Parsons v. City of Indian Wells

majority opinion

Filed 8/31/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MATTHEW PARSONS et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, E082591

v. (Super.Ct.No. PSC2002777)

CITY OF INDIAN WELLS et al., OPINION

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Eric A. Keen, Judge.

Reversed.

Best Best & Krieger, Gregg W. Kettles, Christopher M. Moffitt, Bao A. Pham and

Zachary Scalzo, for Defendants and Appellants.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Wendy S. Dowse; Procopio Cory Hargreaves

Savitch, L. John Nelson and Matthew L. Abbott, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

As part of its ongoing efforts to abate public nuisances related to the operation of

short-term rentals (STR) in residential properties, the City of Indian Wells (the City)

declared STR’s to be a public nuisance and enacted a 29-night minimum stay

requirement for residential rentals that effectively banned STR’s. However, in response

to comments from owners of property in common interest developments (CID) who

wished to operate STR’s, the City adopted Ordinance No. 732, which amended the City

of Indian Wells Municipal Code (IWMC) to allow members of a CID to opt out of the

generally applicable minimum stay requirement and to permit the operation of STR’s in

their community for a shorter minimum period as proposed by their governing board.

Matthew and Rebecca Parsons (the Parsons), owners of property in a CID located

in the City, filed a petition for traditional writ of mandate against the City seeking

injunctive and declaratory relief when the City denied their request for a permit to use

their property as an STR. Among other claims, the Parsons allege the opt-out provision

of IWMC section 5.20.210 conflicts with Civil Code 1 section 4740, part of the DavisStirling Common Interest Development Act (§ 4000 et seq) (hereafter “the Act” or

“Act”), and therefore the opt-out is preempted. Section 4740 exempts members of a CID

from any provision contained in the CID’s governing documents that prohibits the renting

or leasing of property if that prohibition was adopted after the members acquired title to

their property. In addition, the Parsons argue the opt-out provision is an unconstitutional

delegation to private parties of the City’s legislative authority. The trial court agreed

with those arguments and ruled IWMC section 5.20.210 is invalid, and entered judgment

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

granting a writ of mandate to direct the City to issue an unrestricted STR permit to the

Parsons. The trial court subsequently granted the Parsons’ motion for attorney fees.

On appeal, the City argues: (1) section 4740 is inapplicable and does not preempt

IWMC section 5.20.210 because a successful opt-out vote does not require members of a

CID to amend their governing documents to permit the operation of STR’s; (2) granting

local property owners in a CID the ability to decide whether to exempt themselves from

the generally applicable minimum stay requirement is a limited and permissible

delegation of authority and does not violate the due process rights of homeowners; and

(3) the trial court erred by awarding the Parsons their attorney fees. We agree with the

City and reverse the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The City’s Regulation of Short-Term Rentals.

This lawsuit arose amid the City’s decade-long effort to regulate STR’s. After

years of receiving complaints from residents about the negative effects STR’s were

having on their neighborhoods, and efforts made by the City to abate nuisances caused by

operation of STR’s, in 2014 the City issued a temporary moratorium on all STR’s. After

further study of the issue, in 2015 the City adopted Ordinance No. 689, which provided

for the grandfathering of existing STR’s with a seven-night minimum stay requirement

for owners who applied within 30 days, and a 29-night minimum stay for applications

received after 30 days.

Ordinance No. 689 proved to be ineffective and STR’s continued to pose problems

in the community. A staff report submitted to the city council indicated some

homeowners advertised and operated STR’s for shorter minimum stays than permitted

and failed to pay transient-occupancy taxes, and guests of STR’s continued to cause noise

and other nuisances in neighborhoods. In response, in March 2018 the City adopted

Ordinance No. 710 to declare the operation of STR’s to be a public nuisance and to

effectively sunset them. Beginning January 1, 2020, IWMC section 5.20.140 provided

STR’s that had been previously grandfathered to allow a seven-night minimum stay were

now subject to the 29-night minimum stay requirement. However, in response to

comments from homeowners who wished to operate STR’s inside CID’s, 2 IWMC section

5.20.210 provided a procedure whereby members could vote to opt out of the 29-night

minimum stay requirement. An accompanying staff report stated, “The rationale for this

provision was that the City believed that, if a particular neighborhood felt that shorter

durations were acceptable within that neighborhood, that neighborhood should be able to

make that decision for itself.”

From 2018 to 2020, the City found its goal of effectively regulating STR’s had

been frustrated by homeowners attempting to circumvent applicable rules. When some

CID’s decided not to opt out of the City’s general ban on STR’s, some homeowners

began creating smaller CID’s, sometimes consisting of only two residences, to take

2 As of 2014, 40 of the City’s 56 homeowner’s associations (HOA’s),

representing 3,590 residential units, restricted the rental of properties to a 30-day minimum stay. As of 2018, over 100 permitted STR’s in the City were located inside CID’s.

advantage of the opt-out provision prescribed by Ordinance No. 710. Staff reported

“such a new, bare-minimum common interest development would circumvent the intent

of the larger neighborhood, and thus circumvent[] the intent of the City’s exception for

common interest developments to opt out.”

In 2020, the City adopted Ordinance No. 725 to address those concerns.

Ordinance No. 725 amended IWMC section 5.20.210 to add a minimum number of

separate interests (four or more interests excluding common areas) for a CID to be

entitled to conduct a vote to opt out of the City’s minimum stay requirement established

by Ordinance No. 710. The amendment also prohibited a smaller CID created within a

larger CID from operating an STR unless the larger CID had voted to allow such

operation. The same year, the City adopted Ordinance No. 731 to enhance its

enforcement tools over STR’s.

Finally, in 2022 the City enacted Ordinance No. 732. Ordinance No. 732 retains

the minimum-interest requirement and the requirement that a smaller CID may only opt

out if the larger CID in which it resides has also voted to opt out. As amended by

Ordinance No. 732, IWMC section 5.20.210(a)(6) now requires that a CID’s memberproperties satisfy a contiguity requirement for the CID to be entitled to opt out. For the

CID to opt out, IWMC section 5.20.210 requires the governing board to propose a formal

vote of all owners within the CID on the question of whether to permit the operation of

STR’s for a minimum number of consecutive nights as determined by the governing

board. The proposal must be adopted by at least a majority of voting members. Once the

results are filed with the City, STR’s may be operated within the CID for the minimum

stay adopted by the members. If the proposal is not adopted or no opt-vote is conducted,

rentals within the CID will be subject to the minimum stay requirement under Ordinance

No. 710. Finally, a CID may vote to repeal its prior opt-out vote by conducting a new

vote by its members, using the same voting procedures for the opt out, after which rentals

will once more be subject to the generally applicable 29-night minimum stay requirement

under Ordinance No. 710.

