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State v. Jones
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHNNY JONES
(AC 48317)
Alvord, Moll and Clark, Js.*
Syllabus
Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crimes of illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle and illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a window tint inspection, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress physical evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle at a traffic stop. Held:
This court declined to address the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to suppress certain physical evidence on the ground that it was the result of an investigative detention that exceeded its lawful duration, as the defendant failed to adequately brief the threshold issue of whether the traffic stop was measurably extended beyond its initial purpose.
The trial court’s finding that the defendant’s consent to search was voluntary was not clearly erroneous, as the court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in making its determination.
The trial court did not err in concluding that the search did not exceed the scope of the defendant’s consent, as, by its terms, the defendant’s consent was broad and unqualified, without any express limitation on the areas to be searched.
This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made during the traffic stop and search, as the defendant did not preserve his claim before the trial court and did not adequately brief it on appeal.
Argued June 3—officially released September 1, 2026
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with two counts
of the crime of illegal possession of a controlled substance and one count each of the crimes of possession with intent to sell more than one ounce of methamphetamine, use
of drug paraphernalia, criminal possession of a pistol
or revolver, illegal possession of a weapon in a motor
vehicle, and illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a window tint inspection, brought to the Superior Court
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
State v. Jones
in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area
number twenty-three, where the court, Weiner, J., denied
the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence;
thereafter, the defendant was presented to the court,
Calistro, J., on a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charges of illegal possession of a weapon in a motor
vehicle and illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a window tint inspection; judgment of guilty in accordance
with the plea; subsequently, the state entered a nolle
prosequi as to the remaining charges, and the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Judie Marshall, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Connor R. Reed, special deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, state’s attorney, and Jennifer Lindade, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
CLARK, J. Following a conditional plea of nolo contendere pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a,1 the
defendant, Johnny Jones, appeals from the judgment of
conviction of illegal possession of a weapon in a motor
vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38 and illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a window tint
inspection in violation of General Statutes § 14-99g
(g). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress (1) physical
evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle, and (2)
1
General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: “When a defendant, prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress or motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided a trial court has determined that a ruling on such motion to suppress or motion to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied the motion to suppress or the motion to dismiss. . . .”
State v. Jones
statements he made while detained during that search.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to this appeal. “On February 11, 2019, [police officers with the New Haven Police
Department (department), Endri] Dragoi and his partner,
[Eric] Eisenhard, conducted traffic enforcement in a
marked cruiser. Dragoi drove the cruiser and Eisenhard
sat in the front passenger seat.
“At approximately 4:54 p.m., Dragoi observed a dark
grey Mazda coupe with very dark tinted windows turn
left from Garden Street onto Elm Street. The defendant
was the operator and sole occupant of the Mazda.
“While Dragoi drove the cruiser behind the defendant’s
vehicle, Eisenhard conducted a registration check on it.
The inquiry produced a response of ‘no record found,’
which indicated that the car was not registered to the
marker plate affixed to it. Based on the response and the tint violation, Dragoi and Eisenhard initiated a motor
vehicle stop on Elm Street by activating the cruiser’s
overhead lights. The defendant complied and stopped
his vehicle.
“Dragoi approached the driver’s side of the defendant’s
vehicle while Eisenhard approached the passenger side.
As Dragoi and Eisenhard reached the defendant’s car,
they could smell a strong, fresh odor of marijuana coming from the car. Dragoi and Eisenhard also observed small
particles of marijuana on the center console and on the
defendant’s shirt.
“When Dragoi made contact with the defendant, Dragoi spoke with him through the open driver’s side window. The defendant complied with Dragoi’s request to
roll down his passenger side window.
“Dragoi asked for the defendant’s license, registration,
and insurance. The defendant complied. While examining the defendant’s license and registration, Dragoi
explained to him that the plates on the defendant’s car
State v. Jones
were not coming back as having been registered. The
defendant responded, ‘That don’t make no sense,’ and
explained that he had recently bought the car from Jazzy
Auto in Meriden and that the dealership had registered
the car. Dragoi advised the defendant to call the dealership ‘ASAP because the plates have no record.’ Dragoi
told the defendant that he would ‘run the [vehicle identification number (VIN)]’ to see if ‘maybe they got the
VIN registered.’ He again advised the defendant to let
the dealership know that the plates had no record with
the Department of Motor Vehicles.
“Based on the strong odor of marijuana and his visual
observation of marijuana particles inside the car, Dragoi then asked the defendant whether there was ‘any weed
in the car?’ The following colloquy occurred:
“ ‘The Defendant: Weed?
“ ‘Dragoi: Do you have any weed on you?
“ ‘The Defendant: No, why do you say that?
