[Cite as State v. Yusufi, 2026-Ohio-3381.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NO. CA2025-08-099
Appellee, :
OPINION AND
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
8/31/2026
ABDULLAH YUSUFI, :
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2025-01-0030
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Repper-Pagan Law, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for appellant.
OPINION
BYRNE, P.J.
{¶ 1} Abdullah Yusufi appeals his sentence after being convicted in the Butler
County Court of Common Pleas for felonious assault and domestic violence. On appeal,
Yusufi argues the trial court should have merged his convictions at sentencing because
Butler CA2025-08-099
they are offenses of similar import. Upon review, we agree. Both of Yusufi's crimes had
the same victim, the same physical harm, and the underlying conduct leading to those
offenses occurred at the same time with the same motivation. The State's arguments to
the contrary are unconvincing.
Background
{¶ 2} The underlying facts of this case are not contested and were captured on a
home security camera. Yusufi became angry with his wife (the "Victim") after he
unsuccessfully attempted to print coloring pages for their children. Yusufi began yelling
at the Victim and ordered her to fix the printer. Continuing to yell, Yusufi approached the
Victim, who was seated on the floor between a couch and a coffee table, leaned over,
and smacked a heavy glass mug off the table. The mug immediately hit the Victim in the
face, causing injuries including a cut to her lip as well as serious gum and tooth damage.
She received treatment at multiple hospitals but still lost one upper tooth and has a scar
on her lip where stitches were applied. During the incident, one of the Victim and Yusufi's
children sat close beside the Victim on the floor, and another child sat nearby on the end
of the couch.
{¶ 3} A Butler County grand jury indicted Yusufi for felonious assault and
domestic violence. After trial, a jury found Yusufi guilty of both offenses. The trial court
sentenced Yusufi to an indefinite prison term totaling seven to 10.5 years in prison for the
felonious assault charge and to 180 days in jail for the domestic violence charge. The
court also imposed mandatory postrelease control and $12,000 in restitution. At
sentencing, the trial court gave Yusufi various advisements regarding the sentence as
required by law. After finishing its advisements, the court asked defense counsel if there
were any questions or comments to which counsel replied, "Just object for purposes of
the record." The trial court replied, "That objection will be noted and the Court will overrule
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it."
{¶ 4} Yusufi now appeals, raising one assignment of error.
First Assignment of Error - Merger
Felonious Assault and Domestic Violence
{¶ 5} Under Ohio law, knowingly causing "serious physical harm to another"
constitutes felonious assault. R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). Similarly, "knowingly caus[ing] or
attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to a family or household member" constitutes
domestic violence. R.C. 2919.25(A). Each of these offenses must be committed
knowingly. R.C. 2919.25(A); R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). "A person acts knowingly, regardless of
purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain
result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances
when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist." R.C. 2901.22(B).
Merger
{¶ 6} When a defendant is accused of "two or more allied offenses of similar
import," the indictment may include both offenses, but the defendant may ultimately only
be convicted of one offense so as to prevent double jeopardy. R.C. 2941.25(A). However,
when "the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or
where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed
separately or with a separate animus as to each," a defendant can be convicted of all
offenses. R.C. 2941.25(B). Stated differently, Ohio law permits multiple convictions for
multiple offenses if any one of the following applies:
(1) the offenses were dissimilar in import, determined by
analyzing whether (a) the defendant's conduct harmed
more than one person; or (b) the defendant's conduct
caused two or more separate and identifiable harms to
one person;
(2) the offenses were committed separately; or
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(3) the offenses were committed with separate animus or
motivation.
State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 13, 26. The focus of our analysis must be on the
defendant's conduct and is fact dependent. Id. at ¶ 26.
Standard of Review
{¶ 7} Merger is an issue of law that appellate courts typically review de novo.
State v. Penwell, 2017-Ohio-7465, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). However, the failure to raise the issue
of merger at the trial level results in forfeiting that issue on appeal unless plain error is
shown. State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 21-22. When merger is subject to plain error
review, a defendant must "demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions are
for allied offenses of similar import committed with the same conduct and without a
separate animus." Id. at ¶ 3. The plain error doctrine should only be applied "with the
utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice." State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph 3 of syllabus.
Analysis
{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, Yusufi argues the trial court erred by not
merging his felonious assault and domestic violence convictions. The State argues that
because Yusufi only objected "for purposes of the record" and did not expressly raise the
issue of merger at sentencing, Yusufi has forfeited all but plain error.