B. This Lawsuit

The Parsons own residential property within the Eldorado Barranca Property

Owner’s Association (Barranca POA), a CID located in the City. Barranca POA’s

governing documents authorize rentals of any duration. The Parsons alleged that

between July 2015 and July 2017, they invested $1.5 million in their property with the

intention of operating an STR.

In 2015, the Parsons obtained a permit from the City to rent their property as a

grandfathered STR under Ordinance No. 689. The Parsons were among those who

voiced their concerns in 2018 when the City introduced Ordinance No. 710 to further

restrict STR’s. As noted, the City addressed those concerns in Ordinance No. 732 by

providing a version of the opt-out procedure originally introduced by Ordinance No. 710.

Alleging Barranca POA refused to support their claimed right to operate an STR

under the governing documents, the Parsons sued the governing board in 2018. In 2021,

the board confirmed to the Parsons that its governing documents allowed members to rent

their individual property with no minimum stay requirement. However, the board had

not certified a successful opt-out vote by the time the Parsons filed the instant writ

proceeding against the City.

On September 10, 2019, while their lawsuit against Barranca POA was still

pending, the Parsons and other Barranco POA property owners formed the Fairway

Tennis Maintenance Association (Tennis HOA). The Tennis HOA purports to be a CID

consisting of three separate, non-contiguous interests located within Barranca POA.

Three weeks later, the Tennis HOA certified it had successfully conducted an opt-out

vote to allow the operation of STR’s. The Parsons then requested the City issue an

unrestricted STR permit, which the City promptly denied.

On June 1, 2020, the Parsons filed their verified petition for writ of mandate

alleging the City 3 had a ministerial duty to issue a permit for the operation of an STR

once the Tennis HOA had certified a successful opt-out vote. After several rounds of

amended pleadings and partially successful demurrers, on October 13, 2022, the Parsons

filed the operative fourth amended petition for injunctive and declaratory relief. The

Parsons alleged, inter alia, the CID opt-out procedure under Ordinance No. 732

constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of authority to private parties or entities, and it

is preempted by section 4740.

Relevant here, in their trial brief the Parsons argued Ordinance No. 732 is

preempted by section 4740 and the ordinance’s voting procedure conflicts with sections

3 The Parsons also named as respondents the City’s mayor, mayor pro tempore, three members of the city council, and the City’s director of community development.

4270 and 4275, which require a majority vote of all eligible CID owners to amend the

CID’s declaration and not merely a majority of members voting. In addition, the Parsons

argued Ordinance No. 732 improperly delegated the City’s legislative authority to CID’s

to decide whether to permit the operation of rentals for less than the generally applicable

minimum stay requirement. Finally, the Parsons argued the City harassed and targeted

them, and acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it enacted Ordinance

No. 732.

In its responsive trial brief, the City argued the opt-out procedure established by

Ordinance No. 732 is not preempted by section 4740 because it does not require a CID to

amend its governing documents, the ordinance does not unconstitutionally delegate

authority because the City had established a clear legislative policy regarding the

operation of STR’s and the ordinance established procedural guidelines and safeguards

for opt-out votes, and it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it enacted Ordinance

No. 732.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted the petition. Initially, the trial

court rejected the City’s arguments that the Parsons lacked standing to sue and failed to

join necessary parties. On the merits, the trial court ruled the opt-out procedure

established by Municipal Code section 5.20.210, as amended by Ordinance No. 732, does

not require a quorum of CID members and, therefore, conflicts with sections 4270 and

4275. Further, the trial court determined IWMC section 5.20.210 allows a CID to

conduct a vote that would have the effect of restricting homeowners from operating

STR’s even if they previously had that right. Relying on this court’s decision in Brown v.

Montage at Mission Hills, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 124 (Brown) and the legislative

history of sections 4740 and 4741, the trial court ruled IWMC section 5.20.210 is

preempted by the Act.

The trial court also found that, although the City’s delegation of the decision

whether to allow STR’s in a CID is not in and of itself offensive, the court was troubled

the opt out takes the issue of whether to permit STR’s entirely out of the City’s control.

The court further surmised that any vote would necessarily result in an outcome that

conflicts with the Act and, thus, Ordinance No. 732 is preempted.

Finally, the court found the Parsons had not met their “high burden” of

establishing the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it enacted Ordinance

No. 732. The court noted “the City enacted various ordinances over several years

concerning STRs,” and the Parsons submitted no evidence that Ordinance No. 732 had

been enacted to harass, intimidate, or otherwise deprive them of the right to rent their

property.

Having concluded IWMC section 5.20.210 is invalid, the trial court ruled the City

had a ministerial duty to issue a permit to the Parsons for the operation of an STR.

The trial court entered judgment for the Parsons. The court subsequently denied

the City’s motion to set aside the judgment, issued a writ of mandate directing the City to

issue an STR permit to the Parsons, and granted the Parsons’s motion for attorney fees.

The City timely appealed.

II.

DISCUSSION

As explained, post, we hold the opt-out provision of IWMC section 5.20.210 is not

preempted by section 4740 and the Act’s voting requirements for the simple reason that a

vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement does not result in an amendment to a

CID’s governing documents. Likewise, we hold the City did not unconstitutionally

delegate its legislative authority to private parties. The City adopted a generally

applicable policy on the question of STR’s by declaring them to be a public nuisance and

imposing a minimum stay requirement for residential rentals, but properly delegated to

CID members the ability to decide for themselves whether to waive that protection. Last,

we conclude the trial court correctly ruled the City did not act arbitrarily or capriciously

when it enacted Ordinance No. 732. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and the

postjudgment order awarding the Parsons their attorney fees.

