2026 IL App (1st) 252283
SECOND DIVISION
August 31, 2026
No. 1-25-2283
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STEPHEN MURPHY, ) Appeal from
) the Circuit Court
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) of Cook County
)
v. ) 23L4666
)
ILLINOIS ORTHOPEDIC NETWORK, PLLC, ) Honorable LILIANA O’SHEA, and TERRIS MURPHY, ) John J. Tully, Jr.,
) Judge Presiding
Defendants-Appellees. )
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Ellis and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Attorney’s absolute litigation privilege to make statements about potential lawsuit barred defamation claim; summary judgment affirmed.
¶2 Data consultant Stephen Murphy sued his former client’s general counsel, Liliana O’Shea,
contending that she defamed him with an e-mail warning that it was criminal to continue accessing
the former client’s confidential database and would provoke the company to pursue injunctive
relief. The company, Illinois Orthopedic Network, PLLC (ION), is a Chicago-based medical care
network that specializes in anesthesiology, pain management, hand surgery, otolaryngology, and
plastic surgery. O’Shea addressed her e-mail directly to Murphy and ION’s owners, Marc Strongin 1-25-2283
and Irvin M. Wiesman. The trial judge entered summary judgment against Murphy, on the basis
of the absolute litigation privilege that protects attorneys from civil liability for statements which
they make in the course of representation. In the circuit court, Murphy had legal counsel. Here, he
appeals pro se.
¶3 Murphy was a data consultant for ION while his then-wife, Terris Murphy, was the
company’s chief executive officer. In March 2022, ION verbally ended its association with
Murphy and disabled his access to ION’s servers. In July 2022, Terris Murphy filed for dissolution
of marriage. It is undisputed that after Murphy’s logon credentials were deactivated, he used
someone else’s credentials to access ION’s servers. In addition, he did not relinquish the passwords
that ION needed to access its Power BI platform and Microsoft Azure server. ION personnel
exchanged phone calls, texts and e-mails with Murphy about the circumstances. Three of the
e-mails that O’Shea and Murphy exchanged are pertinent to this appeal.
¶4 O’Shea sent an e-mail response to Murphy on Monday, August 22, 2022, at 10:32 a.m.
which she marked “Importance: High.” The subject line indicated that she was continuing a
conversation about a text message. The text message was not included in the record on appeal.
However, in an affidavit filed during these proceedings, O’Shea stated that Murphy “became
extremely aggressive after being told [he] would no longer receive any work from ION,” “kept
pushing back on ION’s decision,” and “refus[ed] to tell ION how he accessed [its] data unless he
was compensated for the information.” When deposed in connection with this litigation, Strongin
(one of ION’s two owners) testified that after “[w]e had a discussion about Stephen inappropriately
accessing our data, *** we agreed that this e-mail was the next logical step.” O’Shea wrote:
“Stephen,
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Your authorization has been terminated, as you have been notified multiple times. I
have reviewed the correspondence you have sent and it is clear that it is blackmail. Per Drs.
Strongin and Wiesman, I will be filing a police report today and moving for a preliminary
injunction.
Sincerely,
Liliana O’Shea
General Counsel
Illinois Orthopedic Network, PLLC.”
¶5 Later that same day, at 12:35 p.m., Murphy answered O’Shea, but Murphy added ION’s
two owners to the e-mail’s distribution list:
“General Counsel, Marc, Irv:
I don’t know what you’re accusing me of doing; what am I blackmailing for and trying
to extort? What is the injunction for?
I consider this escalation on your end [to be] extremely ill intentioned. It feels
intentionally provoking and has caused me extreme distress (you all know my personal
situation).
I’ve been trying to clarify the contract we had between us, the signing authorities, etc[.],
so that I may comply with your request (I’m currently deleting all [patient Protected Health
Information] data from the secure server per your request and our BAA agreement). Since
Friday at 4:47pm when I was first given written notice to comply by 8pm on Monday, I
have not received clear answers to my fair questions.
Sincerely,
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Stephen.”
¶6 According to O’Shea’s affidavit, she used the “reply all” option when composing the
response that she sent to Murphy at 1:53 p.m., which meant that the recipients included both of
ION’s owners.