“ ‘Dragoi: Because I [smelled] it. I know you cleaned it
up but the smell of it, the aroma of it, is still in the car.
“ ‘The Defendant: There ain’t no weed in here. This is
cigarettes.’
“The defendant showed his ashtray to Dragoi.
“The defendant then began speaking with a representative of Jazzy Auto on his cell phone. Dragoi told
Eisenhard to stand by the car and that they had to ‘44 it’ [which Dragoi later explained means to search the car].
While the defendant was on the phone with Jazzy Auto,
Dragoi returned to his cruiser. Dragoi’s initial interaction with the defendant lasted about three minutes.
“While inside his cruiser, Dragoi ran a VIN check of
the defendant’s vehicle through the COLLECT system.2
The check revealed that the defendant’s car was registered. Dragoi then conducted another registration check,
2
Dragoi described the COLLECT system as a database that allows the police to check motor vehicle registrations nationwide.
State v. Jones
this time through the [department’s] communications
division. He also conducted a license check through the
operations center. Finally, Dragoi repeatedly called [the department’s] records division to perform a warrants
check. Dragoi’s initial attempts to conduct a warrants
check were unsuccessful because of delays on dispatch’s
side, resulting from a busier than usual shift. Frustrated with his inability to get through to the records division, Dragoi eventually used his cell phone to request the warrants check. This time, Dragoi was able to get through.
After Dragoi provided the defendant’s name and date
of birth, someone from the records division stated that
they would get back to Dragoi. . . .
“After spending approximately five minutes in his
cruiser—and having not yet received the result of the
warrants check—Dragoi returned to the defendant’s car
to speak with him. Dragoi asked the defendant what the
dealership had said. Dragoi then explained to the defendant that the VIN came back to the plates, which meant
that either the dealership or the Department of Motor
Vehicles had made a mistake because the plates did not
appear to have been registered. Dragoi reiterated that
when he ran the plates, they came back with no record.
He explained that this was a problem for the defendant
because his tints were so dark that he would be stopped
by the police, and officers conducting the stop would be
informed that the plates came back with no record. The
following colloquy occurred:
“ ‘Dragoi: Now that you’ve had time to think, how
much weed do you have on you?
“ ‘The Defendant: I ain’t got no weed or nothing.
“ ‘Dragoi: I asked you if you have weed because I smell
it.
“ ‘The Defendant: Ain’t no weed in the car. You can
check the car. You can do whatever you want.’
“Dragoi instructed the defendant to step out of the
car, and the defendant complied. Upon the defendant’s
State v. Jones
exit from the vehicle, Dragoi and Eisenhard observed
pieces of marijuana on the defendant’s shirt. Dragoi
again explained to the defendant that ‘the car still smells like weed, like you just cleaned it up.’
“After the defendant exited his car, Dragoi patted him
down. While being searched, the defendant jokingly said,
‘I can pull my pants down and do anything for you. I ain’t got nothing.’ Dragoi laughed and responded, ‘Nah, we
don’t need that.’
“During the search of the defendant’s person, Dragoi
found a bag of pills in the defendant’s front pants pocket. Based on his training and experience, Dragoi believed the pills to be ecstasy. Dragoi instructed the defendant to put his hands behind his back and then asked whether the pills were ecstasy. As the defendant was being handcuffed,
he admitted that the pills were ecstasy. He claimed that
he had forgotten that he had them on him and that they
were for his personal use. In response to Dragoi’s question, the defendant denied that he had ‘anything else’ on him. He also repeatedly stated, ‘I fucked up,’ and asked
if he could call his wife. Dragoi walked the defendant to his cruiser and placed him in the backseat. At the cruiser, Dragoi told the defendant that the officers would let him call his wife and Eisenhard went to the defendant’s car
to retrieve the defendant’s phone for the defendant to
use. Approximately two and one-half minutes after the
officers placed handcuffs on the defendant, the records
division informed Dragoi that the warrants check had
come back negative.
“Dragoi then searched the defendant’s car. Dragoi first
saw particles of marijuana on the center console. Inside
a plastic bag on the backseat, Dragoi located containers
which contained particles of marijuana and emitted the
strong odor of marijuana. Inside a backseat compartment, Dragoi located, among other things, a digital
scale that had marijuana particles on it, a mason jar that contained particles of marijuana, a second mason jar that Dragoi suspected contained [phencyclidine (PCP)], and
a black crossbody bag. Based on how heavy the bag felt,
State v. Jones
Dragoi suspected that a gun was inside. Upon opening the
black bag, Dragoi discovered a loaded handgun, a knife,
and a plastic bag with pills. Field tests on the substances Dragoi discovered were positive for marijuana, ecstasy,
and crack cocaine.” (Footnote added; footnotes omitted.)
