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Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
DANNEHY, J., with whom BRIGHT, J., joins as to
part II only, concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part. The majority concludes that the state violated
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269–70, 79 S. Ct. 1173,
3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959), by failing to correct purportedly false or substantially misleading testimony given by Kingsley Minto and Attorney Richard Cohen at the criminal trial of the petitioner, Carlton Bryan. In reaching that conclusion, the majority determines that the habeas court clearly erred in finding that the testimony of Minto and
Cohen was neither false nor substantially misleading and, further, that the habeas court clearly erred in finding
that, even if portions of Minto’s testimony were false
or substantially misleading, any resulting misimpression was corrected by Cohen’s testimony explaining the
nature and extent of Minto’s understanding concerning
his arrangement with the state. In my view, the majority
reaches these conclusions only by failing to afford the
deference required by our clearly erroneous standard of
review. Because the habeas court’s factual findings are
supported by evidence in the record and, therefore, are
not clearly erroneous, I cannot agree that the petitioner established any Napue violation.
I conclude, however, that the petitioner’s conviction
must nonetheless be reversed because he has established
that the state failed to satisfy its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed.
2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). Specifically, the state was required, but failed, to disclose two interviews of Minto conducted by the Manchester
Police Department, as well as certain benefits conferred
on Minto, namely, the pretrial decision of the prosecutor, Senior Assistant State’s Attorney Donna Mambrino,
not to sign arrest warrants supported by probable cause
for Minto’s alleged involvement in armed robberies in
West Hartford and Windsor. Because the state withheld
impeachment evidence and that evidence was material,
it violated its obligations under Brady and Giglio, and
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
reversal is required. I therefore respectfully concur in
the judgment and dissent in part.
I
In Napue, the United States Supreme Court held that a
conviction knowingly “obtained through use of false evidence” violates the fourteenth amendment’s due process
clause. Napue v. Illinois, supra, 360 U.S. 269. Testimony that is substantially misleading, even if “technically correct,” is considered false under Napue. United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 684, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d
481 (1985); see id., 683–84; State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173, 186, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010). “To establish a Napue
violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution
knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed
it ‘to go uncorrected when it appear[ed].’ ” Glossip v.
Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 246, 145 S. Ct. 612, 221 L.
Ed. 2d 90 (2025), quoting Napue v. Illinois, supra, 269.
“[The] essence of [a] Napue/Giglio violation is [the] lack of disclosure of [the] truth to [the] jury . . . .” Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, 336 Conn. 168, 182, 243
A.3d 1163 (2020). “Whether a prosecutor knowingly
presented false or misleading testimony . . . presents a
mixed question of law and fact, with the habeas court’s
factual findings subject to review for clear error and the legal conclusions that the court drew from those facts
subject to de novo review.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 175. Thus, whether testimony was false
or substantially misleading and whether Mambrino corrected any misimpression are factual determinations
entrusted in the first instance to the habeas court. See
id. Our role is not to determine whether we would have
interpreted the testimony differently but only whether
the habeas court’s findings are unsupported by the evidence or otherwise leave this court with “the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle v. Kulesza,
197 Conn. 101, 105, 495 A.2d 1074 (1985).
I conclude that the habeas court reasonably found that
Minto’s testimony, considered in context and as a whole,
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
was not false or substantially misleading concerning his
arrangement with the state. The majority reaches the
opposite conclusion by focusing almost exclusively on
Minto’s repeated denials that he had received a “deal,”
while discounting the testimony that immediately accompanied those denials. On direct examination, after Minto
denied that he had been promised “any deals,” Mambrino
immediately asked whether he had been told that, if he
testified, the state would advise the sentencing judge
of his cooperation. Although Minto again responded
that “[n]o deal was made,” Mambrino clarified the question, asking, “[n]o specific deal was made, but was that
told to you?” Minto answered, “[y]es.” Thus, the jury
was expressly informed that Minto had been told that
Mambrino would make his cooperation known to the
sentencing judge. Read fairly and in context, Minto’s
repeated statements that there was “[n]o deal” reasonably referred to the absence of a negotiated plea agreement,
sentencing recommendation, or promised disposition
of his pending criminal charges—not to the absence of
communications between the parties regarding his cooperation. See Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, 330
Conn. 1, 17, 190 A.3d 851 (2018) (witness’ statement
“cannot be divorced from the context surrounding it”),
cert. denied sub nom. Greene v. Semple, 586 U.S. 1167,
139 S. Ct. 1219, 203 L. Ed. 2d 238 (2019).1 The habeas
court reasonably interpreted the testimony in precisely
that manner.
