[Cite as In re A.M., 2026-Ohio-3417.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: A.M., K.L., & N.D.
Case Nos. CT2026-0019
CT2026-0020
CT2026-0021
Opinion And Judgment Entry
Appeal from the Muskingum County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division Case
Nos. 22330057,
22330058, & 22430021
Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry: September 1, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King, William B. Hoffman, and Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: Ronald L. Welch, Prosecuting Attorney, By Jacob J. Winslow, Assistant Prosecutor, for MSACPS; April F. Campbell, for Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Appellant C.M. ("Mother") appeals the February 5, 2026 Judgment Entry of the Court
of Common Pleas for Muskingum County, Ohio, Juvenile Division, terminating her parental
rights and awarding permanent custody of her minor children, A.M1., K.L.2 and N.D.3, to
appellee, Muskingum County Adult and Child Protective Services ("the Agency"), pursuant
1 Fifth District, Case Number CT2026-0019
2 Fifth District, Case Number CT2026-0020
3 Fifth District, Case Number CT2026-0021
to R.C. 2151.414. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court’s award of
permanent custody to the Agency.
Facts and Procedural History
Initiation of the Case
{¶2} C.M. is the biological mother of A.M., born September 20, 2017, K.L., born
April 25, 2021, and N.D., born January 27, 2024.
{¶3} On May 2, 2023, the Agency received a report alleging Mother's residence was
filthy, that A.M. and K.L. were consistently unclean, and that there were concerns regarding
Mother's substance abuse. On or about May 3, 2023, Mother submitted to a drug screen that
tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.
{¶4} On May 10, 2023, the Agency filed complaints alleging that A.M. and K.L.
were dependent children pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C). The children were placed in the
Agency's temporary custody on May 11, 2023. (1Tr. at 48). On August 30, 2023, the juvenile
court adjudicated A.M. and K.L. dependent children pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C).
{¶5} N.D. was born on January 27, 2024, with neonatal abstinence syndrome. (1Tr.
at 49). On January 30, 2024, the Agency filed a complaint alleging that N.D. was a dependent
child pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C). On January 31, 2024, N.D. was placed in the Agency's
temporary custody. On April 18, 2024, the juvenile court adjudicated N.D. a dependent child.
Case Plan and Review Proceedings
{¶6} Mother's case plan required her to address her mental health, substance abuse,
parenting skills, and housing. (1Tr. at 51).
{¶7} Throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court repeatedly found that the
Agency had made reasonable efforts to prevent the children's continued removal and to
reunify the family.
Permanent Custody Proceedings
{¶8} On April 28, 2025, the Agency moved for permanent custody of the children.
{¶9} On May 7, 2025, Mother filed a motion requesting legal custody of the children.
{¶10} The juvenile court conducted a hearing on the motions at which the following
evidence was presented.
Testimony of Brianna Hickenbottom
{¶11} Brianna Hickenbottom, the ongoing caseworker, testified that A.M. was
removed from Mother's care in 2018 because of domestic violence and was returned to
Mother in 2019. (1Tr. at 49). Hickenbottom further testified that A.M. and K.L. were
removed in August 2021 after K.L.'s father overdosed in the children's presence. (1Tr. at 50).
The children were returned to Mother under protective supervision from March through July
2022. (Id.).
{¶12} Hickenbottom testified that A.M. and K.L. have remained in the Agency's
temporary custody since May 11, 2023. (1Tr. at 48). Hickenbottom testified that N.D. has
remained in the Agency's temporary custody since January 30, 2024. (1Tr. at 49).
{¶13} According to Hickenbottom, Mother's case plan required her to complete
mental health and substance abuse assessments and follow all recommendations, complete
parenting classes, demonstrate an ability to provide for the children's basic needs, and
maintain appropriate housing. (1Tr. at 51).
{¶14} In June 2023, Mother completed a mental health assessment at Cedar Ridge.
(1Tr. at 52). Cedar Ridge recommended therapy and completion of an intensive outpatient
program ("IOP"). Mother discontinued treatment at Cedar Ridge without completing the
recommended IOP. (Id.). In October 2024, Mother enrolled in an IOP through Spero Health
and completed that program. As part of her treatment at Spero, Mother was prescribed
Suboxone. (1Tr. at 123).