The defendant was arrested and charged with various
narcotics and weapons offenses, as well as illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a window tint inspection
in violation of § 14-99g (g). On June 16, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence seized
during the search of his vehicle. On March 7 and 14, 2024, the court, Weiner, J., held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion. Dragoi and Eisenhard testified at the hearing and defense counsel introduced several exhibits,
including recordings from body cameras worn by Dragoi
and Eisenhard during the traffic stop. Following the
hearing, the defendant submitted a posthearing brief
in which he argued that the physical evidence and any
statements he made after his arrest should be suppressed. On June 27, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision denying the motion to suppress.
On July 19, 2024, the defendant appeared before
the court, Calistro, J. The court found, pursuant to §
54-94a, that the denial of the motion to suppress would
be dispositive of the case. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Thereafter, the defendant entered a conditional plea of
nolo contendere to one count of illegal possession of a
weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of § 29-38 and one count of illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a
window tint inspection in violation of § 14-99g (g). On
October 22, 2024, the defendant was sentenced to five
years of incarceration, execution suspended after two
years, followed by two years of conditional discharge.
Thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the
remaining charges. This appeal followed.
Before addressing the defendant’s claims, we begin
by setting forth the standard of review governing the
denial of a motion to suppress. “When reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, the standard of
State v. Jones
review to be applied depends on whether the challenge
asserted on appeal is to the factual basis of the trial
court’s decision or to its legal conclusions. . . . [T]o the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether those findings were clearly erroneous. Where, however, the trial court has
drawn conclusions of law, our review is plenary, and we
must decide whether those conclusions are legally and
logically correct in light of the findings of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joseph E., 231 Conn.
App. 556, 562, 333 A.3d 522, cert. denied, 351 Conn.
927, 333 A.3d 1108 (2025). “A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Garcia, 299 Conn. 39, 54, 7 A.3d 355 (2010).
I
We first address the defendant’s claim that the court
improperly denied his motion to suppress the physical
evidence seized during the searches of his person and his vehicle.3 The defendant argues that Dragoi and Eisenhard
unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and that, therefore, the physical evidence should have been suppressed as
the fruit of an investigative detention that exceeded
its lawful duration. He also argues that his consent to
search was invalid because it was not voluntary and, in
the alternative, that the searches of his person and of the backseat compartment exceeded the scope of his consent.
We conclude that the defendant did not adequately brief
his claim that the physical evidence was the fruit of an
investigative detention that exceeded its lawful duration. We further conclude that the court properly determined
that the defendant consented to the searches of his person 3
Although the defendant claimed in the trial court that the evidence should be suppressed under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, he does not renew that claim on appeal. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the defendant’s claim that the searches violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.
State v. Jones
and his vehicle, including the backseat compartment.
We therefore conclude that the court properly denied
the motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from
the defendant’s person and his vehicle.4
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. In his posthearing brief, the defendant argued that the physical evidence found
during the search of his person and his vehicle should be suppressed because Dragoi and Eisenhard unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop without probable cause. He argued that, because possession of small amounts of marijuana
had been decriminalized by the time of the incident, “[t]he odor of raw marijuana inside a vehicle was insufficient
to justify the continued questioning of the defendant
[or] a search of the vehicle” and that, “[o]nce the motor vehicle issues were resolved, the defendant should have
been free to depart.” He also argued that his consent to
search was not voluntary because the officers “bombarded
[him] with questions about marijuana, despite the stop
allegedly being about tinted windows,” and “continued
badgering [him] with questions about marijuana” even
after “[t]he registration issue had been sorted out . . . .” Finally, he argued that, even if his consent was voluntary, “the scope of the . . . search far exceeded any
reasonable interpretation of that consent.”
In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded
that the searches of the defendant’s vehicle and his person did not violate the fourth amendment because the
defendant had voluntarily consented to those searches.
The court noted that the determination of whether a
consent to search is voluntary requires an evaluation of
4
In addition to concluding that the defendant’s consent was voluntary, the court also concluded that the search of the defendant’s vehicle was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Although the defendant claims on appeal that the court’s conclusion in that regard was improper, our conclusion that the trial court properly determined that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle is sufficient to uphold the court’s ultimate conclusion that the search of the vehicle did not violate the fourth amendment. Consequently, we need not address whether the search of the vehicle also was justified by the automobile exception.
