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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
31-AUG-2026
08:46 AM
Dkt. 58 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RICKY BALAJADIA, JR.,
also known as Ricky Brycen Balajadia, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Ricky B. Balajadia, Jr. appeals
from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's 1 February 27, 2025
Judgment and Conviction of Sentence, convicting him of Attempted
1 The Honorable Kevin A. Souza presided.
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Escape in the Second Degree, in violation of Hawaiʻi Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 705-500 (2014) 2 and HRS § 710-1021 (2014). 3
On appeal, Balajadia asserts five points of error
(POE) challenging the circuit court's (1) admission of evidence
that he was in a fight prior to his attempted escape (POE A and
C); (2) limiting instruction as to the fight evidence (POE B);
2 HRS § 705-500, "Criminal attempt," provides:
(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if the person:
(a) Intentionally engages in conduct which would
constitute the crime if the attendant
circumstances were as the person believes them
to be; or
(b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under
the circumstances as the person believes them
to be, constitutes a substantial step in a
course of conduct intended to culminate in the
person's commission of the crime.
(2) When causing a particular result is an element
of the crime, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit
the crime if, acting with the state of mind required to
establish liability with respect to the attendant
circumstances specified in the definition of the crime, the
person intentionally engages in conduct which is a
substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known
to cause such a result.
(3) Conduct shall not be considered a substantial
step under this section unless it is strongly corroborative
of the defendant's criminal intent.
3 HRS § 710-1021, "Escape in the second degree," provides:
(1) A person commits the offense of escape in the
second degree if the person intentionally escapes from a
correctional or detention facility or from custody.
(2) Escape in the second degree is a class C felony.
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and (3) imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment (POE D
and E). 4
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve this
appeal as discussed below and affirm.
While serving time in Hālawa Correctional Facility
(Hālawa), Balajadia was involved in a fight with another inmate.
He sustained a cut above his left eye for which he required
stitches, and arrangements were made for two Adult Corrections
Officers (the Escorting Officers) to transport Balajadia that
day to Pali Momi Medical Center (Pali Momi or the Hospital).
4 Balajadia's five POE are presented as follows:
A. "The Trial Court erred by allowing the prosecutor to
introduce evidence regarding allegations that Balajadia
was involved in a fight because that alleged 'fight' was
irrelevant."
B. "The Trial Court's recitation of a stipulation and it's
[sic] 'fight' liminting [sic] instruction merged and
allowed for the conclusion that Balajadia stipulated
that he was in a 'fight' when in fact he objected to
evidence at evidence [sic] regarding the alleged
'fight'."
C. "Assuming relevance, allegations that Balajadia was in a
fight created unfair prejudice that substantially
outweighed any probative value."
D. "The Trial Court erred in failing to articulate a basis
and justification for its consecutive sentences."
E. "The Trial Court erred in basing its sentence on
uncharged and unadjudicated conduct."
(Formatting altered.)
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After the emergency room physician saw Balajadia and
was exiting the treatment room, Balajadia leapt off the patient
bed and attempted to follow her, saying he had a question. One
of the Escorting Officers stood between Balajadia and the
physician and instructed him to return to the patient bed.
Balajadia refused and continued forward. He attempted to lunge
past the physician, and the Escorting Officers tackled him to
the floor and returned him to the patient bed.
To further restrict Balajadia's mobility, the
Escorting Officers attempted to move his hand restraints behind
his back. In the process, Balajadia, still in leg restraints,
tore away from the Escorting Officers' grip and ran out of the
room. One of the Escorting Officers chased after Balajadia and
tackled him in the hallway, and the other assisted in again
restraining Balajadia.
After returning Balajadia to the patient bed, the
physician stitched up his injury. He was subsequently returned
to Hālawa without further incident.
Balajadia was charged by felony information with
Attempted Escape in the Second Degree.
