Rink v. Hertz

2026-09-01

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court granted Rink's application to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Bernice Rink filed a pro se complaint in federal district court against Matthew Hertz, the estate representative who oversaw the sale of real property she had co-owned with the now-deceased Henry Marrow. Rink alleged that her rights were violated and that the property was sold improperly without affording her first-buyer protections, claiming she and Marrow held the property as joint tenants with survivorship rights. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia had previously rejected Rink's survivorship claim, determined that Rink and Marrow held the property as tenants in common, and authorized partition and sale of the property by Hertz as trustee.

The district court found Rink's complaint fundamentally deficient under federal pleading standards. Her factual allegations consisted only of conclusory statements expressing dissatisfaction with the outcome, without any coherent narrative of specific wrongdoing or factual basis supporting a legal claim. The court determined that even applying the relaxed standards afforded to pro se litigants, the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts from which misconduct could be reasonably inferred. Additionally, the court concluded that Hertz acted pursuant to Superior Court orders, and any challenge to those orders falls outside federal jurisdiction.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Sufficiency of factual pleading in pro se complaints
Joint tenancy versus tenancy in common property ownership
Federal jurisdiction over state court orders
Estate representative liability for partition sale

Procedural posture

This is a pro se civil action brought in federal district court challenging a property sale executed pursuant to state court orders.

Authorities cited

556 U.S. 662

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BERNICE RINK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 26-2842 (UNA)

)

MATTHEW HERTZ, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on consideration of Plaintiff’s application to proceed in

forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and pro se complaint (ECF No. 1). The Court GRANTS the

application and DISMISSES the complaint.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “‘a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Further,

a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although a pro se complaint is “held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it “must plead ‘factual matter’ that

permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct,’” Atherton v. District of

Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678-79). As drafted, the complaint fails to meet these goals.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no facts. Its Statement of Claim reads:

They denied me my rights they lied as officer of the Court they

illegally sold my home without giving me first buyers rights they

ignored the new deed 2015 so much.

Compl. at 4. Her demand for relief is:

I want to be made whole, . . . I want my home back or the amount

my home is worth now. I really want my home back and let them

know that you too have to follow the law.

Id.

To put Plaintiff’s vague assertions in context, the Court relies on two Superior Court

documents attached to the complaint: Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, Rink v. Estate of

Henry Marrow, No. 23-PR-0691 (D.C. Ct. App. July 22, 2025) (per curiam) (ECF No. 1-2 at 6-11) and Order Granting Motion for Judgment for [the Estate of Henry Marrow] on the Pleadings,

Granting Partition of Real Property, Appointing Trustee to Sell the Property, and Ordering

Occupants of Real Property to Vacate the Premises by September 1, 2023, Estate of Henry Marrow

v. Bernice Rink, No. 2023 LIT 5 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 13, 2023) (ECF No. 1-2 at 73-79).

In 2014, Plaintiff and the late Henry Marrow purchased real property in the District of

Columbia located at 1 Madison Street, N.E. According to the Deed, Plaintiff and Mr. Marrow held

the property as tenants in common. They encumbered the property with three Deeds of Trust.

Plaintiff produced a Deed of Trust from 2015 stating that she and Mr. Marrow held the property as

joint tenants with right of survivorship. Subsequent Deeds of Trust either classified ownership as

tenants in common or were silent as to ownership. Mr. Marrow died intestate in 2020, and Plaintiff

continued to reside at the property after his death.

Defendant Matthew Hertz, whom the Superior Court appointed, served as Personal

Representative of the Estate of Henry Marrow. The property was heavily mortgaged and by the

time Mr. Hertz filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking a partition sale of the property, it

was believed that the outstanding mortgage balance roughly was the same as the property’s value.

Plaintiff claimed that she and Mr. Marrow held the property as joint tenants with right of

survivorship and, therefore, Mr. Marrow’s ownership interest passed to her upon his death. The

Superior Court found otherwise. It ruled that Plaintiff and Mr. Morrow were neither spouses nor

domestic partners; the operative deed from 2014 indicated Plaintiff and Mr. Marrow owned the

property as tenants in common; the Estate of Henry Marrow owned a 50% interest in the property;

and the Estate was entitled to partition the property for sale under D.C. Code § 16-2901. The court

appointed Mr. Hertz trustee to sell the property and ordered Plaintiff to vacate the property, which

was sold in 2024.

Mr. Hertz as the sole Defendant, yet the complaint does not manage to state a claim against

him. It appears that Mr. Hertz acted pursuant to Superior Court Orders, and insofar as Plaintiff

challenges those Orders, this federal district court is without jurisdiction to hear them. See, e.g.,

Klayman v. Rao, 49 F.4th 550, 552–53 (D.C. Cir. 2022); Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 192

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

An Order is issued separately.

/s/

AMIT P. MEHTA

DATE: September 1, 2026 United States District Judge