Leon Randolph v. Lola Rawlinson

2026-08-27

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed because Randolph failed to negate all three independent grounds upon which summary judgment could have been based, requiring affirmance on the unchallenged ground regarding his bankruptcy filings regardless of the merits.

Leon Randolph filed suit in 2020 claiming title to over 23 acres of Texas property through adverse possession, relying on more than a century of occupation by himself and his family. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lola Rawlinson without stating which of three potential grounds it relied on: that the century-long possession negated the exclusivity requirement, that Randolph lacked privity to tack possession from family members, or that Randolph's bankruptcy filings showed he did not own the property.

On appeal, Randolph challenged only the first two grounds, arguing that his own adverse possession period exceeded ten years without tacking and that exclusivity does not require excluding family members. However, the appellate court found Randolph failed to address the third ground—the bankruptcy admissions—which independently could have supported the summary judgment. Because an appellant challenging a multi-ground summary judgment must address all possible bases, and Randolph did not, the court affirmed without reaching the merits of his arguments.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an appellant must address all grounds supporting a multi-ground summary judgment to obtain appellate relief
Adverse possession exclusivity element and its application to family possession
Tacking and the privity requirement between successive possessors
Effect of bankruptcy admissions on adverse possession claims

Procedural posture

Randolph appealed from a summary judgment granted by the trial court in Liberty County that did not specify its reasoning among three alternative grounds.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

NO. 09-24-00399-CV

LEON RANDOLPH, Appellant

LOLA RAWLINSON, Appellee

On Appeal from the 75th District Court

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CV2015889

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2020, Appellant, Leon Randolph, filed a trespass to try title suit against

Appellee, Lola Rawlinson, alleging superior title to 23.65 acres situated in Liberty

County, Texas. Randolph’s petition alleges he acquired title by adverse possession

under the ten-year and twenty-five-year limitations periods, because he and his

family have occupied and held the property in open, peaceful, notorious, exclusive,

hostile, adverse and continuous possession at all times since the early 1900s. See

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 16.026, 16.027. Rawlinson answered with a

general denial and plea of not guilty and counter-claimed for damage to the property

allegedly caused by Randolph and his family. In 2024, Rawlinson filed a traditional

and no-evidence motion for summary judgment asserting three independent

grounds: (1) that Randolph’s petition—by alleging that Randolph and his family

possessed the property for over a hundred years—negated the exclusivity element of

Randolph’s adverse possession claim; (2) that tacking was unavailable to Randolph

because he had no evidence of privity of estate with the family members upon whose

possession he was relying; and (3) that Randolph admitted in bankruptcy

proceedings in 2021 and 2022 that he did not own the property in question.

Randolph filed a response challenging all three grounds, and Rawlinson filed

a reply to the response. After a hearing, the trial court granted Rawlinson’s motion

without specifying the reason, Rawlinson nonsuited her counterclaims, and the trial

court signed a final summary judgment from which Randolph appeals. Randolph

presents two issues on appeal. First, Randolph argues the trial court “incorrectly held

tacking applied when the provided evidence proved that Leon Randolph could show

more than ten years of adverse possession, supplanting adverse possession with

tacking.” Secondly, Randolph asserts the trial court “incorrectly found that nonclaimants on the property must be excluded for a claimant to attain ‘exclusivity.’”

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Cantey Hanger, LLP v.

Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). That said, “[a]n appellate court may not

reverse a trial court’s judgment without properly assigned error.” Rosetta Res.

Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2022) (citing Cent. Educ.

Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)). “The law is well-settled

that either (1) a specific assignment of error must be attributed to each ground on

which a summary judgment could be based or (2) a general assignment that the trial

court erred by granting summary judgment must be made, which permits the

appellant to assert arguments against all grounds on which summary judgment could

be based.” Rollins v. Denton Cnty., No. 02-14-00312-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS

12327, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

“When a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the

grounds on which its order is based, the appealing party must negate each ground

upon which the judgment could have been based.” Rosetta, 645 S.W.3d at 226

(citing Malooly Bros. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 120–21 (Tex. 1970) and Jarvis v.

Rocanville Corp., 298 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied)); see

also Nixon Family P’ship, LP v. Jet Lending, LLC, No. 09-20-00201-CV, 2022 Tex.

App. LEXIS 5544, at *23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 4, 2022, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (“When a summary judgment motion alleges multiple grounds and the order

granting summary judgment does not specify the ground on which the summary

judgment was rendered, the appellant must challenge and negate each and every

basis for the summary judgment on appeal.”).

“If an appellant fails to challenge each ground on which the trial court could

have granted summary judgment, we must uphold the summary judgment on the

unchallenged ground, regardless of its merits.” Matlock v. Balzer, No. 12-24-00329-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8157, at *6 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 22, 2025, no pet.)

(mem. op.); see also Madhu Lodging Partners, LP v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 02-23-00379-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3756, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 30,

2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Nixon Family P’ship, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5544,

at *26; Law Office of Andrew L. Jones, P.C. v. Schachar, No. 05-19-00188-CV,

2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1160, at *14-15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 11, 2020, no pet.)

(mem. op.); Wright v. City of Hous., No. 01-10-00941-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS

8523, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Here, Randolph challenges only two of the three grounds for summary

judgment contained in Rawlinson’s motion, any or all of which may have served as

the basis for the trial court’s granting summary judgment in Rawlinson’s favor. In

two issues on appeal, Randolph argues that Rawlinson’s motion mischaracterizes

the law regarding the exclusivity element of adverse possession and that Randolph’s

summary judgment evidence establishes adverse possession on his own accord

without relying on tacking, but Randolph does not address Rawlinson’s argument

that Randolph admitted in bankruptcy filings that he did not own the property, a

separate ground upon which the trial court may have granted summary judgment.

Without regard to the merits of Rawlinson’s arguments regarding Randolph’s

bankruptcy filings, “we are procedurally constrained to affirm the trial court’s

summary judgment[.]” See Rollins, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12327, at *5.

AFFIRMED.

KENT CHAMBERS

Justice

Submitted on June 29, 2026

Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.