“Stephen,
You were notified verbally months ago of your termination. You have failed to comply
and have (1) threatened to engage in a data breach, and (2) stated that ‘it will cost [ION]’
[to learn] *** how you gained access to the server (after you knew your access had been
terminated). Your behavior constitutes theft pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/16-1, constituting a
felony, and punishable by a minimum of six years in jail and a maximum of thirty years in
prison, if convicted, along with a $25,000 fine.
I have a signed affidavit from [ION’s chief financial officer] relating the facts of what
has transpired in the last few days[,] including your threats, that I intend[] to attach to the
TRO that [will] be filed tomorrow morning, unless you comply with the following by 5pm
CST today.”
¶7 In the next paragraph of her e-mail, O’Shea listed certain demands, including that Murphy
sign documents, turn over ION’s passwords for its Power BI and Microsoft Azure accounts, and
disclose how he had connected to ION’s server even though his credentials had been disabled five
months earlier. O’Shea’s e-mail concluded:
“I look forward to hearing from you and hope this issue can be resolved amicably.
Sincerely,
Liliana O’Shea
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General Counsel
Illinois Orthopedic Network, PLLC.”
¶8 Murphy complied with all of ION’s demands. The next day, August 23, 2022, at 9:18 a.m.,
O’Shea sent Murphy a short follow-up e-mail stating, “Since you provided all the information
requested, we will not be filing any charges.”
¶9 This concluded ION’s disagreement with Murphy.
¶ 10 Nine months later, however, Murphy began this action. He still did not deny engaging in
the objectionable access and retention of ION’s data resources. Nevertheless, he directed Count I
at O’Shea and the ION corporation, contending that it was false and defamatory for the general
counsel to characterize his conduct as felony theft. Count II was a contractual interference claim
directed at Terris Murphy, whom he alleged instigated the end of his relationship with ION, in
order to “gain leverage” in their “contentious divorce.” Murphy did not describe or attach a
contract. The circuit court granted the defendants’ section 2-615 motion to dismiss the complaint
as conclusory (see 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)) because Murphy did not factually indicate that
a false statement had been published to a third party and did not factually identify a contract.
¶ 11 In an amended pleading, Murphy restated his allegations and added a list of tasks that he
performed for ION as a data consultant at the rate of $80 per hour between 2018 and 2022.
¶ 12 O’Shea, ION, and Terris Murphy sought summary judgment on the amended complaint on
grounds that there was no false statement, no publication, no contract, and no interference. After
oral argument and supplemental briefing, the circuit court entered an order granting summary
judgment as to Count II because Murphy’s written response conceded that his contractual
interference claim against Terris Murphy was not viable. The order also indicated the court was
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denying summary judgment as to Count I. That order was entered on Friday, August 22, 2025. The
following Monday, August 25, 2025, however, the circuit court entered a separate order on its own
motion in which it granted summary judgment as to Count I on the basis of O’Shea’s absolute
litigation privilege.
¶ 13 At this point in the dispute, Murphy began representing himself.
¶ 14 He filed a pro se motion to reconsider summary judgment as to Count I only, which the
circuit court denied. Then he filed a pro se emergency second motion to reconsider summary
judgment as to Count I only and grant leave to replead, which the circuit court denied. This pro se
appeal, which was timely filed within 30 days of the order denying the first motion to reconsider,
followed. Murphy’s appeal is limited to the orders about his defamation claim against O’Shea and
ION.
¶ 15 Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Varela ex rel. Nelson v. St. Elizabeth’s Hospital of Chicago, Inc., 372 Ill. App. 3d 714, 722 (2006).
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Id. Additionally, we are to use de novo
review when examining whether the attorney litigation privilege applies in a cause. Popp v. O’Neil,
313 Ill. App. 3d 638, 642 (2000) (this is a question of law).
¶ 16 Illinois generally follows the attorney litigation privilege set out in § 586 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which provides:
“An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning
another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the
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institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he
participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.”
