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Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
LUIS M. RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 48342)
Elgo, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, appealed following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, E, rendered ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to advise him to accept a plea offer from the state that called for three and one-half years of incarceration when he was exposed to a maximum of sixty years of incarceration had he been convicted after trial. Held:
The habeas court properly denied the petitioner’s habeas petition, as the court’s factual finding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by E’s advice regarding the state’s plea offers was not clearly erroneous in that it was based on the court’s rejection of the petitioner’s self-serving testimony and its decision to credit E’s testimony that he had advised the petitioner about the plea offers and the amount of prison time he could face if convicted, and the court’s finding that the petitioner had always maintained his innocence, did not want to accept a plea offer and was adamant on taking his case to trial was supported by E’s testimony and the transcripts of the petitioner’s plea proceedings.
Argued April 20—officially released September 1, 2026
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland
and tried to the court, Wagner, J.; thereafter, the petition was withdrawn in part; judgment denying the
petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
David B. Bachman, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, with whom were Jessica Dellaratta, certified
legal intern, and, on the brief, Christian M. Watson,
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
state’s attorney, and Silvina Bejleri, deputy assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
SEELEY, J. On the granting of his petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner, Luis M. Rodriguez,
who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of various charges in connection with a sexual assault and sentenced
to thirty years of incarceration, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that his
criminal trial counsel, Attorney Christopher Eddy, provided ineffective assistance. On appeal, the petitioner
claims that the habeas court improperly determined that
(1) the advice provided by Attorney Eddy with respect to
two plea offers presented to the petitioner was adequate
and satisfied the constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel, (2) Attorney Eddy’s failure to advise the petitioner to accept a plea offer of three and
one-half years of incarceration, when the petitioner was
exposed to a maximum of sixty years of incarceration,
constituted effective assistance of counsel, and (3) the
petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice resulting from
either alleged deficiency of Attorney Eddy. We agree
with the habeas court’s determination that the petitioner
did not prove that he was prejudiced by any ineffective
assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the
habeas court.
Our Supreme Court set forth the following facts, which
the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural
history of the petitioner’s underlying criminal trial in
his direct appeal.1 “In the early morning, the victim2
was walking from her residence on Martin Luther King
1
The petitioner initially filed his direct appeal with this court, and the appeal subsequently was transferred to our Supreme Court.
2
“In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.” State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 178 n.1, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
Drive in New Britain to a nearby convenience store. Near
Lafayette and Beaver Streets, a gold, four door sedan
with two male occupants stopped and asked the victim if
she knew where they could buy cocaine. The victim told
the men that she did not know, and they drove away.
Less than five minutes later, the men returned, and one
of them pulled the victim into the backseat with him.
After driving for between ten and fifteen minutes, the
vehicle stopped at an abandoned housing complex. The
driver got into the backseat, and the victim sat between
the two men. The victim testified that both men were
Hispanic, one man ‘was kind of thin and the other one
was kind of heavy,’ and both spoke Spanish to each other
during the attack.
“After the men removed, or had the victim remove, her
clothing, ‘[t]hey started putting their fingers . . . [i]nto [her] vagina’ against her will. The thin man engaged
in forcible penile-vaginal intercourse with the victim,
made her perform oral sex on him, and ‘was pretty much
done with [her] within probably about five minutes . . .
.’ The heavier man could not maintain an erection, and
he forced the victim to perform oral sex and forcibly
digitally penetrated her vagina. Thereafter, the heavier
man pulled the victim out of the car by her hair and
ejaculated while ‘rubbing his penis up against the inside
of [the victim’s] thigh.’
“After the assault, the two men drove away, and the
victim ‘walked quite a ways’ and came upon a house. The
occupant of the house, Juanita Isaacs, testified that the
victim banged on her door and asked Isaacs for help, telling her that she had been raped. Isaacs called the police, Officer Alan Vincent Raynis, Jr., of the New Britain
Police Department responded, and the victim told him
what happened. Raynis took the victim back to the scene
of the crime, where he took several photographs and
seized a pair of jeans, a sports brassiere, and panties.
“The victim was transported to New Britain General
Hospital, where she was examined, and a sexual assault
evidence kit was processed. The examining nurse swabbed
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
the victim’s vaginal and oral cavities, the exterior surface of her genitalia, and her inner thigh to collect any
biological material that could be used to identify the
perpetrators. Raynis collected the kit and submitted it
to the state forensic laboratory [laboratory] for analysis. Thereafter, the victim provided the police with a sworn,
written statement regarding the incident.
“The laboratory staff found sperm in the vaginal smear
and genital swabs. The staff did not find sperm on the oral sample, but other tests revealed the presence of human
seminal fluid protein. The laboratory staff extracted
DNA from the evidentiary materials and searched it
against DNA contained in the Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS).3 No matching profiles were found.
“Approximately ten years later, the [petitioner] became
a person of interest in the sexual assault based on a CODIS match between the evidentiary DNA sample that had
been extracted from the victim’s sexual assault evidence kit and a sample of the [petitioner’s] DNA that had
been placed into CODIS at some point after the victim’s
assault. In August, 2016, a detective from the New Britain Police Department interviewed the [petitioner]. The
detective informed the [petitioner] that he was a suspect
in a sexual assault involving two men and a woman. The
[petitioner] denied having had sex in a threesome, which
he described as disgusting, and said he did not allow
women in his car. The [petitioner] also described to the
police vehicles that he previously owned, which did not
include a gold, four door sedan, and informed the police
that he currently did not have any car registered in his
name. The [petitioner] then consented to the taking of
a buccal swab, which the police submitted to the laboratory for analysis.