The remainder of Minto’s testimony at the petitioner’s
criminal trial similarly does not compel the majority’s
conclusion. Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined
1
This court’s decision in Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 330 Conn. 1, bears a striking resemblance to the present one. As in the present case, the petitioner in Greene claimed that the state had violated Napue by failing to correct testimony from a cooperating witness concerning the nature of the witness’ agreement with the state. Id., 9, 13. This court rejected that claim, emphasizing that the challenged testimony must be evaluated in context; id., 21–22; and concluding that the habeas court reasonably found that the testimony, although “ ‘not a model of clarity,’ ” was “neither false nor substantially misleading.” Id., 24.
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
Minto concerning his expectations arising from his testimony. Although Minto denied that anything had been
promised to him, the jury also heard his acknowledgment
at the conclusion of his testimony that he did have “considerations,” the details of which would be addressed
later. Whether those answers were perfectly precise is not the question before us. The relevant question is whether
the habeas court’s findings are unsupported by the evidence. On this record, I cannot conclude that they are.
The habeas court also reasonably determined that, even
if portions of Minto’s testimony could be viewed as incomplete or potentially misleading, Mambrino corrected
any possibly misleading testimony by calling Cohen, the
attorney who represented Minto in connection with the
Manchester robbery, immediately after Minto testified.
See State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 208, 283 A.3d 477
(2022) (witness’ misleading testimony was cured by calling of another witness). Cohen explained what was meant
by Minto’s statement that there was “[n]o deal” when
Cohen testified that there was no written plea agreement, no agreement for any specific sentence, and no promise of any particular sentencing recommendation. He further
testified, however, that Mambrino had informed him
that, if Minto testified truthfully, she would advise the sentencing court of Minto’s cooperation and that Cohen
hoped this would result in a more favorable disposition.
Thus, the jury learned precisely the nature of Minto’s
informal arrangement with the state.
The majority faults Cohen for describing this arrangement as an “ ‘expectation’ ” or “ ‘hope’ ” rather than as an “agreement . . . .” (Emphasis omitted.) Part II of the majority opinion. In doing so, however, it substitutes
its own characterization of the evidence for that of the
habeas court. The constitutional question is not whether
every witness used identical terminology to describe the
parties’ understanding. Rather, it is whether the jury
was apprised of the facts bearing on the witness’ potential bias. See Napue v. Illinois, supra, 360 U.S. 269; Gomez
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 189–90.
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
The habeas court reasonably concluded that Cohen’s
testimony accomplished exactly that by informing the
jury that Minto expected favorable consideration because
Mambrino had agreed to advise the sentencing judge of
Minto’s cooperation. Indeed, Mambrino’s decision to call
Cohen immediately after Minto underscores the absence
of any effort to mislead the jury. Rather than allowing
defense counsel to speculate about the nature of the parties’ understanding, Mambrino elicited testimony from
Cohen, the attorney who had reached the understanding,
and placed its essential terms before the jury. The habeas court therefore reasonably concluded that any potential
ambiguity in Minto’s testimony had been clarified.
Because the record reasonably supports the habeas
court’s determination that Minto’s testimony was not
false or substantially misleading and, alternatively,
that any potentially misleading testimony was corrected
through Cohen’s testimony, I cannot conclude that those
factual findings are clearly erroneous. The majority
reaches a different result only by reweighing the evidence and drawing its own factual inferences from the
trial record. Our standard of review does not permit
that approach. See, e.g., State v. Michael J., 274 Conn.
321, 347, 875 A.2d 510 (2005) (“our function is not to
decide factual issues de novo” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).2
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority that the
state violated Napue and that the petitioner’s conviction should be reversed on that basis.
II
The petitioner claims, however, that his conviction must nonetheless be reversed because the state
2
Because I conclude that there was no Napue violation, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that Mambrino bolstered false or substantially misleading testimony during her rebuttal closing argument. My disagreement on that point, however, should not be understood to suggest that I condone Mambrino’s characterization of the understanding between the state and Minto when she argued that Minto did not “have an interest in the outcome of this case.” The issue of whether these
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
suppressed material impeachment evidence concerning
Minto, a key state witness, in violation of Brady and
Giglio. Specifically, the petitioner argues that the state failed to disclose (1) two recorded interviews conducted
by the Manchester Police Department in which Minto
repeatedly sought to trade information about the murder
of Shamari Jenkins (victim) for favorable treatment in
his own robbery case, and (2) Mambrino’s decision not
to sign arrest warrants supported by probable cause
for Minto’s alleged involvement in armed robberies in
West Hartford and Windsor because it was not in the
state’s interest to do so based on Minto’s anticipated
testimony at the petitioner’s murder trial. The habeas
court concluded that the recorded interviews were not
material and that the state had no obligation to disclose the decisions not to prosecute Minto for those robberies. I respectfully disagree with the habeas court and, for the reasons set forth herein, agree with the petitioner that
his conviction must be reversed.