¶ 17 See Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642 (quoting § 586); O’Callaghan v. Satherlie, 2015 IL App
(1st) 142152, ¶ 27 (observing that Illinois courts generally follow § 586 but are not limited to the
Restatement’s terms and may apply privilege outside of defamation claims where counsel’s actions
are in the client’s interests and pertinent to representation).
¶ 18 The privilege applies to an attorney-at-law’s out-of-court communications so long as the
communication pertains to proposed, ongoing, or completed litigation or quasi-judicial
proceedings. Golden v. Mullen, 295 Ill. App. 3d 865, 870 (1997) (holding that the established
privilege encompassed post-litigation communication). The “pertinency requirement” is not
strictly construed, however, and immunity will attach even to defamatory communications that are
not about a specific litigation issue. Id.; Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642; O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App
(1st) 142152, ¶ 25. As long as the communication relates to the litigation and is in furtherance of
the client’s interests, the pertinency requirement is met. Golden, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 870;
O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 29; Kurczaba v. Pollock, 318 Ill. App. 3d 686, 706
(2000). Furthermore, all doubts about pertinency are resolved in the attorney’s favor. Golden, 295
Ill. App. 3d at 870; Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642; O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 25.
¶ 19 The general public policy underlying the “privilege is to secure to attorneys as officers of
the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.” Libco Corp. v.
Adams, 100 Ill. App. 3d 314, 317 (1981); O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 24 (the
privilege furthers “an attorney’s need to fully and fearlessly communicate with [the] client”). “An
attorney must be at liberty to candidly and zealously represent [a] client in communications to
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potential opposing parties in litigation or other proceedings without the specter of civil liability for
[the] statements clouding [the attorney’s] efforts.” Atkinson v. Affronti, 369 Ill. App. 3d 828, 833
(2006); Tallman v. Hanssen, 427 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Iowa 1988) (quoting Beeck v. Kapalis, 302
N.W.2d 90, 97 (Iowa 1981) (immunity “encourage[s] the open resolution of disputes by removing
the cloud of later suits”)). “[T]he ends to be gained by permitting [unbridled advocacy] outweigh
the harm which may be done to the reputation of some persons in the course of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 870.
¶ 20 The privilege is an absolute one rather than a qualified or conditional privilege given that
it immunizes an attorney from liability for publishing defamatory matter regardless of the
attorney’s purpose for the publication, belief in its truth or even knowledge of its falsity. Popp,
313 Ill. App. 3d at 642; Golden, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 870 (the privilege “affords complete immunity,
irrespective of the attorney’s knowledge of the statement’s falsity or the attorney’s motives”);
Thompson v. Frank, 313 Ill. App. 3d 661, 664 (2000) (the privilege is “a complete bar to a claim
for defamation, regardless of the defendant’s motive or the unreasonableness of his conduct.”). In
other words, there is absolute immunity for remarks that are false, spoken in anger, harsh or hurtful.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 cmt. a. (1977) (“These matters are of importance only in
determining the amenability of the attorney to the disciplinary power of the court of which he is
an officer.”)
¶ 21 Murphy argues that O’Shea’s defamatory communication was not shielded by the absolute
litigation privilege because O’Shea was referring to a criminal proceeding that did not exist and
never materialized. We will assume for purposes of this appeal that O’Shea’s statement was
defamatory. According to Murphy, section 586 requires that “O’Shea ‘participate as counsel’ in
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that proceeding” (emphasis added), meaning that O’Shea could invoke the privilege only if she
provided representation in the criminal case she described when she warned him that her client
was on the verge of filing a civil action concerning his inappropriate access to its data resources.
The appellees respond that Murphy misinterprets the privilege and that O’Shea’s e-mail is
absolutely protected because it was in anticipation of litigation seeking an injunction.
¶ 22 Murphy’s argument is not based on the language of the Restatement or any other authority.
The Restatement and Illinois law indicate that the attorney’s absolute privilege applies to the email that O’Shea sent to Murphy in anticipation of a civil action about his misuse of ION’s data
resources. Murphy has never denied accessing ION’s confidential information without its
permission. O’Shea demanded that Murphy stop his misconduct and communicated that if he did
not comply with her demands, ION intended to seek immediate injunctive relief. According to
§ 586, “[a]n attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning
another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding.” Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 586 (1977). Furthermore, O’Shea’s e-mail is analogous to the demand letters that were
sent in various other Illinois disputes, such as Rosenbaum v. Samler, 2025 IL App (1st) 2400039.