3
“CODIS contains DNA profiles from unsolved crimes and compares them to known samples from convicted felons that are periodically added to the database. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 128 Conn. App. 846, 852–53 n.3, 19 A.3d 678, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 907, 32 A.3d 961 (2011).” State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 180 n.2, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
“Several months later, the laboratory reported a match
between the DNA from the [petitioner’s] buccal swab
and that taken from the victim’s sexual assault evidence
kit. In December, 2016, the police again spoke with the
[petitioner]. The detective informed the [petitioner]
that his DNA was found in the vaginal sample from the
victim. Contrary to his previous statement to the police,
the [petitioner] admitted that he did have a threesome
on two occasions in hotels in Plainville and on the Berlin Turnpike. He stated that one incident involved a ‘skinny,
Puerto Rican’ girl and occurred when he picked up a
man and a woman near an AutoZone store and dropped
them off at a store on Broad Street in New Britain. The
detective also informed the [petitioner] that, in addition to the assault, the victim complained of being robbed
of several hundred dollars, and the [petitioner] replied
with words to the effect of: ‘That’s not me. It’s the other guy.’ ” (Footnotes in original.) State v. Rodriguez, 337
Conn. 175, 178–81, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this appeal. The petitioner was arrested
on February 6, 2017, and charged in an information
dated February 7, 2017, with one count of sexual assault
in the first degree, to which he entered a plea of not
guilty. In a pretrial proceeding before the court, Keegan, J., on August 1, 2017, Attorney Eddy indicated that
there had been pretrial discussions pertaining to the
case that morning and that he had discussed plea offers
with the petitioner, and he requested a continuance for
the petitioner to have time to consider the offers. The
matter was continued to August 29, 2017, at which time
Attorney Eddy indicated to the court that the petitioner
was rejecting the plea offers, and the court canvassed the petitioner, who maintained his innocence.4
4
Specifically, the following discussion took place on the record before the court, Keegan, J.:
“[Attorney Eddy]: Your Honor, [the petitioner] would like to reject the state’s offer and place the case on the firm jury list. “The Court: Okay, can we just go over what the offer is and [what’s] being rejected?
“[The Prosecutor]: The offer contemplated, Your Honor, a plea to sexual
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
Subsequent to the August 29, 2017 pretrial proceeding and prior to trial, the state amended the information
(operative information) to charge the petitioner with
three counts: in counts one and two, the petitioner was
charged with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), and, in count three, assault in the first degree under subsection (a) (1), three and [one-half] years to serve, followed by seven years of special parole. It was Judge Alexander’s offer. That offer did not contemplate a two year minimum/ mandatory based on the age of the alleged victim. He would face a twenty year maximum with the same two year minimum/mandatory.
“The Court: Okay, [petitioner] I understand that you’re rejecting the offer today that Judge Alexander made. I just want to go over with you what that offer was and to make sure you understand at trial what you potentially face as a maximum penalty, okay?
“[The Petitioner]: Yup.
“The Court: All right, so, you’re charged with sexual assault in the first degree, and the state . . . rather, Judge Alexander, made an offer of three and [one-half] years to serve, which includes a two year mandatory minimum followed by seven years of special parole. Are you familiar with special parole?
“[The Petitioner]: No. . . .
“Attorney Eddy: Well, Your Honor, I did discuss the parameters of the agreement. My notes also reflect there was an alternative offer of twelve years suspended after three and [one-half] followed by ten years of probation, but our position is he is factually innocent of this crime.
“The Court: Okay, so, you understand now that the charge of sexual assault in the first degree under [§] 53a-70 (a) (1), which is the actual statute number that you’re charged with, carries a potential of twenty years’ incarceration, two years of which is a mandatory minimum, and it carries a potential maximum of thirty-five years of probation. Okay?
“[The Petitioner]: All right.
“The Court: So, I understand that you’re telling me you’re pursuing that you are factually innocent of [the charge], but I have a duty to inform you about the risks of conviction after trial, okay?
“[The Petitioner]: Yup.
“The Court: Have you discussed those with [Attorney] Eddy?
“[The Petitioner]: Yes.
“The Court: And, even after discussing those, you still wish to pursue your trial right?
“[The Petitioner]: Yes.
“The Court: All right, you wish me to inquire any further?
“[The Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor, thank you.
“The Court: All right, I will place this matter then on the firm jury list, and we won’t see you back here in court on a date until we get to that trial, okay? . . .
“[The Petitioner]: Yes . . . .”
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
he was charged with attempt to commit sexual assault
in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§
53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-70 (a) (1). Specifically, count one charged that the petitioner had compelled sexual intercourse with the victim by the use of force by “using his
superior physical strength to engage in non-consensual
digital penetration of her vagina”; count two charged
that the petitioner had compelled sexual intercourse
with the victim by the use of force by “using his superior physical strength to force her to perform fellatio to get
him aroused”; and count three charged that he had acted
“with the intent to commit [s]exual [a]ssault in the first degree” by “forcibly rubbing his flaccid penis against [the victim’s] vagina while trying to penetrate her, until he
ejaculated . . . .”
On March 5, 2018, counsel and the petitioner appeared
before the court, Alexander, J., at which time Attorney
Eddy stated: “We’re scheduled for jury selection tomorrow, and he would still like to have his trial.” Thereafter, the following discussion took place:
“The Court: Okay. So, [petitioner], your charge was on
the sole count of sexual assault in the first degree, and
the person was not a minor. Is that correct?
“[The Prosecutor]: That is correct. [The victim was]
an adult, Your Honor.
“The Court: So, the sentencing range if you’re convicted after trial is not less than two years, up to twenty years to serve. Do you understand that’s the sentencing
range?
“[The Petitioner]: Yes.
“The Court: Your plea agreement was alternative
offers. You could have three and [one-half] years to serve, with that two year mandatory minimum, followed by
seven years of special parole, or twelve years, suspended
after three and [one-half] years, with a ten year period of probation. Was that your understanding of the offers?
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
“[The Petitioner]: Yes.
“The Court: Do you want to take either one of those
offers?
“[The Petitioner]: No.
“The Court: You want to have your trial.
“[The Petitioner]: Yes.
“The Court: Okay. So . . . [y]ou’ll start picking a jury
tomorrow. . . .
“[The Prosecutor]: Judge, I do want the court’s canvass
to be clear. The state has charged three counts of sexual
assault in the first degree in its long form information
for trial. They were separate and distinct acts that were
alleged as part of the whole package, so his total exposure at the maximum end would actually be sixty years if he
were convicted on all three.
