry Dates (the Enforcement Order), which
gave specific dates and times when PAISD and its agents could enter the property
and conduct the activities authorized by the Order dated July 6. AMJ sought
mandamus relief.
Mandamus Standard
We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by
the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial
court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827
S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion
if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion
in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See In re Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits
of mandamus review against the detriments, considering whether extending
mandamus relief will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from
impairment or loss. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig.
proceeding). An appeal is not an adequate remedy if the very act of proceeding to
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trial—regardless of the outcome—would defeat the substantive right involved. In re
McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
Issues
In its First Amended Emergency Application for Writ of Mandamus and
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, AMJ identifies five alleged defects in the
proceedings below that it argues warrant mandamus relief: (1) the Enforcement
Order purports to nullify AMJ’s right to seek temporary relief in its accelerated
appeal; (2) the property PAISD seeks to condemn is not sufficiently identified for
jurisdiction to attach; (3) the special commissioners were not timely appointed; (4)
PAISD failed to serve all necessary parties with notice of hearing; and (5) the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to compel relief before the special commissioners conduct
a hearing and file an award.
The Enforcement Order states that, “the filing or anticipated filing of a motion,
special appearance, plea to the jurisdiction, interlocutory appeal, or request for stay
shall not suspend the Court’s July 6, 2026 Order or this Order unless a court with
authority to do so enters a written order granting a stay or other temporary relief.”
To the extent AMJ claims the trial court violated rights granted to an appellant
by Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(7) and Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 29.2, we disagree with that argument.
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A person may appeal from an interlocutory order that “grants or denies the
special appearance of a defendant under Rule 120a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
except in a suit brought under the Family Code” and filing an accelerated appeal
“stays the commencement of a trial in the trial court pending resolution of the
appeal.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7), (b). Rule 29.2 allows a
trial court to “permit an order granting interlocutory relief to be superseded pending
an appeal from the order in accordance with Rule 24.” Tex R. App. P. 29.2. This
matter does not involve a special appearance for lack of personal jurisdiction, nor
does it pertain to a governmental entity asserting a plea to the jurisdiction.
AMJ also argues “PAISD fails to provide a legally sufficient description of
the property sought to be condemned for jurisdiction to attach.” AMJ appears to
argue that PAISD must have a metes and bounds description of the property before
it may obtain an order to enter on the property to perform a survey so they can create
a metes and bounds description of the property. AMJ has not shown where it
presented this argument to the trial court. “Due to the extraordinary nature of the
remedy, the right to mandamus relief generally requires a predicate request for action
by the respondent, and the respondent’s erroneous refusal to act.” In re Coppola,
535 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (citation omitted). AMJ has not
established an abuse of discretion by the trial court on this issue. See id.
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Next, AMJ argues that because the trial court appointed the commissioners
eighty-eight days after PAISD filed its original petition, neither the commissioners
nor the trial court possess jurisdiction “to proceed further with authorizing access to
the property in the administrative phase before the administrative hearing or
appointment of special commissioners.” Property Code section 21.014(a) requires
that the trial court appoint commissioners not later than the 30th calendar day after
the petition is filed. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.014(a). The statutory
requirements in condemnation proceedings may be mandatory without being
jurisdictional. Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 183-84 (Tex. 2004) (holding the “unable to agree” requirement in the condemnation
statute is mandatory but not jurisdictional). The remedy for the trial court’s failure
to appoint commissioners within thirty days after the filing of the condemnation
petition is to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to appoint
commissioners. In re Bay Runner Pipeline, LLC, No. 13-25-00383-CV, 2025 WL
2329590, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 12. 2025, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.). AMJ has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion.
AMJ argues the condemnation proceeding must be dismissed because PAISD
failed to serve all necessary parties with notices required by statute. See Tex. Prop.
Code Ann. §§ 21.014(d) (requiring notice of the trial court’s order appointing
commissioners); 21.016 (requiring notice of special commissioner’s hearing).
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According to AMJ, non-parties with possessory interests have not been joined.
AMJ’s arguments are unsupported by the record, which shows that the special
commissioners have not held their hearing. Furthermore, the record does not show
that AMJ alerted the trial court to the alleged defect in parties. AMJ has not shown
that the trial court abused its discretion.
Finally, AMJ argues that until the special commissioners file their award and
the administrative phase of the condemnation proceeding concludes, the trial court
does not have the jurisdiction to issue and enforce the Entry Order and the
Enforcement Order. PAISD argues the Education Code expressly authorizes a
preliminary entry right distinct from possession after an award issues, and PAISD
relies upon Education Code section 11.155(b) for its argument.
“In a condemnation by a school district, the trial and all other proceedings,
including the assessing of damages, shall be in compliance with the statutes that
apply to condemnation by a railroad.” Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.155(b).
A railroad company is entitled to make an examination and survey for
the company’s proposed railway, to be performed as necessary to select
the most advantageous route for the proposed railway, and, subject to
Subsection (c), may enter on the lands or waters of any person or
corporation for that purpose.
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 112.051(a).
Except for the purposes of performing a lineal survey, a railroad
company may not enter on private real property for the purpose of
condemning the property or any material on the property for any
purpose until the company agrees with and pays the owner of the
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property all damages that may be caused to the owner’s property by the
condemnation of the property and by the construction of the company’s
road.
Id. § 112.051(c). We agree that PAISD could have filed an injunctive proceeding in
a separate suit to exercise its right to enter the property for purposes of performing
a lineal survey. See id. But, the current proceeding remains in the administrative
phase, and the trial court exceeded its authority at this stage by issuing the Entry
Order and the Enforcement Order.
PAISD also cites Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc. v. City of Port Neches,
for the proposition that a non-invasive Phase I assessment is reasonably implied from
the condemnation authority granted to PAISD. 11 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2000, no pet.). We note that the posture of that case is different from what
we have before us. In Coastal, the trial court was not acting within the administrative
phase of a condemnation suit.
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the Entry Order
and the Enforcement Order during the administrative phase of the condemnation
proceeding. AMJ lacks an adequate remedy by appeal because the entry on land will
occur before it can appeal.
Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and Relator lacks an
adequate remedy by appeal. Accordingly, we lift our order granting temporary relief
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and we conditionally grant mandamus relief. We are confident that the trial court
will vacate its Order Authorizing Entry Upon Property Pending Condemnation
Proceeding, dated July 6, 2026, and its Order Enforcing Order Authorizing Entry
Upon Property and Confirming Rescheduled Entry Dates, dated July 21, 2026. The
writ shall issue only in the event the trial court fails to comply.
PETITION CONDITIONALLY GRANTED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on August 14, 2026
Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
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