¶ 23 “A demand letter ‘explains [a party’s] legal position in a dispute and requests that the
recipient take some action (such as paying money owed), or else risk being sued.’ ” Id. ¶ 59
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)). After Steven Samler’s mother died at the age
of 103, he found out that she had changed her trust to name her financial advisor, Kenneth
Rosenbaum, as a contingent beneficiary, which substantially reduced the interests of her three
grandchildren. Id., ¶ 1. Samler’s attorneys sent Rosenbaum letters that threatened legal action if
he failed to disclaim his interests. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Rosenbaum worked for a large wealth management
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and investment banking firm and his employer’s compliance department read one of the
threatening letters before he saw it. Id. ¶ 11. The firm’s legal department also read the letter and
forwarded it to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which opened an
investigation. Id. ¶ 12. Steven cooperated with the FINRA investigation and he and the
grandchildren followed through on the threats to sue Rosenbaum for undue influence and financial
exploitation. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. FINRA, however, closed its investigation without taking action and
Rosenbaum prevailed on summary judgment in the circuit court. Id. Rosenbaum then sued Steven
and the grandchildren, based in part on the defamatory letter. Id. ¶ 15. However, the circuit court
dismissed the action due to the attorney’s absolute privilege (id. ¶17) and the appellate court
affirmed. The letter satisfied the “pertinency requirement” because it related to future litigation
and furthered the attorney’s representation of his clients. Id. ¶¶ 56-57. It came within the scope of
the privilege and was not actionable. Id. ¶ 57.
¶ 24 Rosenbaum, 2025 IL App (1st) 240039, is just one example and is similar to
communications that were found privileged in Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d 828, 833 (an attorney
should be able “to settle or resolve cases favorably for his client without resorting to expensive
litigation or other judicial processes”); Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d 638; and Golden, 295 Ill. App. 3d
865.
¶ 25 In addition, O’Shea’s e-mail to Murphy is similar to the communications in Simon v.
Oltmann, 98 C 1759, 2001 WL 1035719, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2001), which stated that the
recipients had misappropriated proprietary and confidential information and advised them that the
letters were pre-litigation offers to settle the case. Cross-claims were filed in federal court,
however, and one of the letter recipients argued that the communication was just an attempt to
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extort money and that the client did not intend to sue, as evidenced by the fact that the recipient
sued first and the client did not file for seven months and, by then, was no longer represented by
the letters’ author. Id. at *7. Applying Illinois law, the district court judge found that “the letters
to which [the litigant] so vehemently objects are nothing more than ordinary demand letters. The
letters invite cooperation and resolution of the dispute prior to formal litigation, a public interest
deserving of protection.” Id. at *8. The court also found that waiting seven months was irrelevant
because the “letters make clear that [the client] would file suit if [the recipients] did not pursue
settlement.” Id.
¶ 26 Other jurisdictions have also applied the privilege to attorney demand letters. For instance,
a California court applying § 586 and California law contemplated an attorney’s letter which stated
that unless the recipient settled, the client intended to sue for violation of federal and state law,
fraud, and misrepresentations. Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 594
(Ct. App. 1976). The court found that the letter was absolutely privileged and emphasized the value
of attempting to avoid litigation:
“As any competent attorney is aware, access to the courts is not an end in itself but only
one means to achieve satisfaction for a client. If this can be obtained without resort to the
courts—even without the filing of a lawsuit—it is incumbent upon the attorney to pursue
such a course of action first. [Citation.] It is equally well established legal practice to
communicate promptly with a potential adversary, setting out the claims made upon him,
urging settlement, and warning of the alternative of judicial action. [Citation.]” Id. at 577.
¶ 27 The sentiment was echoed by a New Jersey court’s observation that “the ability of an
attorney to communicate freely when a matter is in controversy is just as important in the
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preliminary negotiating stage as it is on the day the suit papers are filed with the court.” DeVivo v.