{¶ 9} Regardless of whether Yusufi sufficiently raised the issue of merger at the
trial level, we conclude his crimes should have been merged. Both crimes had the same
victim—Yusufi's wife. Similarly, both crimes had the same identifiable, physical harm—a
cut to the Victim's lip as well as serious gum and tooth damage. However, the State
argues these crimes were committed separately because "to be convicted of domestic
violence, [Yusufi] merely had to attempt to cause physical injury" to the Victim, and "at
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the time [he] smacked the glass mug, he had committed all the elements of domestic
violence" under Ohio law.
{¶ 10} The State's arguments are unconvincing. Yusufi's criminal act of striking the
glass mug off the table and his motivation for doing so (anger over the Victim not
immediately fixing the malfunctioning printer), were the same for both offenses. Through
this single course of conduct, Yusufi did not merely attempt to cause harm to his wife. He
immediately succeeded, and as discussed above, the resulting harm is indistinguishable
between the two offenses. Compare with State v. Pichardo-Reyes, 2017-Ohio-8534, ¶ 64
(12th Dist.) (finding separate and identifiable conduct as well as harm where Reyes
"attempt[ed] to stab Lopez with [a] knife and then actually caus[ed] her physical harm
through . . . punches, scratches, and bites."); State v. Wilson, 2025-Ohio-3038, ¶ 27 (5th
Dist.) (refusing to merge felonious assault and domestic violence convictions where the
defendant choked the victim, "release[ed] her and stepp[ed] away" before coming back
and knocking her to the floor, causing injury to her elbow and arm.).
{¶ 11} Under de novo review, we conclude the facts in this case satisfy Ruff
because (1) they were similar in import as there was only one victim, and the offenses
did not create separate and identifiable harms; (2) Yusufi did not commit the offenses
separately, but simultaneously to one another; and (3) Yusufi committed the offenses with
the same motivation. Likewise, this analysis satisfies plain error review because Yusufi
met his burden to "demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions are for allied
offenses of similar import committed with the same conduct and without a separate
animus." Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459 at ¶ 3.
{¶ 12} Despite the foregoing, the State argues Yusufi's offenses should not be
merged because to do so "would frustrate the express intention" of Ohio's legislature with
regard to the domestic violence statute. The State compares that statute to Ohio's
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Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). See generally R.C.
2923.32. The Ohio Supreme Court observed in State v. Miranda, 2014-Ohio-451, that the
RICO statute's purposes—mirroring those of its federal counterpart—include the
imposition of "'enhanced sanctions'" and "'cumulative liability'" for criminal enterprises. Id.
at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 332, 335 (1997).1 The State
asserts that, consistent with Miranda, "[i]t is crystal clear that the intent of the General
Assembly was to provide special protection for a particular class of people and to provide
additional punishment for those who commit assault against that class of people."
(Emphasis added).
{¶ 13} We agree with the State's contention that Ohio's domestic violence statute
was intended to provide special protection for a particular class of people. See State v.
Carswell, 2005-Ohio-6547, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.) ("In enacting R.C. 2919.25, the General
Assembly clearly intended to address household violence in all its forms . . ."). However,
we see no support for the State's contention that the statute was also intended to provide
additional punishment in a case like this one. The State's comparison of that statute with
Ohio's RICO statute is inapt because "the General Assembly intended to enhance the
government's ability to quell organized crime [with the RICO statue] by imposing strict
liability for such acts" regardless of a defendant's state of mind. (Emphasis added.)
Schlosser at 333. Indeed, the RICO statute makes the mere act of being "employed by,
or associated with, any criminal enterprise" a criminal offense that is "independent of the
conduct required to commit [the underlying predicate offenses]." (Emphasis added.
1. When enacted, the federal RICO statute stated: "'It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by . . . [among other things,] providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.'" (Emphasis added). State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 332 (1997), quoting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News at 1073.
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Bracketed text in original.) R.C. 2923.32(A)(1); Miranda at ¶ 13. It is because of this that
the stated purposes of the RICO statute are not served by merging a RICO offense with
any underlying charges it is based on. Id. at ¶ 14. But the same is not true here, where
Ohio law requires both felonious assault and domestic violence be committed
"knowingly," meaning neither statute imposes strict liability like Ohio's RICO statute. R.C.
2919.25(A); R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2923.32. Ultimately, the domestic violence statute's
creation of protections for a particular class of people does not mean that it inherently
provides enhanced or cumulative punishment for those who commit assault against that
class of people. In contrast, Ohio's RICO statute expressly creates both a new class of
offender and cumulative punishment for that class.
{¶ 14} For these reasons, we sustain Yusufi's sole assignment of error.
{¶ 15} Judgment reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
HENDRICKSON and SIEBERT, JJ., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the above Opinion.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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