“The Court: Okay. Because the state has alleged distinct
conduct, our law recognizes the different manners in
which a sexual assault can happen, even if it arises out
of a single incident. And, with respect to it, as the state has now corrected, if you’re convicted of all counts after trial, your maximum penalty is sixty years with six years
being mandatory minimum. Are you clear on that?
“[The Petitioner]: I have to talk to my attorney.
“The Court: Do you want a second?
“[The Petitioner]: Yeah. . . .
“The Court: Okay. . . . Here, [the state has] three
counts, and your maximum penalty would be up to sixty
years to serve and six year mandatory minimum, and
that would be if the court imposed the maximum on each
and added each count to each other, so that’s how you
get to the maximum penalty. You let me know what you
want to do, okay?
“[The Petitioner]: All right.”
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
At that time, the court passed on the petitioner’s case,
which provided the petitioner with an opportunity to
discuss the amended charges and maximum penalties
for those charges with Attorney Eddy. When the matter
was recalled by the court, the court stated: “We passed
the matter because the state did indicate today that it
was charging three distinct forms of sexual assault in the first degree, so, the court had to advise [the petitioner] that if he is convicted after trial, a court could impose
up to sixty years.” The court then asked if the petitioner had “enough time to talk to Attorney Eddy,” to which
the petitioner replied, “[y]es, I did.” The court asked
if the petitioner understood that he was facing sixty
years if convicted, and the petitioner stated, “[y]es, I
understand.” Finally, the court asked the petitioner if
he wanted a plea agreement or a trial, and the petitioner
responded that he wanted a trial. Jury selection began the next day, and the trial commenced on March 14, 2018.
At trial, through the testimony of Angela Przech, a
forensic science examiner with the laboratory, the state
introduced a laboratory report dated December 16, 2016,
which indicated that vaginal swabs taken from the victim
“had been separated into sperm-rich and epithelial-rich
fractions. The report concluded that the sperm-rich
fraction of the vaginal swabs was a mixture, and the
[petitioner] ‘is included as a potential contributor to the DNA profile . . . .’ [That report also] . . . concluded that the ‘expected frequency of individuals who could be a
contributor to the DNA profile . . . from [the sperm-rich
fraction of the vaginal swabs] is . . . approximately 1 in 230,000 in the Hispanic population.’ The report was . . .
signed by Przech, as the analyst, and a technical reviewer.
“At trial, Przech testified regarding the procedures
used to test the DNA evidence and the results contained
in her three reports. . . . Przech further testified that, in 2016, the New Britain Police Department submitted a known buccal swab of a suspect in the case to the
laboratory for comparison with the evidentiary DNA
that had been extracted in 2007. She explained that,
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
rather than having an analyst physically process the
[petitioner’s] buccal swab, the laboratory processed it via ‘an automated procedure’ in which ‘a robot’ extracts and
processes DNA from the known buccal sample. Przech
compared the [petitioner’s] DNA profile to the profiles
that had been extracted from the evidentiary swabs in
2007 and concluded that the [petitioner] was a ‘potential
contributor’ to the DNA mixture that had been extracted
from the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs.
“Przech testified that the December, 2016 report set
forth her conclusions regarding the comparison of the
[petitioner’s] buccal swab and the DNA taken from the
sexual assault evidence kit. . . . Following the trial, the jury found the [petitioner] guilty on all counts. The
[petitioner] was sentenced to a total effective sentence
of thirty years [of] incarceration.” (Footnote omitted.)
State v. Rodriguez, supra, 337 Conn. 182–84.
On October 28, 2020, the petitioner, in a self-represented capacity, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Subsequently, in May 2023, with the assistance of
counsel, he filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (operative petition). In his operative petition,
the petitioner alleged the denial of his constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel. In particular, he alleged that Attorney Eddy had rendered ineffective assistance in failing, inter alia, (1) to meaningfully convey to the petitioner a plea offer of three and onehalf years, followed by seven years of special parole,
and an alternative plea offer of twelve years, execution
suspended after three and one-half years, followed by
ten years of probation, (2) to adequately explain to the
petitioner the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
state’s case and of the theories of defense pursued at
trial, the maximum exposure on each charge, the probability of success at trial, the nature and strength of the forensic evidence, the likely witnesses for the state and
their probable testimony, and the significant probability
of a far greater sentence resulting from a conviction
following a trial, and (3) to provide the petitioner with
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
affirmative advice regarding whether the petitioner
should accept one of the plea offers.5
A habeas trial was held on June 17, 2024, at which the
court heard testimony from Przech; Eric Carita, a forensic consultant; Attorney Eddy; and the petitioner. The
court also admitted into evidence a number of exhibits
offered by the petitioner, including his criminal court
file, DNA reports, a statement from the victim, a police
report and transcripts from the underlying criminal
trial. The testimony before the habeas court can be summarized as follows.
Przech testified consistently with her testimony at
the petitioner’s criminal trial. She also testified that,
in her final report dated December 16, 2016, the petitioner “was included as a potential contributor to the
DNA profile” generated from the sample taken from
the vaginal swabs of the victim, which was designated
as sample 1CB. Przech testified further that she had met
with Attorney Eddy on February 26, 2018, during which
time they discussed statistics, details of the DNA profiles, the amount of DNA present in sample 1CB, and the fact
that she had to process that sample further in 2016 in
accordance with new procedures and auditing guidelines
so that she could “interpret the data in a proper manner”
and “get a more thorough profile.” Carita testified that
he did not find any issues with the protocols that were
used in the DNA testing in this case and that the results
of the DNA testing were reliable.
5
The petitioner also alleged in the operative petition that Attorney Eddy had rendered deficient performance in failing to employ a Spanishspeaking interpreter, “to employ the assistance of a mental health professional to ensure that the petitioner could understand and retain the information and advice provided by counsel,” to utilize a DNA expert, and to investigate and “advise the petitioner concerning the possibility of presenting evidence [pertaining to the victim’s] sexual history at trial . . . .” The petitioner’s counsel withdrew the allegation regarding the mental health professional during his closing argument at the habeas trial. The habeas court denied the operative petition as to the remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the petitioner does not challenge the court’s decision as to those claims. Accordingly, they are not at issue in this appeal.