A
The majority opinion sets forth the relevant facts and
procedural history, as recounted by the Appellate Court
in the petitioner’s direct appeal. Accordingly, I do not
repeat them in full. Instead, I highlight only those facts that are pertinent to the petitioner’s claim. In 2013, the petitioner and Matthew Allen Hall-Davis, a close friend of his, conspired to kill the victim, who was pregnant with
the petitioner’s child and chose not to have an abortion. In April of that year, Hall-Davis approached a vehicle in which the victim and the petitioner were seated and fired a single shot from a Ruger Super Blackhawk .44 Magnum
revolver (.44 Ruger) through the rear windshield, fatally striking the victim.
Several days after the murder, Hall-Davis met with
Minto, a mutual friend of both Hall-Davis and the
petitioner, at Minto’s residence. During that meeting,
Hall-Davis confessed that he had killed the victim at the remarks, standing alone, were so egregious as to deprive the petitioner of due process is not before us.
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
petitioner’s behest in order to terminate her pregnancy.
Hall-Davis then asked Minto for money to flee the area,
but Minto told him that he had none to give him.
On May 11, 2013, Minto and Hall-Davis robbed a jewelry store in Manchester. During the robbery, Hall-Davis
brandished a .44 Ruger. After the petitioner viewed
surveillance footage of the robbery on the Internet, he
became upset because the footage revealed that HallDavis still possessed the same .44 Ruger used to kill the victim, even though he previously told the petitioner
that he had disposed of it. The petitioner then contacted Detective Reginald Early of the Hartford Police Department and reported that Hall-Davis and Minto had committed the Manchester robbery. Based largely on that
information, the Manchester Police Department obtained
arrest warrants for both men, and Minto surrendered to
the police on May 25, 2013. Shortly thereafter, Manchester police detectives conducted two interviews of
Minto. Both interviews were video recorded. During
the second interview, Minto, in response to questioning,
essentially admitted to participating in two additional
robberies in West Hartford and Windsor. Mambrino
did not authorize warrants charging Minto with those
robberies, expressing that it was not in the state’s interest to bring additional charges against him based on his
anticipated testimony at the petitioner’s criminal trial.
At the petitioner’s criminal trial, the state relied
heavily on Minto’s testimony to establish both the petitioner’s motive and his participation in the conspiracy
with Hall-Davis. Minto testified that Hall-Davis had told him that the petitioner “wanted to get rid of the baby . . . before [the victim] hit seven months” of pregnancy.
Minto further testified that Hall-Davis confessed that
he had killed the victim for the petitioner because the
petitioner “kept pleading with [him] to do it . . . .” Minto also linked Hall-Davis to the murder weapon, testified
that the same firearm had been used in both the homicide
and the Manchester robbery, stated that Hall-Davis and
the petitioner had repaired a malfunction in the firearm
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
before the murder, and testified that he had observed
Hall-Davis dispose of the shell casing from the fatal shot. Because no one other than Hall-Davis and the petitioner
witnessed the shooting, Minto’s testimony assumed
particular significance.
Following his conviction, the petitioner submitted a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Manchester Police Department seeking records relating to
Minto’s cooperation with law enforcement. Through that
request, he learned for the first time that the Manchester police had conducted two recorded interviews of Minto
that had never been disclosed to the defense. Although
the Manchester Police Department had destroyed the
recordings pursuant to a court order, the petitioner
ultimately obtained copies from the Windsor Police
Department.
The first interview reveals that, after initially denying any involvement in the Manchester robbery, Minto
quickly shifted to attempting to bargain with the detectives once they confronted him with incriminating evidence. He stated: “All right. All right. . . . Let’s get it done. . . . What is it going to take for me to get out of here? I got some information.” When the detectives
asked what information he possessed, Minto responded:
“Murder. . . . Shamari, the East Hartford girl [who]
was shot on Mather Street.” Throughout the interview,
Minto repeatedly sought leniency in exchange for his
cooperation, making statements such as: “Drop all this,
I tell you everything,” and “I want to make a deal. If you could help me, I’ll say whatever you want me to say.”
The interview further demonstrates that Minto’s willingness to cooperate fluctuated depending on whether the
detectives suggested that his cooperation might benefit
him. After Minto implicated both the petitioner and HallDavis in the victim’s murder, the detectives indicated
that they already knew much of the information he was
providing, at which point Minto resumed denying his
involvement in the Manchester robbery and declined to
provide additional information. Later, however, after
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
the detective suggested that helping the police recover
the firearm could benefit Minto, he immediately resumed
negotiating, asking the detectives to “lessen up some of
them charges” and repeatedly inquiring, “what are you
going to do for me?”
During the second interview, conducted later that
same day, Minto identified the .44 Ruger as the murder
weapon and sought a reduction in his bond in exchange
for assisting the police in recovering it. He began the
interview by stating: “You get the bond. I’m going to get you the weapon.” The detective responded that recovering the firearm would be “a huge thing” for Minto and
assured him that the prosecutor would be informed of
his cooperation, while cautioning that he could make
no promises because of the seriousness of the charges.