{¶15} After completing the Spero IOP, Mother transferred to Boulder, where she
participated in a peer support program but did not receive counseling from a licensed
therapist. (1Tr. at 54).
{¶16} Following completion of the Spero IOP, the Agency required Mother to
participate in random drug testing through Forensic Fluids Laboratories. (1Tr. at 54).
Hickenbottom testified that the laboratory contacted her because Mother's drug screens
repeatedly tested negative for Suboxone despite Mother's reports that she was taking the
medication daily. During a home visit, Hickenbottom observed that Mother's Suboxone
prescription bottle was empty nearly one week before it could be refilled. (1Tr. at 55).
Hickenbottom testified that Mother had twenty-four negative drug screens for Suboxone
during the period she reported taking the medication each day. (1Tr. at 106).
{¶17} Hickenbottom further testified that Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine and Suboxone in August 2025, after which the Agency requested that
Mother complete another substance abuse assessment. (1Tr. at 57-58). Mother thereafter
returned to Spero Health for additional group treatment. (Id.).
{¶18} Hickenbottom testified that Mother completed two parenting classes,
consistently attended weekly visitation, and that there were no reported concerns during visits. (1Tr. at 59-60). She further testified that Mother's housing was appropriate for the
children. (1Tr. at 60-61).
{¶19} Although Hickenbottom acknowledged Mother had completed many
components of her case plan and expressed no concerns regarding housing or parenting, she
testified that Mother was not ready for reunification because of her unresolved substance
abuse issues. (1Tr. at 62).
Testimony of Jill Hittle
{¶20} Jill Hittle, a nurse practitioner with Spero Health, testified that she prescribed
Suboxone for Mother as part of her substance abuse treatment. (1Tr. at 117, 123, 126, 128).
Hittle was aware Mother also received a prescription for Adipex from another provider. (1Tr.
at 123, 128). She explained that Adipex is prescribed as a weight-loss medication. (1Tr. at
130).
{¶21} Hittle discussed Mother’s two confirmatory urine tests. An October 3, 2025,
test was positive for buprenorphine, norbuprenorphine, and naloxone, findings consistent
with Suboxone use. (1Tr. at 120-121; State's Exh. D). The sample also tested positive for
phentermine, the active ingredient in Adipex. (1Tr. at 122).
{¶22} A November 13, 2025, urine sample tested positive for methadone in addition
to Suboxone. (1Tr. at 122-123). Hittle testified she was unaware of any methadone
prescription and explained that methadone treatment facilities do not report to OARRS 4.
(1Tr. at 124, 126, 128-129). She testified that some patients seek methadone treatment when
Suboxone is ineffective. Mother did not provide an explanation to Hittle for the presence of
methadone in her system. (Id.).
4 The Ohio Automated Rx Reporting System
{¶23} Hittle also testified that Mother tested negative for Suboxone on June 24, July
2, July 9, July 10, July 24, July 25, August 7, August 8, and August 26, 2024. (1Tr. at 144).
Testimony of Matthew Levatis
{¶24} Matthew Levatis, an expert from Forensic Fluids Laboratories, testified
regarding fifty-four oral drug tests administered to Mother between June 2024 and August
2025. (1 Tr. at 31, 44; State's Exh. B).
{¶25} Levatis testified that Mother tested positive for Suboxone on June 6 and June
13, 2025. He further testified that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and Suboxone
on August 14 and August 20, 2025. (1Tr. at 19-21).
Testimony of Mother
{¶26} Mother testified that she completed two parenting programs and completed the
Spero IOP. (2Tr. at 162-165; Mother's Exhs. 1 and 2). She testified that she transferred to
Boulder because her primary provider left Spero and because she was dissatisfied with
treatment at Spero. (2Tr. at 165-167). Mother further testified that she began counseling at
Allwell in September or October 2025 and returned to Spero at the Agency's request on
September 5, 2025. (2Tr. at 166-169; Mother's Exh. 5).