State v. Jones
“the totality of all the circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court found that “[a] careful
review of the officers’ testimony and of the body camera
recordings reveals that the officers’ interaction with the defendant was cordial, cooperative, and nonhostile” and
that “[n]either Dragoi nor Eisenhard ever threatened
the defendant, displayed a firearm, raised his voice,
made promises to the defendant, or otherwise acted in a
coercive or deceptive manner.” The court also found that
“the defendant provided his consent spontaneously and
not in response to a request from the officers” and that he “never asked to leave the scene and never withdrew his
consent.” The court found that “the defendant did not
hesitate to push back against the officers when he believed that something they had said was incorrect, thereby
demonstrating that he possessed the ability to resist.”5
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further
found that, “at the point that the defendant provided
consent, the length of his detention had been relatively
short.” Finally, the court found that the defendant “is
an adult of at least average intelligence . . . [and] had no problem responding appropriately to the officers’ questions, following their instructions, and asking relevant
questions of his own.” The court rejected the defendant’s contention that his will was overborne by the officers’
alleged “badgering” of him with questions about the
presence of marijuana in the vehicle, finding that Dragoi only “briefly raised the issue . . . on two occasions” and that the questions lasted a total of approximately
twenty-five seconds.
The court also concluded that the scope of the search
did not exceed the defendant’s consent. The court noted
that, when Dragoi told the defendant he smelled marijuana, the defendant stated, “You can check the car.
You can do whatever you want.” The court found that,
5
In this regard, the court noted that, “when Dragoi told the defendant that the [license] plates were not registered, the defendant immediately responded, ‘that don’t make no sense,’ ” and that the defendant “debated with Dragoi whether the proper charge was criminal possession of a firearm . . . or weapon in a motor vehicle . . . .”
State v. Jones
“[c]onsidered in context, Dragoi reasonably understood
the defendant’s statements to be granting permission for
him to search the car, and any containers located therein, for marijuana.” The court also found that, although it
was “[a] closer question . . . whether Dragoi could have
reasonably understood the defendant’s statements to
constitute an invitation to search his person for marijuana . . . four aspects of the conversation between the
defendant and Dragoi cause the court to conclude that
an officer reasonably could have understood the defendant’s response in that way. First, on both occasions
that Dragoi raised the marijuana issue, Dragoi did not
only ask whether the defendant had any marijuana in his
car; rather, he asked the defendant whether he had any
‘weed on you.’ Second, the language of the defendant’s
consent—‘[y]ou can do whatever you want’—was broad
enough to include a search of his person. Third, at no
point during the search of the defendant’s person did he
do anything to suggest that he believed that Dragoi was
engaged in conduct that the defendant had not granted
him permission to do; to the contrary, the defendant
joked with the officers during the search of his person. . . . Fourth, the defendant’s reaction to Dragoi’s discovery
of pills in his pocket—lamenting the fact that he had
forgotten he had them—strongly suggests that the defendant knew that Dragoi was going to search his person
in response to his invitation to ‘check the car’ and ‘do
whatever you want.’ ” (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original; footnote omitted.) The court concluded that
“Dragoi, therefore, did not exceed the scope of the defendant’s consent when he searched his person.”
Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that his consent was invalid because Dragoi and
Eisenhard unlawfully prolonged the stop. Quoting from
our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Jenkins, 298
Conn. 209, 236, 3 A.3d 806 (2010), the court noted that
“ ‘inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification
for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
State v. Jones
stop.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) The court concluded that Dragoi and Eisenhard did not unlawfully prolong the stop
for two reasons. First, the court concluded that, because “Dragoi had not yet issued the defendant a citation for
his excessively tinted windows and the warrants check
had not yet been completed” at the time the defendant
consented to the search, “the traffic stop had not ended
when the defendant provided consent.” Second, noting
that “Dragoi revisited the marijuana issue less than
ten minutes after he stopped the defendant” and that
“this questioning lasted less than ten seconds before the defendant spontaneously granted consent to search,”
the court concluded that “the time frame in this case is
well within those that have been deemed reasonable.”
In the alternative, the court also concluded that, “even
if Dragoi’s question measurably extended the stop, it
nevertheless was constitutionally permissible because
. . . [t]he powerful smell of marijuana emanating from
the car, the marijuana particles near the defendant, and
the defendant’s denial in contradiction to the officers’
observations provided Dragoi with reasonable suspicion
that the defendant had committed a separate violation
of the law.”
A
The defendant claims that the court erred in failing to
suppress the physical evidence because it was the fruit
of a traffic stop that exceeded its lawful duration. The
state argues that we should decline to address this claim because, although the defendant’s brief analyzes the
question of whether the officers had probable cause to
extend the duration of the stop, he “fail[ed] to address
the threshold issue of whether the stop was unreasonably
prolonged in the first place.” We agree with the state.