A. Standard of Review

The superior court may issue a writ of mandate “to any inferior tribunal,

corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law

specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . .” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) “Mandamus is . . . appropriate for challenging the

constitutionality or validity of statutes or official acts.” (Jolicoeur v. Mihaly (1971) 5

Cal.3d 565, 570, fn. 2; see Wenke v. Hitchcock (1972) 6 Cal.3d 746, 751.) Relevant here,

the courts have recognized traditional mandate as an appropriate means to challenge the

constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance. (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock

(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 273, 299-300, disapproved on another ground in Hernandez v.

City of Hanford (2007) 41 Cal.4th 279, 297.)

“‘To obtain writ relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the petitioner

must show there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; the respondent has a

clear, present, and ministerial duty to act in a particular way; and the petitioner has a

clear, present and beneficial right to performance of that duty. [Citation.] A ministerial

duty is one that is required to be performed in a prescribed manner under the mandate of

legal authority without the exercise of discretion or judgment.’” (Zubarau v. City of

Palmdale (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 289, 305.)

The trial court must determine whether the official action “‘“was arbitrary,

capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to established public

policy, unlawful [or] procedurally unfair . . . . [Citations.] ‘Although mandate will not

lie to control a public agency’s discretion, that is to say, force the exercise of discretion in

a particular manner, it will lie to correct abuses of discretion. [Citation.]’” [Citation.]’”

(Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159,

1173.)

“‘“In reviewing a judgment granting a writ of mandate, we apply the substantial

evidence standard of review to the court’s factual findings, but independently review its

findings on legal issues. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “Where, as here, the facts are

undisputed and the issue involves statutory interpretation, we exercise our independent

judgment and review the matter de novo.”’” (California Privacy Protection Agency v.

Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 705, 721-722.)

B. Ordinance No. 732 Is Not Preempted By Section 4740.

1. Forfeiture.

As an initial matter, the Parsons contend the City forfeited its arguments on appeal

based on the “home rule” doctrine by not pleading that doctrine as an affirmative defense

in its answer and by not arguing application of the doctrine in its trial briefs. The City

responds it sufficiently raised the “home rule” argument in its response to the fourth

amended petition, and, to the extent it forfeited the argument, we should nonetheless

consider it.

Generally, affirmative defenses are forfeited if they are not properly pleaded in an

answer or asserted in a general demurrer. (See Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection

Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 807; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Internat.,

Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 176.) But the Parsons cite no authority for the

proposition that the “home rule” doctrine applicable to charter cities is an affirmative

defense that must be pleaded, and we have found none.

There is authority for the proposition that failure to argue application of the “home

rule” doctrine in the trial court forfeits the argument on appeal. (See City of Cerritos v.

State of California (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1046.) However, “‘the forfeiture

doctrine is not absolute.’” (Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court

(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1157.) “In general, forfeiture of a claim not raised in the

trial court by a party has not precluded review of the claim by an appellate court in the

exercise of that court’s discretion. [Citations.] Thus, an appellate court may review a

forfeited claim—and ‘[w]hether or not it should do so is entrusted to its discretion.’” (In

re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7.)

“The determination of the correct legal standard to be applied [in the trial court]

presents a question of law, which we review de novo.” (Department of Water Resources

Environmental Impact Cases (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 556, 574.) Because this appeal

addresses an important issue of statutory interpretation and the underlying facts are not in

dispute, we exercise our discretion to address the City’s arguments based on the “home

rule” doctrine. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[T]he appellate court’s

discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an

important legal issue.”]; Perry v. Stuart (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 472, 503 [“‘[W]hen an

appeal raises a question of law on undisputed facts, the issue has not been forfeited.’”].)

2. Preemption principles application to charter cities.

The City is governed by a charter. (City of Indian Wells Charter, art. I, § 100.) 4

“‘“The Government Code classifies cities as either ‘general law cities’ (cities organized

under the general law of California) or ‘chartered cities’ (cities organized under a

charter).”’” (State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. City of Vista

(2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 552, fn. 1 (City of Vista); see Gov. Code, §§ 34100, 34101,

4 Available at

<https://www.cityofindianwells.org/home/showpublisheddocument/7892/638054138402 888870> (as of Aug. 31, 2026.)

34102.) “Both types of cities are governed by article XI, section 7 of the California

Constitution, which vests them with the power to ‘make and enforce within [their] limits

all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with

general laws.’ Under this provision, cities ‘have plenary authority to govern, subject only

to the limitation that they exercise this power within their territorial limits and

subordinate to state law.’” (City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State of California (2025)

114 Cal.App.5th 13, 23, quoting Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High

School District (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 885.)

“Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution provides that

a city governed by charter ‘may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in

respect to municipal affairs, . . . and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to

general laws. City charters . . . with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws

inconsistent therewith.’” (Anderson v. City of San Jose (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 683, 698.)

“The provision represents an ‘affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of “all

powers appropriate for a municipality to possess . . .” and [includes] the important

corollary that “so far as ‘municipal affairs’ are concerned,” charter cities are “supreme

and beyond the reach of legislative enactment.”’” (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at

p. 556.) “The home rule doctrine enshrines charter cities’ sovereignty over ‘municipal

affairs.’ (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (a).) The doctrine ‘also implicitly recognizes

state legislative supremacy over matters not within the ambit of that phrase [municipal

affairs].’” (Anderson, at p. 698, quoting California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of

Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 13 (California Fed. Savings).)

“Home rule authority under article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution

does not mean charter cities can never be subject to state laws that concern or regulate

municipal affairs. ‘[A] charter city’s authority to enact legislation is not unlimited.’”

(City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 243, 254.) “The Legislature

may legislate as to matters of statewide concern and, if the statute is not overbroad, then

the conflicting charter city law ‘ceases to be a “municipal affair” pro tanto and the

Legislature is not prohibited by article XI, section 5(a), from addressing the statewide

dimension by its own tailored enactments.’ (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at

p. 17.) ‘[G]eneral law prevails over local enactments of a chartered city, even in regard

to matters which would otherwise be deemed to be strictly municipal affairs, where the

subject matter of the general law is of statewide concern.’ (People ex rel. Seal Beach

Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 600 . . .)” (Becerra, at

pp. 254-255.)