The State filed a notice of intent to adduce evidence
that Balajadia "went into another inmate's cell and was involved
in a fight with another inmate," and, "[a]s a result of the
fight, [Balajadia] was taken to [Pali Momi]." The State argued
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that the fight "was the means by which [Balajadia] made his way
to the [H]ospital which allowed for the opportunity to attempt
to escape." The State also argued that the fight "provide[d] a
motive for escape," reasoning that "if you just lost a fight,
you don't want to go back."
During a hearing on the matter, the circuit court made
clear it was not going to allow evidence regarding Balajadia
going into another inmate's cell or whether the fight was lost.
The circuit court then ruled that the fight was "highly
relevant" under Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 401, because
(1) "it explain[ed] why Mr. Balajadia had to be transported to
Pali Momi and why it is that he sustained injuries," and
(2) without the explanation that the fight was with another
inmate, the jury might speculate that Balajadia's injuries were
caused by a correction officer or other staff at Hālawa.
The circuit court next determined that the probative
value of the evidence was high for the reasons it previously
stated, "and also given the State's theory of the case and a
reasonable inference regarding motive for escape, although the
State [was] not required to prove motive." The circuit court
additionally addressed "the degree to which the evidence [would]
rouse the jury to overmaster hostility towards" Balajadia, as
argued by the defense. To that, the circuit court explained
that it did not "believe that this particular evidence [would]
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cause the jury to overmaster hostility toward" Balajadia. The
circuit court then indicated it would give a cautionary
instruction.
During closing arguments, the State mentioned the
fight once, arguing "[Balajadia] was involved in a fight with
another inmate. As a result, he received a cut above his left
eye. The facility arranged for him to be transported" to Pali
Momi.
After a one-day trial, the jury returned its verdict
of guilty as charged. The circuit court sentenced Balajadia to
a five-year indeterminate term of imprisonment, to be served
consecutively to the sentences he was already serving.
Balajadia timely appealed.
(1) First, Balajadia challenges the admission of the
fight evidence as irrelevant (POE A), and as inadmissible
character evidence and unfairly prejudicial (POE C).
(a) Relevance (POE A)
Balajadia contends that his being in a fight was
irrelevant to his escape charge and, thus, evidence of the fight
was inadmissible under HRE Rule 401.
"All relevant evidence is admissible." HRE Rule 402.
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
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it would be without the evidence." HRE Rule 401. "The evidence
need only be a building block of a prima facie case. It does
not have to prove the case on its own." State v. Silva, 67 Haw.
581, 586, 698 P.2d 293, 297 (1985).
We review a trial court's relevance determination
pursuant to HRE Rule 401 under the right/wrong standard. State
v. Pulse, 83 Hawaiʻi 229, 247, 925 P.2d 797, 815 (1996).
As previously stated, the circuit court ruled that
evidence of the fight was "highly relevant" under HRE Rule 401,
because (1) "it explain[ed] why Mr. Balajadia had to be
transported to Pali Momi and why it is that he sustained
injuries," and (2) without the explanation that the fight was
with another inmate, the jury might speculate that Balajadia's
injuries were caused by a correction officer or other staff at
Hālawa.
In other words, the fight evidence provided relevant
context for why Balajadia was transported away from Hālawa and
to Pali Momi, the place that set the stage for his escape
attempt.
Thus, the circuit court did not err by determining the
fight evidence was relevant. See Pulse, 83 Hawaiʻi at 247, 925
P.2d at 815; Silva, 67 Haw. at 586, 698 P.2d at 297.
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(b) Character Evidence and Prejudice (POE C)
Balajadia further contends that, even if relevant, the
fight evidence was inadmissible character evidence under HRE
Rule 404 and more prejudicial than probative under HRE Rule 403.
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith." HRE Rule 404(b). However,
prior acts may "be admissible where such evidence is probative
of another fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or
absence of mistake or accident." Id. This list is not
exhaustive. State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawaiʻi 390, 414, 56 P.3d 692,
716 (2002).