{¶27} Mother testified that she has epilepsy and seizure disorders for which she
receives treatment from a neurologist in Columbus and that she is unable to drive because of
those conditions. (2Tr. at 169-170, 241). She testified that she took Klonopin as a rescue
medication for her epilepsy and was also prescribed Adipex by her family physician. (2Tr. at
170-171).
{¶28} Mother denied using methadone and testified she had no explanation for the
positive methadone test. (2Tr. at 172, 185-186, 202-203).
{¶29} Mother testified that she was unaware the Agency had attempted to contact her
at her apartment. (2Tr. at 177-178, 196). She further testified that she had appropriate threebedroom housing. (2Tr. at 179).
{¶30} Mother testified that she suggested Teena Brown as a potential placement for
the children and provided Brown with the caseworker's contact information after Brown
received a letter from the Agency. (2Tr. at 180-183).
{¶31} Mother denied using illegal drugs and denied using drugs in 2018 or 2019. (2Tr.
at 183, 187, 201, 203, 208-211). She testified that the Agency had confused her with someone
else. Mother also testified that she had been instructed to administer Suboxone rectally during
her pregnancy; therefore, it would not appear on a saliva drug screen. (2 Tr. at 188-189;
Mother's Exh. 3). Mother submitted her provider’s instructions that she take Suboxone
rectally. (Mother’s Exh. 3). Finally, Mother explained that she stored her medications in a
pill organizer, which she asserted explained why her prescription bottle was empty during the
caseworker's home visit. (2Tr. at 237-238, 247).
Testimony of Teena Brown
{¶32} Teena Brown testified that she attempted to contact the Agency by telephone
and text message after Mother identified her as a potential placement for the children. (2Tr.
at 268). Brown testified that she later received a letter stating that the Agency was closing its
consideration of her because it had been unable to contact her. (2Tr. at 268).
{¶33} Brown acknowledged that her text messages repeatedly "kicked back,"
suggesting they were never received by the Agency. (2Tr. at 272). She further acknowledged
that after receiving the Agency's letter, she made no additional efforts to contact the Agency.
(2Tr. at 269-270).
Trial Court Decision
{¶34} On February 5, 2026, the juvenile court granted the Agency's motion for
permanent custody, denied Mother’s motion for legal custody and terminated Mother's
parental rights.
Assignments of Error
{¶35} Mother raises four assignments of error,
{¶36} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO GRANT PERMANENT
CUSTODY OF [MOTHER’S] CHILDREN TO MUSKINGUM COUNTY CHILDREN
SERVICES SHOULD BE REVERSED.”
{¶37} “II. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO GRANT PERMANENT
CUSTODY OF [MOTHER’S] CHILDREN TO MUSKINGUM COUNTY CHILDREN
SERVICES SHOULD BE REVERSED, BECAUSE IT WAS NOT IN THEIR BEST
INTEREST TO DO SO.”
{¶38} III. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE FINDING THAT THE AGENCY MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS
TOWARD REUNIFICATION IN [MOTHER’S] CASE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
{¶39} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WEIGHED MANIFESTLY AGAINST GRANTING
PERMANENT CUSTODY OF [MOTHER’S] CHILDREN TO THE AGENCY.”
Fundamental Rights and Governing Standards
{¶40} A parent's right to raise his or her child is an essential and fundamental liberty
interest protected by the United States and Ohio Constitutions. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982). Because the permanent termination of parental rights has been described as
"the family law equivalent of the death penalty," parents must be afforded every procedural
and substantive protection the law allows. In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist.1991).
Accordingly, a juvenile court may grant permanent custody only upon clear and convincing
evidence. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
I. & IV.
Standard of Review
{¶41} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that appellate review of permanent
custody decisions proceeds under the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and manifest-weight-of-theevidence standards, depending upon the arguments presented. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶
18. Mother's first and fourth assignments of error implicate both standards.
Sufficiency
{¶42} Whether sufficient evidence exists presents a question of law reviewed de novo.