The second interview also revealed Minto’s involvement
in additional robberies in West Hartford and Windsor.
The detective informed Minto that those jurisdictions
possessed sufficient evidence to arrest him and advised
him not to deny his involvement because “the whole deal
falls through” if he was not truthful about the additional robberies. The detective further explained that
Manchester, West Hartford, and Windsor had formed
a joint task force to investigate those crimes. Following that discussion, Minto effectively admitted his participation by confirming details of both robberies in response
to the detective’s questions.
The petitioner subsequently submitted additional
FOIA requests to the West Hartford and Windsor Police
Departments. The records produced in response established that both departments had prepared arrest warrants to charge Minto in connection with separate armed
robberies and that Mambrino, the prosecutor who was
also assigned to the petitioner’s murder, declined to
authorize those warrants.
The petitioner thereafter filed an amended petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. In his operative amended petition, he alleged, among other claims, that the prosecuting
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
authority violated his rights to due process and a fair
trial by failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence relating to Minto. At the habeas trial, the petitioner
introduced the Manchester interview videos and evidence
that Mambrino had declined to issue arrest warrants for
the West Hartford and Windsor armed robberies. Mambrino testified that her declination of the West Hartford warrant had nothing to do with Minto’s cooperation. She
explained that both the West Hartford and Windsor warrants had been denied in the interest of judicial economy and not because Minto had agreed to cooperate with the
state. Following the trial, the habeas court denied the
petitioner’s petition.
With respect to the Manchester interview videos, the
habeas court concluded that they were not material evidence. The court stated that “[t]he fact that Minto had
pending cases in Manchester was known to the defense
and he was questioned about his motivation for testifying. [Although] it certainly would have been better for
[the petitioner’s trial counsel] to confront Minto about
his requests for consideration during that interview, the court cannot conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that those questions would have altered the jury’s verdict.” The habeas court likewise rejected the petitioner’s claim concerning the state’s failure to disclose its decision not to prosecute the West Hartford and Windsor robberies, explaining that “[t]here is no evidence that Minto
was aware that those charges were not being prosecuted
in exchange for his testimony, or even that [Mambrino]
did it for that purpose. The evidence establishe[d] that
[Mambrino] unilaterally decided not to prosecute those
charges because she believed there were already enough
charges to prosecute Minto on.” Following the denial of
the petition, the habeas court granted the petitioner’s
petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner
appealed to the Appellate Court.
After filing his principal brief in the Appellate Court,
the petitioner sought permission from the Appellate
Court to file a motion for augmentation and rectification
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
of the record with the habeas court. In support of that
motion, he represented that, during the pendency of
the appeal, he had discovered, through an additional
FOIA request, an email exchange between Mambrino
and a West Hartford police detective. According to the
petitioner, the email exchange established, contrary to
Mambrino’s sworn testimony at the habeas trial, that
she had declined to authorize arrest warrants charging
Minto with multiple armed robberies because it was
“not in [the state’s] best interest” to prosecute him in
light of his anticipated testimony at the petitioner’s
criminal trial. The Appellate Court granted that motion
and directed the appellate clerk “to forward the motion
for rectification and response to the habeas court for
consideration.”3
The habeas court held a hearing on the motion, at
which the parties agreed that the newly discovered evidence—specifically, the email from Mambrino to the
police detective—would be admitted as a full exhibit
and made a part of the record. Following the hearing,
the habeas court concluded that “the existence of the
email sent by [Mambrino] does not alter [the court’s]
application of the prevailing case law.” In explaining that conclusion, the court observed: “What the email proves
is that [Mambrino] declined to sign warrants charging
Minto with additional crimes because he was going to
testify against [the petitioner], and therefore it was not in the state’s best interest to arrest him. There is a fair argument to be made that this information constitutes
information favorable to the defense that must be disclosed.” The habeas court nevertheless concluded that
the newly discovered evidence did not affect its resolution of the petitioner’s claim because, in the operative
habeas petition, he did not allege “that the state [had]
failed to disclose exculpatory or impeachment information in the general sense . . . .” Rather, the court
3
On the same day that the petitioner moved for permission to file a motion for augmentation and rectification with the habeas court, he also filed a motion to remand for further habeas proceedings. The Appellate Court indicated that no action on that motion was necessary.
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
explained, the petitioner alleged the narrower claim that the state “failed to disclose that Minto [had] received
favorable [treatment] in exchange for his cooperation
. . . .” (Emphasis omitted.) Accordingly, because there
remained “simply no evidence of an agreement between
the state and Minto or that he was aware that the state
had chosen to decline warrants for his involvement in
other offenses,” the court determined that the newly
discovered email did not alter its analysis.