Ascher, 228 N.J. Super. 453, 460 (App. Div. 1988). The court recognized that withholding absolute
privilege from attorneys for statements made prior to litigation “might tend to lessen the attorney’s
efforts on behalf of his clients” and that an attorney “preparing for litigation must not be inhibited
by fear of reprisal in the form of actions for defamation.” Id. at 460. See also Waterloov Gutter
Protection Systems Co., Inc. v. Absolute Gutter Protection, L.L.C., 64 F. Supp. 2d 398, 416 (D.N.J.
1999) (concerning attorney letters that were “nothing more than demand letters, alleging
infringement, requesting that the infringement cease, and inviting cooperation and resolution of
any disputes before resort to formal suit,” court held that the letters were “within the ambit of the
privilege if they are sent to achieve the objects of litigation and if they have some logical relation
to the litigation”).
¶ 28 O’Shea’s communication came within the attorney litigation privilege because it was
preliminary to a proposed judicial action about Murphy’s unauthorized use of ION’s data resources
and the contents of the e-mail were pertinent to the anticipated civil suit in which ION would seek
injunctive relief. Like the attorney communications we discussed above, O’Shea’s e-mail obtained
results for her client without resorting to the courts. She followed the “well established legal
practice to communicate promptly with a potential adversary, setting out the claims made upon
him, urging settlement, and warning of the alternative of judicial action.” Lerette, 60 Cal. App. 3d
at 594.
¶ 29 However, Murphy contends that privilege should not apply because O’Shea did not follow
through on her threat to file a police report or her statement that his misconduct amounted to a
felony and she did not draft an order for injunctive relief. He points out that less than a day after
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he capitulated to her demand e-mail, she confirmed, “Since you provided all the information
requested, we will not be filing any charges.” Murphy’s understanding of the privilege is erroneous
because it would require O’Shea to file an unwarranted civil complaint and motion for injunctive
relief in order to invoke the privilege. His interpretation is not supported by any authority and it is
contrary to sound public policy.
¶ 30 For these reasons, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriately entered against
Murphy’s defamation count against O’Shea and ION.
¶ 31 Murphy’s second argument is that circuit court erred by denying his motion to reconsider
the summary judgment ruling. “The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to a court’s
attention (1) newly discovered evidence, (2) changes in the law, or (3) errors in the court’s previous
application of existing law.” Jones v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 152923,
¶ 29. We review the circuit court’s ruling on a motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion. Id.
An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id.
¶ 32 Murphy’s motion to reconsider did not meet any of those standards. He argues that the
motion identified four errors. The first is that the court applied the privilege to include O’Shea’s
statement about felony theft to ION’s owners, Strongin and Wiesman, when they were not her
clients in a criminal case. Murphy contended this was contrary to the holding in Golden, 295 Ill.
App. 3d at 872, that a privilege which must be “narrow[ly]” construed did not encompass an
attorney’s letter to the client and the client’s spouse. This argument is unpersuasive on appeal
because O’Shea’s communication about Murphy’s misuse of data resources was limited to Murphy
and her clients Strongin and Wiesman. It did not include non-client third parties.
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¶ 33 Murphy also argues it was error for the circuit court to rely on authority which neither party
had incorporated into their written briefs, including Rosenbaum, 2025 IL App (1st) 240039;
Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d 828; and Scarpelli v. McDermott Will & Emery, 2018 IL App (1st)
170874. On appeal, Murphy expands this list to include Bedin v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital,
2021 IL App (1st) 190723. This is a new argument on appeal and it is not supported by citation to
any authority. Either of these deficiencies is reason for us to reject Murphy’s argument. Appellate
courts are intended to review matters that have already been ruled upon and cannot review a
decision that was never made. Accordingly, arguments that have not been raised in the circuit court
are deemed forfeited and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Board of Managers of
Eleventh Street Loftominium Ass’n v. Wabash Loftominium, L.L.C., 376 Ill. App. 3d 185, 188
(2007). In addition, appellate contentions which are not supported by legal reasoning, citation to
authority and citation to the pertinent pages of the record are waived on appeal. Id. We find that
Murphy forfeited this argument by failing to bring it in the circuit court and by failing to adequately
brief it on appeal. In any event, we can think of no compelling reason why any court should or
would limit its consideration to authority cited by the parties. The authority was generally relevant
and some of it was pertinent to our own reasoning.