“As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
[a]n officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
individual.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
State v. Jones
v. Brito, 170 Conn. App. 269, 309, 154 A.3d 535, cert.
denied, 324 Conn. 925, 155 A.3d 755 (2017). “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
stop. . . . [Q]uestions permissible . . . during a routine traffic stop include inquiries about whether the car or
driver are carrying contraband, as well as concomitant
requests for consent to search the vehicle. . . . These
inquiries are permissible even if they are irrelevant to
the initial purpose of the stop, namely, the traffic violation, so long as they do not measurably extend the stop
beyond the time necessary to complete the investigation
of the traffic violation and issue a citation or warning. Consideration of that time period necessarily includes the completion of tasks attendant to the traffic stop, including a check of the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and criminal history, and the writing of the citation
or warning, as well as background questions about the
destination and purpose of the driver’s trip.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins, supra, 298
Conn. 236–37.
As explained previously, the trial court concluded that
the traffic stop was not measurably extended beyond the
time necessary to complete the traffic stop because, at
the time the defendant provided consent to search, the
officers had not yet issued the defendant a citation for
his illegally tinted windows, they were still waiting for the results of the warrants check, and only ten minutes
had passed since the stop was initiated. In the alternative, the court concluded that any extension of the traffic stop was permissible because the officers’ observations
indicated that the defendant likely was in possession of
marijuana, which was sufficient to provide them “reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed
a separate violation of the law.” Although the defendant argues that “[t]he traffic stop was unreasonably
State v. Jones
prolonged without probable cause,”6 the defendant does
not provide any analysis of the threshold question of
whether the traffic stop was measurably extended beyond
its initial purpose. Rather, the defendant focuses only
on the question of whether the officers lacked a sufficient basis to extend the stop, arguing that “the odor
of marijuana alone—even coupled with the presence of
small marijuana particles—is insufficient to support an
expansion of a motor vehicle stop.”
“We are not required to review issues that have been
improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than [mere] abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an
issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately
briefed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Starboard
Fairfield Development, LLC v. Gremp, 195 Conn. App.
21, 31, 223 A.3d 75 (2019). Because the defendant did
not adequately brief the threshold issue of whether the
traffic stop was measurably extended beyond its initial
purpose, we decline to address his claim that the court
erred in failing to suppress the physical evidence on the basis that it was the result of an investigative detention that exceeded its lawful duration.
B
We next address the defendant’s claim that the court
erred in concluding that his consent to search was voluntary. “The police ordinarily may not conduct a search and make a seizure unless a neutral and detached magistrate
first issues a warrant based on probable cause. . . . [A] warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable,
subject to a few well defined exceptions. . . . These exceptions have been jealously and carefully drawn . . . and
6
As the state notes, although the defendant’s brief argues that the officers lacked probable cause to extend the traffic stop, the relevant inquiry is whether they had “an independent basis of objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion.” (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Brito, supra, 170 Conn. App. 308.
State v. Jones
the burden is on the state to establish the exception.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brito, supra, 170 Conn. App. 292.
“A warrantless search is not unreasonable under . . .
the fourth amendment to the constitution of the United
States . . . if a person with authority to do so has freely consented to the search. . . . The state bears the burden of proving that the consent was free and voluntary and
that the person who purported to consent had the authority to do so. . . . The state must affirmatively establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to
a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the
state’s burden. . . . The question whether consent to a
search has in fact been freely and voluntarily given, or
was the product of coercion, express or implied . . . is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. . . . As a question of fact, it is normally to be decided by the trial court upon the evidence before that court together with the reasonable inferences to
be drawn from that evidence. . . . We may reverse [the
trial court’s factual] findings on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous. . . .
“[T]he state had the burden of proving the voluntariness of the consent to the search by a preponderance of
the evidence. . . . In determining whether a defendant’s
will was overborne in a particular case, the [c]ourt has
assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation. . . . [T]he test is fact specific, so that, ultimately, the determination of whether the
consent was voluntary rests on a careful consideration
of the totality of the relevant circumstances.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Brown, 129 Conn. App. 552, 558–59, 19 A.3d 1282,
cert. denied, 302 Conn. 914, 27 A.3d 372 (2011). “Some
of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused . . . his lack of education . . . or his low intelligence . . . the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights . . . the length of detention . . .
State v. Jones
the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning . . . and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 251. “In
evaluating the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent,
we note that, while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as
a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. . . . Moreover, that consent to search is given while a defendant is being detained does not render it involuntary per se, as the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to
search.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the court properly considered the
totality of the circumstances in determining that the
defendant’s consent to search was voluntary, and the
court’s finding in that regard was not clearly erroneous. The court found, on the basis of its review of the
testimony and the body camera recordings, that Dragoi
and Eisenhard were cordial and nonthreatening in their
interactions with the defendant and that they did not
attempt to coerce him into consenting to the search. In
fact, as the court found, “the defendant provided his
consent spontaneously and not in response to a request
from the officers” when he stated, in response to Dragoi’s statement that he smelled marijuana, that: “You can
check the car. You can do whatever you want.” The court
also found that the defendant appeared to be “of at least average intelligence,” that he “had no problem responding appropriately to the officers’ questions, following
their instructions, and asking relevant questions of his
own,” and that he “did not hesitate to push back against
the officers when he believed that something they had
said was incorrect . . . .” Finally, the court determined that the defendant’s will was not overborne by the length of the detention or the extent of the officers’ questioning, finding that the defendant had been detained for
only about ten minutes at the time he provided consent
State v. Jones
to search and that Dragoi had questioned the defendant
about marijuana for a total of only twenty-five seconds.