The petitioner thereafter filed in the Appellate Court
a motion seeking a remand to the habeas court for reconsideration of its ruling on the motion for rectification. On the same day, the petitioner filed what he characterized
as an “alternative motion,” renewing his request for rectification and seeking a remand to permit him to amend
his habeas petition. The Appellate Court denied both
motions but ordered the petitioner to file a supplemental brief addressing the issues raised in the two motions.
After briefing in the Appellate Court concluded, but
before oral argument was scheduled, the petitioner filed
a motion pursuant to Practice Book § 65-2 requesting
that this court transfer the appeal to itself. We granted that motion.
B
As a threshold matter, the petitioner claims that the
habeas court abused its discretion during the rectification proceedings by declining to consider whether the
state’s suppression of the newly discovered evidence—
namely, the email exchange between Mambrino and a
West Hartford detective—deprived him of a fair trial.
The petitioner contends that the habeas court improperly
construed his operative petition as alleging only that
the state had failed to disclose an agreement between
the state and Minto, pursuant to which Minto received
favorable treatment in exchange for his cooperation,
rather than as a broader claim that the state had violated its obligations under Brady by suppressing material
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
impeachment evidence generally. I agree with the petitioner.
“[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question
of law for the court . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Carpenter v. Commissioner of Correction, 274
Conn. 834, 842, 878 A.2d 1088 (2005). In interpreting
pleadings, Connecticut courts construe them “broadly
and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877 A.2d
761 (2005). “[W]e long have eschewed the notion that
pleadings should be read in a hypertechnical manner.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer
Asset Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 299, 94 A.3d
553 (2014). “Although essential allegations may not be
supplied by conjecture or remote implication . . . [a habeas petition] must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory [on] which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties. . . . As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the [habeas petition] is insufficient to allow recovery.” (Footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Carpenter v. Commissioner
of Correction, supra, 842.
In count two of the operative habeas petition, the petitioner alleged a constitutional due process violation
based on “the prosecuting authority’s failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence.” The petitioner specifically alleged that “[t]he prosecuting authority failed to disclose in a timely manner the following evidence to the petitioner or his counsel prior to the petitioner’s criminal trial . . . (B) [that Minto] received favorable dispositions in [State v. Minto, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T];
Manchester Police Department Case No. M201304348;
Windsor Police Department Case No. 2013-21679; and
West Hartford Police Department Case No. 1300023062,
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
Incident No. 083, in exchange for his cooperation with the police and/or prosecuting authority in [State v. Bryan,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T] . . . .” In his habeas petition, the petitioner further described each of these items as “exculpatory or otherwise favorable evidence that should have
been disclosed to the petitioner or his counsel prior to his criminal trial” and alleged that “there is a reasonable
probability that, had [they] been disclosed in adequate
time to be used by the defense during the petitioner’s
criminal trial, the result of the petitioner’s criminal
trial would have been different and more favorable to
the petitioner.”
I conclude that the habeas court construed the operative habeas petition too narrowly. In it, the petitioner
alleged a general claim under Brady and then specified
that the prosecuting authority failed to disclose that
Minto had “received favorable dispositions” in multiple
criminal matters “in exchange for his cooperation with
the police and/or the prosecuting authority . . . .” Properly understood, that allegation is not limited to the
existence of a formal or informal agreement between the
state and Minto. Rather, read broadly and realistically,
as our pleading jurisprudence requires, the petitioner
alleged that the state had failed to disclose favorable
impeachment evidence bearing on Minto’s motive to
cooperate with law enforcement and to testify against
the petitioner. Such an allegation falls squarely within
the general principles announced in Brady, and it provided the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction,
with fair notice that the petitioner claimed, in general
terms, a violation of the state’s disclosure obligations
under Brady. Having concluded that the petitioner’s
claim was sufficiently pleaded and that the record is
adequate for review, I turn to the merits of his Brady
claim, namely, whether the state’s suppression of (1)
its pretrial decision not to authorize arrest warrants,
despite having probable cause, for Minto’s alleged armed
robberies in Windsor and West Hartford, and (2) video
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
recordings of Minto’s interviews with the Manchester
Police Department constituted violations of Brady.4
C
Under Brady, the government bears a constitutional
duty to disclose favorable evidence to the accused when
such evidence “is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .” Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 87.
Favorable evidence includes not only evidence that tends
to exculpate the accused, but also evidence that is useful to impeach the credibility of a government witness.