“When state law and a charter city’s regulations or ordinances conflict, we apply a

four-factor test to determine whether the home rule doctrine permits or bars state law

preemption.” (People ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th

962, 968.) “First, we analyze ‘whether the city ordinance at issue regulates an activity

that can be characterized as a “municipal affair.”’ (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at

p. 556.) Second, we consider whether the case presents an actual conflict between state

and local law. (Ibid.) Third, we ‘decide whether the state law addresses a matter of

“statewide concern.”’ (Ibid.) Fourth, we ‘determine whether the law is “reasonably

related to . . . resolution” of that concern [citation] and “narrowly tailored” to avoid

unnecessary interference in local governance.’ (Ibid.) ‘“If . . . the court is persuaded that

the subject of the state statute is one of statewide concern and that the statute is

reasonably related to its resolution [and not unduly broad in its sweep], then the

conflicting charter city measure ceases to be a ‘municipal affair’ pro tanto and the

Legislature is not prohibited by article XI, section 5[, subdivision (a) of the California

Constitution], from addressing the statewide dimension by its own tailored

enactments.”’” (People ex rel. Bonta, at p. 968.)

“[T]he question whether in a particular case the home rule provisions of the

California Constitution bar the application of state law to charter cities turns ultimately

on the meaning and scope of the state law in question and the relevant state constitutional

provisions. Interpreting that law and those provisions presents a legal question, not a

factual one. [Citations.] Courts accord great weight to the factual record that the

Legislature has compiled [citations], and also to any relevant facts established in trial

court proceedings. [Citation.] Factual findings by the Legislature or the trial court,

however, are not controlling. [Citation.] The decision as to what areas of governance are

municipal concerns and what are statewide concerns is ultimately a legal one.” (City of

Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 558.)

i. Municipal affairs.

The Parsons argue Ordinance No. 732 might, in its entirety, address “municipal

affairs” but IWMC section 5.20.210—the portion that allegedly “interfere[s] with internal

CID operations”—does not. Putting aside for a moment the question of whether the

ordinance does or does not interfere with a CID’s internal operations—which relates the

question of whether there is an actual conflict—we have no difficulty concluding a local

ordinance addressing STR’s regulates a “municipal affair.”

“There is no precise, lasting, and inflexible definition of a municipal affair.” (Los

Angeles Brewing Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 391, 397.) “[T]he task

of determining whether a given activity is a ‘municipal affair’ or one of statewide

concern is an ad hoc inquiry,” and “the question ‘must be answered in light of the facts

and circumstances surrounding each case’ [citation]. ‘No exact definition of the term

“municipal affairs” can be formulated and the courts have made no attempt to do so, but

instead have indicated that judicial interpretation is necessary to give it meaning in each

controverted case.’ [Citation.] But our decisions have also strived to confine the element

of judicial interpretation by hedging it with a decisional procedure intended to bring a

measure of certainty to the process, narrowing the scope within which a sometimes

mercurial discretion operates.” (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 16.)

The courts have long recognized that local land use and zoning regulations are

municipal affairs. (New Commune DTLA LLC v. City of Redondo Beach (2025) 115

Cal.App.5th 111, 126 [“Municipal land use and zoning regulations are municipal

affairs”]; City of Los Angeles v. State of California (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 526, 533

[“[P]lanning and zoning in the conventional sense have traditionally been deemed

municipal affairs”].) “‘Land use regulation in California historically has been a function

of local government under the grant of police power contained in article XI, section 7. . . .

“[The California Supreme Court has] recognized that a city’s or county’s power to

control its own land use decisions derives from this inherent police power, not from the

delegation of authority by the state.”’ [Citation.] Consistent with this principle, ‘when

local government regulates in an area over which it traditionally has exercised control,

such as the location of particular land uses, California courts will presume, absent a clear

indication of preemptive intent from the Legislature, that such regulation is not

preempted by state statute.’” (City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health &

Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729, 742-743 (City of Riverside).)

In addition, as part of their general police powers and by statute, cities are

authorized to regulate local businesses through zoning ordinances and licensing

requirements. (Cal. Const., art XI, § 7; Gov. Code, § 3701, subds. (a)-(b); Bus. & Prof.

Code, § 1600.)

Because IWMC section 5.20.210 clearly addresses a “municipal affair,” we next

address whether there is an actual conflict between it and the Act.

ii. No actual conflict.

The Parsons argue IWMC section 5.20.210 conflicts with state law because the

local ordinance requires what the Act prohibits. We disagree and find no inimical

conflict.

“Charter city law is contradictory to state law when it is inimical thereto. (City of

Riverside[, supra,] 56 Cal.4th [at p.] 743.) ‘[N]o inimical conflict will be found where it

is reasonably possible to comply with both the state and local laws.’ (Ibid.)” (City of El

Centro v. Lanier (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1505.) “If no conflict exists, the analysis

is complete and there is no need to go to the next step.” (City of Huntington Beach v.

Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 255, citing California Fed. Savings, supra, 54

Cal.3d at p. 16.)

Whether there is an actual conflict between the Act and IWMC section 5.20.210 is

a matter of statutory construction. (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 559.) “The

principles of statutory construction apply equally to the construction of ordinances.”

(Bruni v. The Edward Thomas Hospitality Corp. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 247, 254.)

“When interpreting a statute, ‘“[w]e first examine the statutory language, giving it

a plain and commonsense meaning.” [Citation.] We do not consider statutory language

in isolation; instead, we examine the entire statute to construe the words in context.

[Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, “then the Legislature is presumed to have

meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” [Citation.] “If the

statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider

other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”’”

(Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5th 592, 602.)

The Act governs the creation and operation of CID’s. (Pinnacle Museum Tower

Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) CID’s

are created by recording a “declaration” that contains, inter alia, a legal description of the

development and a statement of restrictions on the use or enjoyment of any part of the

common property. (§ 4200, subd. (a); see §§ 4135, 4250, 4255.) The governing

documents of the CID include the declaration “and any other documents, such as bylaws,

operating rules, articles of incorporation, or articles of association, which govern the

operation of the common interest development or association.” (§ 4150.) The

declaration may only be amended by a vote of the percentage of members of the common

interest development as specified in the declaration. (§§ 4270, 4275.)