In claiming that the court improperly determined that
his consent to search was voluntary, the defendant does
not challenge any of the court’s underlying factual findings or point to any evidence in the record that the court overlooked in reaching its ultimate determination that he voluntarily consented. Rather, the defendant primarily
argues that his consent was involuntary because it “came
after he was seized, was not free to leave, and the officers had determined they would conduct a search.” It is well
established, however, that the fact “[t]hat consent to
search is given while a [person] is being detained does
not render it involuntary per se, as the fact of custody
alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a
coerced confession or consent to search.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, supra, 129 Conn.
App. 560. Thus, the fact that a defendant was detained
at the time he provided consent to search is one factor to consider in assessing whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant’s will was overborne. See
id., 561 (“[w]hile we recognize that being handcuffed can be a factor in determining if consent was voluntary . . . this court previously has concluded that a defendant’s
consent to a search of his car was voluntary where he was arrested, handcuffed and placed in the back of a police
cruiser despite not having been read his Miranda rights”
(citation omitted)); see also, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424–25, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d
598 (1976) (defendant’s consent to search vehicle, given
while he was detained, was voluntary where “[t]here were
no promises made to him and no indication of more subtle
forms of coercion . . . [he was] on a public street, not in the confines of the police station . . . [and] [t]here [was] no indication . . . that [he] was a newcomer to the law,
mentally deficient, or unable in the face of a custodial
arrest to exercise a free choice” (footnote omitted)); State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 252 (consent to search
given while defendant was detained was not involuntary
where “[t]here is no evidence that the length of the stop
State v. Jones
was excessive or overbearing and . . . [t]he defendant
was never threatened or restrained” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the court considered the
fact that the defendant was detained when he consented
to the search but found that, under the totality of the
circumstances, his consent was voluntary. Because that
finding is not clearly erroneous, we reject the defendant’s claim that the court erred in finding that his consent to search was voluntary.7
C
The defendant also claims that the search exceeded the
scope of his consent because his consent “did not extend
to his body [or] to locked areas of the car.” “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the
[f]ourth [a]mendment is that of objective reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect? . . . The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. . . . Although objective reasonableness is a question of law [over which our review is
plenary], the factual circumstances are highly relevant
when determining what a reasonable person would have
believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was
given.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Vaught, 157 Conn. App. 101, 118, 115 A.3d 64 (2015).
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that the court properly determined that, in light
of the context in which they were made, the defendant’s
statements that Dragoi could “check the car” and “do
whatever you want” reasonably could have been understood as granting permission to search his person and
7
The defendant also argues that his consent was not voluntary because Dragoi “bombarded [him] with questions about marijuana,” such that he “knew that the only way the officer[s] would ever let him go was if he proved he did not have marijuana on him.” As explained previously, however, the court expressly considered and rejected that argument, finding that Dragoi’s questioning was brief and that the exchange was not hostile or aggressive. Because the court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, we reject the defendant’s contention that his will was overborne by Dragoi’s questioning.
State v. Jones
his entire vehicle, including any bags or compartments
therein that may have contained narcotics. By its terms,
the defendant’s consent was broad and unqualified, without any express limitation on the areas to be searched.
See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.
Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991) (defendant’s statement granting officer permission to search his car without “any explicit limitation on the scope of the search”
after officer informed defendant that “he believed [the
defendant] was carrying narcotics” reasonably could
have been understood as “general consent to search [the
defendant’s] car includ[ing] consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs”); State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 257 (“a general consent to search
a vehicle reasonably include[s] permission to search any
container that might have held illegal objects” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, as the trial court observed, Dragoi did not ask the defendant whether he
had marijuana in his car but, rather, asked, “Do you have any weed on you?” (Emphasis in original.) Considered in
context, Dragoi reasonably could have understood the
defendant’s statement that Dragoi could “search the
car” and “do whatever you want” as authorizing him to
search his vehicle and his person for marijuana.
Moreover, the defendant’s words and conduct once
Dragoi commenced the search further support the conclusion that the defendant consented to the search of
his person and the backseat compartment of his vehicle.