¶ 34 Murphy next argues that his motion to reconsider identified certain undisputed or disputed
material facts that the circuit court incorporated in its order denying summary judgment on Friday,
August 22, 2025, and the circuit court did not state these facts were resolved or were not relevant
in its order granting summary judgment on Monday, August 25, 2025. These facts would indicate
that O’Shea’s defamatory statement was false. Murphy specifies that the circuit court initially
concluded that there were “competing narratives about Murphy’s termination” and a material
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question of fact as to whether he was verbally terminated prior to his written termination on August
19, 2022. If Murphy had not been terminated before he was fired in writing, then it would not be
wrongful of him to (use someone else’s credentials to) access ION’s data; retain Protected Health
Information or PHI; or fail to disclose ION’s passwords for its access to Power BI and Microsoft
Azure, and his actions would not be felony theft.
¶ 35 The fact dispute that Murphy focuses on has never been material. The privilege immunizes
an attorney from liability for publishing defamatory matter regardless of the attorney’s purpose for
the publication, belief in its truth or even knowledge of its falsity. Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642;
Golden, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 870. It has never made a difference whether O’Shea accurately or
inaccurately characterized Murphy’s actions when she demanded that he either take certain steps
or become the defendant in a civil action and motion for injunctive relief. There is no indication
that O’Shea acted in bad faith when she communicated her client’s concerns to Murphy. In fact,
ION’s owner, Strongin, confirmed at his deposition that ION wanted to stop Murphy’s
inappropriate access to ION’s data and that Strongin discussed the e-mail with O’Shea before she
sent it. However, even if Strongin’s deposition had never been taken, O’Shea’s defamatory
communication plainly states it is in anticipation of a civil action, which means that Murphy’s
defamation claim would be met with the absolute litigation privilege and was ill-conceived.
Accordingly, the facts that Murphy identified in his motion for reconsideration of the summary
judgment ruling were not material and were not grounds for granting the motion.
¶ 36 The fourth claimed error is that the circuit court (1) denied ION and O’Shea’s motion for
summary judgment as to Count I on Friday, August 22, 2025, but (2) revisited the summary
judgment materials on its own motion, reversed the decision and granted summary judgment on
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Count I on Monday, August 25, 2025. Murphy cites Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13,
for the proposition that “a sua sponte ruling deprives a party of notice and opportunity to raise
objections because the court acts on its own and without any warning.” This is a new argument on
appeal and is forfeited. Board of Managers of Eleventh Street Loftominium, 376 Ill. App. 3d at
188.
¶ 37 Forfeiture aside, we do not find that any of the concerns expressed in Peterson were
implicated by the circuit court’s almost immediate reversal. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1. The
Peterson plaintiff alleged that his real estate agent schemed to acquire certain property for herself.
Id. As part of her scheme, she allegedly overpriced his residence in order to stall its sale and delay
him from acquiring funds he needed to buy the other property. Id. at 4. The agent answered the
complaint and contended that a certain allegation – the final sales price of his residence – was
knowingly false and that the client should be sanctioned. Id. at 5. The circuit court limited the
parties’ discovery to that fact and prohibited any discovery into the substantive issues involved in
the case. Id. The issue of the purchase price was just one of several fact issues raised by the
complaint alleging the agent engaged in self-dealing and duplicitous conduct. Id. at 12.
¶ 38 When the parties appeared for hearing on the defendant’s sanctions motion, the circuit
court denied it, but granted summary judgment sua sponte, even though no motion for summary
judgment was pending. Id. at 5-6. The appellate court vacated the order, id. at 14, because the
client had not been given notice and opportunity to respond to a dispositive motion. Id. at 11. The
court pointed out that the two types of motions were substantively different. A motion for sanctions
is directed at allegations on the face of the complaint, while a motion for summary judgment “is
the procedural equivalent of a trial and constitutes an adjudication of the claim on the merits.” Id.