State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30. We consider whether the evidence, if believed, is legally
adequate to permit the juvenile court to form a firm belief or conviction that the statutory
requirements have been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Z.C. at ¶ 13; In re
Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-104 (1986).
Manifest Weight
{¶43} Manifest-weight review concerns the persuasiveness of the evidence. Eastley v.
Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. We review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether the juvenile court clearly lost its way, creating a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
{¶44} Because the juvenile court personally observes the witnesses, however, we
afford substantial deference to its credibility determinations. Eastley at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co.
v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). An appellate court acts as the "thirteenth juror" only
where the evidence weighs against the factfinder's resolution of conflicting testimony. See State
v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26. Likewise, reversal is warranted only where testimony is so
internally inconsistent, so thoroughly impeached, or so inherently unbelievable that the
factfinder clearly lost its way. State v. Reillio, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 3. Reversal on manifestweight grounds remains reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the judgment.
Statutory Framework
{¶45} Before granting permanent custody, the juvenile court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that one of the circumstances listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through
(e) exists and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D).
{¶46} Here, the juvenile court found both that the children could not or should not be
placed with Mother within a reasonable time under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and that the
children had been in the Agency's temporary custody for at least twelve months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).
Twelve of Twenty-Two Months
{¶47} The “12 of 22” provisions set forth in R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) and R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d) balance the importance of reuniting a child with the child’s parents against
the importance of a speedy resolution of the custody of a child. In re C.W., 2004-Ohio-6411, ¶22. Through the “12 of 22” provisions in the permanent-custody statutes, the legislature
provides parents with 12 months to work toward reunification before an agency can institute
a permanent-custody action asserting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds. Id.
{¶48} When calculating this period, the court in C.W. cautioned, “the time that passes
between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing
does not count toward the 12–month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).” 2004-Ohio6411 at ¶ 26. Accord, In re: N.C., 2011-Ohio-6113, ¶32 (5th Dist.).
{¶49} A child is considered to have entered an agency's temporary custody on the
earlier of the adjudication date or sixty days after removal. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e).
{¶50} We note that the trial court found that A.M. and N.D. had been in the custody
of the Agency for twelve of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. (Judgment Entry, ¶42.)
The trial court did not mention K.L. (Id.) We find this to be a scrivener’s error.
{¶51} Testimony established that A.M. and K.L. were removed from Mother's home
on May 11, 2023. Sixty days after this removal was July 10, 2023. The juvenile court
adjudicated A.M. and K.L. dependent children on August 30, 2023. Accordingly, for
purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the children are deemed to have entered the Agency's
temporary custody on July 10, 2023 – the earlier of the two dates pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(e). The Agency filed its motion for permanent custody on April 28, 2025, well
after A.M. and K.L. had remained in temporary custody for more than twelve months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period.
{¶52} N.D. was placed in the Agency's temporary custody on January 31, 2024. Sixty
days after this removal was April 1, 2024. On April 18, 2024, the juvenile court adjudicated
N.D. a dependent child. Accordingly, for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), N.D. was deemed to have entered the Agency's temporary custody on April 1, 2024 – again, the earlier
of the two dates. The Agency filed its motion for permanent custody on April 28, 2025.
Therefore, N.D. had remained in temporary custody for more than twelve months,
specifically 12 months and 27 days.
{¶53} Because the findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (d) constitute
alternative grounds for permanent custody, either finding independently satisfies the first
prong of the permanent custody analysis. In re Dalton, 2007-Ohio-5805 (5th Dist.); In re
Calhoun, 2008-Ohio-5458 (5th Dist.).
{¶54} Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's finding under R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d). Accordingly, that finding alone, together with a proper best-interest
determination, supports the award of permanent custody of A.M., K.L, and N.D.
Nevertheless, in the interest of completeness, we address Mother's arguments concerning R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) as to all three children.
Placement Within a Reasonable Time
{¶55} Under R.C. 2151.414(E), if the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that one of the enumerated factors exists, it must determine that the child cannot or
should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d
95 (1996).
{¶56} In this case, we find that competent, credible evidence supports the juvenile
court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(E).