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
In his testimony, Attorney Eddy confirmed that he had
engaged in pretrial discussions about the plea offers concerning the petitioner. He recalled the petitioner having
been given alternative offers from the trial court, both of which involved a period of incarceration and would have
required sex offender treatment and lifetime registration
as a sex offender. When asked if the court, during the
pretrial discussions, had expressed an indication that it
would accept either disposition, he responded, “I believe
so.” He stated his belief that “the state and the court
made those offers as a way of inducing [the petitioner]
to plead guilty to eliminate the need for [the victim] to
have to testify.” According to Attorney Eddy, he “communicated [the offers] to [the petitioner] on more than
one occasion and did so in person with [his] investigator
present . . . .”6 At the time he did so, Attorney Eddy
“displayed the audio/video interview or interviews that
[the petitioner had] provided to New Britain police. And
then, in addition . . . [he] met with [the petitioner] with Attorney Joe Lopez, who speaks Spanish . . . .” Attorney
Eddy clarified that the offers, which were originally made and rejected in August 2017, were held open and that
the petitioner could have pleaded guilty after that time
if he had wanted to do so. He qualified that statement,
however, noting that, “through [his] meetings with
the petitioner as well as the statements [the petitioner
had] provided to the New Britain Police Department,
[the petitioner] always denied his involvement in this
incident.” Attorney Eddy also stated that, at times, he
did utilize the services of an interpreter but that the petitioner was bilingual and spoke English and Spanish, and
that he never had difficulties communicating with the
petitioner. He testified, however, that the petitioner had a poor memory and later was evaluated and determined
to be “of borderline intelligence.” When asked whether
it seemed that the petitioner understood “the gravity of
6
Specifically, Attorney Eddy testified that he “would have met with [the petitioner] on each and every court date that he attended,” and that he also had “evidence of at least two professional visits that would have taken place” at either the courthouse or the correctional institution in which the petitioner was incarcerated at that time.
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
the situation that he was in,” Attorney Eddy responded:
“Well, thinking back now, I don’t think he did. At the
time, nothing stuck out to me.”
Attorney Eddy testified that he had reviewed the evidence with the petitioner, including the victim’s statement, that he had explained to the petitioner his opinion
that her allegations supported multiple charges of sexual
assault, and that he went over the amended charges
against the petitioner with him. When asked what, if
anything, he related to the petitioner about the DNA
evidence in this case prior to proceeding to trial, Attorney Eddy stated: “I would have indicated that his DNA was
a mixture in the vaginal swab[s] and that he was eliminated from being the [contributor] of the sperm that was
located on the inner thigh . . . .” Attorney Eddy testified that the petitioner had “never indicated a willingness to
plead guilty. I mean, I’m not going to force someone to
go to trial, but, you know, I can’t make him plead guilty
either.” Attorney Eddy stated further: “[T]he nature of
our [pretrial] discussions focused primarily on the DNA
because there was no evidence other than the DNA to
establish identity. And, maybe I evaluated this wrongly,
but there was DNA that excluded [the petitioner]. So,
I believe the jury disregarded that argument because
there was evidence in terms of DNA that would have
eliminated [the petitioner] from doing what [the victim]
said he did. . . . So, [the victim] claims to have been sexually assaulted by two males, one thin male, one heavyset
male. The state was very specific in [its] charging that
[the petitioner] . . . was the heavyset male. . . . And,
the heavyset male was alleged to have deposited semen
where the sperm is located on her inner thigh. . . . That
testing was done on that sample from the inner thigh,
and [the petitioner] was eliminated. So, it was a single
source profile from that semen stain, and [the petitioner] was eliminated.” With respect to the statements made
by the petitioner during his police interviews, Attorney
Eddy testified that he had advised the petitioner that
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
those statements could be or would be introduced into
evidence against him at trial.
Attorney Eddy testified that he had told the petitioner
that, “if he was found guilty, he would get north of the
three [and] one-half [years],” and he provided a ballpark
of “something in the teens.” Attorney Eddy confirmed
that, in their discussions, the petitioner was not amenable to pleading guilty and that the petitioner’s “perspective
was that he was innocent.” Attorney Eddy also was asked
what, if anything, he had advised the petitioner about
his assessment of the strength of the state’s case, to
which he replied: “Well, again, hindsight is 20/20, but I
thought the fact that he was eliminated from depositing
the DNA where she maintains he would have—[where]
his DNA would have been found—okay. So, the scientific
evidence would have indicated that some other heavyset
Hispanic male ejaculated on her inner thigh. He was
eliminated from that person.” When asked whether he
had “provide[d] the petitioner with any advice” concerning the advisability of proceeding to trial, Attorney Eddy stated: “I left the decision up to him.” He also testified that he could not recall having a discussion with the
petitioner regarding his chances of success at a trial, in terms of percentages.