See Giglio v. United States, supra, 405 U.S. 153–54;
see also Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
330 Conn. 15.
The rules established in Brady and its progeny derive
from the due process clauses of the United States constitution, and their core aim is to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial by ensuring the reliability of any criminal verdict against him. See United States v. Bagley, supra,
473 U.S. 675. In order to prove a Brady violation, “a
defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching, (2) the evidence was suppressed by
the state either wilfully or inadvertently, and (3) the
evidence was material to the case.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Vega v. Commissioner of Correction, 354
Conn. 437, 445, 354 A.3d 151 (2026); see also Strickler
4
There is no dispute that the petitioner never received or was aware of this information and, therefore, that the information was suppressed. Notably, on February 25, 2015, before his criminal trial, the petitioner filed a “Motion for Giglio Material,” in which he requested a host of information from the state. He asked for, among other things, “[a] complete list of all crimes committed by the informant(s) and witness(es) where there was no arrest or apprehension, including dates and places,” “[t]he specific consideration received or promised in exchange for the informant(s)’ and witness(es)’ services to the state, including but not limited to . . . [f]avorable disposition of any criminal or civil cases,” and “[d]isclosure of any and all files, confidential or otherwise, relating to the informant(s) and witness(es). These files may exist with respect to the [Federal Bureau of Investigation], the [Drug Enforcement Administration], state and local police agencies, prosecutor’s offices, or organized crime task force[s].”
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144
L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999). Evidence is material “only if there would be a reasonable probability of a different result
if the evidence had been disclosed.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354, 370,
102 A.3d 1 (2014); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 433–34, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995).
The petitioner first claims that “the habeas court erred
in finding that the state did not have an obligation to
disclose its decision not to prosecute [Minto]” in connection with the Windsor and West Hartford robberies.
He argues that the authorities on which it relied were
inapposite and that it incorrectly determined that the
arrest warrant information did not have to be disclosed
on the basis that there was no evidence Minto was aware
that the charges were not being prosecuted in exchange
for his testimony. In the petitioner’s view, the habeas
court’s “constrained application of Brady,” which would
“prohibit a finding that this information was favorable
. . . unless it establishe[d] an incentive promised to the witness, is wholly inconsistent with Brady’s requirement that the prosecutor disclose all favorable exculpatory impeachment information.” (Emphasis omitted.)
The respondent counters that the habeas court did not
err because the petitioner had failed to demonstrate
that the warrants were denied pursuant to “an agreement or understanding, whether formal or informal,
in exchange for Minto’s testimony at the petitioner’s
criminal trial.” I agree with the petitioner that, because Mambrino declined the warrants based on Minto’s anticipated cooperation, the state conferred a benefit on Minto that it was obligated to disclose to the defense.
The habeas court’s reasoning—and the respondent’s
argument on appeal—rests on the premise that favorable treatment or benefits afforded to a cooperating
witness do not qualify as impeachment evidence unless
a defendant first establishes the existence of an express or implied agreement between the witness and the prosecution. That premise misconstrues the nature of the
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
state’s disclosure obligations under Brady and Giglio.
The state’s duty to disclose impeachment evidence is
not limited to circumstances in which there is proof of
an informal or formal agreement. Rather, impeachment
evidence is “broadly defined” as “evidence having the
potential to alter the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a significant prosecution witness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adams v. Commissioner of Correction,
309 Conn. 359, 369–70, 71 A.3d 512 (2013).
Here, the evidence demonstrates that Mambrino
declined to authorize warrants supported by probable
cause for the arrest of Minto for two armed robberies
because pursuing those charges was not in the state’s
interest in light of his anticipated testimony against
the petitioner. By withholding authorization for the
warrants, and by failing to disclose that decision and the basis for it, the state deprived the petitioner of favorable impeachment evidence. This evidence would have
tended to impeach Minto’s credibility by demonstrating
a motive to testify favorably for the state by implicating the petitioner in the victim’s murder.5 See, e.g., Benn
v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1057 (9th Cir.) (explaining
that disclosure of benefits conferred on informant “could have allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that [the
informant] had a motive other than altruism for testifying on behalf of the [s]tate” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942, 123 S. Ct. 341, 154 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2002); United States v. Johnson, 26 F.3d
669, 682–83 (7th Cir.) (expressing concern over government’s failure to disclose, under Brady and Giglio, that
it had requested state prosecutor to delay filing robbery charges against witness until after she testified), cert. 5
A prosecutor undoubtedly retains broad discretion to decline to authorize an arrest warrant or to file a criminal information. When that discretion is exercised in good faith because the prosecutor concludes that probable cause is lacking, or because other legitimate, nontactical reasons exist, the decision may not constitute a conveyed benefit. When, however, as in the present case, the decision not to authorize charges is a trial tactic—i.e., to minimize impeachment evidence against a state’s witness—the state has given that witness a benefit that must be disclosed under Brady and Giglio.