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at 9-10. Furthermore, section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment
rulings and provides for either party to move for summary judgment, but it does not authorize the
circuit court to sua sponte dispose of a case as a matter of law. Id. at 10 (citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998)). The statute allows time for the opposing party to respond to a motion for
summary judgment, id., and a local rule specified that a summary judgment motion should not be
heard until 10 days after it had been served. Id. at 11 (citing Cook. Co. Cir. Ct. R. 2.1(e) (eff. July
1, 1976)). The client was not given that response time and the order which limited the parties’
discovery efforts hampered his opportunity to respond to the disposition of his entire case. Id. The
other allegations of self-dealing and duplicitous conduct were not argued by the parties or
addressed by the sua sponte ruling. Id. at 12. It was error for the circuit court to transform the
sanction motion into a summary judgment motion. Id. at 14.
¶ 39 In contrast, there was extensive discovery in Murphy’s claims against O’Shea and ION,
including interrogatories, document production, and a half-dozen depositions. The hearing was
scheduled well in advance. The parties not only filed written briefs, they filed supplemental briefs
and made oral arguments. The procedure that was followed conformed with the statute and local
rule governing summary judgment. The record shows that there was notice and opportunity to be
heard on all of the substantive issues that Murphy raised in his amended complaint. On a Friday,
the trial judge denied summary judgment on the defamation count, but upon further reflection over
the weekend, recognized that the ruling was incorrect, and on the following Monday, entered a
contrary order that was consistent with the facts and the law. Murphy’s action was fully and fairly
adjudicated and what occurred bears no resemblance to the Peterson matter. Peterson, 313 Ill.
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App. 3d 1. Therefore, if Murphy had not forfeited his Peterson-based argument by failing to raise
it on a timely basis, we would reject it on the merits.
¶ 40 Murphy has not shown that his motion to reconsider should have been granted.
¶ 41 Murphy’s last argument concerns his second motion to reconsider summary judgment, in
which he also sought leave to replead. He explains that this successive motion provided the court
with exhibits that were not previously filed, including some text messages he exchanged with
Terris Murphy, correspondence about obtaining a hearing transcript, handwritten notes which he
took during the hearing, and a four-page summary or outline of his proposed second amended
complaint. Murphy points out that the circuit court denied the motion in just two sentences and did
not address the substance of his argument or whether his proposed new pleading would cure any
defect. He contends this perfunctory order demonstrates an abuse of discretion which should be
remedied by our reversal and remand with instructions to address the successive motion on the
merits.
¶ 42 We reject this argument because Murphy should not have filed a successive motion to
vacate the summary judgment order. A successive postjudgment motion is one that requests
reconsideration after the first postjudgment motion is denied. Owens v. Berkshire Nursing & Rehab
Center, LLC, 2026 IL App (1st) 241662, ¶ 25. Murphy’s motion did exactly that–it asked the court
to vacate its summary judgment order and reconsider the denial of the first postjudgment motion
to vacate. Murphy argued that granting the successive motion would be fair and allow the parties
to avoid “unnecessary appellate proceedings.”
¶ 43 “There is no provision in the [Code of Civil Procedure] or the supreme court rules which
permits a losing litigant to return to the trial court indefinitely, hoping for a change of heart or a
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more sympathetic judge.” Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253, 259 (1981). There is no section of the
Code of Civil Procedure that authorizes successive postjudgment motions. Furthermore, Supreme
Court Rule 274 prohibits successive postjudgment motions by providing that any party “may make
only one postjudgment motion directed at a judgment order that is otherwise final and appealable.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 274 (eff. July 1, 2019). In addition, supreme court precedent emphatically states that
a circuit court should not grant a successive postjudgment motion. See Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 258;
Royal Oak Condominium Ass’n v. Stevenson, 2025 IL App (1st) 242317, ¶ 39 (“The unmistakable
holding of Sears is that the circuit court loses jurisdiction over a final judgment once it denies the
timely postjudgment motion directed at that final judgment.”).
¶ 44 For these reasons, it was not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to deny Murphy’s
second motion.
¶ 45 The appellant has not identified any errors in the judgment on appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 46 Affirmed.
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