On cross-examination, Attorney Eddy was questioned
regarding the plea offers and his discussions with the
petitioner relating to those offers, and he indicated that he had communicated the offers to the petitioner multiple times, that he went over the pros and cons of taking an offer versus going to trial, that he explained the
evidence against the petitioner that the state would be
offering, including the videos of the petitioner’s police
interviews, the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s
DNA evidence, the witnesses against him, the state’s
burden of proof, the maximum exposure for each charge
against the petitioner, and the petitioner’s probability
of success at trial. Attorney Eddy also gave the petitioner time to think about the offers, but, ultimately, the petitioner did not want to plead guilty. As a result, the
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
petitioner decided to proceed to trial and maintained his
innocence throughout. In fact, Attorney Eddy met with
the petitioner on the eve of trial and confirmed, again,
that the petitioner still wanted to go to trial. On redirect examination, Attorney Eddy could not recall whether
he had had any discussion with the petitioner concerning the statistic in the December 2016 DNA report that
“the ‘expected frequency of individuals who could be a
contributor to the DNA profile . . . from [the sperm-rich
fraction of the vaginal swabs] [to which the petitioner
was found to be a contributor was] . . . approximately 1
in 230,000 in the Hispanic population.’ ”
In his testimony, the petitioner stated that he did not
understand the plea offers. When asked if he had any discussions with Attorney Eddy regarding the plea offers,
the petitioner testified: “What he told me was to choose
the jury because it was possible that he could win the case, for me to not worry. What I was able to understand was
that I would not be guilty; it was possible for him to win the case.” The petitioner acknowledged that Attorney
Eddy had discussed the accusations with him, as well
as the DNA evidence and potential defenses, and that
Attorney Eddy had advised him that there was “a great
possibility” of the petitioner succeeding at trial. When
asked, however, what advice, if any, Attorney Eddy
had given him regarding the likely sentence he would
receive if he lost at trial, the petitioner stated, “[n]o
advice at all.” The petitioner responded, “[y]es,” when
asked whether it would have changed his decision about
going to trial if he had been advised that the state could bring additional charges against him. The petitioner also
testified that Attorney Eddy did not discuss with him the
maximum amount of prison time that he could receive if
he were convicted of the charges, stating that Attorney
Eddy “was focused on winning the case . . . .” He testified further that, when he returned to court in March 2018
and rejected the plea offers, he did not know that the
state had brought additional charges against him and
did not find out about those charges until “[a]fter he lost the jury.” According to the petitioner, Attorney Eddy
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
never discussed the additional charges with him and, if
he had, it would have impacted the petitioner’s decision
to go to trial. He testified: “I wouldn’t have gone to trial because I know I would have lost . . . [b]ecause it’s more charges.” The petitioner testified further that Attorney
Eddy never gave him advice about what plea offer he
should take or whether he should go to trial, and that if
Attorney Eddy had advised him to consider taking the
three and one-half year offer, he would have taken it.
On cross-examination, the petitioner testified that he
had told Attorney Eddy that he was innocent all throughout the trial. The petitioner acknowledged that he had
lied to the police when, in his first statement, he stated that he did not take part in threesomes. When the petitioner was asked, “[d]id you tell your attorney that it
was you,” he replied: “What I told the attorney was
that I didn’t remember who the lady was. I didn’t say to
the attorney that it was not me.” The prosecutor then
asked, “[s]o, it could have been you,” and the petitioner
replied, “[y]es,” but that he didn’t remember and that
“[m]aybe [he] was drunk . . . .” When the prosecutor
asked the petitioner whether Attorney Eddy had told
him “that the judge made an offer of three and one-half
years,” the petitioner replied, “[y]es,” but that he did
not want to take the offer and wanted to go to trial in
light of Attorney Eddy’s advice about the “high chance”
of winning at trial.
In its memorandum of decision filed October 1, 2024,
the habeas court denied the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding that the petitioner had
failed to sustain his burden of establishing either deficient performance or prejudice. Specifically, the court
found “that the petitioner failed to prove that Attorney
Eddy’s performance in advising the petitioner as to the
plea offers was deficient. Attorney Eddy testified credibly that he advised the petitioner regarding the parameters of the plea offers in addition to the state’s evidence against him, the charges and the exposure the petitioner
faced, and the probability of the petitioner’s success at
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
trial so that the petitioner could make his own informed
decision. The record also reveals that the petitioner was
granted ample time to consider the plea offers, and the
trial court fully canvassed the petitioner on his decision to reject them. This court does not credit the petitioner’s testimony that he did not understand the plea offers but
failed to ask for further explanation. Under the facts of
this case, the court cannot find Attorney Eddy’s performance to be deficient.
“Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove prejudice
by demonstrating that a reasonable probability exists
that the petitioner would have accepted one of the plea
offers had Attorney Eddy explained the offers further.
The credible evidence indicates that the petitioner maintained his innocence and was adamant on taking his
case to trial. The petitioner’s testimony indicates that,
with the benefit of hindsight, he regrets not accepting a
plea offer because he would now be close to finishing his
sentence. Such evidence fails to sustain the petitioner’s
burden of proving prejudice. As a result, these claims
must also be denied.” Subsequently, the court granted
the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, and this appeal followed.
Before we address the merits of the claims raised by
the petitioner on appeal, we set forth relevant legal principles that guide our analysis and the applicable standard of review. “ ‘Under the sixth amendment to the United
States constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 1, 29, 188 A.3d
1 (2018), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1068, 139 S. Ct. 788,
202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019). ‘Given the centrality of plea
bargaining to the efficient administration of the criminal justice system, defense counsel have responsibilities in
the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be
met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that
the [s]ixth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution] requires in the criminal process at critical stages. Because ours is for the most part a system of pleas, not
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
a system of trials . . . it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. . . . In today’s criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea
bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost
always the critical point for a defendant.’ . . . Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 338 Conn. 330, 339–40,
258 A.3d 40 (2021). To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
[466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984)] by ‘demonstrating that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
defense because there was a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
had it not been for the deficient performance.’ ” Barlow
v. Commissioner of Correction, 343 Conn. 347, 354–55,
273 A.3d 680 (2022).
“[T]o satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test
when the ineffective advice of counsel has led a defendant to reject a plea offer, the habeas petitioner must show
[1] that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have
been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not
have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances),
[2] that the court would have accepted its terms, and
[3] that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the
offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the
judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. . . .
These factors focus on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the
plea process . . . and the ultimate conviction or sentence imposed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vivo v.
Commissioner of Correction, 233 Conn. App. 54, 60–61,
337 A.3d 1203, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 907, 343 A.3d
503 (2025); see also Bonds v. Commissioner of Correction,
223 Conn. App. 645, 654, 309 A.3d 411 (for petitioner
to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
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performance during plea negotiations, petitioner must
establish that “there was a reasonably probability that—
but for the deficient performance—the petitioner would
have accepted the plea offer, and that the trial court
would have assented to the plea offer” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 956, 310
A.3d 380 (2024).