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
denied, 513 U.S. 940, 115 S. Ct. 344, 130 L. Ed. 2d
300 (1994). Although the respondent contends that the
evidence lacked impeachment value because the habeas
court found no evidence that Minto knew that Mambrino
had declined to pursue those charges in exchange for his
testimony, evidence of the witness’ awareness of the
benefit is not a prerequisite for the evidence to possess impeachment value. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, supra,
314 Conn. 370 (explaining that impeachment evidence is
“broadly defined” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A benefit conferred on a cooperating witness, regardless
of specific evidence that he knew of that benefit, can bear on his credibility because it is objective evidence of the relationship between the witness and the state, evidence
the jury is entitled to weigh in assessing whether his
testimony was the product of an ordinary civic obligation or something else.6
Turning to the Manchester interview videos, I similarly conclude that they were favorable evidence that
should have been disclosed to the defense. During those
6
In concluding that that Mambrino’s decision not to authorize the warrants for the Windsor and West Hartford robberies was not information that needed to be disclosed to the defense, the habeas court relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003). Shabazz, however, is inapposite to the present case because it addressed a fundamentally different question. The issue in Shabazz was whether the petitioner had established the existence of an alleged, undisclosed promise of leniency between the prosecution and its cooperating witnesses. Id., 163–65. The Second Circuit held only that the prosecutor’s decision to afford favorable treatment to a witness, standing alone, does not permit an inference that the prosecutor had made a promise of leniency in exchange for the witness’ testimony. Id., 165. The court explained that “[t]he government is free to reward witnesses for their cooperation with favorable treatment in pending criminal cases without disclosing to the defendant its intention to do so, provided that it does not promise anything to the witnesses prior to their testimony.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. Here, however, the issue is not whether the state made an undisclosed promise of leniency. Rather, the question is whether Mambrino’s decision to confer a substantial pretrial benefit on an important cooperating witness—one made for the tactical purpose of minimizing the impeachment evidence available against that witness—constituted favorable impeachment evidence that the state was required to disclose to the defense.
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
interviews, Minto repeatedly attempted to negotiate with
law enforcement for favorable treatment in exchange for
providing information concerning the victim’s death.
Indeed, at one point, Minto stated: “I want to make a deal. If you could help me, I’ll say whatever you want me to
say.” That statement alone was powerful impeachment
evidence because it demonstrated Minto’s willingness
to tailor his account if doing so would secure a benefit
from the state. A reasonable juror could have viewed the
statement as reflecting not merely a generalized desire
for leniency but a willingness to subordinate the truth
to his own self-interest.
Additionally, during the interviews, law enforcement
informed Minto that he was a suspect in two additional
armed robberies and that the investigating agencies
possessed sufficient evidence to obtain arrest warrants
against him. Thus, at the very time Minto was attempting to negotiate with investigators, he knew that he
faced the realistic prospect of prosecution for multiple, additional serious felonies. That circumstance provided
a concrete and compelling reason for him to seek favorable treatment from the state and, in turn, to provide
information that would be perceived as valuable to the
prosecution. The videos of the interviews would have
permitted the defense to argue that Minto was motivated
by his own substantial criminal exposure and was actively attempting to leverage testimony against the petitioner
into favorable treatment for himself. Accordingly, I
conclude that the suppressed evidence was favorable to
the defense.
The remaining question is whether the suppressed
impeachment evidence was material. Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S.
433–34. Put differently, “[t]he question is not whether
the defendant would more likely than not have received
a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in
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its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown
when the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Adams v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 309 Conn. 370–71, quoting Kyles v.
Whitley, supra, 434.
In the present case, there can be little dispute that
Minto occupied a central role in the state’s case. First, through his testimony, the state introduced Hall-Davis’
admissions, which directly implicated the petitioner in
the victim’s death. Minto testified that Hall-Davis had
confessed to him that he killed the victim and did so
at the petitioner’s behest. Minto’s testimony painted
the petitioner as the architect of the murder, one who
requested Hall-Davis to carry it out.
Second, Minto linked the petitioner to the murder
weapon. Minto testified that, some time before the victim’s murder, he saw the petitioner and Hall-Davis with
a .44 Ruger and that the two went into another room of
the apartment they were in to repair it by installing a
spring. Minto testified that the .44 Ruger was the same
firearm Hall-Davis had used during their Manchester
robbery and to kill the victim. He indicated that, after
the robbery, Hall-Davis discarded a shell casing and told him it was from the bullet that killed the victim. Minto
further testified that he then drove to Henry Park in
Vernon, where he dropped off Hall-Davis so that HallDavis could hide the gun. Minto testified that, after
the robbery, he, Hall-Davis, and the petitioner met at
a restaurant, where the petitioner was upset with HallDavis because he had not discarded the firearm and said
that he wanted the gun back. Notably, without Minto,
law enforcement would not have recovered the firearm.
After his arrest by the police for the Manchester robbery, Minto led the police to the area of Henry Park where he
had dropped off Hall-Davis to hide the gun.