Section 4740 is found in chapter 5, article 1 of the Act, which “includes provisions

that limit the authority of an association or the governing documents to regulate the use

of a member’s separate interest.” (§ 4700.) In relevant part, section 4740 provides, “An

owner of a separate interest in a common interest development shall not be subject to a

provision in a governing document or an amendment to a governing document that

prohibits the rental or leasing of any of the separate interests in that common interest

development to a renter, lessee, or tenant unless that governing document, or amendment

thereto, was effective prior to the date the owner acquired title to their separate interest.”

(§ 4740, subd. (a), italics added.) On its face, section 4740 only applies when the

governing documents of a CID prohibit rentals by members who purchased their

properties before the prohibition became effective. It simply does not address whether a

city may ban, restrict, or otherwise regulate STR’s by ordinance, or whether a CID may

vote to opt out of such a restriction on the operation of STR’s in a manner that does not

amend the governing documents.

Nor does the legislative history of section 4740 indicate the Legislature intended

to insulate CID’s from generally applicable zoning restrictions on STR’s, or to prohibit a

CID’s members from opting out of those restrictions. Legislative efforts to protect

owners’ ability to rent out housing in CID’s began with Senate Bill No. 150 (2011-2012

Reg. Sess.), which enacted former section 1360.2. That statute stated, in relevant part,

“[a]n owner of a separate interest in a common interest development shall not be subject

to a provision in a governing document or an amendment to a governing document that

prohibits the rental or leasing of any of the separate interests in that common interest

development to a renter, lessee, or tenant unless that governing document, or amendment

thereto, was effective prior to the date the owner acquired title to his or her separate

interest.” (Former § 1360.2, subd. (a), as added by Stats. 2011, ch. 62, § 2, subd. (a).)

This restriction applied only to rules that became effective on or after January 1, 2012

(Stats. 2011, ch. 62, § 2, subd. (f)), and owners remained free to consent to new

restrictions on their right to rent their property (Stats. 2011, ch. 62, § 2, subd. (b)).

Legislative analyses of Senate Bill No. 150 emphasized owners’ need for

flexibility during a period of widespread financial hardship and depressed property

values. 5 (See, e.g., Assem. Housing & Community Development Com., Analysis of

Senate Bill No. 150 as amended June 9, 2011, p. 3 [“Many people need to rent their units

because of job relocation or a personal situation. The ability to rent a unit has become

even more important because of the deteriorating housing market.”] 6; Sen. Judiciary

Com., Analysis of Senate Bill No. 150 as amended April 25, 2011, p. 4 [“For those

homeowners who are facing difficult economic times, renting their home and moving in

with a family member is one practical way to generate additional income to pay the

mortgage and avoid a foreclosure”] 7.) In 2012, the Legislature repealed former section

1360.2 and enacted the same language as section 4740. (Stats. 2012, ch. 180, §§ 1-2.)

The Legislature expanded its regulation of restrictions on rentals in common

interest developments with Assembly Bill No. 3182 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). Effective

January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill No. 3182 removed former section 4740’s exceptions for

rules to which owners consented and for those adopted prior to January 1, 2012, and

added section 4741. 8 (Stats. 2020, ch. 180, §§ 1-2.)

5 The City’s unopposed request that we take judicial notice of legislative history materials related to Senate Bill No. 150 and Assembly Bill No. 3182 is granted. (Evid Code, §§ 452, 459; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a).)

6 Available at <https://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/sb_150_cfa_20110614_082052_asm_comm.html> (as of Aug. 31, 2026).

7 Available at < https://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/sb_150_cfa_20110509_133106_sen_comm.html> (as of Aug. 31, 2026).

8 Section 4741 provides, in relevant part: “An owner of a separate interest in a common interest development shall not be subject to a provision in a governing document or an amendment to a governing document that prohibits, has the effect of

In contrast to Senate Bill No. 150, the legislative history of Assembly Bill No.

3182 focuses less on the need to protect homeowners experiencing financial hardship and

more on the need to address the state’s housing shortage. As stated by the bill’s author,

“We must marshal all available resources to address the housing and homelessness crisis.

There are millions of homes across the state that have the potential to be rented to

Californians in need of housing but are prohibited from being leased under outdated HOA

rules. AB 3182 prohibits rental bans in HOAs to allow homeowners who want to, [to]

rent out their homes.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading

analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3182 as amended July 27, 2020, p. 3, italics added.) 9 The

bill’s sponsor, California YIMBY, argued “that HOA prohibitions against tenants act as a

prohibition against the production of important types of housing needed to solve

California’s housing crisis because if that housing cannot be occupied by a tenant, it is

unlikely in many cases to be built.” (Id. at p. 5, italics added.) And, as stated in an

Assembly report, the bill “would remove the exemption for pre-2012 rental bans and

prevent the governing documents of a CID from banning the rental or leasing of a

prohibiting, or unreasonably restricts the rental or leasing of any of the separate interests, accessory dwelling units, or junior accessory dwelling units in that common interest development to a renter, lessee, or tenant.” (§ 4741, subd. (a), italics added.)

9 Available at

<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB3 182#> (as of Aug. 31, 2026).

separate interest.” (Assem. Housing & Community Development Com., Analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 3182 as amend. May 7, 2020, at p. 2, italics added.) 10

Nothing in that legislative history supports the trial court’s ruling that section 4740

conflicts with and preempts the opt-out procedure in IWMC section 5.20.210, as

amended by Ordinance No. 732. Nor does this court’s decision in Brown, supra, 68

Cal.App.5th 124 dictate that conclusion. In Brown, the plaintiff purchased her home in a

CID located in Cathedral City in 2002. At the time, the CID’s governing documents did

not prohibit STR’s, and for the next 15 years the plaintiff consistently rented her property

for less than 30 days at a time. (Brown, at p. 128.) In 2018, the CID amended its

governing documents to prohibit members from renting or leasing their property for less

than 30 days and informed the plaintiff that prohibition would be enforced if she

continued to operate an STR. (Ibid.) The plaintiff sued the CID seeking a declaratory

judgment that, under section 4740, she was exempt from the prohibition on STR’s

contained in the amended governing documents. (Brown, at p. 128.) The trial court

granted summary judgment for the CID, concluding section 4740 precludes a CID from

completely prohibiting its members from renting their properties, whereas the amended

governing documents merely restricted the plaintiff from renting her property for less

than 30 days. (Brown, at p. 129.)