“Furthermore . . . the specific underlying question of
whether there was a reasonable probability that a habeas
petitioner would have accepted a plea offer but for the
deficient performance of counsel is one of fact, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Martinez
v. Commissioner of Correction, [221 Conn. App. 852,
865–66, 303 A.3d 1196 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
939, 307 A.3d 273 (2024)]; see Bonds v. Commissioner
of Correction, supra, 223 Conn. App. 655–56 (explaining
that clearly erroneous standard of review applies to factual question of whether there was reasonable probability
that petitioner would have accepted plea offer in absence
of deficient performance of counsel); see also Ebron v.
Commissioner of Correction, 307 Conn. 342, 351, 53 A.3d
983 (2012) ([t]he habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous
. . .), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone v. Ebron, 569 U.S.
913, 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2013).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of
Correction, 228 Conn. App. 701, 712–13, 324 A.3d 837,
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 929, 326 A.3d 250 (2024); see
also Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, 354 Conn. 30,
40, 348 A.3d 463 (2026) (“[t]he habeas court is afforded
broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barlow
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 357–58
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
(“Because it is the [habeas] court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether
the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than
the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable
presumption . . . in favor of the [habeas] court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
“It is well settled that [a] reviewing court can find
against a petitioner on either [prong of Strickland],
whichever is easier.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
228 Conn. App. 713; see also Maia v. Commissioner
of Correction, 347 Conn. 449, 460 n.4, 298 A.3d 588
(2023). In the present case, the court denied the habeas
petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to
show both deficient performance and prejudice. Because
we conclude that the petitioner has not demonstrated
that he was prejudiced by Attorney Eddy’s allegedly
deficient performance, we need not reach the question
of whether Attorney Eddy’s performance was, in fact,
deficient.7 See Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction,
7
Although we need not address the petitioner’s various claims of deficient performance by Attorney Eddy, we note, nonetheless, that the record belies the petitioner’s contention concerning one of the claimed deficiencies by Attorney Eddy, namely, that Attorney Eddy had never informed him “of the possible disparity between the [three and one-half] year sentence (plus special parole or probation) [in the plea offer] and the sentence he could expect if he lost at trial.” Attorney Eddy testified that he had advised the petitioner of the maximum exposure he would have if he lost at trial, and the court specifically credited that testimony. See Martinez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 221 Conn. App. 868 (“As an appellate court, we do not reevaluate the credibility of testimony, nor will we do so in this case. The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. . . . [W]e must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Moreover, the transcript from the March 5, 2018 pretrial proceeding and the trial court’s canvass of the petitioner establish that, when the court informed the petitioner that he could receive up to sixty years of incarceration, six of which was a mandatory minimum, if he were to be convicted after a trial, the
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
supra, 713–14; see also Dixon v. Commissioner of Correction, 233 Conn. App. 851, 858, 342 A.3d 260, cert.
denied, 353 Conn. 918, 345 A.3d 808 (2025).
“In assessing whether a petitioner has met his burden,
a habeas court, as the finder of fact, must assess whether to believe all, none, or some of the testimony presented.
See, e.g., Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, [supra,
343 Conn. 367]. The habeas court ‘is free to juxtapose
conflicting versions of events and determine which is
more credible.’ . . . Echeverria v. Commissioner of Correction, 193 Conn. App. 1, 15 n.6, 218 A.3d 1116, cert.
denied, 333 Conn. 947, 219 A.3d 376 (2019); see also
Bowens v. Commissioner of Correction, 333 Conn. 502,
523, 217 A.3d 609 (2019).
“An appellate court ‘does not retry the case or evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, [the reviewing court] must defer to the [habeas court’s] assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.’
. . . Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 631, 643, 153 A.3d 1264 (2017); accord Sanchez v. Commissioner of Correction, 314 Conn. 585, 604, 103 A.3d 954
(2014). A habeas court’s pure credibility determination
is unassailable, and we will not disturb it on appeal. See Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 640,
694, 159 A.3d 1112 (2017); Orcutt v. Commissioner of
Correction, 284 Conn. 724, 741, 937 A.2d 656 (2007).
‘Because it is the [habeas] court’s function to weigh the
evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether
the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than
the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable
presumption . . . in favor of the [habeas] court’s ruling.’ . . . Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
court provided the petitioner with an opportunity to discuss that with Attorney Eddy. The petitioner subsequently informed the court on the record that he had been given adequate time to discuss the matter with his attorney, that he understood the maximum penalty to which he was subjected, and that he, nevertheless, wanted to proceed to trial.
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
343 Conn. 357–58. Thus, the habeas judge’s credibility
determinations and findings are entitled to deference
from this court and cannot be disregarded unless they
are clearly erroneous.” Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, 354 Conn. 825, 835–36, 358 A.3d 983 (2026).
In the present case, Attorney Eddy testified that,
“through [his] meetings with the petitioner as well as
the statements [the petitioner had] provided to the New
Britain Police Department, [the petitioner had] always
denied his involvement in this incident,” that the petitioner had “never indicated a willingness to plead guilty,” that the petitioner was not amenable to pleading guilty,
and that the petitioner’s “perspective was that he was
innocent.” The habeas court, in finding that “[t]he credible evidence indicates that the petitioner maintained
his innocence and was adamant on taking his case to
trial,” necessarily credited that testimony and rejected
the petitioner’s contrary testimony that he would have
accepted a plea offer if he had been advised properly by
Attorney Eddy, which was the only evidence offered by
the petitioner in support of his claim of prejudice.