{¶57} N.D. was born with neonatal abstinence syndrome. Matthew Levatis of
Forensic Fluids Laboratories testified that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine on
August 14, 2025, and again on August 20, 2025. Jill Hittle, a nurse practitioner with Spero Health, testified that Mother also tested positive for methadone on November 13, 2025.
Mother denied taking methadone, testified that the results were incorrect, and asserted that
the Agency had confused her with someone else.
{¶58} Although Mother reported taking Suboxone daily, repeated drug screens were
negative for Suboxone during portions of her treatment, raising concerns regarding her
compliance with prescribed medication. The testimony of Hittle established that the negative
Suboxone test results occurred from June through August 2024, well after the birth of N.D.
(1Tr. at 144). The evidence also showed Mother tested positive for methamphetamine during
the pendency of the case. Mother's history with the Agency dates back to 2018. By the time
of these proceedings, Mother’s substance abuse had become a significant and continuing
concern.
{¶59} In addition, the Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) recommended that permanent
custody be granted.
{¶60} Although the record reflects Mother made meaningful progress in several
respects, including obtaining appropriate housing, completing parenting classes, participating
in substance abuse treatment and counseling, and maintaining a positive relationship with the
children during visitation, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that significant concerns
remained regarding Mother's substance abuse and her ability to safely reunify with the
children.
{¶61} Completion of portions of a case plan does not, standing alone, preclude an
award of permanent custody. A case plan is a means to achieve reunification, not an end in
itself. In re J.L., 2004-Ohio-6024, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the
parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the children's removal.
{¶62} Upon our review of the record, we conclude competent, credible evidence
supports the juvenile court's determination that the children could not or should not be placed
with Mother within a reasonable time.
{¶63} Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, Mother’s first and fourth
assignments of error are overruled.
II.
{¶64} In her second assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial court’s finding
that it is in the best interests of the children that permanent custody be granted to the Agency
is not supported by the record. We disagee.
Best Interest
{¶65} An agency that seeks permanent custody of a child bears the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best
interest. In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 26.
{¶66} R.C. 2151.414(D) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors in
determining whether the child’s best interests would be served by granting the permanent
custody motion. These factors include but are not limited to: (1) the interrelationship of the
child with others; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the
child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether such a placement can be achieved
without permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11)
apply.
{¶67} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to make specific findings
regarding each of the best-interest factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or to include in its decision or judgment entry a written discussion of each of those factors. In re: A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶33.
{¶68} A child’s best interests are served by the child being placed in a permanent
situation that fosters growth, stability, and security. We have frequently noted, “[t]he
discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order of permanent
custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature
of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties
concerned.” In re Mauzy, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5261, (5th Dist. Nov. 13, 2000), citing in re
Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316 (8th Dist. 1994).
Interaction and Interrelationship
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)
{¶69} The evidence demonstrated that the children’s interactions with Mother were
generally good.
Wishes of the Children and Custodial History
{¶70} Mother argues that the trial court failed to consider the children's wishes in
determining their best interest. She contends that the failure to ascertain the children's wishes
is fatal to the Agency's motion for permanent custody, citing In re Lopez, 2006-Ohio-2251 (3d
Dist.). We disagree.
{¶71} A child's wishes do not require a trial court to deny an agency's motion for
permanent custody. In re K.M., 2018-Ohio-3711, ¶ 27, citing In re S.M., 2014-Ohio-2961, ¶ 36
(4th Dist.). Rather, a child's wishes are “a factor for the trial court to weigh along with others
outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)." Id., quoting In re S.M., ¶ 36, citing In re C.F., 2007-Ohio1104, ¶ 57. A child's wishes are not entitled to heightened importance. Id.; see also In re M.W., 2020-Ohio-5199, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.) (concluding that a trial court cannot give a child's wishes
under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) greater weight than the other best-interest factors); accord In re
W.J., 2022-Ohio-2449, ¶ 65 (3d Dist.); In re D.B., 2006-Ohio-479, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.); In re J.H.,
2025-Ohio-5218, ¶ 66 (5th Dist.).