10 Available at

<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB3 182#> (as of Aug. 31, 2026).

This court observed that, on its face, section 4740 is partly ambiguous in scope.

“On the one hand, if a regulation forbids any category of rental, such as a short-term

lease, that regulation ‘prohibits’ that type of rental, even if it does not prohibit all rentals.

On the other hand, the section’s language could be read to bar only complete

‘prohibitions’ on leasing but not ‘restrictions’ on leasing that fall short of outright bans on

all leasing.” (Brown, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 130.) After reviewing section 4740’s

legislative history, we concluded: “In both its language and its substance, . . . section

4740’s legislative history shows that the Legislature sought for it to broadly address both

rental ‘restrictions’ and rental ‘prohibitions’ in CIDs. In our view, the statute’s

legislative history demonstrates that the statute’s goal is to exempt CID property owners

from any kind of rental prohibition or restriction that did not exist when the owner

acquired title to the property. The exemption must include at least the type of restriction

at issue here, where a category of rentals (STRs) is barred.” (Brown, at p. 132.) And, in

the context of rejecting the CID’s claim that the plaintiff was essentially running a hotel

out of her property in violation of separate restrictions on the use of member properties

for business or commercial activities, we reiterated that “section 4740 exempts [the

plaintiff] from any regulation, whatever its label, that restricts her rights to rent her

property if the regulation did not exist at the time she acquired title to the property and

she does not agree to the regulation.” (Brown, at p. 134, italics added.) Because the

prohibition on STR’s in the amended governing documents did not exist at the time the

plaintiff purchased her property, we held section 4740 exempted her from that

prohibition. (Brown, at p. 135.)

Relying on Brown, the trial court dismissed the City’s argument that section 4740

has no application here because the opt-out provision of IWMC section 5.20.210 does not

require CID members to amend their governing documents. But the trial court read this

court’s somewhat broad language out of its proper context. When we indicated section

4740 applied to “any kind of rental prohibition or restriction” (Brown, 68 Cal.App.5th at

p. 132) and “any regulation, whatever its label” (id. at p. 134, italics added) we

necessarily referred to the interpretative questions at issue in that case, to wit, whether

section 4740 applies solely to total prohibitions on rentals in a CID’s governing

documents or more broadly to any restrictions on rentals, and whether the CID could bar

the plaintiff from renting her property under separate restrictions on members operating a

business out of their properties. And, as the City contends, our use of the term

“regulation” necessarily referred to a CID’s governing documents or internal operating

rules, and not to generally applicable zoning ordinances. 11

We had no occasion whatsoever in Brown to decide whether section 4740 applies

to limitations on STR’s found in municipal law or otherwise not contained in a CID’s

11 The Act uses the term “regulation” in various sections to describe a CID’s internal operating rules and procedures. (E.g., §§ 4340, subd. (a), 4715, 4730, subd. (d), 4750, subd. (e); see Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Assn. v. Terifaj (2004) 33 Cal.4th 73, 85 [Observing, “A prospective homeowner who purchases property in a common interest development should be aware that new rules and regulations may be adopted by the homeowners association either through the board’s rulemaking power or through the association’s amendment powers”].)

governing documents. “‘It is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be

understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court.’” (Ixchel Pharma,

LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1130, 1158.) An opinion is not authority for a

proposition that was not considered. (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office

(2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 631, fn. 6; People v. Serna (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 563, 604.)

We find no inimical conflict between IWMC section 5.20.210 and section 4740.

Ordinance No. 732 does not require or even encourage a CID to amend its governing

documents. The generally applicable, minimum stay limitation on rentals throughout the

City is found elsewhere in IWMC section 5.20.140, as amended by Ordinance No. 710,

and the Parsons do not challenge the legality of that provision. The opt-out provision

merely provides that members of a CID may vote to exempt themselves from that general

limitation. A successful opt-out vote does not result in an amendment of the CID’s

governing documents that has the effect of prohibiting or restricting rentals, so section

4740 is simply not implicated. Because it is possible to comply with both section 4740

and the opt-out provision of IWMC section 5.20.210, there is no conflict. (City of El

Centro v. Lanier, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.) Therefore, we need not decide

whether section 4740 addresses a matter of statewide importance and whether IWMC

section 5.20.210 is narrowly tailored. (City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra, supra, 44

Cal.App.5th at p. 255.)

Likewise, we must disagree with the trial court’s finding that the opt-out provision

conflicts with the Act’s voting rules. As noted, ante, sections 4270 and 4275 govern the

voting procedure for members to amend a CID’s declaration, which is part of the

governing documents. (§ 4150.) To repeat, a successful opt-out vote under IWMC

section 5.20.210 results in the CID’s members being exempt from the generally

applicable minimum stay requirement for residential rentals but does not require or

necessarily result in an amendment to the CID’s governing documents. Therefore, it is

possible to comply with the voting requirements of the Act and the opt-out procedure.

In sum, we find no inimical conflict between section 4740 and the opt-out

provision of IWMC section 5.20.210.

C. The Delegation Of Authority Under The Opt-Out Provision Does Not

Violate The Parsons’ Due Process Rights.

“‘The federal and state Constitutions forbid the government from depriving an

individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (U.S. Const., 14th

Amend. [“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law”]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a) [“A person may not be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law”].)’ (In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th 292,

322.) ‘“The essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of

serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’”’

(Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th

197, 212 . . . quoting Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 348.)” (In re R.M.

(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 130.)

Both the federal and state due process clauses impose some limits on the ability of

local governments to delegate the exercise of regulatory powers to private parties.

(Vaquero Energy, Inc. v. County of Kern (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 312, 329 (Vaquero

Energy).) “Once the Legislature has established the law, it may properly delegate the

authority to administer or apply the law to private or governmental entities.” (People ex

rel. Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 632.) “‘An

unconstitutional delegation of legislative power occurs when the Legislature confers upon

an administrative agency unrestricted authority to make fundamental policy decisions.