"Prior bad act evidence under HRE Rule 404(b) is
admissible when it is (1) relevant and (2) more probative than
prejudicial." State v. Behrendt, 124 Hawaiʻi 90, 102, 237 P.3d
1156, 1168 (2010) (citation modified). Under HRE Rule 403,
"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
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"Evidentiary decisions based on HRE [Rule] 403, which
require a 'judgment call' by the trial court, are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion." Pulse, 83 Hawaiʻi at 247, 925 P.2d at
815. And because HRE Rule 404 requires application of HRE
Rule 403, we also review those decisions for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Richie, 88 Hawaiʻi 19, 37, 960 P.2d 1227,
1245 (1998) ("HRE 404 represents a particularized application of
the principle of HRE 403, and we will employ the same abuse of
discretion standard of review." (citation modified)).
At the hearing on the motion, the State argued that
the fight "was the means by which [Balajadia] made his way to
the [H]ospital which allowed for the opportunity to attempt to
escape." The circuit court determined the probative value of
the fight evidence was high, in part, "given the State's theory
of the case and the reasonable inference regarding motive for
escape, although the State [was] not required to prove motive."
The circuit court then explained that it did not "believe that
this particular evidence [would] cause the jury to overmaster
hostility toward" Balajadia. And to guard against any
prejudice, the circuit court indicated it would give a
cautionary instruction.
The fight evidence was not admitted to show
Balajadia's character as violent and that he acted in conformity
therewith when he attempted to escape while at the hospital.
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Instead, the fight was probative of affording Balajadia an
opportunity to leave Hālawa and later attempt an escape. See
HRE Rule 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
. . . may, however, be admissible where such evidence is
probative of another fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action, such as proof of motive[ or]
opportunity[.]"). The fight's probative value of showing how
Balajadia came to be transported from Hālawa to the Hospital was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
See HRE Rule 403. Nothing about the fight between Balajadia and
another inmate was so inflammatory that it would cause a jury to
be hostile towards Balajadia or cause unfair prejudice.
Furthermore, the circuit court gave a limiting
instruction regarding the fight evidence. As set forth in more
detail below, the circuit court instructed the jury to consider
the fight evidence "for the limited purpose of providing . . . a
reason why [Balajadia] was transported to [Pali Momi] on the
date in question, to receive medical treatment" and "not [to]
consider this evidence for any other purpose." The jury is
presumed to follow the court's instruction. Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985); State v. Austin, 70 Haw.
300, 308, 769 P.2d 1098, 1102 (1989) ("A jury is presumed to
follow a trial court's directive."). And the State mentioned
the fight evidence only once in its closing argument to provide
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context for why Balajadia was transported from Hālawa to Pali
Momi.
Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not
disregard rules or principles of law to Balajadia's substantial
detriment and, thus, did not abuse its discretion. See Pulse,
83 Hawaiʻi at 247, 925 P.2d at 815.
(2) Next, Balajadia appears to argue that by
providing a limiting instruction regarding a specific piece of
admitted evidence (Balajadia was involved in a fight at Hālawa)
shortly after reciting a stipulated fact (Balajadia was
incarcerated at Hālawa on the date of the offense), the circuit
court failed to adequately distinguish between the facts
Balajadia stipulated to and the fight evidence (POE B).
"The circuit court has the duty and ultimate
responsibility to instruct the jury on the proper and relevant
law." State v. Lavoie, 145 Hawaiʻi 409, 433, 453 P.3d 229, 253
(2019); accord State v. Nichols, 111 Hawaiʻi 327, 336-37, 141
P.3d 974, 983-84 (2006). We note that Balajadia did not object
to the circuit court's instruction and, thus, Balajadia's
contention may be deemed waived. See Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal
Procedure Rule 30(f) ("No party may assign as error the giving
or the refusal to give, or the modification of, an instruction
. . . unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires
to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which
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the party objects and the grounds of the objection."); Nichols,
111 Hawaiʻi at 337 n.6, 141 P.3d at 984 n.6 ("[T]here was and
remains a presumption that unobjected-to jury instructions are
correct; hence, the appellate court is under no duty to scour
the record for error sua sponte."). Nonetheless, a review of
the record shows that the circuit court did not err in its
instruction to the jury.