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
Third, Minto was instrumental in advancing the state’s
theory of motive. Minto testified that, in January 2013,
the petitioner told him the victim was pregnant with his
child and that he was trying to convince her to have an
abortion. Minto later testified that, when Hall-Davis
admitted killing the victim, Hall-Davis said the petitioner wanted her dead in order to terminate the pregnancy
before she reached seven months. Consequently, Minto’s
credibility was of particular importance to the jury’s
assessment of the state’s case.
To the extent there was any ambiguity as to Minto’s
importance to the state’s case, the degree to which Mambrino relied on Minto’s testimony in closing argument
clears it up. In closing, Mambrino identified the elements the state needed to prove and directed the jury to Minto’s testimony as evidence supporting each element. As to
the murder count, Mambrino argued, “[i]n count one,
the state has to prove two elements: the [petitioner]
intended to cause the death of another person, and the
[petitioner] caused the death of such person. Evidence
to support element one: Look at [Minto’s] testimony. He
told you that [the petitioner] was upset with [the victim] when she told him that she was going to have the baby. He did not want to have a baby with her.” As to causation,
Mambrino argued, “Hall-Davis also told [Minto] that
he’s the one [who] shot and killed [the victim] because
[the petitioner] pressured him to do it.” Mambrino again
emphasized Minto’s testimony in arguing that the petitioner was guilty as an accessory to murder, stating, the petitioner “is charged as an accessory in this case. And the judge is going to tell you that, in order for the state [to] prove that someone is an accessory . . . he either solicited or requested or commanded or importuned or intentionally aided [Hall-Davis] to kill [the victim]. [Hall-Davis] told [Minto] that the [petitioner] begged him to do it. . . . [The petitioner] then aided [Hall-Davis] by providing
him with his gun . . . and . . . when [Reginald Lewis, one
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
of the petitioner’s former coworkers] couldn’t fix that
gun, both Hall-Davis and [the petitioner] fixed that gun.”
The respondent contends that the interview recordings
and the pretrial decision not to authorize arrest warrants for Minto’s alleged armed robberies in Windsor
and West Hartford were not material evidence. With
respect to the decision not to authorize the arrest warrants, the respondent maintains that such evidence has
no impeachment value. As to the interview recordings,
the respondent contends that the jury already knew
that Minto had cooperated with law enforcement in the
Manchester robbery investigation, understood that he
expected to receive some benefit in exchange for that
cooperation, and heard extensive cross-examination on
those subjects. In essence, the respondent’s position is
that the withheld evidence was immaterial because it
was merely cumulative impeachment evidence or because
defense counsel had already impeached Minto’s credibility through other means.
Although Minto was subjected to cross-examination
and the jury was aware that Cohen had offered Minto’s
cooperation to the state in exchange for making Minto’s
cooperation known to the sentencing judge, the suppressed evidence was qualitatively different from the
impeachment evidence presented at the petitioner’s
criminal trial. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 582
U.S. 313, 327, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 198 L. Ed. 2d 443 (2017)
(explaining that impeachment evidence is not immaterial
merely because witness may have already been impeached
with other evidence). As previously discussed, during the recorded interviews, Minto repeatedly sought leniency
in exchange for his cooperation. Perhaps most damning
was when he said to detectives: “I want to make a deal. If you could help me, I’ll say whatever you want me to say.” (Emphasis added.) This statement was direct evidence,
in Minto’s own words, that he was willing to tailor his
account to secure a benefit from the state. Such evidence strikes at the heart of a witness’ credibility in a manner fundamentally different from generalized evidence of
bias or cooperation.
Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction
The withheld evidence also would have revealed that
Minto faced substantially greater criminal exposure than
the jury was led to believe. That information, together
with the fact that law enforcement had made the tactical
decision not to authorize warrants because of Minto’s
cooperation in the petitioner’s case, would have furnished defense counsel with further ammunition to argue that
Minto’s testimony was motivated by self-interest rather
than truthfulness.
The respondent nonetheless argues that there is not a
reasonable probability that a different result would have occurred because the state’s case against the petitioner
was strong. The materiality inquiry under Brady, however, “is not a sufficiency of [the] evidence test.” Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. 434. The relevant question is
not whether the remaining evidence, viewed in isolation,
would have been sufficient to sustain the conviction but
whether the suppressed evidence, considered collectively, “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id., 435. On the facts of this case, and given Minto’s
central role in the prosecution, I conclude that it could. The withheld evidence would have provided the defense
with a substantially stronger basis on which to challenge the credibility of Minto, the state’s principal witness,
whose testimony was central to the state’s theory that
the petitioner had orchestrated the murder. In sum, I am
persuaded that the cumulative effect of the suppressed
impeachment evidence sufficiently undermines confidence in the verdict.
Because I would reverse the judgment of the habeas
court and remand the case with direction to grant the
habeas petition, to vacate the petitioner’s underlying
conviction, and to order a new trial on the basis of the
foregoing Brady violations, I concur in the judgment.