[Citations.] “This doctrine rests upon the premise that the legislative body must itself

effectively resolve the truly fundamental issues. It cannot escape responsibility by

explicitly delegating that function to others or by failing to establish an effective

mechanism to assure the proper implementation of its policy decisions.” [Citation.]’”

(Id. at pp. 632-633, quoting People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 712.)

“At its core, the nondelegation doctrine’s fundamental concern is with legislative

abdication by failure to provide meaningful guidance, either at the level of basic policy or

in implementation of policy.” (Lovelace v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1081,

1097.) “‘An unconstitutional delegation of authority occurs only when a legislative body

(1) leaves the resolution of fundamental policy issues to others or (2) fails to provide

adequate direction for the implementation of that policy. [Citation.]”” (Kasler v.

Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 491-492, quoting Carson Mobilehome Park Owners’

Assn. v. City of Carson (1983) 35 Cal.3d 184, 190.)

In general, after adopting fundamental policy by enacting generally applicable

laws, state and local governments may delegate to private parties the decision whether to

consent or withhold consent to the law based on local needs. (See New Motor Vehicle

Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. (1978) 439 U.S. 96, 109 [“An otherwise valid regulation is

not rendered invalid simply because those whom the regulation is designed to safeguard

may elect to forgo its protection”]; Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura (2004) 33

Cal.4th 1, 26 [rejecting proposition that “a government interest becomes unimportant or

less important when decisions about how to accomplish that interest are delegated to

those most affected by those decisions”]; Brock v. Superior Court (1937) 9 Cal.2d 291,

299 [“a statute is not invalid merely because it provides for consent of interested persons

to the contemplated regulation”]; City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC

(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1380 [“The Legislature may provide for the consent or

agreement of interested parties to an application of the statute or regulation”].)

For example, a local government may generally prohibit certain uses of land by

private property owners but “permit[] this prohibition to be modified with the consent of

the persons who are to be most affected by such modification.” (Thomas Cusack Co. v.

City of Chicago (1917) 242 U.S. 526, 531.) In general, no due process violation will be

found if “the legislature’s restriction [is] in the form of a general prohibition, and the

delegation [is] in the form of permitting private citizens to waive the protection of that

prohibition.” (Silverman v. Barry (D.C. Cir. 1988) 845 F.2d 1072, 1086.) Put another

way, the general rule to be derived from nondelegation decisions of the United States

Supreme Court is “‘property owners can’t regulate other property owners—with an

exception if . . . they’re actually deregulating against the baseline of a general prohibition

of a nuisance.’” (Vaquero Energy, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 331, quoting Volokh, The

New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust

Challenges (2014) 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 931, 943.)

After surveying United States Supreme Court and California nondelegation

decisions, one California court concluded “the most important factors in analyzing the

constitutionality of a land use ordinance that transfers some authority to private property

owners are (1) the amount and type of control transferred, (2) whether the private

property owners’ action or inaction produces results that are binding on the other

property owner, and (3) the presence or absence of standards dictating how that control

must be exercised.” (Vaquero Energy, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 333.)

Applying those factors, we find the delegation here passes constitutional muster.

With respect to amount and type of authority delegated to CID members (Vaquero

Energy, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 333), the opt-out provision established by IWMC

section 5.20.210 does not “‘leave[] resolution of fundamental policy issues’” to members

of a CID. (Kasler v. Lockyer, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 491.) Instead, the City had already

determined the fundamental policy on the issue of residential rentals in Ordinance No.

710 when it declared STR’s to be a nuisance and enacted the minimum 29-night stay

requirement for rentals. In its ruling, the trial court indicated the delegation of authority

to CID members to decide for themselves whether to opt out of the minimum stay

requirement and to permit the operation of STR’s “in and of itself is not inherently

offensive,” but the court found the scope of the delegation to be problematic. We

disagree. The opt-out provision merely delegates to CID members the authority to decide

whether “to waive the protection” of the 29-day minimum stay requirement for rentals.

(Silverman v. Barry, supra, 845 F.2d at p. 1086.) Like its predecessor, the opt-out

provision of IWMC section 5.20.210 was intended to return to CID members the ability

to decide for themselves whether the benefits of permitting the operation of STR’s in

their communities outweigh the negative impacts of such rentals, if any, not to decide the

underlying policy regarding STR’s.

Nor is a successful opt-out vote irrevocably binding on a CID’s members.

(Vaquero Energy, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 333.) IWMC section 5.20.210(a)(5)

provides that a CID may repeal its vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement by

conducting a new vote using the same procedures mandated for the opt out. The trial

court was troubled by the lack of a quorum requirement for an opt-out vote, which might

result in “absurd results” and fail to safeguard members’ rights. True, in theory a

majority of members may fail to participate in the vote and a small number of members

who do vote to opt out and permit the operation of STR’s would at least temporarily bind

all members. But the opt-out procedure already protects members’ rights by requiring the

governing board to propose such a vote to the entire membership. Members who vote

against the opt out or who fail to participate in the vote are not irrevocably bound by the

result. If members are dissatisfied with the operation of STR’s, they may call on the

governing board to propose a vote to repeal the opt out.

Last, although IWMC section 5.20.210 provides no standards to guide members in

their decision whether to vote for or against an opt out, meaning they “‘are free to

withhold consent [to the minimum stay requirement] for selfish reasons or arbitrarily’”

(Vaquero Energy, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 333), “[t]hat factor, by itself, is not

determinative.” (Ibid.)

In sum, we find the scope and type of delegation in IWMC section 5.20.210 does

not violate due process.

D. The City Did Not Adopt Ordinance No. 732 in an Arbitrary or Capricious

Manner.

In their trial brief, the Parsons argued the City’s motivation for adopting

Ordinance No. 732 was “to harass, intimidate and deprive [the Parsons] of their right to

rent the Property short term,” and that the record showed the City had no rational or

reasonable basis for adopting the ordinance. The City responded there was no evidence

in the record to support the assertion it had adopted the ordinance merely to harass the

Parsons, and, the record established the ordinance was the reasonable culmination of its

years-long efforts to address the problems related to the operation of STRs. The trial

court concluded, “the City enacted various ordinances over several years concerning

STRs and there is no evidence in the record that meets [the Parsons’s] high burden to

show the City enacted the ordinance in a capricious or arbitrary manner.”