Because the habeas court’s factual finding of no prejudice was made on the basis of its credibility determination, to which this court must defer, we cannot conclude
that the habeas court’s finding that the petitioner had
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Attorney
Eddy’s allegedly deficient performance is clearly erroneous.8 The court’s finding is supported by the testimony
of Attorney Eddy, which it specifically credited, and “it
was within the purview of the habeas court to disbelieve
8
The petitioner maintains that certain other allegedly clearly erroneous findings of the habeas court—that Attorney Eddy had reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s evidence with the petitioner and the probability of success at trial, and had informed the petitioner of the sentence he could expect if he lost at trial—cast doubt on its finding that he “was not prejudiced by any ineffective assistance because he ‘maintained his innocence and was adamant on taking his case to trial.’ ” The petitioner asserts that, “[w]hile there is evidence on the record to support this finding, the court never considered the effect [on the petitioner] of Attorney Eddy’s optimism with respect to [the petitioner’s] chances at trial . . . . Of course [the petitioner] was
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
the petitioner’s self-serving testimony.” Lane v. Commissioner of Correction, 129 Conn. App. 593, 599, 20
A.3d 1265 (2011).
Our conclusion is supported by recent decisions from
this court in Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
233 Conn. App. 64, and Dixon v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 233 Conn. App. 861, both of which involved
circumstances similar to the present case. In Vivo, the
petitioner claimed on appeal that his trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance “by failing to adequately
advise him regarding certain plea offers” and, citing
Maia v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn.
472–73, that “trial counsel had an affirmative obligation
to advise [the petitioner] to accept the plea offers.” Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 58. The petitioner
asserted similar claims with respect to his prior habeas
counsel. Id. The habeas court in Vivo dismissed the claims pertaining to trial counsel; id., 58 n.3; and denied the
habeas petition as to the claims involving prior habeas
counsel. Id., 58. On appeal, this court concluded “that
the petitioner failed to establish that the habeas court
improperly determined that the petitioner had not proven
prejudice . . . .” Id., 62. This court explained: “The testimony of [trial counsel] and [prior habeas counsel] supports a factual determination by the habeas court that
the petitioner had insisted he was innocent, that he was
adamant about not pleading guilty to a murder charge,
that the state was not willing to offer a deal that did not ‘adamant on taking his case to trial.’ His lawyer assured him he would win a trial.” We are not persuaded.
In asserting this claim, the petitioner acknowledges that the habeas court’s findings are supported by the record. The essence of his claim, therefore, is not that the findings are clearly erroneous; rather, the petitioner appears to be raising a claim concerning the reasonableness of any such advice provided by Attorney Eddy, which relates to counsel’s performance. Moreover, the only testimony at the habeas trial to support the assertion that Attorney Eddy had “assured” the petitioner that “he would win a[t] trial” was the petitioner’s testimony, which the court did not credit, and, as we have indicated, the transcript of the March 5, 2018 trial proceeding undermines any claim that the petitioner was not made aware of the sentence he could receive if convicted following a trial. See footnote 7 of this opinion.
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
require him to plead guilty to the charge of murder and,
therefore, that the petitioner was not willing to accept the plea offers made by the state under any circumstances.
These findings are immutable regardless of whether his
trial counsel had recommended that he accept the plea
offer.” Id., 64.
Likewise, in Dixon v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 233 Conn. App. 861, this court upheld the habeas
court’s determination that the petitioner had not met
his burden of establishing prejudice resulting from trial
counsel’s allegedly deficient performance during the plea
bargaining process, stating: “At the habeas trial, [the
petitioner’s trial counsel] testified that the petitioner was unwilling to accept a plea offer that involved a twentyfive year term of incarceration. The court credited that
testimony, as was its exclusive prerogative as [the] arbiter of credibility. It is well established that the appellate courts of this state cannot ‘evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses. . . . Rather, we must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor
and attitude. . . . The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.’ . . . The court’s
decision to credit [trial counsel’s] testimony that the
petitioner was unwilling to accept the twenty-five year
plea offer, therefore, is one we cannot disturb. In light of that evidence, we conclude that the court’s finding that
there was not a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have accepted the pretrial plea offer but for the
deficient performance of counsel is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot establish prejudice
resulting from any deficiency in the advice provided by
[his trial counsel] on that plea offer.” (Citations omitted.) Id.
Our appellate courts consistently have adhered to the
principle that a habeas court’s credibility determinations are entitled to deference and have held that, when a habeas court’s finding that a petitioner has failed to establish
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
prejudice is premised on a credibility determination of
the court, we must defer to the habeas court’s finding
and not reevaluate the credibility of the testimony before the court. See, e.g., Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 354 Conn. 840 (appellate courts “must defer
to the habeas court’s credibility determination[s]”; id.,
835 (“[a] habeas court’s pure credibility determination
is unassailable, and we will not disturb it on appeal”);9
Dyous v. Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction
Services, 324 Conn. 163, 188–89, 151 A.3d 1247 (2016)
(deferring to habeas court’s credibility determination
regarding petitioner’s self-serving testimony); Johnson
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 228 Conn. App.
715 (“[t]his court defers to a habeas court’s finding that a petitioner was not willing to accept a plea offer when
that finding was based on the court’s credibility determination”); Bonds v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
223 Conn. App. 653, 656 (upholding habeas court’s
determination that petitioner had failed to establish
that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance during plea negotiations and failure
to adequately advise petitioner to accept plea deal, as
habeas court’s finding was based on its determination
that petitioner’s testimony that he would have pleaded
guilty instead of proceeding to trial was not credible, and that finding called for deference); Soto v. Commissioner
of Correction, 215 Conn. App. 113, 127–29, 281 A.3d
1189 (2022) (habeas court, in finding that petitioner
failed to show prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s
allegedly deficient performance during plea process,
9
In Hilton, our Supreme Court noted that, in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 225, 272–73, 112 A.3d 1 (2015), it had “recognized an ‘exceptional factual and procedural scenario’ in which [it had] held that the habeas court’s credibility assessment of expert witnesses was clearly erroneous.” Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 354 Conn. 836. In doing so, however, the court in Lapointe explained that it “did not substitute its own credibility determination for that of the habeas court but, instead, concluded that the underlying factual findings on which the habeas court relied to discredit the petitioner’s experts were clearly erroneous because they were unsupported by the record.” Id., 837. In the present case, the petitioner does not contend that this case is analogous to Lapointe.