When Dragoi started searching the defendant after he
exited from the vehicle, the defendant did not voice
any objection or otherwise indicate that the search was
outside the scope of his intended consent. On the contrary, the defendant spontaneously stated to Dragoi,
“I can pull my pants down and do anything for you. I
don’t have nothing.” Similarly, the body camera footage shows that, while the defendant was seated in the
cruiser accompanied by Eisenhard, Dragoi returned to
the cruiser and asked the defendant if there was a key for the compartment in the backseat, to which the defendant
responded that he “never had a key” for the compartment
State v. Jones
and never received one from the car dealership. Dragoi
testified that the defendant never withdrew his consent
to search, and there is no indication in the body camera
footage or the testimony that the defendant objected to
Dragoi searching the compartment.
The defendant argues, however, that his consent did
not extend to the compartment in the backseat because
the evidence demonstrated that the compartment was
locked and that “[t]he court made a clearly erroneous
factual finding that the rear compartment of the motor
vehicle was not locked.” We disagree.
The evidence supports the court’s finding that the
backseat compartment was not locked and that Dragoi
did not have to break the compartment to access it. Dragoi testified that he initially could not figure out how to open the backseat compartment and that he eventually
walked back to the cruiser to ask the defendant if there
was a key for the compartment. When the defendant
responded that he did not have any such key, Dragoi
returned to the defendant’s vehicle. Dragoi testified
that he “could tell that the compartment folds down” and
“had some type of a button on the top” and that, “once
[he] was able to figure out how to pull [the compartment] down, then it just opened up.” He further testified that
the compartment was not locked and that he did not
have to break it open to access it. The trial court was
entitled to credit Dragoi’s testimony, and the defendant
has not identified any evidence in the record that compels the conclusion that the court’s finding was clearly
erroneous.8 Accordingly, we conclude that the court did
not err in concluding that the search did not exceed the
8
The defendant argues that the body camera footage shows Dragoi struggling to open the compartment and that “a breaking sound can be heard” on the video. During the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel questioned Dragoi about the “cracking sound as though plastic were breaking.” Dragoi responded that “[i]t was a squeaking sound” and that the compartment may have been “jammed” but that he “definitely did not break it.” After reviewing the body camera footage and listening to Dragoi’s testimony, the trial court credited Dragoi’s explanation and found that the compartment was not locked and that Dragoi did not break it open. On the basis of our own review of the
State v. Jones
scope of the defendant’s consent. We further conclude,
therefore, that the court properly denied the motion to
suppress the physical evidence seized during the search.
II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
denied the motion to suppress certain statements he made
during the traffic stop and search. He claims that the
statements should be suppressed pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), because the officers questioned
him without providing the warnings required by Miranda.9 Although the defendant concedes that he did not
expressly raise a Miranda claim before the trial court,
he argues that he nevertheless preserved such a claim
when he argued that his statements should be suppressed
under the fourth amendment. In the alternative, the
defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213
Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified
by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188
(2015).10 The state argues, inter alia, that the record is record, we conclude that the court’s finding in that regard was not clearly erroneous.
9
“In [Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436], the United States Supreme Court held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments’ prohibition against compelled self-incrimination requires that a suspect in police custody be informed specifically of his or her right to remain silent and to have an attorney present before being questioned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 289, 746 A.2d 150, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855, 121 S. Ct. 136, 148 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2000).
10
The defendant also asserts, in passing and without any analysis, that this claim is reviewable under the plain error doctrine. See Practice Book § 60-5. “A party claiming plain error must engage in a separate analysis under that doctrine to demonstrate that plain error has occurred under the circumstances of [the] case. . . . Indeed, a mere conclusory assertion of plain error is insufficient to allow this court to reach the merits of an unpreserved claim under that doctrine.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wright v. Commissioner of Correction, 235 Conn. App. 816, 837 n.7, 346 A.3d 1011, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 935, 347 A.3d 877 (2025). Because the defendant has not provided any analysis to support his claim that reversal is warranted under the plain error doctrine, we conclude that his claim is inadequately briefed and, therefore, decline to review it.
State v. Jones
not adequate to review the defendant’s claim and that,
even if it is, he did not adequately brief the merits of his claim.11 We conclude that the defendant did not preserve
his claim before the trial court and did not adequately
brief it on appeal. We therefore decline to review the
defendant’s claim.
At the outset, we disagree with the defendant’s contention that he preserved his Miranda claim. On the contrary, our review of the record reveals that the defendant never cited Miranda as a basis for suppressing his statements and never raised any argument that reasonably
could be construed as raising a Miranda claim. In his
initial motion to suppress, the defendant sought to suppress only the “items seized” during the search, not any
statements he made during the traffic stop or the search. Although defense counsel stated during the March 7,
2024 hearing that the defendant was seeking to suppress
“any and all physical evidence and any and all statements,” counsel did not argue at any point during the
hearing that the statements were obtained in violation
of Miranda. Moreover, although the court instructed
the defendant that his posthearing brief should identify
the statements he was seeking to suppress and the legal
basis for suppressing them, the defendant did not raise
a Miranda claim in his posthearing brief. Rather, the
defendant argued only that, “[i]f the court finds that the officers illegally prolonged the motor vehicle stop, any
evidence seized after that is fruit of the poisonous tree, including postarrest statements made by the defendant.”