In their respondents’ brief on appeal, the Parsons again argue the City acted in an

arbitrary and capricious manner and there is a “complete absence of any evidence” to

support the ordinance. 12 We conclude otherwise.

The enactment of a zoning ordinance is a quasi-legislative decision that may be

reviewed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 to determine whether the

governmental action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely without evidentiary support.

(Citizens for Improved Sorrento Access, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th

808, 814; Corona-Norco Unified School Dist. v. City of Corona (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th

985, 992 .) “[Q]uasi-legislative acts are accorded the most deferential level of judicial

scrutiny.” (Pulaski v. Occupational Safety & Health Standards Bd. (1999) 75

Cal.App.4th 1315, 1331, citing Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995)

9 Cal.4th 559, 575-576.) “Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome

this presumption the petitioner must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that

the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid.” (County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City

(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 972-973.)

The record must show a “reasonable or rational basis” for the quasi-legislative act.

(Save Civita Because Sudberry Won’t v. City of San Diego (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 957,

984.) However, “[t]he wisdom of [a zoning ordinance] is a matter for legislative

12 Although the Parsons have elected not to pursue their cross appeal (see ante, fn. 4), they may challenge the adverse ruling on this claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 906.) “Without having cross-appealed, a party can properly raise an argument in its capacity as a respondent that shows the trial court reached the right result, even if on the wrong theory.” (Dieves v. Butte Sand Trucking Co. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1129, 1139.)

determination, and even though a court may not agree with that determination, it will not

substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authorities if there is any reasonable

justification for their action.” (Lockard v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, 461,

italics added; accord, Westsiders Opposed to Overdevelopment v. City of Los Angeles

(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1079, 1086 [“‘“A court cannot inquire into the wisdom of a

legislative act or review the merits of a local government’s policy decisions.”’”]; Tandy

v. City of Oakland (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 609, 612 [“‘[T]he wisdom or good policy of a

zoning ordinance is for a municipality to determine and the courts have nothing to do

with it.’”].) “We do not inquire whether, if we had the power to do so, we would have

taken the action taken by the agency.” (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San

Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361.)

The standard under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 of whether a quasilegislative action is “‘“entirely lacking in evidentiary support”’” is more deferential than

the usual substantial evidence standard of review. (American Coatings Assn. v. South

Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 446, 461.) In deciding whether

evidence supported the quasi-legislative action, “‘the court does not have the power to

judge the intrinsic value of the evidence or to weigh it.’” (California Oak Foundation v.

Regents of University of California (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 227, 247.) And, we may not

disturb the quasi-legislative act “simply because there is evidence, even substantial

evidence,” that supports a different decision. (American Coatings, at p. 475, italics

added; see Russian Riverkeeper v. County of Sonoma (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 382, 403.)

On appeal, the Parsons argue Ordinance No. 732 does not advance the City’s

stated goal of returning to CID homeowners the decision whether to allow the operation

of STR’s for less than 29 nights, because, according to the Parsons, the right to make that

choice “is already decided by the CID’s governing documents.” Not so. As the City

contends in its reply brief, before enactment of the opt-out provision in Ordinance No.

732 (and its predecessor), CIDs had no such authority. The City had already determined

in Ordinance No. 710 that the operation of STR’s was a nuisance and effectively banned

them by imposing the 29-day minimum stay requirement. To repeat, the Parsons do not

claim the minimum stay requirement is unlawful. On this record, we conclude adoption

of the opt-out provision in Ordinance No. 732 was a rational and reasonable means of

advancing the goal of addressing the concerns of CID homeowners and returning to them

the ability to decide for themselves whether to allow the operation of STR’s for shorter

periods.

In addition, the Parsons contend there was no rational basis for the City’s decision

to apply the new opt-out provision of IWMC section 5.20.210 to existing CID’s but to

permit, under IWMC section 5.20.200, new CID’s to allow operation of STR’s without

conducting an opt-out vote. The City argues the distinction made between existing CID’s

and new ones that might be formed in the future is a rational one because newly created

CID’s do not yet have members who can vote to opt out of the minimum stay

requirement. “The City Council could have reasonably concluded that a voting process

for existing members was necessary for existing CIDs (which ha[ve] members that can

vote), and not new CIDs (which do not have members that can vote).” We agree with the

City. Although the City might have concluded the opt-out process should apply to all

CID’s equally, including those formed after enactment of Ordinance No. 732, we cannot

say it acted irrationally or unreasonably by making such a distinction.

Next, the Parsons argue the City had no rational basis for requiring a CID to

contain four or more parcels and share boundaries to qualify for the opt-out provision.

The City responds it “reasonably determined that an opt-out vote by members of a CID

with three or fewer legal parcels or parcels that were not contiguous would not fairly

reflect whether those who would be impacted by a proposed STR—the neighbors—

desired to allow that STR to operate.” Again, we agree with the City. A staff report to

the City Council noted that, under the former opt-out provision, some CID homeowners

had responded to the failure of their board to conduct an opt-out vote by creating smaller,

“bare-minimum” CID’s and holding their own opt-out vote, effectively circumventing the

will of the larger CID and of the City’s intent behind the opt-out provision. Limiting the

opt-out provision under Ordinance No. 732 to CID’s consisting of a minimum of four

parcels and requiring contiguity was a rational and reasonable response.

Last, the Parsons argue the evidence shows the City had targeted them specifically

and adopted the four-parcel minimum “solely to prevent the Parsons from obtaining an

STR permit.” True, the staff report discussed, ante, did mention the CID formed by

Parsons. But, as the trial court corrected noted, the report indicated “there were three

CIDs in the City that had fewer than four legal lots,” not just the one formed by the

Parsons. (Italics added.)

In sum, we conclude the trial court correctly found the City had not acted in an

arbitrary or capricious manner when it enacted the opt-out provision of Ordinance No.

732.

III.

DISPOSITION

The judgment and postjudgment order on attorney fees are reversed. The City of

Indian Wells shall recover its costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

McKINSTER

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

CODRINGTON

Parsons v. City of Indian Wells

Summary · law.co

Key issues

Procedural posture

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain