Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCEC-XX-XXXXXXX
01-SEP-2026
08:03 AM
Dkt. 12 FFCL
SCEC-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
BLESSINGS DE LA CRUZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, OFFICE OF ELECTIONS;
SCOTT T. NAGO, Chief Election Officer, State of Hawaiʻi,
Defendants.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT
(By: Devens, C.J., McKenna, Eddins, and Ginoza, JJ.,
and Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Hiraoka,
assigned by reason of vacancy)
On August 24, 2026, Plaintiff Blessings De La Cruz
(Plaintiff) filed an election contest complaint (Complaint). On
August 28, 2022, Defendants State of Hawaiʻi Office of Elections
and Scott T. Nago, Chief Election Officer, State of Hawaiʻi
(collectively, the State) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
Upon consideration of the Complaint, the motion to dismiss
or for summary judgment, the documents attached and submitted in support of the Complaint and motion, and having heard this
matter without oral argument, we enter the following findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On August 8, 2026, a primary election was held for
District 44 State Representative, State of Hawaiʻi (District 44).
2. The final results for the August 8, 2026 primary
election for District 44 were:
Non-Partisan Votes
DE LA CRUZ, Blessings 41
Blank Votes: 13
Over Votes: 0
Republican Votes
WEAVER, Charla (Kahealani) 900
Blank Votes: 85
Over Votes: 0
Democratic Votes
KILA, DARIUS K. 1760
KAHIKINA, Michael P. 228
Blank Votes: 75
Over Votes: 1
3. The total votes cast for the candidates in the primary
election for District 44 was 2,929, and ten percent of that
total is 292 votes.
4. On August 24, 2026, Plaintiff, the unsuccessful
nonpartisan candidate in the primary election for District 44,
filed the Complaint contesting the decision that “she will not
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advance to the 2026 General Election ballot” pursuant to Hawaiʻi
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 12-41(b) (2009).
5. Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth five counts for
relief. Briefly summarized, Plaintiff’s Complaint, including
these five counts, assert that the different treatment between
partisan and nonpartisan candidates in HRS § 12-41 is
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Because HRS § 12-41(b) is unconstitutional, Plaintiff asserts that this results
in an error, mistake, or irregularity that could have caused a
difference in the primary election results for District 44
because Plaintiff ran unopposed as a nonpartisan candidate.
Plaintiff thus seeks a declaration in this primary election
contest that HRS § 12-41(b) is unconstitutional and, based on
this declaration, asks this court to determine which candidates
advance to the general election for District 44.
6. Plaintiff also asserts that Article II, Section 4 of
the Hawaiʻi Constitution should be considered as “constitutional
support” based on the manner that nonpartisan candidates appear
on the ballot with partisan candidates.
7. We construe all of Plaintiff’s requests for relief in
the Complaint as being connected to Plaintiff’s equal protection
argument.
8. On August 28, 2026, the State filed a motion to
dismiss the Complaint or for summary judgment.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 11-172 (Supp. 2021)
states that an election complaint “shall set forth any cause or
causes, such as but not limited to, provable fraud, overages, or
underages, that could cause a difference in the election
results.” See Dicks v. Office of Elections, 155 Hawai‘i 102,
106, 557 P.3d 831, 835 (2024) (“To state a claim under HRS § 11-172, the election contest complaint, at the bare minimum, must
plead that the conduct in question by the election official
could cause a difference in the election results.”).
2. HRS § 11-172’s requirements for an election complaint
are viewed in context with the relief allowed in a primary
election contest, which is that this court’s judgment “shall
decide what candidate was nominated or elected.” HRS § 11-173.5(b) (2009).
3. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing actual
information of mistakes or errors sufficient to change the
result, and “[i]n the absence of facts showing that
irregularities exceed the reported margin between the
candidates, the complaint is legally insufficient.” Akaka v.
Yoshina, 84 Hawaiʻi 383, 388, 935 P.2d 98, 103 (1997). “An
election contest cannot be based upon mere belief or indefinite
information.” Id.
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4. For a primary election contest, the “court shall hear
the contest in a summary manner” and “[t]he judgment shall
decide what candidate was nominated or elected.” HRS § 11-173.5(b).
5. When reviewing a request to dismiss a complaint, the
court’s review “is based on the contents of the complaint, the
allegations of which [the court] accept[s] as true and
construe[s] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Dismissal is improper unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.” Casumpang v. ILWU, Local
142, 94 Hawaiʻi 330, 337, 13 P.3d 1235, 1242 (2000) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
6. The court’s consideration of matters outside the
pleadings converts a motion to dismiss into one for summary
judgment. Foytik v. Chandler, 88 Hawaiʻi 307, 313, 966 P.2d 619,
625 (1998).
7. Because we consider the total votes cast for the
candidates in the August 8, 2026 primary election for District
44, application of the summary judgment standard is appropriate.
See id.
8. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Estate of Doe v. Paul
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Revere Ins. Group, 86 Hawaiʻi 262, 269-70, 948 P.2d 1103, 1110-11 (1997).
9. A fact is material if proof of that fact would have
the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of a
cause of action asserted by one of the parties. Winfrey v. GGP
Ala Moana LLC, 130 Hawaiʻi 262, 271, 308 P.3d 891, 900 (2013).
10. On a motion for summary judgment, this court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Id.
11. However, this “court is permitted to draw only those
inferences of which the evidence is reasonably susceptible and
it may not resort to speculation.” Id. (quoting Pioneer Mill
Co. v. Dow, 90 Hawaiʻi 289, 295, 978 P.2d 727, 733 (1999)).
12. HRS § 12-41(b) (2009) provides:
(b) Any nonpartisan candidate receiving at least ten
per cent of the total votes cast for the office for which
the person is a candidate at the primary or special
primary, or a vote equal to the lowest vote received by the
partisan candidate who was nominated in the primary or
special primary, shall also be a candidate at the following
election; provided that when more nonpartisan candidates
qualify for nomination than there are offices to be voted
for at the general or special general election, there shall
be certified as candidates for the following election those
receiving the highest number of votes, but not more
candidates than are to be elected.
(Emphases added.)
13. When viewed in context with the second HRS § 12-41(b)
alternative that allows a nonpartisan candidate to advance to
the general election, blank and overvotes are not included in
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the calculation of the “ten per cent of the total votes cast for
the office for which the person is a candidate” at the primary
election. See HRS § 12-41(b) (“[O]r a vote equal to the lowest
vote received by the partisan candidate who was nominated in the
primary or special primary[.]”); Jijun Yin v. Aguiar, 146 Hawaiʻi
254, 264, 463 P.3d 911, 921 (2020) (“In construing each
individual part of a statute, the court must consider the
statute as a whole to ensure that all parts produce a sensible
and harmonious whole.”).
14. Plaintiff received 41 votes, which is less than ten
percent of the total votes cast for District 44 (292), and is
not equal to the lowest number of votes received by a partisan
candidate who was nominated (Charla (Kahealani) Weaver, 900
total votes).
15. The constitutional arguments in Plaintiff’s Complaint
lack merit. Plaintiff asserts that HRS § 12-41’s alternative
routes for partisan and nonpartisan candidates to advance to the
general election are unfair and denies her equal protection
under the law. This court previously considered and rejected
this argument in Hustace v. Doi, 60 Haw. 282, 588 P.2d 915
(1978).
16. In Hustace, we recognized that HRS § 12-41 mandates a
minimum number of votes needed for a nonpartisan candidate to
advance to the general election, and this minimum number of
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votes can never be more than the lowest number of votes that a
partisan candidate received in order to advance to the general
election. Id. at 290, 588 P.2d at 920. This means that a
nonpartisan candidate will advance to the general election if
the total number of votes cast for the nonpartisan candidate is
equal to or greater than the least-popular partisan candidate
that will also advance to the general election. See HRS § 12-41(b) (“[O]r a vote equal to the lowest vote received by the
partisan candidate who was nominated in the primary or special
primary, shall also be a candidate at the following
election[.]”).
17. And as recognized in Hustace, 60 Haw. at 292, 588 P.2d
at 922, HRS § 12-41(b)’s alternative requirement of a
nonpartisan candidate receiving at least ten per cent of the
total votes cast is similarly required for a partisan
candidate’s party to appear on a primary election ballot. See
HRS § 11-61(b)(2)(A) (2009).
18. In other words, a nonpartisan candidate is not
required to satisfy HRS § 11-61 in order to be placed on the
ballot for the primary election. See HRS § 12-21 (2009) (“The
names of the candidates of each party qualifying under section
11-61 or 11-62 and of nonpartisan candidates may be printed on
separate ballots, or on a single ballot.”). But HRS § 11-61
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applies to partisan candidates who want to be placed on the same
ballot. See id.
19. Recognizing the foregoing, this court held that the
appellant was not deprived of equal protection under the law.
Hustace, 60 Haw. at 293, 588 P.2d at 922.
20. In holding as such, this court also considered
Hawaiʻi’s interest in the different routes that partisan and
nonpartisan candidates take to the general election pursuant to
HRS § 12-41. For example, this court recognized: “The purpose
of providing and protecting an effective direct primary system
is clearly a vital state objective, in pursuit of which a state
may require a nonpartisan candidate to demonstrate substantial
public support as an alternative to being nominated in one of
the direct party primaries.” Id. at 290-91, 588 P.2d at 921
(citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 (1974)).
21. We apply Hustace here and conclude that HRS § 12-41
did not deny Plaintiff equal protection under Article I, Section
5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
22. Accordingly, HRS § 12-41’s different treatment of
partisan and nonpartisan candidates does not constitute an
error, mistake, or irregularity that could have caused a
difference in the election results. See HRS § 11-172.
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23. Article II, Section 4 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution
states in its entirety:
The legislature shall provide for the
registration of voters and for absentee voting and
shall prescribe the method of voting at all
elections. Secrecy of voting shall be preserved;
provided that no person shall be required to declare
a party preference or nonpartisanship as a condition
of voting in any primary or special primary election.
Secrecy of voting and choice of political party
affiliation or nonpartisanship shall be preserved.
24. Article II, Section 4 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution does
not require election officials to set aside the requirements of
HRS § 12-41(b) and allow Plaintiff to appear on the general
election ballot as a nonpartisan candidate.
25. Also, this court recently said that the prohibition on
declaring a party preference in Article II, Section 4 of the
Hawaiʻi Constitution was meant to change elections in Hawaiʻi
from a closed primary system to an open primary system. Dicks,
155 Hawai‘i at 107, 557 P.3d at 836. As such, Article II,
Section 4 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution does not support
Plaintiff’s argument that nonpartisan candidates’ eligibility
for the general election should be treated in the same manner as
partisan candidates under HRS § 12-41.
26. Based on the above, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
establish any viable claim to relief under HRS § 11-172.
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27. The complaint also fails to establish any conduct by
election officials that could cause a difference in the election
results. See Dicks, 155 Hawaiʻi at 106, 557 P.3d at 835.
28. We conclude that Plaintiff did not receive the minimum
number of votes required under HRS § 12–41(b) to advance to the
November 3, 2026 general election.
29. Accordingly, based on the above conclusions of law and
there being no genuine issue of material fact in Plaintiff’s
election contest, we find and conclude in favor of the State as
a matter of law.
30. Also, to the extent not already addressed above or in
the Judgment below, any remaining claims for relief in
Plaintiff’s Complaint are denied.
JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions
of law, judgment is entered in favor of the State and against
Plaintiff. Darius K. Kila and Charla (Kahealani) Weaver shall
be placed on the ballot for the general election for District 44
State Representative, State of Hawaiʻi. Plaintiff shall not be
placed on the general election ballot for District 44.
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The clerk of the supreme court shall forthwith serve a
certified copy of this judgment on the chief election officer in
accordance with HRS § 11-173.5(b).
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, September 1, 2026.
/s/ Vladimir P. Devens
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
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