The circuit court instructed the jury as to the
stipulation that Balajadia was imprisoned at Hālawa:
All right, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before
we start the State's case there is a stipulation that I am
going to be giving to you along with an instruction. All
right. So please listen carefully.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the parties have
stipulated to the following facts and you must accept these
following facts as having been conclusively proven for the
purposes of this trial. All right.
And the facts are as follows: On October 21, 2022,
the defendant, Ricky Balajadia, Jr., by order of a court of
the State of [Hawaiʻi] was serving a sentence of
imprisonment at [Hālawa] under the control of the
Department of Public Safety. All right.
So you must accept those facts as having been
conclusively proven for the purposes of this trial. These
facts are being presented to -- stipulated to and being
admitted into evidence only for the limited purpose of
deciding whether or not the defendant committed the offense
-- the charged offense of Attempted Escape in the Second
Degree. Do not consider this evidence for any other
purpose.
In particular, you shall not speculate or concern
yourself at all with the reason why the defendant was in a
correctional or detention facility at the time he allegedly
committed this offense. Furthermore, you must not use this
evidence to conclude that because the defendant was
incarcerated, that he is therefore a person of bad
character and therefore he must have committed the offense
charged in this case. You cannot make those assumptions.
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And in considering this evidence that has been
stipulated to for the limited purpose for which it is
offered, you must weigh it in the same manner you would all
other evidence in this case and you must consider it along
with all other evidence in this case. All right.
(Emphases added.)
The circuit court then indicated it was admitting
evidence that Balajadia was transported to the hospital
following a fight at Hālawa and instructed the jury to consider
that evidence "only for the limited purpose of providing . . . a
reason why [Balajadia] was transported to Pali Momi":
Additionally, you are about to hear evidence that the
defendant was incarcerated, was in a fight or an
altercation at [Hālawa]. Again, this evidence is being
admitted only for the limited purpose of providing you with
a reason why the defendant was transported to [Pali Momi]
on the date in question, to receive medical treatment. Do
not consider this evidence for any other purpose.
Again, you shall not speculate or concern yourself
with what the fight or altercation was about, who started
it, or what transpired. You must also not use this
evidence to conclude that because the defendant was in a
fight or altercation, that he is, again, a person of bad
character and therefore must have committed the [offense]
charged in this case. You cannot engage in that kind of
thinking. All right.
In considering this evidence, again, of the fight or
altercation, you must consider it along with all the other
evidence presented and weigh it in the same manner you
would all other items of evidence in this case. All right.
(Emphases added.)
While discussing the fight evidence, the circuit court
stated, "you are about to hear evidence that the defendant was
incarcerated," but then appeared to immediately correct itself
by stating, "was in a fight or an altercation." The remaining
instruction to the jury concerned the fight evidence. The
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circuit court's instruction on the stipulated fact of
Balajadia's imprisonment was sufficiently separate from its
instruction on the fight evidence. Thus, there was no error
here.
Balajadia also appears to argue that the limiting
instruction regarding the fight should have been given to the
jury prior to each witness's testimony. Balajadia does not
provide any legal authority for this proposition, and this
contention may be deemed waived. See Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate
Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(7) (requiring opening briefs to
include an argument section "containing the contentions of the
appellant on the points presented and the reasons therefor, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on" and cautioning that "[p]oints not argued may be
deemed waived" (emphasis added)).
Notwithstanding Balajadia's unsupported contention,
the circuit court gave the limiting instruction on the fight
evidence twice: once before the first witness testified and
again repeating it before the jury entered its deliberations.
We see no error in the timing of the circuit court's limiting
instruction on the fight evidence.
(3) Finally, Balajadia contends the circuit court
"erred in issuing consecutive sentences because it failed to
provide an adequate basis for the consecutive sentence" (POE D)
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and punished him for an uncharged crime — fighting in prison
(POE E).