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
credited trial counsel’s testimony that petitioner had
insisted that he was innocent of crimes and thought plea
offer was unfair, and discredited petitioner’s habeas
trial testimony that, but for counsel’s deficient advice,
he would have accepted plea offer, and this court would
not reevaluate that credibility determination); Cruz v.
Commissioner of Correction, 206 Conn. App. 17, 26, 257
A.3d 399 (“[a]lthough the petitioner testified that he
would have gone to trial but for [trial counsel’s] advice, the habeas court, as the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony,
was entitled to reject his testimony in light of the other evidence presented during trial”), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 913, 265 A.3d 926 (2021); Watts v. Commissioner of
Correction, 194 Conn. App. 558, 566–67, 221 A.3d 829
(2019) (“[b]ecause the habeas court discredited the petitioner’s testimony [that he would have accepted the plea
offer], and there was no other evidence from which the
court could have found that the petitioner would have
accepted the plea deal offered, the petitioner failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating prejudice”), cert.
denied, 334 Conn. 919, 222 A.3d 514 (2020); Rogers
v. Commissioner of Correction, 194 Conn. App. 339,
350–51, 221 A.3d 81 (2019) (habeas court discredited
petitioner’s testimony that he would have accepted plea
offer if counsel had performed competently, and this
court deferred to that determination in upholding habeas
court’s conclusion that petitioner was not prejudiced);
Fields v. Commissioner of Correction, 179 Conn. App.
567, 577, 180 A.3d 638 (2018) (affirming judgment of
habeas court that petitioner had not been prejudiced by
trial counsel’s deficient performance, as record showed
“no evidence independent of the petitioner’s own testimony that he would have accepted the state’s plea offer
had [his counsel] conveyed it to him,” which court discredited, and it was “not the role of this court on appeal to second-guess credibility determinations made by the
habeas court” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, the habeas court’s finding that the petitioner had maintained his innocence and did not want to
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
accept a plea is supported by other evidence before the
court, including the transcripts from the underlying
criminal trial proceedings. Those transcripts demonstrate that the petitioner initially had been presented
with the plea offers on August 1, 2017, at which time
Attorney Eddy asked for, and was granted, a continuance so that the petitioner could have time to consider
the offers. On August 29, 2017, twenty-eight days
later, Attorney Eddy informed the trial court that the
petitioner was rejecting the offers and wanted to proceed to trial, after which the court canvassed the petitioner regarding his decision. During that canvass, the
petitioner indicated to the court that he was factually
innocent of the charges, that he had discussed the risks
of conviction after trial with his counsel and that he
wanted to proceed with trial. On March 5, 2018, the
petitioner again indicated to the court that he did not
want to accept the plea offers and wanted to proceed to
trial, even though the on-the-record discussions at the
March 5 proceeding demonstrated that the petitioner
was aware that the state had increased the number of
charges against him and that he was facing sixty years
of imprisonment if convicted of those charges after trial.
Accordingly, because the habeas court’s finding that
the petitioner did not establish a reasonable probability
that, but for the deficient performance of Attorney Eddy,
he would have accepted one of the plea offers was based
on a credibility determination, to which this court must
defer, and was supported by other evidence in the record,
and because the only evidence provided by the petitioner
in support of his claim of prejudice was his self-serving
testimony that he would have accepted a plea offer if
Attorney Eddy had advised him properly with respect
to the plea offers, which the habeas court did not credit, the petitioner failed to establish prejudice stemming
from any deficiency in Attorney Eddy’s performance
concerning the plea offers.
The petitioner relies on federal case law to support
his contention that a “significant disparity between the
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terms of the plea offer and the maximum exposure faced
by the defendant himself [can] suffice to show prejudice,” and that “evidence that [he] wanted a trial rather than a
generous plea offer must be viewed in the context of the
omissions and misinformation of counsel.” See United
States v. Knight, 981 F.3d 1095, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2020);
United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir.
2005); Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 737–38
(6th Cir. 2003); Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178,
182 (2d Cir. 2003). We find this reliance misplaced.
Significantly, those cases did not involve credibility
determinations by the habeas court, to which controlling
Connecticut case law clearly directs that we must defer,
and the factual circumstances of those cases, in which
the habeas petitioners either had not been informed of
a plea offer at all or had been misinformed as to the sentencing consequences of proceeding to trial or accepting
the plea, are inapposite to the present case, in which the petitioner was fully aware of the plea offers, the habeas
court specifically found not credible the petitioner’s
testimony that he did not understand the plea offers, the
trial court transcripts clearly show that the petitioner
was made aware of the full exposure he faced if convicted
of the charges after trial, and there was no evidence demonstrating that the petitioner was amenable to a plea.10
Accordingly, the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
10
In his appellate reply brief, the petitioner asserts, again after citing federal case law; see Pham v. United States, supra, 317 F.3d 182; that our Supreme Court, in Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 367, recognized the validity of the principle set forth in that federal case law that “a petitioner’s statement of intentions, combined with a significant disparity between the actual sentence and the sentence offered in a plea deal, can indeed sufficiently prove prejudice.” The issue in Barlow concerned the habeas court’s failure to incorporate contemporaneous evidence into its prejudice analysis and the applicability of Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 359, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017), “which requires that ‘post hoc assertions from a defendant about
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction
how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies’ must be substantiated by ‘contemporaneous evidence,’ meaning evidence from the time of the underlying plea negotiations, to support the petitioner’s after-the-fact testimony.” Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 360. Our Supreme Court in Barlow cited to United States v. Knight, supra, 981 F.3d 1106, in the context of evaluating whether “the absence of unequivocal contemporaneous evidence . . . [necessarily] mean[s] that [a petitioner] cannot show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if he had been provided the effective assistance of counsel.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 366.
In the present case, the habeas court’s finding of prejudice was made on the basis of a credibility determination, not a lack of contemporaneous evidence, and the petitioner’s reliance on the principles set forth in federal case law, as we have indicated, fails to recognize the significant differences in the factual contexts in which those principles were applied, when compared to the circumstances of the present case.