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court expressly
declined to address whether any of the defendant’s statements should be suppressed under Miranda, noting that
“[t]he defendant’s posthearing memorandum does not
argue that any of his statements were the product of a
11
The state also argues that the defendant waived his claim. Because we conclude that the defendant did not adequately brief his claim, we need not address the state’s waiver argument.
State v. Jones
Miranda violation.” Thus, we disagree with the defendant’s contention that he preserved his claim.
“Generally, this court is not required to consider a
claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. Practice Book § 60-5. It is well established, however, that an unpreserved claim is
reviewable under Golding when (1) the record is adequate
to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation
. . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state
has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cane, 193
Conn. App. 95, 115–16, 218 A.3d 1073, cert. denied, 334
Conn. 901, 219 A.3d 798 (2019). Although our Supreme
Court held in State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d
862 (2014), that a party need not “affirmatively request
[Golding] review”; id., 754; the court “did not eliminate the important requirement that all claims of error be
adequately briefed on the merits.” Bank of America,
N.A. v. Thomas, 151 Conn. App. 790, 801 n.6, 96 A.3d
624 (2014). As the court explained in Elson, “[i]f the
defendant’s brief fails to identify the relevant record sections, identify the governing constitutional principles,
or apply law to fact in demonstrating the existence of
a constitutional violation requiring reversal, then the
claim likely will be deemed inadequately briefed and will fail on that ground anyway, regardless of some threshold
invocation of Golding review prior to the briefing of the merits.” State v. Elson, supra, 750.
In the present case, we cannot review the defendant’s
claim because his brief does not identify the statements
he claims should have been suppressed and lacks any substantive legal analysis to support his claim. To establish that a Miranda violation occurred, the defendant had the
burden to establish both that any statements he seeks to
suppress were made while he was in custody and that he
State v. Jones
made those statements in response to police interrogation. See State v. Ramos, 317 Conn. 19, 29, 114 A.3d
1202 (2015).12 The defendant’s brief, however, does not
even reference that legal standard, much less provide an
analysis of which, if any, of his statements were made
in response to custodial interrogation.
Moreover, as the state argues, the defendant’s brief
does not identify with any particularity the statements
he claims should have been suppressed. Rather, the two
paragraphs that the defendant devotes to his Miranda
claim consist of little more than a general overview of
some of the questions he was asked after Dragoi placed
him under arrest. Although the defendant provides
citations to the body camera footage for some of those
questions, for others he includes only a general description of the subject matter of the questioning without
providing any citation to the record. Specifically, the
defendant states that “the questions did not stop during
the pendency of the search of the motor vehicle, including questions about whether the liquid in the car was
lemonade, and whether there was an additional key to
the locked compartment in the rear of the vehicle,” but
he does not identify what statements he made in response
to such questions or provide any analysis of whether
any such statements were made in response to questions
that constituted interrogation under Miranda. In addition, although it is not entirely clear from his brief, the 12
“Two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by Miranda: (1) the defendant must have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must have been subjected to police interrogation. . . . A defendant in custody is subject to interrogation not only in the face of express questioning by police but also when subjected to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. . . . Whether a defendant in custody is subject to interrogation necessarily involves determining first, the factual circumstances of the police conduct in question, and second, whether such conduct is normally attendant to arrest and custody or whether the police should know that such conduct is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, supra, 317 Conn. 29.
State v. Jones
defendant appears to expand his claim beyond the statements he sought to suppress in the trial court to include statements he made prior to the time Dragoi placed him
under arrest. He argues that he “was bombarded with
questions throughout the stop, spanning over an hour
in time,” but includes no analysis of whether he was in
custody for purposes of Miranda prior to the time Dragoi
placed him under arrest. The defendant’s failure to identify the specific statements he claims should have been
suppressed as well as his failure to provide any legal analysis in support of a claim that any such statements were
obtained in violation of Miranda precludes our review of
the defendant’s claim. See, e.g., State v. Fetscher, 162
Conn. App. 145, 155–56, 130 A.3d 892 (2015) (“[F]or
this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without
analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case
and the law cited. . . . It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving
the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for
the argument, and put flesh on its bones.”), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 904, 138 A.3d 280 (2016). Accordingly, we
decline to review the defendant’s claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.