{¶72} Thus, even assuming the children expressed a desire to return to Mother, the
trial court was not required to give that preference controlling weight or to disregard the other
statutory best-interest factors.
{¶73} Here, the record reflects that the juvenile court considered the evidence
presented at the permanent custody hearing, Mother's testimony, the records before the court,
and the recommendation of the GAL, whose first report was filed in October 2018 -subsequent reports were filed throughout the years that followed. The GAL ultimately
recommended that permanent custody of the children be granted to the Agency.
{¶74} The children's custodial history also supported the juvenile court's
determination. Mother first became involved with the Agency in 2018. By the time of the
permanent custody hearing, substance abuse remained a significant and continuing concern.
Although Mother had made progress in several areas, the evidence demonstrated that she had
not consistently addressed the substance-abuse concerns that had been a recurring component
of the Agency's involvement. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Mother's
progress remained insufficient to establish that the children could safely and consistently be
returned to her care.
{¶75} The juvenile court also found that the children had remained together in foster
care throughout the proceedings. The court found that A.M. had been diagnosed with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct, was receiving counseling through school, and was prescribed
medication for those conditions. K.L. was attending Head Start and doing well in the
program. N.D. was meeting appropriate developmental milestones. These findings support
the conclusion that the children were receiving appropriate care and stability in their current
placement.
Need for a Legally Secure Permanent Placement
{¶76} The record supports the juvenile court's conclusion that the children required a
legally secure permanent placement.
{¶77} Although Mother demonstrated progress in several areas, the juvenile court
reasonably determined that unresolved concerns regarding substance abuse prevented
reunification within a reasonable time. The court could further conclude that the children's
need for permanence and stability outweighed Mother's request for additional time to
complete reunification.
Additional Factors
{¶78} The juvenile court also considered the remaining statutory factors, including
the Guardian ad Litem's recommendation that permanent custody be granted.
{¶79} The court concluded that the children's need for a legally secure permanent
placement could not be achieved without awarding permanent custody to the Agency. Upon
review of the entire record, we conclude that competent, credible evidence supports that
determination.
{¶80} In short, the juvenile court's judgment entry demonstrates that it considered the
relevant best-interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). The court was
not required to assign the children's wishes greater weight than the other statutory factors, nor was it required to reach a different result simply because the children may have expressed a
preference regarding their placement. The juvenile court did not err in determining that
permanent custody was in the children's best interest.
{¶81} Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶82} In her third assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court erred in finding
the Agency made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with her children. We disagree.
{¶83} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held the trial court is not obligated by R.C.
2151.419 to make a determination that the agency used reasonable efforts to reunify the family
at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless the agency has not established that
reasonable efforts have been made prior to that hearing. In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104; R.C.
2151.419. The trial court is only obligated to make a determination that the agency has made
reasonable efforts to reunify the family at "adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and
temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional hearings for abused, neglected, or
dependent children, all of which occur prior to a decision transferring permanent custody to
the state." Id. at ¶ 41; In re L.J., 2019-Ohio-5231, ¶44 (5th Dist.); In re A.M., 2026-Ohio-1986,
¶50 (5th Dist.).
{¶84} The record reflects that the juvenile court made reasonable-efforts findings at
multiple hearings throughout these proceedings, and Mother did not challenge those findings
at the time they were made. Consequently, the juvenile court was not required to make an
additional reasonable effort determination at the permanent custody hearing.
{¶85} Mother’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶86} Upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that clear and
convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's findings. The finding under R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d) independently supports the award of permanent custody of the children.
Competent, credible evidence also supports the juvenile court's determination under R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) that A.M., K.L., and N.D. could not or should not be placed with Mother
within a reasonable time. Finally, after considering the factors set forth in R.C.
2151.414(D)(1), we conclude the juvenile court did not err in determining that permanent
custody was in the children's best interests.
{¶87} Accordingly, Mother's first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error are
overruled.
{¶88} For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Muskingum County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
{¶89} Costs are to be paid by Appellant-Mother, C.M.
By: Popham, J.
King, P.J. and
Hoffman, J., concur