(a) Consecutive Sentence (POE D)
Balajadia's contention is unsupported by specific
reasons or citations to the parts of the record he relies on,
and this argument may be deemed waived. See HRAP Rule 28(b)(7).
Moreover, a review of the record shows the circuit court
articulated its reasons and provided a meaningful rationale for
imposing a consecutive sentence.
The sentencing court "must state on the record at the
time of sentencing the reasons for imposing a consecutive
sentence." State v. Hussein, 122 Hawaiʻi 495, 510, 229 P.3d 313,
328 (2010).
Here, the circuit court pointed to Balajadia's
criminal history, namely that, at twenty-nine years old,
Balajadia had "six total convictions," three of which are "prior
felony convictions for which he is currently serving
indeterminate prison sentences after failing on probation."
See HRS § 706-606(1) (2014) ("The court, in determining the
particular sentence to be imposed shall consider . . . [t]he
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant[.]"). The circuit court also
acknowledged Balajadia's "long history of noncompliance with
community supervision"; lack of "insight into [his] mental
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health and substance abuse history"; denial of "any prior drug
use in the pre-sentence report when prior pre-sentence reports
tell a very different story"; and "tangential incoherent
responses during his pre-sentence interview."
The circuit court explained that a concurrent sentence
"would be little incentive for him and others similarly situated
to not repeat the same conduct of attempting to escape from
custody." The circuit court then explained that a consecutive
sentence, on the other hand, "would send a clear message that
attempting to escape [would] result in [Balajadia] being fully
held accountable and would make [Balajadia] and others think
twice before trying to escape."
After considering "the need for a sentence imposed to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, to provide a just punishment, to afford adequate
deterrents to further criminal conduct, and to protect the
public," see HRS § 706-606(2), the circuit court concluded that
"[t]hese factors also mitigate in favor of a consecutive
sentence."
Contrary to Balajadia's contention, the circuit court
provided an adequate basis for running the Attempted-Escape
sentence consecutively to the sentences Balajadia was already
serving. See Hussein, 122 Hawaiʻi at 509-10, 229 P.3d at 327-28.
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(b) Uncharged Crime (POE E)
"[A] judge cannot punish a defendant for an uncharged
crime in the belief that it too deserves punishment,"
notwithstanding the judge's otherwise "broad discretion in
imposing a sentence, and [ability to] consider the candor,
conduct, remorse and background of the defendant as well as the
circumstances of the crime and many other factors." State v.
Nunes, 72 Haw. 521, 525, 824 P.2d 837, 840 (1992).
Here, Balajadia points to the following underlined
statement from the circuit court during sentencing:
In looking at the nature and circumstances of this
offense, at the time of the incident offense, which is
Attempted Escape in the Second Degree, Mr. Balajadia was
serving a concurrent five-year prison term for unauthorized
control of a propelled vehicle in the first degree in 1CPCXX-XXXXXXX.
He was also serving a concurrent ten-year and fiveyear prison sentence for Burglary in the First Degree and
Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree under 5CPC-19-0000199.
Additionally, at the time of the [instant] offense,
the defendant had recently arrived at [Hālawa]. He did get
into a fight with another inmate. And he needed to be
treated for his injuries. And so he was transported to the
[Pali Momi] in the Pearl Ridge area where he initially
tried to follow a female doctor out of the emergency room
bay. And according to the jury's verdict, [Balajadia] did
attempt to escape.
(Emphasis added.)
Taken in context, the circuit court was reciting the
facts surrounding the offense while considering the nature and
circumstances of the offense. We do not construe the circuit
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court's statement as punishing Balajadia for an uncharged crime.
See Nunes, 72 Haw. at 525, 824 P.2d at 840.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's
February 27, 2025 Judgment and Conviction of Sentence.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, August 31, 2026.
On the briefs: /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Chief Judge
Walter J. Rodby,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge
Elyse C.N. Oyama,
Deputy Attorney General, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen for Plaintiff-Appellee. Associate Judge
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