In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-26-00164-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF K.E.
On Appeal from the 279th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 25DCFM0548
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor child,
“Kinsey.” 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory
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grounds exist for termination of Mother’s, K.E.J.’s, parental rights and that
termination of her parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (2). 21F
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To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d).
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The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights after he signed an Affidavit of Voluntary Relinquishment, but he is not a party to this appeal.
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Mother’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there
are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no
pet.) (noting Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief
presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no
arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney
represented to the Court that she provided Mother with a copy of the Anders brief
she filed, notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief, and would provide a copy
of the clerk’s and reporter’s records to Mother. The Court likewise notified Mother
of her right to file a pro se response, and the deadline. Mother did not file a response
with the Court.
We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by
Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)
(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009,
no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we have found nothing that would
arguably support an appeal and agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit.
See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by
indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and
reviewed the record for arguable error but found none, the court of appeals met the
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requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346
S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new
counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Should
Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, her counsel’s
obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for
an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (citations
omitted).
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on August 24, 2026
Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.
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